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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to illuminate the nature of the British national interest in Southeast
Asia (SEA), as defined and pursued by the Attlee government, 1945-1951. The analysis
is undertaken by examining the relationship between government and business in the
region, identifying areas of consensus and conflict. It is established that the British
government intended to do its utmost to aid British firms in SEA to re-establish their
businesses after the disruption to production and trade caused by the war, as a means of
protecting its own subjects and assets, and also of furthering British political and
commercial interests in the region. However, this was at a time when the need to divert
resources to reconstruct and support the domestic British economy made the task of
assisting business overseas problematic, to the extent that government's ability to
provide material support was limited. Whilst such logistical difficulties were real, it can
also be said that differences over the level of assistance to business were heightened by
ideological division between businessmen, on the one hand, and government officials,
on the other.
These themes are explored through an analysis of the interactions of British
enterprises which had business interests in Siam (Thailand), Indonesia and Malaya, with
the British government and the local British authorities in these countries. This
examination takes place against the background of a readjustment in Britain's relations
with these countries in the aftermath of the war. Given the urgency of reconstruction at
home, the Attlee government was lessening Britain's overseas commitments. In SEA
the British government firmly believed economic and social betterment to be pivotal to
the task of quickly establishing stability and also, later on, in protecting the region from
Communist expansionism. Therefore US cooperation was sought as a source of
necessary resources, but at the same time the British were bound to protect British-
based business interests against US competition, not least because of their valuable
impact on the value of Sterling. The Attlee administrations' endeavour to obtain US
cooperation however often proved to be ineffective because of the US government's
reluctance to be involved in this particular part of Asia.
In practice, government assistance to and protection of business were not always
possible in the aftermath of the war and firms needed to transform themselves to adapt
to new times. Despite this, the two worked closely together and the British government
often showed a great willingness to provide moral and practical support for British
enterprises. In retrospect, this cooperation only worked where the demands of business
did not conflict with the interests and policy of government, and under such
circumstances, business was seldom satisfied. Those firms that did survive achieved this
primarily by implementing their own strategies and some accomplished a great deal
throughout the 1950s and beyond.
A natural harmony? Government, Business and British
Interests in Southeast Asia, 1945-1951.
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Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the extent to which the national interest of
Britain, as pursued by the Attlee government, coincided with the interests of British
businesses in SEA. The general understanding of 'a natural harmony of interests' 1
between government and business is questioned through an examination of the
interactions between them and the way in which one tried to influence the other. I will
argue that there was an objective basis for the mutuality of interest based upon the
importance of British firms overseas to Britain's domestic economy. This was
especially the case with regard to British companies in the Malayan extractive
industries, who were the main dollar earners and whose profits were remitted back to
Britain. It was also the case that continued strong presence of British investments in the
region was greatly valued by the government, as a representation of British political
power and influence.
The re-establishment of the productive capacity of British firms in SEA takes
place against the background of a readjustment in Britain's relations with these
countries in the aftermath of the war, in the face of a heightened background of tension
in the region. As Indian independence loomed ever larger, SEA was becoming central to
safeguarding British interests in Asia as a whole. The importance of SEA was further
highlighted, in the context of the deepening Cold War, by Communist advance in the
continent.
Due to the lack of resources in Britain to sufficiently support and reconstruct
British business interests in SEA, there were differences over the level of assistance to
I This expression was used by Gilpin to describe the relationship between British as well as American
political and business leadership, in R. Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation; the
Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (London, Basingstoke, 1975), p. 143. He also
emphasises the mutual help provided by each for the other, for instance the emergence of US power was
the necessary condition for the expansion of US multinationals at the same time contributing to the
international position of the USA: pp. 5-6, 137, 143.
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business and these were heightened by ideological division between businessmen, on
the one hand, and government officials, on the other.
These themes are explored through an analysis of the interactions of British
enterprises which had business interests in Siam, Indonesia and Malaya, with the British
government, and their representatives and the local British authorities in these countries.
The analysis is undertaken by examining the relationship between government and
business, identifying areas of consensus and conflict. The British government desired to
re-establish its pre-war British business interests in the region, which had been severely
damaged during the war, as a means of protecting its own subjects and assets, and also
of furthering British political and commercial interests.
All of the themes of this thesis and the policy pre-occupations of the British
government can be illustrated by an examination of the Malayan case. Malaya was a
key earner of US dollars, and the Attlee government sought to maintain a strong role for
Britain in Malaya. The British government re-drafted the new constitution in order to
ensure the continuation of such a role, and in the process hoped to play a role in
safeguarding British political and economic interests. The means by which the
constitution would be expected to assist in such objective would be through the
preparation of the conditions for a peaceful and agreeable transfer of political power in
the form of future self-government. The speed of such a transition would later form the
basis for dissatisfaction and concern on the part of British business interests. Despite the
objective basis for mutual interest, it was nevertheless the case that at certain historical
moments in the post-war period this relationship became conffictual and antagonistic.
None more so is this shown than in the debates and arguments around the need for
security for British businesses during the Malayan Emergency.
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The rise of new situations in the aftermath of the war brought into the open
conflicts that had previously lain dormant between the interest of British business and of
the British political elite. My analysis will show that it became clear that the
maintenance of the existing social relations in the peripheral areas of British businesses'
operation was no longer compatible with the political objectives now predominant
inside the metropolis, where decision making was made 'in reaction to events in SEA
and events outside that had an impact on it' . 2 In these circumstances businesses'
conservative concept of pursuing interests under the protection of the metropolitan and
colonial governments did not keep up with the changes that were taking place in the
ideas of those wielding political authority.
The liberal attitude that prevailed among the officials in Malaya was often
criticised by business as a hindrance to their business activities. Without understanding
the nature of the liberalism among the officials, the actions and decisions taken in
Malaya during the Attlee period cannot be fully explained. In short business' concern
with 'profitability' was overlooked in favour of the general theme of British progressive
colonialism. Some in the metropolitan government came to believe that the
progressivism in their colonialism was, however, retarded by the old-fashioned
liberalism among the officials in the Malayan administration. When the Secretary of
State for War, John Strachey, visited Malaya in June 1950, he was shocked by the 'very
old-fashioned "laissez faire" sort' of liberalism widespread among the British officials
in the periphery (including Singapore) which, he believed, prevented them from taking
positive and more vigorous steps towards the political, democratic, and economic
development of Malaya, and the firm measures necessary to break the Communist
insurgency, a strategy that had been already elaborated at the metropolitan level. He
2 N. Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (Cambridge, 1998), p.
266.
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found that the local officials — especially the middle rank officials and administrators
— paid only lip service to the aims of the metropole's strategy, which its essence was
the promotion of the development of prosperity in Malaya, shared in by the mass of the
population, fostering cooperation from Malays and the Chinese, and to grant
independence within the Commonwealth.
While one has to be cautious about accepting the validity of Strachey's stance, it
is worth, at this point, to reflect upon the nature of the 'liberalism' that Strachey himself
adhered to and therefore can be seen as an indicator of the ideological basis which
enabled the liberal minded Fabian socialists, who led the British government at that
time, to play a central role in seeking to maintain Britain's status as a world power.
Strachey identifies classical laissez faire liberalism as the ideology underpinning
unwillingness of the Malayan colonial government to oversee state intervention both in
the socio-economic arena and in the arena of political conflict. If Strachey's stance is to
be taken as being exemplary of the stance taken by the authority in the metropolis then
we can see that advocacy of the need for state intervention was not restricted to state
intervention into the economy. It also extended to recognition of the need for coercive
state intervention into political developments, in order to safeguard the liberal capitalist
model of political and economic operation. This was especially the case in response to
the extreme situation of Emergency during 1950.
The metropolitan government recognised that the perpetuation of an economic
and political system based upon plurality, in terms of competition in the political and
economic spheres, was possible only if the state was prepared to intervene decisively in
every sphere. Such a stance was imperative if British interests were to be safeguarded in
Malaya. The old style liberals in the Malayan government still clung to the outdated
liberalism, the protagonists of which believed that if the private sector were allowed to
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get on unimpeded then entrepreneurial dynamism would ensure that the necessary levels
of wealth were created and political crises would sort themselves out. Meanwhile the
British entrepreneurs grew increasingly frustrated. They remained liberal in their
economic views, but were quite illiberal in their political views. As such we might
identify a three-way division: the governmental authorities in London accepted the need
for bold state intervention into both the economy and politics in Malaya; the
governmental authorities in Kuala Lumpur felt that large-scale state intervention into
both economic and political matters ill-advised; meanwhile British businessmen
accepted the need, and indeed strongly advocated, strong, coercive state intervention
into political matters, while simultaneously seeking to safeguard the maintenance of
their own autonomy, in terms of their combative defence of managerial prerogatives, in
the economic field. 3 As we will see in Chapters 3 to 5, these divisions would impede
coherent and decisive actions in dealing with post-war crises in Malaya.
The colonial relationship of Malaya with Britain provides a certain fixed
preconception to the relationship between the British political authorities and British
firms in Malaya (that of the presence of direct political intervention from Westminster,
resulting in a relatively privileged position for firms in that location). In order to gain
insight into the nature of government/business relations in the region more generally, it
is necessary to look at their interactions in other countries which shared similar
historical experiences such as the war, Japanese occupation and their relations with
European powers, but at the same time which did not have the colonial ties with Britain.
Siam and Indonesia are chosen as comparative examples. The rise of the nationalist
3 PRO CAB 211681, MAL C(50)21 memorandum by John Strachey for Cabinet Malaya Committee, 17
June 1950; CAB 128 17 CM 37(50)1 Cabinet conclusions, 19 June 1950; PREM 8 1406 Part II minute by
John Strachey, to Attlee, 11 Dec. 1950; A.J. Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire,
Malaya, Part I: The Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948 (London, 1995), pp. lxvii-lxix. Also see
M.R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948 (London, New
York, Kuala Lumpur, 1970), pp. 150, 158, 233.
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movement in Indonesia and its struggle for her independence brought with it the
unleashing of social and political forces that challenged the status quo with renewed
intensity. Differently from what might have been expected, British enterprises and the
British political authorities showed unusual unity in Indonesia and also in Siam where
British policy objectives in the region — particularly protection of British subjects and
expansion of their interests — were broadly synchronised with British business
interests.
Chapters 1 and 2 largely set a scene already well established in the secondary
literature, their purpose being to establish the background for the following chapters.
The first two chapters clarify the Labour government's assessment of the value and
significance of SEA for Britain's national interest. British desire to remain as an
influential power in SEA is examined through the studies undertaken on the process of
British regional policy-making and regional cooperation. An examination of the culture
of and relations between, government and British business in Malaya, as well as
throughout SEA, lays the basic structure for the analysis of the interactions between
these actors.
Chapter 3 analyses the economic aspects of the Japanese occupation of Malaya
and the rehabilitation work that took place in the aftermath of the war. The focus is on
the government's efforts to provide basic subsistence and goods, and to establish a
social presence. The poor economic results of the Malayan rehabilitation programme
and its negative consequences — the labour unrest — are re-examined. Chapter 4
focuses on reconstruction work undertaken by businesses themselves, often in the
absence of large scale government assistance. The major issues dealt with here are the
early resumption of business interests in the form of the recommencement of
production, the loss of personnel, and the divisions over wartime planning and the
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restructuring of Malaya's industries between government and business. The debates on
several issues related to the reconstruction of the dollar-earning Malayan extractive
industries are closely examined in order that they might provide an insight into the
connection between the difficulties facing the reconstruction and the metropolitan
government's economic troubles. This examination has highlighted the fact that while
private business interests were not at all neglected by the British government, there were
substantial differences, leading to an atmosphere characterised by intransigence in their
relations, with regard to war compensation, financial aid for rehabilitation work and
taxation.
Chapter 5 examines business relations with government around two distinct, but
not entirely separate, issues: the contribution of Malayan extractive industries to closing
the UK dollar gap and the counter-insurgency operations. It is often assumed that
British businesses in Malaya received government backing because of their contribution
to the British and colonial governments, and as a result of Malaya's colonial status. The
case studies of Siam and Indonesia in Chapter 6 provide an opportunity to assess
business relations with government outside the colonial context. Chapter 6 will also
present an analysis of the degree to which the policies of, and political developments in
the host countries, limited the scope of action by foreign interests. The analysis of the
interactions between government and business aims at the development of an
understanding of the role of each sectoral actor.
Chapter 7 examines the way in which the firms reacted to their uncertain
business prospects, in circumstances where assistance from the government at home and
from the local British authorities was scant and uncertain. In such circumstances, it
became clear that if they were to survive, they had to adapt, and flexibility was the
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cardinal virtue. Finally, a concluding chapter analyses the significance of the findings of
this thesis.
Primary Sources
Official files in the Public Record Office are the main sources of this work. These
include Foreign Office files, especially in the series FO 371, concerned with the Far
East. Colonial Office files include much valuable correspondence with firms in SEA.
Treasury and Board of Trade files are used for the discussion of dollar deficit and
colonial resource development (in conjunction with D.J. Morgan's series The Official
History of Colonial Development). 4 Also consulted were PREM (Prime Ministerial
files) and CAB (Cabinet files) 128 and 129. A.J. Stockwell's series British Documents
on the End of Empire have a substantial selection of documents on the Malayan issues.5
Hansard is used with these files to observe the policy debate at the Parliamentary level
as well as the ministerial level. The Modern Records Centre at the University of
Warwick holds the files of the Federation of British Industries (FBI) and Trades Union
Congress (TUC), including various country reports. These files are concerned with
issues such as Britain's export-drive, US competition, colonial resource development,
agency houses' extensive interests in the extractive industries, and Asian nationalism
and the promotion of indigenous business interests. The issues of the Emergency in
Malaya and the political situation in Indonesia immediately after independence are also
4 D.J. Morgan, 'The Origins of British Aid Policy 1924-1945', Official History of Colonial Development,
Vol. 1 (London, 1980); D.J. Morgan, Developing British Colonial Resources 1945-1951, The Official
History of Colonial Development, Vol. 2 (London, 1980); D.J. Morgan, Changes in British Aid Policy
1951-1970, The Official History of Colonial Development, Vol. 4 (London, 1980); D.J. Morgan,
Guidance Towards Self-Government in British Colonies 1941-1971, The Official History of Colonial
Development, Vol. 5 (London, 1980).
5 A.J. Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, Malaya, Part I: The Malayan Union
Experiment, 1942-1948 (London, 1995); A.J. Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire,
Malaya, Part II: Communist Insurrection, 1948-1953 (London, 1995); A.J. Stockwell (ed.), British
Documents on the End of Empire, Malaya, Part III: The Alliance Route to Independence, 1953-1957
(London, 1995).
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covered by this selection of files. The Guildhall Library in the City of London has the
files of the Overseas Committee of the London Chamber of Commerce and the
Federation of Chambers of Commerce of the British Empire, which concentrate on
foreign competition, the UK dollar shortage and Imperial preference. Amongst these,
the London Export Merchants' Minute Books have details of trade with the Southeast
Asian countries. Finally, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) is an excellent
source for American perspectives on Asian matters.
Secondary Literature
I will divide the major sources of secondary material according to subject and literary
genre. Firstly, biographies provided a very useful insight into the Labour governments
and their limits and strengths. Among the most important are Attlee's autobiography
and biographies by A. Bullock, K. Harris, and F. Williams. 6 Various works were also
consulted addressing Britain's relations with the USA, Soviet Union and the European
countries, particularly France.' Secondly, there are several valuable books on Southeast
Asian history and Britain's historical and colonial relations with Southeast Asian
countries: R. Aldrich, I. Brown, T.N. Haper, P.H. Kratoska, A. McCoy, G. McT Kahin,
J. Pluvier, A. Short, M.R. Stenson, J.A. Stowe, R. Stubbs, and N. Tarling's The
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia are among the most significant. 8 C.J. Christie
6 C.R. Attlee, As It Happened (Melbourne, London, and Toronto, 1954); A. Bullock, Ernest Bevin:
Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1985); K. Harris, Attlee (London, 1982); F. Williams, A Prime
Minister Remembers: The War and Post-war Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Earl Attlee (London, Melbourne,
and Toronto, 1961).
7 W. Knight, 'Labourite Britain: America's "Sure Friend"? The Anglo-Soviet Treaty Issue, 1947',
Diplomatic History, vol. 7, no. 4, Fall 1983, pp. 267-82; S. Greenwood, `Bevin, The Ruhr and the
Division of Germany: August 1945-December 1946', The Historical Journal, vol. 29, no. 1, 1986, pp.
203-212; S. Greenwood, 'Ernest Bevin, France and 'Western Union': August 1945-February 1946',
European History Quarterly, 14, 1984, pp. 319-337; M. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's
Foreign Policy (Stanford, 1969); A. Gorst, 'Facing Facts? The Labour Government and Defence Policy
1945-50', in N. Tiratsoo (ed.), The Attlee Years (London, New York, 1991), pp. 190-209.
8 R.I. Aldrich, The Key to the South: Britain, the United States, and Thailand during the Approach of the
Pacific War, 1929-1942 (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford, Singapore, New York, 1993); I. Brown, Economic
Change in South-East Asia (Kuala Lumpur, 1997); T.N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of
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deals with the nationalist awareness among the minorities in the region. Though it was
not cited explicitly in this thesis, Christie's book provides an insight into the situation
that prevailed behind the scenes in the mainstream nationalist movements and the de
facto role played by the western powers in the process of establishing the basis for the
independence of the colonies. 9 The books by P. Dennis, F.S.V. Donnison, W.R. Louis
and T. Remme are used to illustrate the factors that underlay Britain's regional policy
and her ambitions in post-war SEA. 1° The book by J.J. Puthucheary and articles by M.
Caldwell and M. Rudner provide an insight into Malaya under British colonial rule."
Thirdly there are books that deal exclusively with British business interests in Malaya;
mainly the agency houses and their extensive interests in the extractive industries.
Puthucheary thoroughly examines the structure of the Malayan economy which was
Malaya (Cambridge, 1999); P.H. Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic
History (St Leonards, 1998); A. McCoy (ed.), Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation (New Heaven,
1980); G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, 1952); J. Pluvier, South-East
Asia from Colonialism to Independence (Kuala Lumpur, London, New York, Melbourne, 1974); A.
Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 (London, 1975); M.R. Stenson, Industrial
Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948 (London, New York, Kuala Lumpur,
1970); J.A. Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue (London, 1991); R. Stubbs, Hearts and
Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 (Singapore, Oxford, New York, 1989);
N. Tarling, The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. three: From c. 1800 to the 1930s (Cambridge,
1999); N. Tarlimg, The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. four: From World War II to the present
(Cambridge, 1999).
9 C.J. Christie, A Modern History of Southeast Asia: decolonization, nationalism and separatism
(London, New York, 1996).
10 P. Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-46
(Manchester, 1987); F.S.V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East 1943-46 (London,
1956); Wm.R. Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire
1941-1945 (New York, 1978); T. Remme, Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1945-49
(London, New York, 1995).
11 J.J. Puthucheary, Ownership and Control in the Malayan Economy; a study of the structure of
ownership and control and its effects on the development of secondary industries and economic growth in
Malaya and Singapore (Singapore, 1960); M. Caldwell, 'From "Emergency" to "Independence", 1948-
57', in M. Amin and M. Caldwell (eds.), Malaya: The Making of A Neo-Colony (Nottingham, 1977), pp.
217-249. M. Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya, 1945-48', Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies, vol. 1, ISS. 1, 1970, pp. 23-36; M. Rudner, 'The Draft Development Plan of the Federation of
Malaya 1950-1955', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 3, 1972, pp. 63-96; M. Rudner, 'A Reply to
P.T. Bauer's Comment on Post-War Malayan Rubber Policy', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, ISS.
Iv, 1973, pp. 300-304; M. Rudner, 'Financial Policies in Post-war Malaya: The Fiscal and Monetary
Measures of Liberation and Reconstruction', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.
III, no. 3, May 1975, pp. 323-348; M. Rudner, 'Malayan Rubber Policy: Development and Anti-
Development during the 1950s', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 7, 1976, pp. 235-259; M. Rudner,
'Development Policies and Patterns of Agrarian Dominance in the Malaysian Rubber Export Economy',
Modern Asian Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, 1981, pp. 83-105.
10
largely controlled by foreign business interests, mainly the British agency houses. Since
this book covers practically every aspect of the Malayan economy in relation to foreign
control, it is an invaluable source of figures that facilitate a comparison between foreign
and indigenous business interests in each sector of economic life. R.P.T. Davenport-
Hines and G. Jones comprehensively examine British business interests in Asia since
1860. 12
 The book deals with British foreign investments, covering the forms taken by
British enterprise, such as multinationals, agency houses, trading companies and banks.
It examines their performance, and looks at the respective roles of the British business
community and the British government, and also examines the factors that underlay the
survival of British business since 1945. J.H. Drabble and P.J. Drake write more
exclusively about the history of the British agency houses in Malaya, and pay particular
attention to the ability of firms to adapt to changing circumstances. 13 These general
comprehensive studies are backed by studies on specific British multinationals,
managing agencies and trading companies and banks such as Dunlop, Burmah Oil,
Unilever, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, Harrisons & Crosfield and the Borneo
Company." With regard to the interactions between the British and colonial
governments and British private firms with business interests in Malaya, Nicholas
12 R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, and G. Jones (eds.), British Business in Asia Since 1860 (Cambridge, 1989).
13 J.H. Drabble, and P.J. Drake, 'The British Agency Houses in Malaysia: Survival in a Changing World',
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12, 1981, pp. 297-328.
14 F.H.H. King, Volume IV of the History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation: The
Hongkong Bank in the Period of Development and Nationalism, 1941-1984 From Regional Bank to
Multinational Group (Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney, 1991); J. McMillan, The
Dunlop Story: the Life, Death and Re-birth of a Multi-national (London, 1989); G. Jones, 'The Growth
and Performance of British Multinational Firms before 1939: The Case of Dunlop', Economic History
Review, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 35-53; H. Longhurst, The Borneo Story: the History of the First 100 Years of
Trading in the Far East (London, 1956); D.K. Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas; The Anatomy of a
Multinational 1895-1965 (London, Stanford, 1978); T.A.B. Corley, 'Strategic Factors in the Growth of a
Multinational Enterprise ; The Burmah Oil Company, 1886-1928', in M. Casson (ed.), The Growth of
International Business (London, 1983), pp. 214-235; T.A.B. Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil
Company 1886-1924 (London, 1983), vol. 1; P. Pugh, Great Enterprise: A History of Harrisons &
Crosfield (London, 1990).
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White has produced work using unpublished materials in Malaysia and Singapore.15
A. Stockwell has published numerous detailed studies on the origins of the Emergency,
decolonisation, and planning for the Malayan Union scheme.16
The name 'Siam' became 'Thailand' firstly in June 1939 and then again in 1949.
The term 'Siam' is used throughout the thesis. 'The Netherlands East Indies' is used
most of the time, instead of 'Indonesia' because the issues referred to regarding this
country mainly took place in the colonial period. However, the term 'Indonesia' is often
used, irrespective of its colonial status when addressing issues where its political status
is irrelevant to the context. 'Indonesia' is consistently used when referring to matters
that took place after independence.
15 N.J. White, Business, Government and the End of Empire: Malaya 1942-1957 (Oxford, 1996); N.J.
White, 'Government and Business in the Era of Decolonization: Malaya 1942-57', PhD thesis,
Department of History, University of London, 1993; N.J. White, 'Government and Business Divided:
Malaya, 1945-57', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1994, pp. 251-
274; N.J. White, 'Capitalism and Counter-Insurgency? Business and Government in the Malayan
Emergency, 1948-1957', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32, Part. 1, 1998, pp. 149-177. He seeks to fill the
historiographical gap by reassessing official and commercial interaction in politically disturbed Malaya.
His point being that the maintenance of British business in Malaya was important to both central and
Federation governments, nevertheless 'it was a thorny path ... Government and business never worked
"hand-in-glove" during the emergency years.' (in White, 'Capitalism and Counter-Insurgency', p. 176).
16 A.J. Stockwell, 'A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya? The
Origins of the Malayan Emergency', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 21, no. 3,
1993, pp. 66-88; A.J. Stockwell, 'Insurgency and Decolonisation during the Malayan Emergency',
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 25, no. 1, 1987, pp. 71-81; A.J. Stockwell,
'British Imperial Policy and Decolonization in Malaya, 1942-52', The Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, vol. 13, no. 1, Oct. 1984, pp. 68-87; A.J. Stockwell, 'Colonial Planning during
World War II: The Case of Malaya', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 3, 1974, pp.
333-351. A.J. Stockwell has also published several books in Malayan studies: A.J. Stockwell, and R.B.,
Smith, British Policy and the Transfer of Power in Asia: Documentary Perspectives (London, 1985); A.J.
Stockwell and A.N. Porter (eds.), British Imperial Policy and Decolonization, 1938-64, vol. 1: 1938-51
(Basingstoke, 1987); A.J. Stockwell, and A.N. Porter (eds.), British Imperial Policy and Decolonization,
1938-64, vol. 2: 1951-64 (Basingstoke, 1989).
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Chapter 1 The British Government's Assessment of the Value and
Significance of Southeast Asia l for the National Interest
The impact in the Second World War in the European and the Asian theatres brought
devastation to Britain and her colonial possessions in Asia. Reconstruction in the
aftermath of physical destruction and social and economic disaster in Britain was the
core of the newly elected Labour government's post-war policy at home. Alongside
domestic policy which brought nationalisation and the introduction of a welfare state, in
the international arena British interests in SEA were clarified, and her colonial relations
restructured on the basis of the metropolitan government's wartime planning. In these
circumstances, the government's assessment of the value and significance of SEA
naturally reflected its perception of Britain's own interest: political, strategic and
economic. The main conjunctural significance of SEA to British interests was with
respect to Britain's dollar deficit. Malaya, a British colony in SEA, was the biggest dollar
earner among the colonies in the pre-war period, and would continue to serve this role in
the post-war period. Britain also had substantial business interests and capital
investments in the region. SEA as a whole was not only an alternative market, but it was
also a non-dollar source of raw materials. Moreover, the Pacific War had proved that
once the security of SEA was at stake, then so was that of India and the Dominions in
the Pacific, and thus the British Empire itself. Given these circumstances keeping the
region safe and stable in the post-war period sat well with British interests and the
Labour government's aim of maintaining Britain's role as a power.
I Southeast Asia is' ... usually understood to comprise Siam (later Thailand), Indochina, Malaya and
the Netherlands East Indies. For certain purposes, however, Burma in the west and Hong Kong in the
east are also included within the area': PRO FO 63549 F2616/2616/61 British Policy in South East Asia,
South East Asia Department, 24, Jan. 1947. A paper published by the US State Department defined
Southeast Asia to include Indochina, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, Siam and the Philippines: PRO FO 371
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Britain wished to maintain her pre-war economic and political influence in the
region, but her success was conditioned by the fact that post-war SEA was now more
diverse. The views of the South Asian countries would need to be considered and those
of the emerging elites and colonists of the Southeast Asian countries themselves could
not be ignored. In addition, the Soviet Union was growing as an alternative power to the
USA in the Far East. Within this context the British worked diligently to press the Dutch
and the French to make plans to concede self-government to the Netherlands East Indies
(NET) and French Indochina, as a means by which stability could be brought to a region
beset by the war and the nationalist struggle against the European colonialism. The
British argued that such measures would ultimately contribute to world peace. Given the
urgency of the reconstruction of her own domestic economy Britain expected the USA
to take up some of her extensive responsibilities overseas. The US Administration,
however, was by no means willing to intervene in this politically sensitive part of Asia.
Moreover, the British had very little faith in the Americans' ability to become the major
power in the region. The USA had far fewer historical links than Britain with most
countries in SEA. The region had, after all, been staked out for decades, if not centuries,
as British, French and Dutch territory before the USA had belatedly stumbled into it,
only half a century before, following the Spanish-American War. As a result of this
imbalance of historical interests in SEA between these two Western powers, their post-
war strategies on the region were subsequently beset by long-running conflicts.
This chapter sets out the British government's assessment of the value and
significance of SEA to the national interest and the objectives of the Attlee government's
Southeast Asian policy. The assessment is divided into three different categories:
76025 F17668/10345/61G US Policy towards Southeast Asia: copy of a US Planning Staff Paper, 29
Mar. 1949.
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strategic, political and economic. This division appears in numerous places, whether to
explain the significance of the region to the British national interest or simply to clarify
British interests in the region. 2 There may be confusion, however, over the definition of,
and difference between, strategic and political interests. British strategic interests are
concerned with the value of a territory or a resource to the British Empire in a
hypothetical hostile situation. Political interests, though not entirely detached from the
strategic interests, deal rather more with the mundane pattern of British relations with
the places concerned. The latter part of this chapter reviews British endeavours to obtain
the cooperation of other powers in SEA as a means to keep the region stable and secure.
1.1 British Interests in Southeast Asia in relation to Britain's National Interest
Prior to the Pacific War, SEA was 'a comparatively unimportant and little known area',
but the war demonstrated the region's strategic, political and economic significance.' As
India would be granted independence in the foreseeable future, SEA, particularly Malaya
(including Singapore), acquired increasing significance in British thinking: 4 Britain was
the leading power in SEA because of her long historical, commercial, and political links
with the countries in the region. British interests in SEA, which were closely related to
its own national interests, fell into three different categories: first of all, political interests,
tempered by a feeling of responsibility as a colonial power in the region, secondly
strategic interests, and thirdly commercial interests. Britain's colonial relations with her
Dependencies in SEA had a profound impact on her interests in the whole region.
222 For instance, PRO FO 371 54052, and 63549; CAB 21 1954; T. Remme, Britain and Regional
Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1945-49 (London, New York, 1995), pp 211 ff.
3 PRO CAB 21 1954 Appointment of Special Commissioner in SE Asia: outward telegram no 656 from
the Cabinet Office to Admiral Louis Mountbatten, 13 Feb. 1946.
4 Renune, op.cit., p. 11. The Acts of 1919 and 1935 had already made substantial transfers of power to
India. In 1940 the British government accepted the principle that Indians should themselves frame a
new constitution for fully autonomous India.
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Although SEA was not the first priority of British foreign policy (the FO specified SEA
as third after Europe and the Middle East), its political and strategic significance came to
be more fully recognised (as Communism took a greater hold in Southeast Asian
countries) during the late 1940s. SEA was an important source of raw materials and a
market for British manufactured goods. British investment in the Southeast Asian
countries had taken place from the early years of the colonial period, although in
comparison with India and China, they were relatively minor trading partners. However,
thanks to its political relations with Britain, Malaya attracted a great amount of
investment from both British private enterprises and the colonial government; in
particular Penang, Malacca, and Singapore were purpose built as entrepots to foment the
increasing trade between West and East. Outside of colonial relations, Siam and
Indonesia were significant to Britain as foci of cultural influence and also as trading
partners.'
1.1.1 Strategic Significance
Building a naval base in Singapore had been proposed as early as 1919, as a part of
Britain's naval strategy. Its purpose was to secure the principal routes of imperial
communication and provide a base out of which capital warships could operate. Progress
in the construction of the base went slowly through different phases owing to the
economic collapse in Britain during the late 1920s and also to the moves toward
5 Before 1914 Britain was the world's largest capital exporting country. While Britain's share of world
trade fell from 23 to 17 per cent between 1870 and 1914, its Foreign Direct Investment (1.(1)I) stock rose
from around £160 million to £1,680 million between 1870 to 1913 with an annual growth rate of 5.3 per
cent. Asia, especially China and India, was significant as a recipient of capital exports from Britain. In
the 1930s, Britain's surplus in trade with the Asia of the 1920s turned to deficit, though Britain still
remained significant as a market and as a supplier of imports to Asia. Nevertheless, as far as capital
investment was concerned, Britain was still the leading creditor in Asia. In the inter-war years Britain
was 'the most important source of foreign capital for India, the largest foreign investor in Siam and
Malaya, and the second largest investor (after Japan) in China': R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, and G. Jones,
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disarmament. 6 Nevertheless, stimulated by the Japanese expansion in Asia during the
1930s, Britain went ahead with the plan, and the base was finally completed at a cost of
approx. £.63m.7
In the late 1930s, the possibility of a conflict with Japan seemed imminent to
those in the Malayan administration. Accordingly, they began to organise food supplies
and rice stockpiling, and to equip hospitals to treat military casualties in times of
hostility.' As in the 1920s, the potential of the Japanese forces to land in southern Siam
and northern Malaya was considered. This prospect was rejected at once, however,
because the British thought that the Japanese would have wished to avoid the extremely
hostile terrain of the peninsula, which would be insuperable barriers to communications,
preferring the approach by sea. 9 In addition, the presence of the 'impregnable' naval base
in Singapore and of British troops gave false assurance not only to the British Chiefs of
Staff, but also to US intelligence. A memorandum written by US intelligence a week
after the landing of Japanese forces in northern Malaya (on 8 December 1941) shows
their undiminished confidence in the strength of British military forces in Malaya, aided
by the defences provided by the country's geography. 10 As a result of defence plans that
largely disregarded the main Malay Peninsula, it took the Japanese troops, who hardly
'British Business in Asia Since 1860', in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, and G. Jones (eds.), British Business
in Asia Since 1860 (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 3-6.
6 P. Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History (St Leonards,
1998), pp. 26-27.
7 G. Woodcock, The British in the Far East (London, 1969), p. 228. In February 1938 there was an
opening ceremony of the naval base, but it was not yet finished, and remained unfinished till the fall of
Singapore: Kratoska, op.cit., p. 27. It should be noted that Hall's estimate of the expenditure of the
construction is markedly different, £20 million: D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (London,
1964), p. 803.
8 KraSt0Ska, op.cit., pp. 29-32.
9 According to Kratoska (p. 34), the British defence plans of the 1920s had largely disregarded the
Malay Peninsula, while emphasised the need to protect Singapore. However, during the late 1930s there
was a revision over Malayan defence by which the possibility of a landward advance on Singapore was
correctly assessed: see R.J. Aldrich, The Key to the South: Britain, the United States, and Thailand
during the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929-1942 (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford, Singapore, New York,
1993), pp. 188-194.
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met any serious resistance, less than two months to capture the entire peninsula. The
assault on Singapore began on 8 February 1942, and the fortress, in reality, proved to be
ineffective against the swift advance of Japanese troops.
The fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 marked the nadir of British power in
Asia. Lord Cranborne, the Colonial Secretary, defended Britain, arguing that it was
unjust to single out the British, as the French, the Dutch and particularly the Americans
had all suffered defeats at the hands of the Japanese. 0
 In particular, the US
administration's refusal to join the League of Nations in opposing the Japanese
occupation of Manchuria had allowed Tokyo to expose British fallibility in Asia. By the
summer of 1940, the Japanese had successfully penetrated into French Indochina and had
demanded the closure of the Burma Road, which was China's only remaining link with
the Western world, as coastal access had been closed by Japanese occupation. When
Britain failed to gain a pledge of support from America in the event of attack from Japan,
Churchill decided to close the road for three months. The re-opening of the road the
following October only served further to expose Britain's isolation and therefore her
weakness. Then the prospect of an attack from Japan appeared ever more realistic. From
this time onwards the British government, whose commitments in the European theatre,
the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, had not left sufficient armed power in the region to
defend Singapore against Japanese attack, asked for part of the American Pacific fleet to
be sent to Singapore. However, the plea fell on deaf ears, and the USA did not move
until they themselves were attacked in 8 December 1941. 12 Cranborne argued
10 Coordinator of Information, British Empire Section, Special Memorandum No. 16, Singapore, 12
Dec. 1941. OSS R&A No. 34, cited in Kratoska, op.cit., p. 37.
11 PRO CO 825 35/4 F227 minute by Lord Cranborne, 14 July 1942; PRO CO 825/35/55104 Lord
Cranborne to Eden, 18 Aug. 1942, cited in Wm.R. Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the
Decolonization of the British Empire 1941-1945 (New York, 1978), pp. 189-90.
12 Aldrich, op.cit., pp. 20-24; J. Pluvier, South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence (Kuala
Lumpur, London, New York, Melbourne, 1974), pp. 92-124.
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emphatically that ' ... [lit is in fact the United States who have above all brought about
the present situation in the Far East'. He went on to say that as for Britain, 'let us
shoulder our share of the blame. But do not let us shoulder theirs too' •13 However, one
of the reasons for the severe criticism of Britain based on the pre-war defence strategy of
Western colonial powers in SEA, which was centred around the assumption that any
attack from Japan would come by sea, and thus be deterred by the strong British sea
power. The means of attack, contrary to British expectations, was truly devastating for
the Western world."
SEA emerged from the three and a half years war and Japanese occupation, with
its economies run down and its infrastructure, especially its means of communication
and its port facilities, largely destroyed. The population suffered from atrocity,
malnutrition and disease at a level hardly experienced before. 15 The war was over, but its
legacy remained in the form of a marked decline in moral and ethical standards, a ruined
economy, physical destruction, and disorder. Britain established military administrations
in the British territories. The South East Asia Command (SEAC) 16 continued its
operation in the NET and Indochina in order to maintain law and order, to preside over
the release of the Prisoners of War (POWs) and the internees, and to disarm and
repatriate the Japanese forces. Although it was still too early for the British to fully
appreciate the changes that had occurred in the region owing to the war and the
13 PRO CO 825 35/4 F227 minute by Lord Cranborne, 14 July 1942.
14 Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 170-71.
13 ibid., pp. 357-9.
16 The Quebec Conference in August 1943 decided to establish the South East Asia Command,
'embracing Burma, Malaya, Sumatra and Thailand'. Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed the
Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia. During the Potsdam Conference its responsibility was
extended: C.M. Turnbull, 'Regionalism and Nationalism', in N. Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History
of Southeast Asia, vol. 4: From World War II to the Present (Cambridge, 1999), p. 258; A.J. Stockwell,
'Southeast Asia in War and Peace: The End of European Colonial Empires', in N. Tarling (ed.), The
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 4: From World War II to the Present (Cambridge, 1999), pp.
4-5.
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Japanese occupation, the war, nevertheless, demonstrated the strategic significance of
Singapore for the region, and of SEA for the British Empire and Commonwealth.
British strategic interests in SEA were based, first, on a need to secure the main
strategic concentrations of British interest and population in the Pacific Basin: Australia,
New Zealand, Western Canada, and Malaya. Beyond this, to secure the security of
Burma and India and Ceylon, against attack from the East required a successful defence
of SEA, which formed the southern flank of any such attack. Secondly, SEA was the
key strategic point of concentration of the sea, air and cable communications of Britain
with Australia and New Zealand. Thirdly, the security of SEA ensured the defence of
British local assets, concentrated mostly in Malaya, Siam, Indonesia, and Burma, and in
the lesser dependencies around the region. 17 In addition, SEA, especially Malaya and the
NET, was Britain's main supplier of tin and rubber — two vital strategic materials.
A prerequisite of security in SEA and Asia in general was the full and early
support of the USA. Thus it was axiomatic that Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada
and particularly India should agree with the USA in advance on a policy for the provision
of both forces and bases. This was not easy to achieve however, because there appeared
to be too many US bases in the Pacific, and also it was suspected by many that these
bases were only kept in order to ensure that they would not be occupied by other
powers.18
The strategic requirements of the British Commonwealth countries in the region
and the Pacific were: firstly, to make sure that no potentially hostile power established
itself in the East; secondly, to control the sea and air routes to the south and east from
17 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum prepared by the Far Eastern Civil Planning
Unit of the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, part. IV. The Dependencies are namely North Borneo, Hong
Kong, Papua and the mandated territory of New Guinea, Fiji and the smaller islands in the Pacific,
which form part of the general defensive system comprising the main strategic areas listed above.
18 PRO FO 371 46410 F6721/6721/61 Balfour, British Embassy, Washington, to FO, 11 Sept. 1945.
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Russian or Japanese bases, through forward naval and air bases held either by the British
Commonwealth or by the USA; and thirdly, in the event of penetration of this line of
forward bases and of a delay in the full development of the US war effort to enable
Britain, Australia, and New Zealand in cooperation with the Dutch and French to
maintain an alternative defensive cordon from a system of bases along a line from French
Indochina to Samoa through Borneo.°
Immediately after the war, Britain considered no single power strong enough to
endanger the region's security, but acknowledged that the only realistic threat came from
the Soviet Union in alliance with either China or Japan or both. 2° Yet the Labour
government was not so much concerned with any direct threat from the Soviet Union to
SEA, as with the vaguer possibility that the Soviets might first want to remove any
possible threat from Japan if they were to fight a war in Europe. Moreover, the Soviet
Union was unlikely for some years to have a large and powerful Far Eastern fleet, able to
constitute a potential threat to British strategic interests in the Pacific.21
With regard to Japan, the British strategy was for the Commonwealth and the
USA to first of all continue the suppression of her military power through strict
economic control. Although Japan would not be strong enough to generate another war
for a number of years, nevertheless Britain need to ensure that Tokyo did not receive
assistance from the Soviet Union. China was also regarded as significant because of its
19 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, pp. 52-53.
20 ibid., part. V.
21 PRO FO 371 46336 Strategic Interests in the Far East: report by the Joint Planning Staff of the War
Cabinet, 1 Jan. 1945. Indeed, the Soviet navy was to remain a glorified transport service for the Red
Army until the development of a 'Blue Water' doctrine in the 1970s.
21
relations with the Soviet Union and the potential threat in case the latter gained access to
China's manpower resources.22
The real threat, however, was the apparent possibility of a clash between the
USA and the Soviet Union as the Cold War deepened. The main concern of the British
government, which did not contemplate a direct war with the Soviet Union in the
immediate future, was based on provocative US strategic interests and post-war foreign
policy. The USA was expanding its bases and forces in various parts of Asia, and this
irritated the Russians. Moreover, it was a well-known fact that the USA's virtual sole
control over Japan was deeply resented by the Soviets, who were concerned at the
prospect of Japan becoming a base for hostile action against themselves by the USA.
From the British perspective, it was possible that American and Soviet interests might
come into direct conflict over the control of Japan. Furthermore, the strategic interests of
the two powers were sharply opposed in China and in Korea. Korea, in particular, was
'the first danger spot', in which each occupied half of the country as a trusteeship. In
1946, the British FO already foresaw that the Far East including SEA was one of the
areas where Soviet-American rivalries were likely to be most acute. With somewhat
wishful thinking, the FO drew the conclusion that the Soviet Union would first work to
improve her position, then to extend her influence as energetically as she could, while
still seeking to avoid provoking a major clash, and that in any case neither the Soviet
Union nor the USA was in a condition necessary to sustain a war.23
22 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, pp. 52-3.
23 ibid.
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1.1.2 Economic and Financial Importance
In order to assess SEA's economic and financial importance to Britain's national interest,
the scale of British interests in the region should first be clarified. British economic and
financial interests in the Far East fell into three categories: trade, capital investments, and
invisible exports. Invisible exports were often closely associated with capital investments,
as were dividends and royalties, but services like shipping, banking and insurance cannot
be reduced to outcomes of foreign direct investment and were therefore categorised
independently.
UK trade with this area, from a quantitative point of view, was not of primary
importance, accounting for about 4.5 per cent of UK imports and 5.75 per cent of UK
exports (1937-39 averages). 24 However, the ratio of UK exports to UK imports from
East Asia was relatively favourable to the UK compared to UK trade as a whole: 72:100
against 58:100. Geographically speaking, 77 per cent of British exports and 64 per cent
of imports consisted of trade with countries south of the Tropic of Cancer and 58 per
cent of British exports and 46 per cent of British imports were with British territories,
partly for re-export. The British Dependencies not only provided half the British East
Asia trade, but also supported sterling exchange by large exports of their raw materials
to the USA. UK exports consisted of various goods, such as textiles, vehicles, capital
and consumer goods while imports consisted almost entirely of raw materials, including
silk, rubber, tin, jute and foodstuffs such as tea, sugar, copra, and spices.25
In the case of capital investments, however, it is not possible to make any
authoritative estimate of British investments in East Asia because the nominal values of
24 PRO FO 371 76041 F10598/1103/61 Economic and Social Development in the Far East and SEA:
preliminary report by the Working Party, established at the 5th Meeting of the Far Eastern Official
Committee, 12 May 1949. If India is included, the percentages become about 9.5 per cent of UK imports
and 6.5 per cent of UK exports (by value).
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capital investments held by British shareholders in stocks quoted on the London market
often undervalued their worth, and also excluded companies not quoted on the London
market; holdings of shareholders who were not UK residents, but paid through London;
and the holdings of UK citizens who resided in the Far East. Nevertheless, of the income
receivable as interest or dividends on capital investments in East Asia, between 78 per
cent and 66 per cent arose south of the Tropic of Cancer and between 65 per cent and 55
per cent in the British Dependencies. In addition there were British holdings of foreign
bonds, the largest holdings being in China and Japan, though the value of these would
have to be revised after the war depending on the ability of each country to meet its
external obligations.26
The third form of income, invisible exports, consisted of: firstly, remittances to
the UK by individuals and, secondly, earnings from shipping, banking and insurance.
Among these service areas, it was possible to estimate gross earnings and profits only for
shipping. In the case of insurance it was known only that the total premium income of
British insurance companies and of Lloyds insurance brokers in the East before the war
was a substantial amount; in fact, it was assumed to be several million pounds a year, and
moreover, the profits were normally remitted in full to Britain. The British banks in Asia
specialised in Eastern business, gaining substantial earnings through exchange dealings
and considerable profits in London on the clearance of sterling bills, thus providing an
invaluable service to British business interests.27
In summary, an early re-establishment of both trade and other forms of business
was imperative, for all these commercial activities were interdependent. Since the British
25 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, p. 46.
26 ibid., p. 48. In the case of China the British government could directly negotiate with the Chinese
government, but in Japan with the Allied Powers.
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Dependencies accounted for the majority of British economic and financial interests,
early recovery of these areas would be the most cost effective, and would have the
greatest effect on the British economy because this recovery would support sterling
exchange against the dollar.28
1.1.3 Political Importance
SEA's political significance to Britain lay mainly in her relations with the colonial
Dependencies but also extended to historical relations with the rest of the region. Britain
wanted to remain her pre-war hegemony and to preserve her interests in post-war SEA.
The relationship directly related to the pursuit of British political interest was that with
the USA, and with the Southeast Asian countries as well as the European colonial
powers. In the post-war period, although the US administration was primarily driven by
pragmatism, US anti-colonial rhetoric grew stronger, still prevailing over the Anglo-
American relationship. In order to keep the 'Special Relationship', the British observed
that the USA thought that Britain ought to show them that she was progressive rather
than reactionary with regard to colonial issues. The British were well aware of the fact
that the work of the SEAC, as the liberating force, and the ensuing political events
between the European colonial powers and their colonies were closely watched by the
Americans, and by Britain's own colonies in South and Southeast Asia, particularly
India. Britain's success in laying a foundation for her European allies to work on self-
government in their respective colonies during the reoccupation period would not only
stabilise the war-stricken region, but also save her from heavy criticism of the USA.
27 ibid., pp. 48-49. For the details of how many British lived abroad, and how much money was brought
back to Britain a year, see p. 49.
28 ibid., p. 50.
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Britain also calculated that this might induce more material as well as moral support from
the latter.
The official British FO view on post-war Asia was that the whole of SEA and the
Far East, particularly those territories in the South of the Tropic of Cancer in which the
greater part of her strategic and economic interests lay, should be viewed from a world
perspective rather than each country being individually assessed, particularly in the
setting of the United Nations Organisation (UNO). In this respect, Britain's relations
with the USA and the Soviet Union had significant implications for policy making on the
region. To the North of the Tropic of Cancer Britain showed herself disinterested, her
attitude based on a belief that a non-involvement policy would be more appreciated by
the USA. The British also assumed that the principal burden on the USA was to ensure
that Japan should not re-emerge as a military power and any encroachments by the
Soviet Union in Asia should be restrained. However, to the South of the Tropic, where
British-owned strategic and economic interests were more substantial, the British took
up the task of strengthening and developing the area as far as possible in conjunction
with neighbours such as the NET and French Indochina.
The British aim was to ensure a measure of security and stability in the region,
which would assist in maintaining their own interests. There was an appreciation among
the British that the pre-war status quo was not acceptable to most Southeast Asians, and
a revised understanding between the European colonial powers and the colonies was
required, which, at the same time, would be satisfactory to the Americans and sufficient
to thwart any intervention by the Soviets. 29
 As the post-war stability and development of
British and non-British territories in the region were inextricably linked, Britain needed
to work closely with both the native peoples and the metropoles.
26
The presence of the SEAC should provide the opportunity for Britain to expand
her influence in the region by linking the colonial and foreign territories under the
British-dominated military organisation. Initially SEAC's involvement in the political
development of the NET and French Indochina fulfilled the Supreme Allied Commander,
Southeast Asia, Lord Louis Mountbatten's instructions to establish law and order,
repatriate the Japanese and rescue prisoners of war. However the actions taken in the
process resulted in wide criticisms from the USA, as well as from the other European
colonial powers and Asian countries. The responsibility of liberating the NET (except
Sumatra) and of the part of French Indochina south of the 16th parallel, was only given
to the SEAC at the Potsdam Conference (17 July-2 August 1945), just before the
surrender of the Japanese, in order for the US South West Pacific Area to concentrate on
invading Japan. There had therefore been no British planning for these contingencies, as
the NET and Indochina were not British territories.
Although clearly military, the SEAC often had to deal with administrative, and
even political, matters in the face of escalating Asian nationalist struggle with the
returning European colonial powers. The SEAC military commanders in the NET and in
French Indochina were bound to set up administrations out of necessity. Mountbatten
tried hard to prevent himself and his commanders from being involved in political
matters," but he often faced a dilemma in the process, because of the clash of two
incompatible and conflicting considerations: the obligations of friendship felt by the
British towards their European allies and loyalty to liberal policies in dealing with the
Asians. Moreover, since Indians, the self-appointed advocates of all nationalist
29 Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, p. 6.
3° This is well shown by the dismissal of General Christison by Mountbatten after the former having
made several comments (especially out of sympathy toward the Indonesian nationalists) on political
matters without consulting or any direction from his superior: see, P. Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace:
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aspirations in Asia, comprised the majority of British troops, balancing the interests of
European colonial powers and their respective colonies in SEA was a sensitive issue
within British circles.31
From the outset, therefore, British policy makers gave careful consideration to
the divergence of views on sensitive matters relating to the liberation of the colonies and
their political future so as not to jeopardise the British relationships with other countries,
in particular the USA. Contrary to British hopes, the wide measure of agreement that
existed between the Allies on major issues of foreign policy could not prevent disputes
over general matters, like the treatment of colonial territories, from straining their
relationship. The early post-war years showed that the relationship between the UK and
the USA was not going to run smoothly unless they could resolve their differences over
colonial matters. Against this background, SEA's importance to Britain was greatly
enhanced by the independence of India, which resulted in the shift of the centre of British
influence in eastern Asia from Delhi to Singapore, and by the conviction among the
British that 'Moscow was sponsoring the Communist insurrections' in SEA in 1948.32
Indeed, towards the end of the 1940s the security of the British Commonwealth in South
Asia and the Pacific seemed again to be in danger, not from any direct attack by an
enemy, but from subversive Communist expansion in SEA. All these factors added to the
significance of SEA for the defence of British possessions, and these increased the need
to re-define her relations with the USA in order not to repeat what happened in 1940-
1941 in the face of increasing Japanese encroachment.
Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-46 (Manchester, 1987), pp. 92, 100-03, 156-57, and
also see pp. 182-84 for the dismal of Christison.
31 F.S.V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East 1943-46 (London, 1956), p. 401.
32 Renune, op.cit., p. 211.
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1.2 British Policy in Southeast Asia 1945-47: the Objectives and Aims
When the war was over, completely new situations arose which had not existed before
1941. In addition to the unprecedented war destruction and the sufferings imposed on
the local people, the British FO was concerned with the social, political and economic
disorder left by the Japanese, the accelerated growth of nationalism in Asia, the
disappearance of Japan as a supplier of manufactures, the appearance of the Soviet
Union as a major power in the Far East, the predominance of the USA in the Pacific and
the weakness of France and the Netherlands as colonial powers. 33 Moreover, local
Communist movements were growing fast owing to the economic and political instability
in the region. All these factors directly affected the direction of British policy in SEA and
its objectives.
The main objectives of British policy in the Far East in 1945 were: firstly, the
security of British territories and the protection and well-being of British subjects and
British assets in the area; secondly, good relations between the governments and peoples
of the British Commonwealth and those of countries with interests in the area, and
among all the countries with interests in the area; and thirdly, economic progress and
financial stability in the area and the extension of British economic interests.34
However, as noted previously, the British faced various problems in achieving
the objectives listed above, and among these the most important and difficult was that of
political advancement in SEA. The way in which the European colonial powers had left
their territories, together with rising nationalism, made it difficult for them to regain their
previous position in the region. Moreover, other countries, especially the US, were now
sensitive to issues relating to colonialism and nationalism and were watching political
33 For the rest, see PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil
Planning Unit of the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, p. 4.
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developments in the NET and French Indochina closely. Notwithstanding this the British
repudiated the various nationalist movements as alternatives to resumption of
government by the colonial powers, lest the whole region fall into chaos and general
unrest. They insisted that self-government 'must be an orderly growth, and be designed
to meet local conditions' . 35 They simply did not have any trust in the ability of the
natives, who seemed to lack the experience and political cohesion to attain the degree of
stability on which the post-war world relied.
Within Whitehall, the direct responsibility for Siam, the NET, and French
Indochina resided with the FO, while Malaya and other colonies were under the Colonial
Office (CO). Each country's political situation largely affected its neighbours, but the
prosperity of individual territories was not greatly dependent upon prosperity amongst
their neighbours?' As Malaya and the NET relied heavily on rice imports from their
neighbours, Siam, Burma and Indochina, an assurance of stability in the latter countries
was still significant. The British government set up a general foreign policy that covered
the whole region, but also specified the aims in each particular country.
In Siam the British were interested in promoting stability and the development of
democratic institutions in a former belligerent. As the militarist ultra-nationalist
government in the 1930s discriminated against British as well as European interests in
the country, it was therefore in Britain's interest to promote every possible chance to
assist the liberal elements there?' Britain had special interests in Siam in terms of defence
and commerce and in the event of any conflict, Britain needed to integrate Siam into its
defence system for the region's security. The priority for defence in SEA was always
34 ibid., p. 3.
35 ibid., p. 4.
36 ibid., p. 5.
37 PRO FO 371 63549 F2616/2616/61 British Policy in South East Asia, South East Asia Department,
24 Jan. 1947, p. 1.
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given to French Indochina, nevertheless, the use of communications and facilities in Siam
would assist in the defence of Indochina. If Indochina fell into an enemy's hands, the
security of Malaya and Burma would entirely depend on the ability of British naval and
air forces to maintain control over the Gulf of Siam. Besides, there was a possibility of
land operations on Siamese territories in the Malay peninsula.38
Under the post-war policy, British commercial interests, which were the biggest
amongst foreign interests in the country in the pre-war period, were to be maintained and
developed. Despite the subsequent difficulties in resuming commercial activities, mainly
because of the troubled political relationship that had arisen from the state of war
between Britain and Siam and the consequent negotiations on war compensations, the
policy was designed 'to encourage and assist British companies to resume and develop
their activities'. The main theme of British policy in Siam was 'to secure ourselves'.39
Britain, while trying to bring the Dutch to the negotiating table with the
Indonesians, also planned to provide the physical means of rehabilitation under the
SEAC. The monetary system was in complete chaos due to the circulation of three
different currencies — the Japanese military guilder, the Republican rupee and the
N.I.C.A. currency in the Dutch controlled areas." Without trust in the monetary system
there would not be any incentives for foreign investors to bring in capital essential to
restoration and rehabilitation. Establishment of a realistic monetary policy was therefore
the essential prerequisite to recovery together with a stable political situation. On the
other hand, there were British plantation companies whose representatives had been
waiting to get back to their estates during the period of uncertainty, which was extended
38 Siam and her strategic position in the British defence system in SEA is from PRO FO 371 46544,
46545, and 63549.
39 PRO FO 371 63549 F2616/2616/61 British Policy in South East Asia, South East Asia Department,
24 Jan. 1947, pp. 1-3.
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by the hostilities between the Indonesians and the Dutch. The British government
promised, first, to give them 'steady official backing not only locally, but in London'',
but unsurprisingly this was often violated, not by the British government and officials but
by the dangerous internal conditions in the Archipelago.
Indonesian leaders were seeking SEAC's assistance and advice on constitutional
issues, education, social welfare, health, and labour relations, and they looked towards
Britain as a model for their independent state in the future. These approaches were
enthusiastically taken up by the British as an opportunity that should not be lost to
further its influence in the archipelago. As in Siam, British interests were to maintain
Indonesian leaders who could preserve British interests in the country, in order to mould
Indonesia in the way in which the British wanted.
The scope for the British to work in French Indochina was however limited
because the French would not appreciate any attempt by Britain to spread any form of
influence in their territory. For reasons including this, but mainly because of their political
and commercial interests, the British paid more attention to Siam and the NET than to
French Indochina. 42
Malaya had a significant position in British Southeast Asian policy. As with the
Philippines for the USA, Britain was extremely conscious of the effects of her success or
failure in Malaya on her influence in SEA as a whole — and on her survival as a major
Far Eastern power. The FO also assessed that success was largely dependent on the
degree to which Britain showed herself to possess both sympathy and progressive
leadership in working towards the rehabilitation of economic and social stability. In
4° PRO T 236 1292 Economic Survey of the N.E.I written by Economic and Industrial Planning Staff;
May 1947, p. 8.
41 PRO FO 371 63549 F2616/2616/61 British Policy in South East Asia, South East Asia Department,
24 Jan. 1947, P. 11.
42 ibid., pp. 8-13.
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doing so, an urgent need was to recruit the right people who would give a new impetus
to officialdom as well as to the rest of the British community.43
In conclusion, the objectives of British policy in each country were aimed at
rehabilitation and stability. However, the ultimate goal of the policy was to benefit
Britain itself; as might be expected. The British faced various problems in achieving these
objectives, among them the most important and difficult being that of political
advancement in SEA. The British were well aware of the changed mood in SEA towards
them since their defeat by the Japanese and their re-entry into the region as an ambiguous
'liberator'. Nevertheless, the re-occupation of the region went smoothly, and was
complete by the end of 1946, though in the process there often arose clashes with both
the European colonial powers and the locals. From then on, though still concerned with
the implications that the outcomes of instability and unrest would have for socio-
economic progress, British assistance in the social, educational, economic and political
(mainly constitutional) spheres would be given equal weight in order that it might
entrench its future influence.
1.3 Forms of Cooperation with Other Powers
By means of ensuring security and stability in SEA, the British worked: first of all to
maintain the colonial powers in the region; secondly to sustain cooperation with the USA
and the Asiatic countries, including the Commonwealth (this was also a way of easing
their heavy responsibilities in the region); and thirdly to establish cooperation in the
region between the UK, the USA, and the USSR. However unrealistically, the British
continued to hope that great power cooperation could secure the region against any
major clash between the powers, and keep British interests, and the region, safe.
43 ibid., pp. 13-4.
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1.3.1 Resumption of the Colonial Powers and the South East Asia Command
Despite US anti-colonial rhetoric and the pressure directly placed on Britain, the Labour
government felt a strong moral obligation to restore the European powers to their
territories, in the belief that only their presence could maintain stability in the region.
Although Britain was only placed in that position during the course of the war, she still
regarded herself as a trustee for her allies. The establishment of a just and stable system
of government in the region was the first priority, and the British did not believe in the
ability of the Southeast Asians to rule themselves and to stabilise the economy and
politics, on which the post-war world relied, on account of their apparent lack of
experience and political cohesion. At the same time, however, the FO argued that France
and the Netherlands should make every possible effort not to antagonise the local people
when resuming governance of their colonies, so as to maintain a good relationship with
them. Furthermore the FO also proposed that the metropolitan countries should release a
feasible plan for future independence or self-rule of these countries as a condition to the
resumption of their position.'"
Behind this planning proposal there was also an acute material consideration.
Britain understood the significance to European recovery of Dutch relations with
Indonesia and those of the French with Indochina. Thanks to the liberal economic policy
of the Dutch in the NET (mainly born of their realisation of the insufficiency of their own
capital resources to develop the abundant resources of the colony), the British, the
Americans and the French actively invested into the NET. While 75 per cent of business
investments in the colony prior to the war had been Dutch, this was relatively small in
44 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945.
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comparison with the French, whose outlays in Indochina had constituted 95 per cent of
business investment, or the British with 90 per cent in Burma, though they were
considerably more than the shares of the Americans in the Philippines and the British in
Malaya, with 60 and 70 per cent respectively. Of some US$4,370 million capital
investments made into the whole of SEA, more than half were in the NET. The annual
transfers of dividends from these investments, as well as the remittances of company
profits in the Indies, were a significant element of the prosperity and employment of The
NetherlandS.45
With regard to France and her relations with overseas colonies, General de
Gaulle pronounced in August 1946 that 'United with the overseas territories ... , France
is a great power. Without these territories she would be in danger of no longer being
one. )46 To most Frenchmen, 'there existed an indissoluble link (italic in origin) between
the metropole and the Colonies'. 47 Indeed, 'the colonies formed an integral part of the
French Empire' 48 However, although Indochina was 'the most important, developed,
and prosperous of the French colonies', 49 the economic implication for France of
relations with Indochina might not have been so significant as that for the Netherlands
with the NET, for the scale of economic activity in Indochina was much smaller and there
was less variety of natural resources. Nevertheless, the economic relationship between
the two countries, in fact, provided the most extreme example of a colonial economy
completely dominated by the metropole: Indochina's economic development was 'almost
45 Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 42-4; Hall, op.cit., pp. 789-803. Pluvier normally does not indicate the origins of
his sources. Here he did not indicate which year and which source was used for these figures. However,
through the context it is figured as about the 1930s.
46 E.J. Hammer, 'The Struggle for Indochina, 1940-1955' (Standford, 1966), in E. Colbert (ed.),
Southeast Asia in International Politics 1941-1956 (Ithaca, 1977), p. 205.
47 Louis, op.cit, p. 27.
48 Pluvier, op.cit., p. 43.
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exclusively' dependent on French capital and on French enterprises, while foreign
penetration into Indochina, whether Western or Eastern, was systematically resisted
through high tariffs.50
During the war, the European metropolitan governments announced the future
prospect of the transfer of powers to their colonies in SEA. This was mainly designed to
obtain cooperation for their war efforts. With regard to Burma, it had been stated in the
British Parliament on 22 April 1943 that as soon as circumstances permitted the country
would be assisted in its transition to self-government. The Dutch stated in December
1942 that the NEI would attain 'complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct'
regarding its internal affairs within a commonwealth. The French also promised the
Indochinese, in March 1945, a certain degree of freedom of action within a French
Union. 5I However, during the re-occupation period it became apparent that the Dutch
and French did not understand the depth of the changes that had taken place in their
colonies during the war and the Japanese occupation, as they refused to accept the
presence of the nationalists in spite of them having thoroughly consolidated their
positions during the interregnum. This lack of a perception of the reality further
complicated the tasks of the SEAC in the area.
The fundamental problem regarding the future of the colonial areas was the
difference in attitudes between the metropoles and the colonies towards the timing of
independence. The Asians wanted immediate independence without re-establishing the
status quo ante, but the British and other European metropolitan countries believed that
49 Louis, op.cit., p. 39. The original statement comes from Albert Sarraut, a hard-line French colonial
statesman, which was quoted by Geoffrey Hudson of the British FO's Research Department during the
wartime.
50 Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 42-3.
51 The March statement by De Gaulle government however, only reflected the strong imperialist
sentiment of some section of the French government: Stockwell, 'Southeast Asia in War and Peace', pp.
16-18.
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'political change could come only after the imperial powers had returned in force and re-
established their control'.52
While the British government was anxious to establish a close and firm
relationship with its European allies, Mountbatten and the SEAC were struggling to
implement the directives given to them. In any case, they were well aware of the
potential effects of the actions taken in the NET and French Indochina by the SEAC, both
on Britain's own colonies, and on their European allies as well as the USA. As a result,
the British were juggling the immediate problems they faced in implementing the
directives and these long term considerations.53
Of the areas for which the SEAC was responsible, French Indochina had caused
the most controversy between Britain and the USA throughout the war because of
Roosevelt's genuine dislike of French imperialism — once he remarked that, 'Anything
must be better than to live under French colonial rule ! ' 54 This anti-French sentiment
formed the basis of US policy towards Indochina during the war. The President strongly
believed that Indochina, and other French colonies should not be restored to France after
the war, but administered by an international trusteeship. However, shortly before his
death he reluctantly agreed to return Indochina to French authority. 55 Truman and the
US State Department toned down their opposition to the restoration of the French in
Indochina. 56 Yet the suspicions of the Americans toward the French and other European
colonial powers remained.
52 Dennis, op.cit., p. 19.
53 ibid., p. 228.
54 E. Roosevelt, 'As He Saw it', p. 115, in Louis, op.cit., p. 27.
55 Memorandum by Taussig, 15 Mar. 1945, Taussig Papers; Foreign Relations: United Nations, pp. 121-
4, cited in Louis, op.cit., p. 486. Roosevelt said to Taussig, one of his advisers, 'if we can get the proper
pledge from France to assume for herself the obligations of a trustee, then I would agree to France
retaining these colonies with the proviso that independence was the ultimate goal'.
56 For more details, see Louis, op.cit., p. 552. According to Stockwell, the moderation of American anti-
colonialism owed much to the fact that the Americans increasingly appreciated 'the stable order of
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The work of the SEAC was impeded by the lack of sufficient troops due to the
pressures from home to demobilise troops who were urgently required for domestic re-
construction. In essence, the war against Japan never gained the same degree of support
in Britain compared to the war against the Axis powers. In addition, as the war had
already ended in Europe, the newly elected Attlee government could neither guarantee
'an even greater involvement for purely British forces' in SEA, nor prolong military
service in order to install the Dutch and French colonial governments 'whose
acceptability ... was very much in question' among the British.57
Direct American assistance for the operation of the SEAC was, however, out of
question, because although the SEAC remained an inter-allied command, the extent of
US involvement was for the USA alone to decide, and after having handed over SEA to
the SEAC, the USA had every political reason to remain aloof. The British were, of
course, more than willing to share the burdens of the post-surrender period with their
European allies, given their own lack of resources and troops. However, the problem
was that, firstly, none had trained and equipped troops readily available, while logistical
complications promised to delay the deployment of their military forces further.
Secondly, using French and Dutch troops, who were heavily reliant on US equipment
and training facilities, might have brought strong objection from the Americans, irritated
by the use of their resources to suppress independent movements across the region. The
British were thus afraid that this in turn might affect the operations of the SEAC under
the assistance of Lend-Lease. Thirdly, if the French and Dutch troops re-entered with the
SEAC, there would be an enhanced risk of SEAC forces meeting active resistance from
colonialism' over 'the restitution of potentially fragile nation-states', in addition to the considerations on
their strategic, political and commercial interest. The French also compromised their strong imperialist
inclination by allowing Indochina some form of 'internal autonomy within the French Union':
Stockwell, 'Southeast Asia in War and Peace', pp. 15-18.
57 Dennis, op.cit., p. 17-19.
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local populations." Soon it was found out that the British were accurate in that
assessment, for the provocative and undisciplined behaviour of French forces and
civilians alike led to Vietnamese counter-actions, and so did the 'trigger happy'
behaviour of the Dutch in the NET."
Despite the efforts made by the Supreme Allied Commander to limit the scope of
the SEAC's task strictly to the directives and away from direct confrontation with
indigenous revolutionary forces, clashes with the nationalists were foreseeable from the
very beginning. A good example of the conflicts to come was the military confrontation
between SEAC's forces and the Indonesian nationalists at Surabaya at the end of
October 1945. The fundamental problem with the task of the SEAC arose from the
directives and the vagueness of the terms of engagement, which were subject to
interpretation. Indeed, the confusion upon the directives was exacerbated by the failure
of the FO and WO to do any detailed plans for the Dutch and French territories.° There
were no misgivings regarding disarming the Japanese and repatriating the POWs and
internees, but with regard to the commitment 'to establish and maintain peaceful
conditions preparatory to handing over the territories to their respective civil
governments' was problematic because it was difficult to distinguish between maintaining
law and order to accomplish the primary tasks, and maintaining them pending the arrival
of the Dutch and French colonial governments. 61 Be this as it may, reoccupation of the
French Indochina proceeded relatively smoothly under Gracey, who later on admitted
that he 'inevitably provided considerable assistance to the political aims of French' in
liberated French Indochina. 62
58 ibid., pp. 8, 19-23.
59 ibid., pp. 48, 142.
60 ibid., p. 100.
61 ibid., p. 44.
62 ibid., p. 169.
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However, the nature of the SEAC's work in the NET was more complex. On 17
August 1945, the Indonesian Republicans proclaimed their independence and their forces
maintained de facto control of key areas of Java. It then followed that without the
assistance of nationalists it was impossible for the SEAC to release the POWs and
internees. Despite the Dutch plea to the British government not to recognise the
Indonesian government, Mountbatten was convinced that it was unrealistic to exclude
the Indonesians from discussions on the political future of the country. Moreover, he felt
strongly that it was essential for the Dutch to begin talks with the nationalist leaders and
to pronounce immediately their future intentions with regard to some degree of
independence for the NET. Mountbatten was assisted by his Political Adviser, Esler
Dening, in ensuring the necessary combination of military action and political
negotiation. After Surabaya the British government was more convinced about the need
for working on political ground as a way of extricating itself from commitments in the
NEI."
Towards the end of the SEAC's period of authority, Britain wanted to withdraw
from the NEI and French Indochina as soon as possible. The British still believed in the
advantages of restoring the metropoles, even though in French Indochina the war with
the Vietnamese was completely exhausting the French economy and European recovery
was impossible without a healthy France. This was because Indochina was the place most
vulnerable to Communist infiltration due to support among the Vietnamese for Ho Chi
Minh and, at a later stage, the backing from Communist China. Restoring French
authority in Indochina was therefore seen as absolutely crucial by the non-Communist
part of the world.
63 ibid., pp. 82-160.
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Behind all these efforts to restore the pre-war status quo, lay a strong sympathy
among the British people, both the citizens and leadership, towards the Southeast Asian
countries for their sufferings during and after the war. In addition, there was also a deep
understanding of the genuine wish of the people for independence. It appeared that the
only practical way to deal with the chaotic post-war situation in the region was a return
of the colonial powers to their territories. Britain could not afford to be idealistic about
SEA, for the security of the region bore directly on her own political, strategic and
commercial interests. Although the directives given to Mountbatten did not specify
SEAC's role as restoring the European colonial powers to their own colonies, they did
aim at establishing law and order so that the colonial powers could resume their own
authority in the colonies. After the SEAC had accomplished its task it was entirely up the
metropoles to choose which model of political development they opted for. The
difficulties attending this task lay in the fact that the Dutch and French refused to adapt
to the new post-war reality that the Japanese occupation brought to the Asians, who had
become more politically aware, and instead insisted on a resumption of their pre-war
authorities. The SEAC, by contrast, demanded from its allies a recognition of the
substantial power of the nationalist movements, which were most outstandingly
exemplified by the Viet Minh in Indochina, and the Republic of Indonesia under Sukarno.
Paradoxically, while the vagueness of the directives brought a great deal of confusion
among the commanders of the SEAC, the British Treasury willingly took up the
expenses incurred on the re-establishment of Dutch and French administrations in their
respective colonies.64
64 Donnison, op.cit., p. 235. Under the financial agreement between the British and Dutch governments
on 20 December 1945, the whole cost of military government in Indonesia was to be borne by the Dutch.
However, the British military operations in Indonesia, in order to re-establish the Dutch administration,
whether those of the combatant forces or of the forces engaged in the revival of the public services, were
not borne by the Dutch under the agreement. Donnison described the amount involved with re-
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1.3.2 Cooperation with the United States of America
From early on the FO reluctantly conceded that the early and full support of the USA
would be essential to British security in the Far East.° Yet the USA was not prepared to
assist them, for the interests of the USA were largely concentrated on Japan, and to a
lesser degree on Siam and the Philippines. In retrospect, the USA directly intervened
only in one place and on one occasion: in the war between the Dutch and the native
Indonesians after the second police action in 1948. Apart from the acquisition of the
Philippines in 1899 after the Spanish-American War, US interests in this region were
limited before the Pacific War. There were some American businesses and missions that
had become important to the livelihoods of some Asiatic peoples. Even so, in
comparison with American investments in China, Japan, or the Philippines, those in the
rest of SEA were not so substantial: they were somewhat larger in Indonesia and Malaya
than in Burma, Siam and Indochina where American investments were negligible.
Missionaries were sent to China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Malaya, Siam, Burma,
and India, but almost none to Indonesia. 66 In 1935 after the granting of Commonwealth
status to the Philippines, the USA started a process of further reducing its responsibilities
in Asia. Before the Pacific War, Japanese penetration into Indochina and the NET was
concerning the USA; however its action was conditioned by technical American
neutrality.°
establishment of Dutch administration as 'a considerable part of the general cost of the operations as
incurred on military government'; the total cost of these up to 31 March 1946 was very roughly
£8,000,000, in addition to the cost incurred on re-establishing administration in French Indochina.
65 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, Part. IV.
66 K.S. Latourette, The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951 (New York, 1952), pp. 11, 55-56.
The natural resources, mainly petroleum, tin and rubber, of Indonesia and Malaya attracted investments
from the US.
67 R.H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy (New York, Washington, London, 1967), p. 15.
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During the Pacific War the USA had made no careful plans for the future of
SEA." Understandably, the absence of post-war US blueprints for the region reflected a
belief that the primary responsibility for the territories of the European powers lay with
these powers themselves. Though fundamentally opposed, the return of colonial
possessions to their colonial powers eventually came to be taken for granted among US
decision makers.° Immediately after the war, the USA did not perceive any direct threat
to the region's security: Japan had already been disarmed, China was still ruled by a
friendly power, and the Soviet Union was still in no position to advance toward SEA. As
the Cold War was deepening in Europe, American attention was naturally focused on
containment of the Soviet Union; for if war with the Soviet Union erupted Europe was
the most vulnerable place." Awarding the lion's share of American resources to Europe
in the late 1940s clearly showed that the USA considered Europe to be the most
significant area in its foreign policy strategy. It was common, not only in the Pentagon
but also within the Administration, to believe that 'the most vulnerable side of our
defensive area will be in the Atlantic'.71
Meanwhile the political situation in Asia deteriorated. In particular, 1947 and
1948 saw the outbreak of hostilities by the local Communists in various Asian countries.
As Soviet activities were not developing on any formidable scale in SEA, the British
were not greatly concerned to counter them directly, but the local Communist parties,
who were 'growing in strength', presented 'a direct, if only potential menace to security
68 ibid., p. 16.
69 Washington's concern with the economic, political and social security of Western Europe contributed
to the decision to support the return of the European colonial powers to their Southeast Asian
possessions. The USA did not regard SEA as important to its own interests. US rhetoric about
decolonisation (which it supported) was therefore, quite different from what it did in practice: which was
to support the return of the Europeans who were to promise eventual self-government, and to establish
US military bases in the Pacific.
70 Fifield, op. cit ., p. 16.
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in the Far East'. 72 The civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists in China
was escalating, colouring all other incidents in the Southeast Asian countries.
Meanwhile, negotiations between the French and Ho Chi Minh in Indochina broke off, as
they did between the Filipino government and the Communist forces. In 1948,
Communist revolts broke out in Malaya, Indonesia, and Burma. Siam was now the only
country in SEA that was not subjected to any armed insurrection by Communists.73
The USA's laissez-faire attitude towards SEA often brought severe criticism not
only from the European powers and the colonies but also within the USA itself;
particularly inside the US State Department. However, the problem with the State
Department was that it consisted of numerous divisions and offices for different
purposes, and their interests were not necessarily compatible. For instance the fate of the
Asian document 'US Policy Toward SEA', designated 'PPS-5 1', prepared by the State
Department's Policy Planning Staff immediately after the adoption of the US policy
paper on China on 3 March 1949, clearly indicates the conflicting interests among
them. 74
 To be fair, the paper shows that the State Department had a better understanding
of the world political situation than most others working in the polity of the USA.
Especially important here was the attention that the Department drew to the danger of
the Kremlin's encroachment in SEA. It also noted the region's abundance of raw
materials and its geographical significance 'as a crossroads in east-west and north-south
global conununication'. 75 However whilst the Bureau of European Affairs of the
Department of State was generally in a stronger position, the Bureau of Far Eastern
71 L.J. Foltos, 'The New Pacific Barrier: America's Search for Security in the Pacific, 1945-47',
Diplomatic History, vol. 13, no. 3, Summer 1989, p. 341.
72 PRO FO 371 63520 F9979/90/61 Lord Killearn, Singapore, to the FO, 15 July 1947.
73 Fifield, op.cit., p. 17-18.
74 R.M. Blum, Drawing the Line: The Origin of the American Containment Policy in East Asia (New
York and London, 1982), p. 104.
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Affairs of the Department had no input concerning the status of the paper. In the end this
document became a non-policy paper, a mere source of information, and it was not until
the 1949-50 winter, after the Communist victory in China, that the paper was reviewed
again."
Under these circumstances, Britain seldom succeeded in obtaining whole-hearted
cooperation as distinct from some sympathy. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to
attribute the lack of US interest in SEA to ignorance or a lack of understanding by the
Administration of Asiatic affairs, as was often suggested by the British. It was rather that
the agenda the USA pursued in Asia was different from that which the UK pursued; for
instance, Americans wanted to promote the Philippines as an example to the emerging
states of SEA, while the British were doubtful about the prospects for any significant
development of the Philippines as a leader amongst the Southeast Asian countries,
preferring to back India as leader of the whole South and Southeast Asian region. 77 This
said, US judgements on the Asians' thoughts were often rash, mainly due to lack of
experience in this part of world. For example, the Americans sincerely believed that there
was a strong pro-American sentiment among the Asians, 78 and thus they had a strong
75 PRO FO 371 76025 F17668/10345/61G US Policy towards Southeast Asia: copy of a US Planning
Staff Paper, 29 Mar. 1949, p. 7.
76 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) (1949), The Far East and Australia, vol. vii, part. 2,
Policy Planning Staff Paper on United States Policy toward Southeast Asia, 29 Mar. 1949, pp. 1128-9;
Blum, op. cit., pp. 123-24. Reviewing 'PPS-5 1' was a response to US concerns about Communist activity
in Asia, and at the same time was a recognition of the need to accommodate nationalism, but only
'moderate' nationalism which accepted US policy.
77 PRO FO 371 76025 F7649/1034516I minutes by R.H. Scott, 18 May 1949; FO 371 76025
F17668/10345/61G minutes by R.H. Scott, 24 Nov. 1949; FRUS (1949), The Far East and Australia,
vol. vii, part. 2, Copy of a US Planning Staff Paper, 29 Mar. 1949, pp. 1128-33. R.H. Scott wrote (PRO
FO 371 76025 F7649/10345/61 minutes by R.H. Scott, 18 May 1949), after hearing W.L. Holland,
Secretary-General of the Institute of Pacific Relations, speak on American policy in the Far East, that
there seemed to be much increased interest in India among the Americans and appreciation of the India
as 'the only large area in Asia which might form a suitable anti-Communist base'. Stanton, the US
Ambassador in Siam, also advised that the US Administration should consult regularly with India on
Asian problems: FRUS (1950), East Asia and the Pacific, vol. vi , The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton)
to the Secretary of State, 27 Feb. 1950, p. 28.
78 'The US has had a good build-up in Japan. Pro-American feeling is very strong in Korea, is
continuing in the Philippines, exists definitely in Indonesia and Thailand, is rather strong in Burma and
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fear of losing this illusory advantage by giving grounds for the belief that they were
trying to replace Western colonial power through a modification of imperialism, in the
form of an economic imperialism.79
Another factor was that US policy in SEA was torn between promoting the
independence of colonies from their European masters and at the same time recognising
the need not to undermine the fragile European allies. A further inconsistency in the US
Southeast Asian policy lay in the fact that the Indonesian nationalists obtained relatively
more sympathy from the USA mainly because of the relative absence of Communist
involvement in their movement as compared to the Communist-led Indochinese
nationalists. In effect, people in the USA stood cautiously aside until the deep division
between capitalism and Communism became apparent and until they were more infused
with Cold War thinking. When the armies of Communist China reached the borders of
Burma, Laos and Vietnam, the USA could no longer stand aloof (though it was still too
early for a full commitment"). After all, it was only the fear of Communist encroachment
in the region that drew the USA into SEA, 81 otherwise Washington would have carried
on considering Asia as a strategic backwater. 32 This attitude explains the dilemma that
the British encountered when trying to in their dealings with the USA in Asia:
is fairly considerable in Pakistan.': FRUS (1950), East Asia and the Pacific, vol. vi , memorandum of
conversation by Charlton Ogburn, Policy Information Officer, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Oral
Report by Ambassador-At-Large Philip C. Jessup upon His Return from the East, 3 Apr. 1950, p, 72.
79 FRUS (1950), East Asia and the Pacific, vol. vi , memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Economic
Affairs, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Shohan) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant), Washington, 16 Mar. 1950, p. 62.
89 Yahuda shows the evaluation of US policy in terms of containment in Asia. According to him even
the Communist take-over of China in October 1949 was 'not seen entirely within the prism of the Cold
War and containment'. Regarding the perimeter defence published in January 1950, although Cold War
rhetoric was much more evident, the document still showed lack of a vision in the American approach to
Asia in terms of containment. He concludes that the adoption of NSC-68 in September 1950 was the key
factor in the American strategy for containment by raising American defence expenditure 'from $13.1
billion in 1950 to $25 billion and then $44.0 billion in 1951 and 1952 respectively.': M. Yahuda, The
International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London and New York, 1996), p. 118-20.
81 Yahuda, op.cit., pp. 127-8.
82 JCS, "Political and Pressures for Extension of US Aid to Foreign Nations," SWNCC 360/1, 29 Apr.
1947, FRUS, 1947 1:736-50, cited in Foltos, op.cit., p. 341.
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American policy in China may have been too narrowly
conceived on account of inexperience and the treatment of
Japan is an instance of the somewhat unimaginative tendency
of the Americans to graft their own way of life on to rather
improbable stock. Moreover, their insistence on restoring the
Japanese low-cost economy on multilateral principles takes
little account of British economic interests. But an American
stake in the region is of great importance for the
consolidation of Western influence.83
Nevertheless, successive UK governments always had to struggle to earn the necessary
cooperation and support from the USA in the region.
1.3.3 Expectations towards the Asian Countries and the Commonwealth
Apart from pressing the USA for more active intervention into Asian affairs in the post-
war period, the Labour government hoped that the Commonwealth would assist Britain
in Asia. During and after the Second World War, the Commonwealth was extremely
cooperative. India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa had assisted
Britain throughout the war and after, in particular during the Indonesians' war with the
Dutch, the Emergency in Malaya, and the Korean War. Their savings in the City, the so-
called Sterling Balances, supported Britain, while Canada offered a loan." Throughout
the post-war period cooperation with the Commonwealth was clearly one of the major
83 PRO FO 371 76386 W5573/3/500G P.U.S.C. (51) Final: Anglo-American Relations: Present and
Future, produced by the Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee, Oct. 1949, p. 4.
84 See PRO CO 1022 266 for the details of Commonwealth and Colonial troops sent to Malaya during
the Emergency, and also see T 230 199 copy of The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic
Development in South and South-East Asia, London, Oct. 1950, for the details of the generous support
from Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the form of loans: Marshall Aid and gifts and of the
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options chosen by the British FO to resolve problems in Asia. It was also taken for
granted that Britain should call on Canada, Australia and New Zealand for help with the
execution of any policy in the Pacific rather than demur, because the British government
was concerned that lack of interest on the part of Britain in the Pacific might bring a
result that would expose the Dominions to increased foreign influence. Britain made sure
that whichever policy was adopted in the Far East it was broadly acceptable to the
Commonwealth and the Dominions and that these countries were implicated, so that they
all stayed within the British political and strategic ambit in Asia in one form or another.
The Labour leadership expected India to lead Asia, whether through a regional
economic organisation or an organisation for collective security. Fifield explains that
Britain appreciated India's size, population, natural resources and location, and relatively
advanced industrialisation as the contributing factors to its leadership of neighbouring
areas.
85
 Furthermore, the Southeast Asian countries themselves were aware of the
significant role of New Delhi as a centre of non-Communist influence in Asia, and
without it, it might be impossible for them to remain outside the expanding area of
Communist subversion. 86 The British were well aware of the unpopularity of India, and
the fear of Indian expansionism, among countries in the region. This contributed to their
reluctance to accept India as their leader. 87 For instance, Pakistan could not accept
Indian leadership due to their conflicting interests in Kashmir, while Siam also would not
be pleased to see its neighbour becoming too strong, as they shared a common border. In
addition, the British themselves feared India's ambition to supersede British influence in
accumulation of sterling balances by various countries made the rehabilitation work in the Sterling area
possible, though the immediate responsibility was upon the UK.
85 Fifield, op.cit., p. 359. The Indian Army of a quarter of a million men which was the foundation of
British imperial role, was also one of the contributing factors to the British expectation towards India: A.
Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1985), p. 31.
86 Fifield, op.cit., p. 362.
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the region. The Labour leadership thus listened carefully to the opinions of Indians on
Asiatic affairs and examined them thoroughly, a process that was, on occasion, reflected
in policy."
Japan offered an alternative model of leadership to SEA. She was apparently the
strongest power in Asia, but such a leading role for Japan was deemed to be
inappropriate because of her historical relations with other Asian countries. In any case,
this option was not in Britain's favour because of the strong US influence in post-war
Japan. The FO concluded that from the Persian Gulf to the China Sea there was no single
power capable of bringing about unity and cooperation throughout the region."
At the furthest geographical limit lay Australia. Britain hoped the Australians
would be more active in Asian affairs as a regional power. However, Australia could not
be a genuine Asian country despite its geographical proximity because it was white-
dominated and dependent on the USA for trade and defence. Yet Britain pressed
Australia to take up some aspects of British responsibilities, mainly in the Far East,
which Australia willingly did because of her ambition to be an Asian power. For instance,
it was Britain that insisted on the representation of Australia in the Japanese surrender
ceremony and armistice negotiations. 9° Australia also participated in international
conferences on Korean affairs on behalf of Britain, and later was to be the trustee of
Korea, although this never materialised.
87 PRO FO 371 76030 F17397/1055/61G PUSC (53) Final Approved. Regional Co-operation in South-
East Asia and the Far East by Permanent Under -Secretary's Committee, 20 Aug. 1949.
88 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945. In fact, without India's agreement it would not have been possible to
establish US forces and bases in various parts of Asia. India also had a big role in the British giving
recognition to Communist China.
89 PRO FO 371 76030 F17397/1055161G PUSC (53) Final Approved. Regional Co-operation in South-
east Asia and the Far East by Permanent Under -Secretary's Committee, 20 Aug. 1949.
90 The Times, 4 Aug. 1945.
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Anita Singh describes the British colonies and the Commonwealth as a mere
springboard for Britain's post-war economic recovery. 91 On the one hand he was right
that the Commonwealth reduced Britain's burden by taking up a share of its
responsibilities in Asia. Britain maintained a desire to remain a world power while
revenues from the domestic economy alone could not maintain her excessive
commitments abroad, but with the abundant resources of the Commonwealth, she need
not be subservient to the USA or the Soviet Union. 92 Britain together with the
Commonwealth, could serve as an independent unit in world politics, standing apart from
the USA and the Soviet Union. However, Singh's interpretation is obviously limited by
his inability to explain the open-ended support of the Commonwealth during and after
the Second World War. Britain took up the dollar deficit of the Commonwealth and
suffered together with it while her own dollar gap was improving. Nonetheless, the only
nation powerful and resourceful enough to take on Britain's burden in this region was
the USA.
1.3.4 Cooperation Between the United Kingdom, the United States of America and
the Soviet Union
Last but not least, cooperation between the UK, the USA and the Soviet Union was
sought, for these powers and their activities were the key to peace. The pursuit of such a
cooperative strategy seemed to be the natural thing to do in Asia, as in Europe, in 1946.
91 A.I. Singh, The Limits of British Influence; South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship 1947-56
(London and New York, 1993), P. 39; N.J. White, Business, Government and the End of Empire:
Malaya 1942-1957 (Oxford, 1996), P. 5. Singh emphasised Imperial Preferences as considerable value
to the British economy and the Commonwealth role in Britain's trade in general as Europe handled only
25 per cent of British trade in September 1947, whereas the Empire between 1946 and 1949 accounted
for 48 per cent of Britain's imports and 57.5 per cent of her exports: the percentage of the imperial
proportion of trade between 1946 and 1949 is from B. Porter, 'The Lion's Share: A Short History of
British Imperialism, 1850-1983' (London, 1984), p. 320, in White, op.cit., p. 20.
92 PRO CAB 129 23 C.P.(48) memo by Bevin, 4 Jan. 1948.
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However, the hope of cooperation with the Soviet Union did not blind the Labour
government. While there was little concrete evidence of any determined Soviet
intervention, it was understood that it loomed in the background. 93 From the beginning an
obstacle was foreseen as the Soviets continued to severely criticise British efforts to
reinstate colonial powers in SEA, and the Soviet Union's own economic and political
interests in the region were by no means compatible with those of the British. The British
government was also enormously concerned about the growing activities of regional
Communist parties around and within SEA, whether with or without the backing of the
Soviets. An even worse impediment to such a strategy was the presence of the USA
whose every step in Asia provoked the Soviets. The FO perceived that:
... as elsewhere, the degree to which international co-
operation will become a reality depends largely on the
attitude taken up by the U.S.S.R., which in turn will tend
to react decisively upon that of the United States."
Apparently then, there was to be no peace in Asia without cooperation from the USA
and the Soviet Union. Britain had hoped to act as a mediator in Asia not only between
the native peoples and the Western colonial powers, but also between the USA and the
Soviet Union, in order to minimise friction among them until the UNO could perform its
purpose. As mentioned above, the British desire to obtain cooperation from two other
powers in the region was related to a distinctive approach to Asian affairs: that the Asian
countries should be viewed in a world perspective, in particular 'in the light of our
relations with the United States and the U.S.S.R.'.95 However, it is not certain how far
the British expected to achieve success in implementing a policy based upon this
93 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945.
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framework of operation, or whether they sincerely believed that any form of cooperation
with the Soviet Union was at all feasible given the deepening of the Cold War and its
profound global and regional implications.
Conclusion
According to the assessment made in this chapter, the value and significance of SEA for
the British national interest was directly related to Britain's economic interests, to the
security of the British Empire and the Commonwealth, and to her ambition to remain as
the influential power in SEA in the post-war period. The British strongly believed that
the restoration of the European colonialism, redressed by progressive reconstitution, was
a prerequisite for the establishment of some form of stability in post-war SEA. This task
was undertaken by the SEAC. The SEAC had in fact a dual function of guaranteeing
British interests, while liberating the region. What limited their actions in this respect was
Britain's lack of resources, combined with the urgent need for demobilisation, and the
uncompromising nature of both Asian nationalism and the European colonialism.
Throughout the Attlee period cooperation with various other powers was sought, on the
one hand, as a way to keep the region secure and stable particularly in the face of
increasing Communist activities through local Communist parties, but on the other to
offset her lack of resources to implement all necessary economic and political measures
and also to obtain compromises from the diverse parties with interests in the region.
Britain's ambition to preserve her interests and to maintain influence provided an
incentive to establish bedrocks of the subsequent regional organisation, and also to seek
out the basis for regional cooperation. The importance of these factors is elaborated in
94 ibid., p. 60.
95 ibid., pp. 52-54. The quote is from p. 53.
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the next chapter, as are the processes that underpinned government and business
relations in post-war Malaya. An understanding of these matters, in turn, provides the
basis for an understanding of the relationship between government and business in post-
war SEA.
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Chapter 2 Regional Policy-Making and Business/Government Relations
The strategic, political, and economic significance of SEA to the British national interest
increased in the post-war period. The Pacific War proved the region's strategic
importance to the defence of the British Commonwealth and the Dominions in the area.
SEA, the main producer of strategic materials such as rubber and tin, would also
continue to be the major dollar source for the war-stricken European metropolitan
governments. In the post-war period, while the independence of India was imminent, the
British government was 'hoping to use Singapore as the "centre for the radiation of
British influence" in the region'.' Britain's involvement with the liberation of the region
under the SEAC enabled her to restore her pre-war hegemony in the region, and during
the period of Attlee government, Britain continuously struggled to maintain this position
by seeking regional cooperation with the European colonial powers, Asiatic countries
and the British Commonwealth.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the process of regional policy-making in Britain and
SEA. First, the roles of the CO and the FO are examined. At the regional level, there
were the Malayan government, the Governor-General and the Special Commissioner.
The offices of the Governor-General and the Special Commissioner were created to
allow the British government to reconcile the activities of British as well as non-British
representatives in the region with its regional policy.
An examination of the process of regional policy-making in Whitehall and in SEA
inevitably leads to an explanation of 'Regional Cooperation' as the nucleus of British
policy in South Asia in general and SEA in particular after the war. The role of
Mountbatten's SEAC, Killearn's role as the Special Commissioner, Malcom
MacDonald's operations as the Governor-General (later the Commissioner-General,
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South East Asia, after the Special Commission was integrated into his office), and the
formulation of the Colombo Plan are studied within the context of regional cooperation.
This chapter also undertakes an examination of the culture and processes of
government/business relations. As the business interests of British private firms in SEA
were directly related to British national economic and financial interests in the region, the
relationship between government and business should be understood not only as a series
of attempts by each to influence the other, but also as the means by which British
national interests were advanced and policies implemented in the region.
2.1 The Process of Regional Policy-Making
2.1.1 The Metropole: the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office
In the process of regional policy-making on SEA, the ministerial committees of the
Cabinet and the Cabinet itself were most important in the design of policy. 2 However, the
issues that went up to ministerial and Cabinet level were few, and the civil servants of the
CO and the FO primarily handled the rest.
As the CO was responsible for the colonies and Dependencies in Asia, incoming
correspondence from Malaya, for instance, was first seen by the civil servants of the CO,
usually by the Malayan desk of the Eastern Department, which dealt with most of routine
issues concerning Malaya. Among the issues raised, a few were taken up to the inter-
departmental committees and the Cabinet by officials of Assistant Secretary rank and
upwards, who also consulted directly with the Governor, the High Commissioner of the
'Rename, op.cit., p. 11.
2 A.J. Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, Malaya, Part 1: The Malayan Union
Experiment, 1942-1948 (London, 1995), pp. xlv-xlvi. Yet the function of Parliament as where policy
was discussed and shaped should not be ignored, as Stockwell pointed out (pp. xlvi-xlvii).
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Federation of Malaya and, the Chief Secretary of the Malayan government, and the
Governor-General.'
Although dealing with Malayan affairs was primarily the CO's responsibility,
other government Departments could not be excluded, because colonial policy towards
Malaya was clearly entwined with Britain's foreign, defence and economic policies in
Asia. Since the CO was only a middle-ranking department in Whitehall, more prestigious
departments of state often felt that matters closely related to Britain's own national
interest to be too significant to be left in its hands. Therefore, the issues regarding
Malaya's dollar earning, rehabilitation work and subsequent post-war development plans,
and the counter-insurgency attracted the attention of the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee;
the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin; the Chancellors of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton and
Stafford Cripps; the Minister of Defence, Emmanuel Shinwell; the Secretary of State for
War, John Strachey, etc.4
By contrast with the CO, which had taken the initiative in post-war planning in
SEA immediately after the fall of Singapore in February 1942, the FO 'had done hardly
any planning work on the future of East and South-East Asia'. In fact, the Premier and
the Foreign Secretary of the War Cabinet, Churchill and Eden, had 'tended to neglect Far
Eastern questions in favour of those concerning Europe'. 5 It was J.C. Sterndale Bennett,
the newly appointed head of the Far Eastern Department of the FO in June 1945, who
drew attention to the fact that there was virtually no machinery for Far East planning in
the FO. He also pointed to the lack of inter-departmental coordination, particularly
3 ibid., pp. xlii-xliii. According to Stockwell, the Secretaries of States for the Colonies made approaches
to the Cabinet with respect to constitutional changes, the Emergency, the appointments of Gurney and
Templer as High Commissioner, the reorganisation of Malayan administration in 1951-1952, and the
conduct of constitutional talks in 1955-1957. Also for the evolution of the Eastern Department, see p.
XJ0di.
4 ibid., pp. xliii-xlv.
5 Remme, op.cit., pp. 21-2.
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between the India Office, the Burma Office and the CO on the one hand, and the FO on
the other, regarding the fundamental problems of British foreign and colonial policies in
the area and he pledged to make a major effort to rectify such deficiencies. 6 As a result
of his successful initiative, the Far Eastern Department secured additional staff, and was
subdivided into three specialised sections dealing with Japan and the Pacific, China and
SEA respectively; the South East Asia Department grew out of the third of these
sections.'
Within a few weeks (26 June 1945) of Sterndale Bennett's pledge, another Far
Eastern expert, Esler Dening, wrote a memorandum urging political coordination in
SEA. Rooted in his personal antagonism towards Mountbatten, which was to become
more overt at the beginning of 1946, 8 Dening pointed out that the failure of British
defence in the Far East had been mainly due to the fact that India, Ceylon, Burma and
Malaya had been pre-occupied with their own internal problems, and were thus largely
unfamiliar with each other's problems as well as those of the non-British territories in the
area, such as Siam, Indochina, the NET, the Philippines, China and Japan. To rectify this
deficiency, he suggested that there should be a central authority in the periphery which
could report directly to the Cabinet and would coordinate 'the views and the needs of all
the British territories involved and to relate these with developments in other non-British
territories' .9
6 PRO FO 371 46328 F3943/149/61 memo by Sterndale Bennett, 8 June 1945, cited in Remme, op.cit.,
p. 22 and Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, p. 47. Sterndale Bennett
criticised with the continuos tendency to watertight compartments. For instance, 'Plans for the future of
Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong are prepared without Foreign Office participation, though they may
affect, and be affected by, developments in territories which are the concern of the Foreign Office.'
7 Remme, op.cit., pp. 22-3.
8 For the details of the friction between them, see Dennis, op.cit., pp. 184-187.
9 PRO CO 273/677/3 no 5 Political Co-ordination in South-East Asia: memorandum by M.E. Dening,
26 June 1945. He also suggested that the central authority be appointed either through the detachment of
the office of political adviser from the SAC's staff and giving him an independent responsibility to
London, or alternatively through an appointment of a Minster of State for Southeast Asia. When Sir
Archibald Clark Kerr was appointed to handle negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesians,
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2.1.2 The Process of Regional Policy-Making in the Periphery
As we have seen in Chapter 1, Britain's major interests in SEA arose out of her relations
with the colonial Dependencies. Among these, Malaya was the most significant because
of her political relations with Britain, and her strategic and economic value to British
national interest. Thus, the centre of British regional policy-making in the periphery was
Malaya and its government. Stockwell points out that in order to examine policy-making
at the regional level, we need first to deal with the government of Malaya, its position in
the region as 'the base of British power in a region of contiguous Great Power rivalries',
and its relations with the metropolitan authorities.10
2.1.2.1 The British Territories: The Malayan Government
Pre-war Malaya was divided into three different administrative areas. The Straits
Settlements (Singapore, Penang, Malacca) were the British colonies under the direct rule
of the British Governor, while nine other states were protected states by virtue of
Treaties and Agreements with Britain. Among them, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, and
Selangor comprised the Federated Malay States in 1896, in which the Governor of the
Straits Settlements acted as the High Commissioner. The remaining five states refused to
enter the federation in order to keep the authority of their rulers, though they accepted
British Advisers, and together formed the Unfederated Malay States (Johore, Kedah,
Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis in Malaya, together with Brunei in Borneo). The
Advisers operated under the general direction of the Governor of the Straits Settlements
as the High Commissioner, and were involved in all matters of general administration of
immediately followed by the appointment of the Special Commissioner, Dening was only to be
disappointed: see Dennis, op.cit., pp. 184-88.
58
the states except religion and custom. 11 In any case, these states, whether federated or
unfederated, retained their sovereignty. As a result, Malaya was governed by the system
of both direct and indirect rule, and there was a clear difference between the system of
indirect rule, as applied to the states within the federation, and to those outside the
federation. 12
 Under such circumstances there was little consistency within the
administrative structure in Malaya.
In the pre-war period Britain had attempted to re-structure the Malayan
administration, first, through incorporating the five Unfederated Malay States into the
federation, and then through decentralisation of the Federated Malay States. The
objective of this administrative structure was to attain a certain uniformity, but this was
not achieved. 13 The Japanese occupation in February 1942 actually provided an
opportunity for the British to re-structure and rationalise the Malayan administration, and
thus to eliminate the pre-war inefficiency that was believed to have hampered the
economic and social development of the country. Establishing a strong and unified
administration in Malaya was regarded as vital in the post-war period because of
Malaya's strategic importance and the prospect of self-government."
Post-war planning for Malaya began early in 1943. The CO took the initiative to
create an informal CO-WO Malayan Planning Committee in February and this
subsequently led to the formation of the Malayan Planning Unit (MPU) in July 1943.
Under the auspices of the Planning Unit, the British Military Administration for Malaya
and constitutional changes in Malaya as well as Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo
10 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, p. xlvii; Stockwell, 'Southeast Asia in War and Peace', pp. 25-27, and the
quote is from p. 26.
11 Donnison, op.cit., p. 136.
12 Pluvier, op.cit., p. 13.
13	 •Tarhng, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, pp. 17-8, and Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 12-
3.
14 Donnison, op,cit., p. 136.
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were conceived. By March 1944 the War Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo had
approved the general lines of policy regarding the Malayan Union, and on 31 May 1944,
the War Cabinet gave its endorsement. 15
Since the main aim of post-war planning for Malaya was to establish a strong
central government in the country, it was 'of the greatest importance that the Military
Administration should not do anything to re-establish, or even to give cause to think that
they were re-establishing, the pre-war form of government'. In any case, the character of
a military administration perfectly fitted the post-war plan for Malaya, for 'it was the
essence of military administration that it should be direct and unified'. Since Mountbatten
encouraged the people of the country to associate themselves 'to the fullest extent
possible with the machinery of government', the Military Administration gave the
Malayans experience of a unified central administration of a kind, though still under
decentralised administrative structure, as to some extent the Japanese Malay Military
Administration had been.16
The essence of the Malayan Union constitution 'to provide for integration and for
defence, and to give legal status to non-Malays' was borne out of necessity. 17 Under the
pre-war constitutional and administrative system, the British government had no
jurisdiction in the Malay states where the rulers of the states remained nominally
independent as sovereign powers. In order to achieve the objectives of the constitution,
the Union should, first, break with the past administrative structure; fresh treaties should
be made with each of the rulers to transfer their powers to the central government, and
so all State and Settlement properties and revenues, with the exception of those related
to the Sultans' prestige as the leaders of their Malay subjects and protectors of their
15 ibid., pp. 137-39. On 31 May, the War Cabinet gave provisional approval to the policy in Malaya and
Borneo, then on 3 September 1945 the Cabinet approved the policy as outlined previously,
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religion. 18 Sir Harold MacMichael was sent out to Malaya, where he was assisted by the
BMA to 'prepare the way and make routine arrangements for his mission', to obtain the
required surrender of sovereignty of each state to enable the British government to pass
the necessary constitutional legislation. 19 In addition, a common citizenship scheme for
all who regarded Malaya as home would be applied to unify the plural society.
The Malayan Union would comprise all the Malay states including the
Settlements of Penang and Malacca, but excluding Singapore, which would form a
separate colony. In the Union the Governor was 'to exercise the Legislative and other
authority surrendered by the Sultans, with the aid of Executive and Legislative Councils,
to which both official and non-official members would be nominated'. 20 Apart from the
Governor, there were three other principal officers of government: the Chief Secretary,
the Attorney-General, and the Financial Secretary. Among them, the Chief Secretary, as
the key official, not only managed the business of the Federal Executive and Legislative
Councils, but also liased with heads of government Departments and British Advisers in
the states. 21
 The central government would delegate the powers of local administration
to Councils in the states. The position of the British Advisers, whose status under the
pre-war administration was 'higher than that of any other officials save the High
Commissioner', would be subordinated to the Chief Secretary of the Union.22
When the White Paper on the Malayan Union constitution was released on 22
January 1946, a large scale of protest movement erupted. Firstly, the Malays opposed the
16 ibid., p. 141.
17 Tailing, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, pp. 19 -20.
18 For more details, see PRO CAB 129 1 CP(45)133 Cabinet memorandum by G. Hall, 29 Aug. 1945,
and PRO CAB 129 2 CP(45)199 Policy in regard to Malaya: Cabinet memorandum by G. Hall, 4 Oct.
1945.
19 Donnison, op.cit., pp. 396-97.
29 Donnison, op.cit., p. 397.
21 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, p. xlvii.
22 Donnison, op.cit., p. 397.
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forceful way in which MacMichael's mission to persuade the sultans to hand-over their
authorities was carried out, but more importantly they feared the implication of the
Union constitution for their future position. Under pre-war British rule, the plural
structure of Malayan society was relatively peaceful without serious communal conflicts.
Generally speaking the Malays were bureaucrats and peasants; many of the Chinese and
Indians were businessmen, though the majority in these communities worked as labourers
in the tin mines and plantations. The weakness of the plural society was not overtly
obvious until the Japanese occupation. Although it is debatable whether or not the
Japanese deliberately promoted racial animosity between Malays and Chinese as a matter
of policy, 23 the Japanese preference for the Malays and their brutal suppression of the
Chinese created overall social tensions and led to bitter inter-racial conflicts between the
Malay and Chinese communities. As soon as Japanese rule ceased, more overt Chinese
reprisals against the Malays (and vice versa) started taking place. During the interim
period the communal conflicts reached their peak and were only subdued, albeit in a
limited way, when the BMA intervened and initiated negotiations with the MPAJA
leaders for disarmament and disbandment.24
Therefore the storm of protest from the Malays should be understood against the
background of these communal conflicts, aggravated during the Japanese occupation. On
the other hand, long before the war the Malays had already feared and envied the
Chinese for their vigour and their success in business. The Malays now feared that
23 B. Cheah, 'The Social Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya (1942-1945)', in A. McCoy (ed.),
Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation (New Heaven, 1980), p. 108. Cheah concluded that the
Japanese did not deliberately promote a policy of communal conflict, whereas most of authors used in
this bibliography wrote the opposite.
24 Cheah, op.cit., pp. 101-03, 108-111; Donruison, op.cit., pp. 378-88. The reprisals were led by the
Chinese dominated resistance group, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), who took the
law into their own hands during the interregnum period. Their main targets were the Malay
collaborators, especially the District Officers in the local government and their subordinates, the district
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granting equal rights to the Chinese and Indians would not only retard the already
economically educationally weaker Malay community even further, but also result in loss
of their political privilege. Many Malays agreed that without special protection they
would lose their own country to the Chinese and Indians.25
The waves of protests were led at first by the Sultans, who were pressurised by
their own subjects to act, and then organised locally and nationally at a later stage. A
Pan-Malayan Malay Congress, convened in March 1946, under the leadership of Onn bin
Jaafar (Dato Onn), called for a complete boycott of the Union by denying the legitimacy
of the agreement between MacMichael and the Sultans. 26 Although the British had
already predicted strong objection from Malays to the Union proposals, especially to the
idea of the common citizenship, the unprecedented scale of organised mass protests from
the Malay community took the British by surprise. 27
A certain part of the British community, especially the former members of the
Malayan Civil Service (MCS), the so called 'old Malayans', supported the Malays'
cause. They wrote to the national press and lobbied the Members of Parliament (MPs),
the CO, and even Attlee. 28 British businessmen with business interests in Malaya also
headmen and headmen who were held responsible for their involvement with the notorious forced
requisition of rice, labour and volunteers for the Japanese war effort.
25 Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 395-6.
26 Dormison (in p. 398) wrote, ' ... these violent protests were made by the Sultans, backed up by the
Malays.' However, Newboult, Bourdillon, and Gent were all convinced that the Sultans were much
pressurised by their own subjects to act, who were questioning the Sultans' action in signing the
MacMichael's agreement: from PRO CAB 129 7 CP(46)81 Malayan Policy: Cabinet memorandum by
G. Hall, 26 Feb. 1946, and CO 537 1548 no 31, Pan-Malayan Malay Congress: inward telegram no
08312 from HQ, British Military Administration (Malaya) to War Office, 5 Mar. 1946.
27 The proposal of the common citizenship is 'to grant full political rights in the Malayan Union to all
those, of whatever race, who regard Malaya as their true home and as the object of their loyalty': from
PRO CAB 129 7 CP(46)81 Malayan Policy: Cabinet memorandum by G. Hall, 26 Feb. 1946.
28 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, pp. lviii-lix; PRO CO 273 675/7 minute by J.J. Paskin to Sir G. Gater
about a meeting with T.B. Barlow, 16 Nov. 1945. There were prominent members of the former MCS,
such as Sir George Maxwell, the former Chief Secretary (1920-1926) of the Federated Malay States; Sirs
Cecil Clementi and Frank Swettenham, the former High Commissioners. There were also the British
civil servants who had served Malaya, for example, Leonard Gammons (whose enthusiasm earned him
the unofficial title of 'the honourable member for Malaya' during a Parliamentary session), Sir Richard
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objected to the Malayan Union proposals. In November 1945 Thomas Barlow, Chairman
of the Rubber Growers' Association (RGA), visited J.J. Paskin, the then head of the
Eastern Department of the CO. Barlow was concerned about constitutional changes that
might destroy the 'old friendly atmosphere' in Malaya by reneging on traditional British
pro-Malay policy. He particularly feared unrest in the country, which would affect
business prospects in Malaya. Interventions like Barlow's did not have the desired effect.
Instead, they were criticised for being self-interested and for not supporting the
government's efforts to create a strong central government in Malaya which would pave
the way for a move towards self-government.29
Encountering strong opposition not only from the Malays but also within Britain
the CO agreed to postpone the implementation of the common citizenship to allow local
consultation." The real turning point in the rigid attitude of the CO, particularly that of
the Secretary of State, George Hall, who had earlier refused to let the Malays' reactions
to the White Paper affect the implementation of the policy, was the result of pressure
from Sir Edward Gent and MacDonald. Gent had previously favoured Hall's opinion but
changed his mind after his arrival in Malaya as the Governor. MacDonald had also been
in agreement with Hall before, but completely changed his views within a few days of his
arrival in Singapore.31
Winstedt and A. S. Haynes: Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, pp. xlvii, 179, 180-81 note, 199 note 1, 233 note
2, 209.
29 PRO CO 273 675/7 minute by J.J. Paskin to Sir G. Gater about a meeting with T.B. Barlow, 16 Nov.
1945.
30 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, the author's own note in p. 209. Hall particularly emphasised the practical
effect of the protest from the ex-Malayan civil servants including Sir Frank Sweettenham: Hall, op.cit.,
pp. 835-36.
31 PRO CO 537 1528 Malay Reactions to the White Paper: minute by H.T. Bourdillon of a CO
Departmental Meeting, 25 Feb. 1946; CAB 129 7 CP(46)81 Malayan Policy: Cabinet memorandum by
G. Hall, 26 Feb. 1946; CO 537 1528 no 95A Sultans' Constitutional Proposals: inward telegram no 222
from Sir Edward Gent to G. Hall, 4 May 1946; CO 537 1529 no 104 Sultans' constitutional proposals:
outward telegram (reply) no 442 from G. Hall to Gent, and Minute by H.T. Bourdillon of a discussion
between G. Hall and M.J. MacDonald, 16 May 1946; CO 537 1529 no 110 Proposed concessions to
Malays: inward telegram no 6 from M.J. MacDonald to G. Hall, 25 May 1946.
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The hand over of the Military Administration, which had been established on 1
October 1945, to the civil government was accomplished when Gent was sworn in as the
Governor of the Malayan Union on 1 April 1946. On 11 May 1946 the Malay Congress
was reorganised into a political party, the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO),
under the leadership of Dato Onn. Three weeks after, the British decided to nullify the
Malayan Union, and on 2 June Gent began talks with the Malays. The negotiations
focussed on two aspects of the Union constitution, apart from the issue of its title — the
restoration of Malay prestige and amending common citizenship proposals. Malayan
Union citizenship was replaced by federal citizenship in which Malay special rights were
guaranteed, the prerogatives of the Malay rulers in the states were restored, and the
separate identity of Malay states was recognised. On 21 January 1948 Gent and the
Malay rulers signed the Federal Agreement. On 1 February 1948 the Federation of
Malaya came into being.32
The British congratulated themselves on their success in the negotiations with the
Malays, believing that they had not yielded much." However, the reality was that,
despite the constitutional change, executive power was still vested in the Malays. As a
result, the Malayan administration was uneasily shared between the British-dominated
central government and the state governments, and suffered from lack of unity and
central direction and consequent inefficiency.34
32 Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 396-404. Under the federal citizenship, every Malay was automatically entitled to
have a citizenship, but a Chinese only if he met some strict requirements as to birth and domicile.
33 The British 'felt that 90 per cent of the strategic aims of the Union were achieved within it': PRO CO
539 1529 part 2 Creech Jones to Gent, 16 May 1946, cited in T.N. Harper, The End of Empire and the
Making ofMalaya (Cambridge, 1999), p. 92.
34 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, p. xlvii; Pluvier, op.cit., p. 394. See R. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in
Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 (Singapore, Oxford, New York, 1989), pp. 77-
81 for the deficiency of the federal constitution, that was, decentralisation and its resultant adverse
effects on the counter-insurgency.
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Regarding the relationship between the metropolitan and local authorities, it was
generally true that the colonial administrations were politically subordinate to the home
authorities. Pluvier describes the colonial administrative systems in the area as
constitutionally incomplete entities, and each colony as 'a headless torso', and 'an
appendage of an empire with its locus of power thousands of miles away'. 35 However, in
comparison to other European colonies in the region, the Malayan administration
enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, for 'there was as little interference as possible in
the internal affairs' of Malaya by the London government.36
The relationship between the metropolitan and local authorities can also be
analysed by reference to the hierarchic relationship between the Secretaries of State for
the Colonies and the Governors in Malaya. Stockwell describes a Governor as a
somewhat mischievous cook who would 'get above himself and try to dictate his own
terms', and the Secretary of State as being a master who would 'not shrink from
interfering below stairs'. In any case, both had the dual function of presenting British
requirements and policy to Malaya and Malayan needs to the British government, thus
they saw their tasks as complementary.37
The Governor also had another hierarchic relationship at the regional level with
the Governor-General. Malayan affairs were supervised regionally by the Governor-
General who was directly responsible to the London government and whose function it
was to ensure coordination of policy and administration throughout British territories
with regard to political, economic and social questions.'s
35 Pluvier, op.cit., p. 10.
36 The colonial government in Burma also enjoyed similar degree of autonomy as that in Malaya. In the
case of the French Indochina, 'continuous interference by Paris severely restricted the theoretically
absolute power of the French governor-general of Indochina': ibid., pp. 10-12.
37 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, p. xlix.
38 PRO CAB 21 1954 Survey of co-ordination within the territories of South-East Asia: inward
savingram no 12 from Killearn to FO, 17 June 1946.
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Malcom MacDonald arrived in Singapore on 16 May 1946 and, as the Governor-
General, he quickly established himself and exerted his influence in many aspects of
Malayan affairs. In theory, he could not exercise any direct administrative role in
Malayan affairs, but had a supervisory role only. However, in reality he was not only
involved in the internal affairs of Malaya, such as constitutional change, the appointment
and dismissal of High Commissioners, but also he often acted over the heads of the High
Commissioners to the dismay of the latter. While Gent and Sir Henry Gurney were
prepared to be overruled by him as well as by the CO, General Templer, the Cabinet-
appointed High Commissioner and the Director of Operations (1952-1954), was not.
Basically the traditional hierarchic rule of CO was irrelevant to him because he had been
a professional soldier, not a career civil officer. Moreover, by the time Templer was
appointed High Commissioner, MacDonald was already past the peak of his influence.39
Nevertheless during his career as the Governor-General, then Commissioner-General,
'his views carried immense authority locally and commanded the respect of the CO and
of ministers'. 49
 Thanks to his presence and influence the British local authorities had a
coordinated voice, and, as a result, were given a better hearing by the metropolitan
authority.
From early 1952 onwards the importance of the role of the High Commissioner
rose as the colonial role of MacDonald receded. The locus of policymaking switched to
Malaya as a result of the commanding presence of the High Commissioners and,
ultimately and more significantly, of the Malayanisation of government. The difficulties
experienced in the aftermath of the war, such as the Malayan Union crisis and the
39 General Montgomery even wrote to Churchill that 'MacDonald must go' (because of his lack of
vigour) in order to revitalise the counter-insurgency: PRO PREM 11 169 Appointment of Templer: letter
from Field Marshall Lord Montgomery to Churchill. Enclosure: 'Success in Malaya', note by
Montgomery, 4 Jan. 1952.
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Communist insurrection, altered the course of Britain's plans for the colony, and resulted
in the need for continuous attention of, and consultation between metropole and
periphery. Having recognised this, it should be noted that the final stage of British rule
was characterised by a constant exchange of views between London and Kuala Lumpur.
This took the form of constant liaisons of high-level personnel in the two capitals.
Communication between London and the periphery was improved by frequent visits paid
by the successive Secretaries of State to Malaya and by MacDonald and the High
Commissioners in the other directions. As a result of improved contacts the gap between
London and the colony narrowed. By the time Sir David MacGillivray became High
Commissioner in 31 May 1954, Malayan political and economic decisions were ever
increasingly being made in Kuala Lumpur, but London still carried relatively more weight
in dealing with Malayan affairs.41
2.2 Britain and Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia
2.2.1 The Colonial Office and Regional Cooperation
During the Pacific War, the British CO took initiatives to develop wartime planning for
the British colonies in SEA, at the same time as making every effort to eliminate
international, but ultimately US, intervention in British colonial affairs. Immediately after
the fall of Singapore, the press and MPs began to search for the military reasons behind
the catastrophe, while colonial experts paid particular attention to the structure of the
Empire in their search for deficiencies in the British colonial system to which the defeat
might be attributed. 42 Even before the fall of Singapore, and especially after the Atlantic
meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in August 1941, there had been a recognition
4° This particular quote is from Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, p. xlviii, but the whole paragraph is based on
pp. xlviii-l.
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among the British (especially within the CO) that Britain's colonial policy would have to
be re-examined and defined, because Roosevelt made it clear that the Atlantic Charter,
particularly the most controversial principle regarding 'self-determination', was directed
against Britain and her Empire. Although Churchill and the War Cabinet alike insisted
that the Atlantic Charter and 'self-determination' referred to the nations of Europe under
the Nazi regime and were not intended to cover the sovereignty and self-government of
the British colonies, this could not prevent the Charter being freely interpreted as
applying to the Empire. Churchill's enthusiasm for the creation of a British alternative to
the Atlantic Charter drew the CO into making declarations on British commitments to
the self-government of the colonies, while, ironically, itself standing opposed to the
principle of self-government, 'even in the limited sense of self-governmene.43
The US declaration on National Independence of March 1943 emphasised the
colonial powers' responsibilities in preparing dependent peoples for independence under
fixed timetables, through internationally accountable regional commissions." This
particular declaration became a guideline for the British CO in search of a counter-
strategy to US trusteeship. Lord Cranborne's original idea on regional (defence and
economic) cooperation without international accountability° was now being
implemented by the CO. Since the Americans were interested in working through
regional commissions, the British would set up the regional commissions, composed of
representatives of all the nations interested, in the main colonial areas, such as in Africa,
SEA, South-West Pacific and the Caribbean. As SEA was still under Japanese
occupation, it was not feasible to establish any organisation. Nevertheless, the region was
41 ibid., pp. xlix-1
42 Louis, op.cit., pp. 134-39.
43 ibid., p. 121-139. The last quote is from p. 128.
44 ibid., p. 231.
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included because the British did not wish to be seen as perpetuating the old pre-war
imperial order.46
The foundation stone of the CO's strategy throughout the wartime was that
'Britain had her own colonial duty and ultimately the British were accountable only to
themselves and the inhabitants of the colonies.' 47 Yet when the US State Department
invited the British to submit a proposal on trusteeship as a way to resolve their
differences the CO promptly took the opportunity. In mid-October 1944, the CO
produced a document, International Aspects of Colonial Policy, and this received War
Cabinet approval in late December. The document emphasised partnership between the
metropole and dependent peoples, international regional cooperation, and the significant
role that could be played by publicity in demonstrating Britain's accountability."
Despite the CO's effort to deter any foreign intervention in British colonial affairs
and Cabinet approval of the CO project on regional cooperation based on Britain's
accountability, Churchill endorsed US trusteeship at Yalta. However, he did this more
because of the assurance given by the Americans that 'the proposal had nothing at all to
do with the British Empire', rather than as a result of any rejection of Britain's need to
guard its own interests against the encroachment made by other world powers.°
45 ibid., pp. 188-89. According to Louis, this was 'the genesis of the Colonial Office's idea of regional
cooperation'.
46 PRO CAB 66 49 W.P. (44) 211 Regional Bodies in Colonial Areas, 18 Apr. 1944, cited in Louis,
op.cit., pp. 313-15. The further difficulty involved in establishing a South-East Asia regional
commission would be the incompatibility of economic and strategic interests between the colonial
powers, the USA, Australia, China, India, and the Soviet Union. Other members of the Commission in
Southeast Asia would be Malaya, the British Borneo, the NEI, Portuguese Timor, Indochina, Siam, and
the Philippines, and possibly Burma, Ceylon, and Hong Kong where the possible membership was left
open.
47 PRO CO 968 156 Part. 1 International Supervision and the Colonial System: memorandum by
Poynton, 26 July 1944, cited in Louis, op.cit., p. 382.
48 In fact, the result was perceivable from the outset because the officials who undertook this task, Hilton
Poynton and Kenneth Robinson of the CO, were deeply committed to British colonial responsibilities.
For more details of the personal views of Robinson and Poynton on colonial matters, see Louis, op.cit.,
pp. 378-91.
49 ibid., pp. 433-460, and the quote is from p. 459.
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However, the reality was that the British 'accepted the premise of international
trusteeship' and, as the Colonial Secretary Oliver Stanley put it, 'were now committed'
to it." Since Britain accepted international trusteeship, the direction of British colonial
policy had, accordingly, needed reappraisal. It was an urgent matter at that moment
because colonial problems, including the future of the mandates, were soon to be debated
at the San Francisco Conference on the establishment of the United Nations
Organisation.
The focus at San Francisco was on the colonial question, with two issues being
highlighted: 'security (the strategic trust territory) and colonial accountability' and 'the
future of dependent peoples'. On these matters the British and the Americans
compromised; the British permitted the Americans to hold the Japanese mandated islands
as US strategic trust territory and in return the US delegates backed the British against
the Soviets and Chinese, who wanted 'Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing
Territories', to include a reference to 'Independence'. Although the US hard line against
European colonialism persisted, most of the US delegates, though some reluctantly,
decided to side with the British rather than back the position of the Soviets and Chinese,
setting pragmatism before principle. After all, 'British friendship was worth more than
the abstract ideal of independence'.51
50 ibid., p. 468.
51 Undated memorandum (post-San Francisco) in the Taussig papers, cited in Louis, op.cit., p. 539. Also
see Louis, chapters 33 and 34, for more evaluation of British/American collaboration on major issues
such as strategic territories and the question of colonial independence at San Francisco.
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2.2.2 Regional Cooperation in the Post-War Period: the Foreign Office, the South
East Asia Command, the Special Commissioner, the Commissioner-General, and
the Colombo Conference
During the war the British CO was convinced of the superiority of the British colonial
administration, thus rejecting international accountability for their colonies. The
documents produced by the CO reflected this strong belief in British accountability.
However, after International Trusteeship was endorsed by Churchill, the CO had to
shelve its own projects on colonial policy in order not to throw the whole future of the
colonial Empire open to discussion in international assemblies. During the post-war
period regional cooperation once again became a major issue in relation to rehabilitation
work and political developments in SEA. The CO was, however, reluctant to take the
lead in establishing regional cooperation due to their fear of international intervention
into British colonial affairs.
In the meantime, the FO was closely drawn into the process of regional policy-
making in SEA. The Office was quick to grasp the opportunity provided by the SEAC
which created a link between the British territories and non-British area in SEA. In spite
of having been criticised by the CO during the war years for their conciliatory attitude
towards the USA, the FO now hoped that the SEAC would be the basis for a British
dominated international organisation in post-war SEA. The general aim of the FO, with
respect to a regional organisation in SEA, was to provide for international cooperation at
the economic and political levels, which at a later stage might lead to a regional defence
arrangement. In any case, the FO hoped to maintain and extend the regional hegemony in
SEA immediately after the surrender of the Japanese under the British-led SEAC.52
52 Remme, op.cit., pp. 2-3. The meeting between the representatives of the CO and the FO on 26 July
1944 clearly showed their different way of looking at US trusteeship. While the CO saw the US
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Indeed the presence of the SEAC, which was responsible for the area comprising
Burma, Ceylon, Siam, Malaya, Southern Indochina, Borneo, and the NET, made up for
the lack of adequate regional machinery. 53 The SEAC also coordinated British military
and civilian authorities in SEA. However, as the Command was to be terminated at the
end of 1946, the British government needed another machinery to work SEA.
In fact there had already been consideration of the establishment of an overall
British authority for the Far East before the Pacific War. 54 In July 1941 Duff Cooper,
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, had been sent out to Singapore to examine
coordination between the various British military, administrative and political authorities
in that area. He reported back to the War Cabinet with a recommendation for the
appointment of a commissioner-general. In the following December Cooper himself was
appointed as Resident Minister to form a War Cabinet in the area following the Japanese
attack, but stayed in that position only until February due to the arrival of the Supreme
Commander of the US South West Pacific Area.55
In June 1945, the war in Europe had already ended. In SEA the British troops
had captured most of Burma, including Rangoon, and operation Zipper was under way
for the invasion of Malaya and the capture of Singapore. By that time some officials
within the British government were already pressing for the creation of administrative
trusteeship as a fatal blow to the British Empire, and British control on their own colonial affairs, the
FO was thinking the international trusteeship and cooperation with it more in terms of Britain's
relations with the USA and future financial aid from the Americans. The FO representatives were
worried that the CO's intransigence on the trusteeship issue might risk the chance to obtain US financial
aid in the future. As Cadogan of the FO pointed out, it seemed natural to the FO that the USA should
'expect to have some say in how the British Empire was run', while the British were 'asking them
[economically] of view': Louis, op.cit., pp. 382-83.
53 PRO CAB 21 1954 Survey of co-ordination within the territories of South-East Asia: inward
savingram no 12 from Killearn to FO, 17 June 1946 and CAB 21 1955 F6151/6151/61 South-East Asia:
work of the Special Commission during 1946: despatch no 119 from Killearn to Bevin, 12 Apr. 1947.
54 PRO FO 371 27856 F13798/6887161 minute, 10 Oct. 1941, cited in Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia
and the Onset of the Cold War, p. 47.
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machinery to coordinate the activities of officials and policies of the departments
concerned with SEA. These FO officials' enthusiasm for policy coordinating machinery
in SEA was led to a meeting of ministers, including Attlee and Sterndale Bennett on 18
October 1945. The participants agreed on 'the appointment of an official of
ambassadorial status directly responsible to the foreign secretary ... for the co-ordination
of both economic and political matters in the region'. 56 Clearly the FO was pressing for a
link between regional cooperation and its new appointment — Special Commissioner.57
The CO, though agreeing about the vital importance of regional cooperation in raising
the standard of living throughout the area, seriously doubted the wisdom of including any
reference to international regional cooperation in the Special Commissioner's directive.
They feared that such an inclusion might lead to outside interference, particularly from
the USA, and undermine the colonial powers. Moreover, the French and Dutch might
suspect the British of taking advantage of the presence of the SEAC to exert power into
their colonies. The CO was also anxious that its own plan to appoint a 'Governor-
General' with direct power over the British authorities in Malaya, Singapore, North
Borneo and Sarawak, might be disrupted by the FO's appointment of the Special
Commissioner.58
Notwithstanding these doubts, Lord Killearn, the British Ambassador in Cairo,
was chosen as the Special Commissioner for South East Asia, and took up post in March
55 PRO CAB 66 20 WP(41) 286 Report by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 29 Oct, 1941, cited
in Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, pp. 46-7; Stockwell, Malaya, Part I,
p. 106 note 4; Donnison, op.cit., p. 6.
56 The Committee was comprised of the Prime Minister, Attlee, as chair; the Lord President, Morrison;
the President of Board of Trade, Cripps; the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Hall; Addison
(Dominions); Pethick-Lawrence (India and Burma); and several officials from the Cabinet Office, the
CO, and the FO. It took them a few more months to be able to reach an agreement on the terms of
reference of the new appointment, which were finally approved in mid-March: Stockwell, Malaya, Part
p. 170 note 3.
57 Remme, op.cit., p. 39.
58 PRO CO 273 677/3 FF13-14 Political co-ordination in SE Asia: minute by Gent, 7 Aug. 1945;
Remme, op.cit., pp. 39-43.
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1946. According to the directives, his tasks were to advise the British government on
problems affecting the conduct of foreign affairs in SEA. He would give guidance to the
Supreme Allied Commander in filling in for the deficiencies of the SEAC in the political
and economic, as well as social, areas. He would also take all possible steps to ensure
coordination and cooperation between the British and non-British territories particularly
in economic and social welfare matters.59
Most of his work was carried out in cooperation with the Governor-General, the
Supreme Allied Commander, and the British Defence Committee in SEA. The Governor-
General had his own sphere of authority. Nonetheless his work often required
cooperation with other colonial powers and with foreign territories in all matters of
common interest, in which case required the cooperation of the Special Commissioner.6°
Killearn needed to maintain close contact with all representatives of British territories as
well as British representatives in non-British territories, and with the governments of
Australia and New Zealand. He also worked with the administrations in the NET and
Indochina, which were still under the SEAC, after the return to the civilian rule. 61 He and
his deputy, Michael Wright, as well as their advisers, travelled widely to discuss various
political and economic issues with the neighbouring countries and the local colonial
authorities. 62 The authority of the office of the Special Commissioner, in cooperation
with the Governor-General and the SEAC, covered the whole region and had
responsibility for the most urgent issues, particularly famine and rehabilitation. As a
59 PRO CAB 21 1955 F6151/6151/61 South-East Asia: Work of the Special Commission during 1946:
despatch no 119 from Killearn to Bevin, 12 Apr. 1947; CO 537 2203 no 2 Special Commissioner in
South-East Asia: memorandum by M.E. Dening on the future of the office, 23 Apr. 1947.
69 PRO CAB 21 1954 inward savingram no 12 from Lord Killearn to FO, 17 June 1946; CAB 21 1955
F6151/6151/61 despatch no 119 from Lord Killearn to Bevin, 12 Apr. 1947. After the termination of the
SEAC the British Defence Committee in SEA included the commanders-in-chief of the three services in
addition to the Governor-General and the Special Commissioner.
61 PRO CAB 21 1954 Appointment of Special Commissioner in SE Asia: outward telegram no 656 from
the Cabinet Office to Admiral Mountbatten, 13 Feb. 1946.
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result, the Special Commissioner became 'a chief advocate of greater regional
cooperation'.63
Killearn's appointment was provisionally for a period of two years. After a year,
the considerable value of the office, especially with regard to food supply and arbitration
of political problems in the NET and Indochina, was already highly regarded by the
British government. However, in March 1947 the UNO decided to establish the
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) to 'give effective aid to
countries devastated by war'. 64 It was initially proposed that ECAFE should act as a
coordinating body on all economic matters, and thus taking over all responsibilities of the
unofficial conferences, including the Special Commission.65
Another blow to the existence of the Special Commissioner came from within
Britain itself, for the high cost of the office was becoming problematic for the British
government. In 1947 the government made a defence budget cut of five per cent to
offset the increasing balance of payments deficit. The FO was asked by the Treasury to
reduce its expenditure in Singapore, including the ever rising running costs of the office
of the Special Commissioner — Killearn's staff had grown from approximately 200 at
the end of July 1946 to 500 by March 1947. 66 Richard Allen of the FO was sent to
Singapore in March 1947 to conduct an inspection. He suggested the amalgamation of
the Special Commissioner with the office of the Governor-Genera1. 67 Dening also
approved the merger in economic terms despite valuing the Special Commission as 'a
62 PRO CAB 21 1955 F6151/6151/61 despatch no 119 from Killearn to Bevin, 12 Apr. 1947.
63 Remme, op.cit., p. 50.
64 This particular quotation is from L.P. Singh, 'The Politics of Economic Cooperation in Asia'
(Columbia, 1966), pp. 18-22, in Remme, op.cit., pp. 105-16.
65 Rename, op.cit., p. 105-16.
66 A.S.B. Oliver, 'The Special Commission in South-East Asia, Pacific Affairs', vol. 21, no. 3, Sept.
1948, Daily Telegraph, 30 July 1946, and PRO FO 371 63543 F7570 minutes by M.E. Dening, 10 April
1947 and by R. Allen, 14 April 1947, cited in Renune, op.cit., p. 111.
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focal point for the radiation of British influence throughout South East Asia', which, in
the future, might become 'a vital link in the South East Asia Defence Organisation'.68
Nevertheless, duplication between the two offices had to be eliminated if the excessive
costs of running them were to be reduced. The Treasury saw various advantages in the
proposed merger°, the CO was also 'pleased', and the FO 'believed that the combined
post would improve the coordination of British policies' in the region."
However, Killearn, apart from being bitter about his forced early resignation, was
highly sceptical about the effectiveness of the merger into the CO machinery. The Special
Coinmission's reputation as a quasi-international organisation in the region was 'derived
from the fact that it represented the Foreign Office' and was not an instrument of British
colonial policy. Therefore, he emphatically argued that the Special Commission should
remain as a 'FO organisation, under an FO man'. 71 Nevertheless the merger went ahead.
On 1 May 1948 the former Governor-General, Malcom MacDonald, was officially
appointed Commissioner-General of the United Kingdom in SEA.
In 1948, nationalism ran high throughout the region; India had obtained her
independence in 1947, as had Burma in the following year; after the Dutch launched their
first police action in July 1947 Indonesian matters were brought to the UN Security
Council, the second police action, attracting world-wide condemnation of the Dutch, had
the effect of further fanning the flames of colonial independence. Under the
circumstances, the chances of the office of the Commissioner-General, directly
67 PRO FO 371 63543 F7571 Future of the Special Commissioner in South-East Asia: report by R.
Allen, 15 Mar. 1947, cited in Remme, op.cit., pp. 111-12.
68 PRO CO 537 2203 no 2 Special Commissioner in South-East Asia: memorandum by M.E. Dening, 23
Apr. 1947.
69 PRO CO 537 2203 no 7 Special Commissioner in South-East Asia: Treasury note of an inter-
departmental meeting with FO and CO, 24 Apr. 1947.
70 Remme, op. cit., pp. 112-13.
71 Malcolm MacDonald papers, Durham University, file 17/2/34, Killearn to Bevin, 4 July 194'7, cited in
Remme, op. cit., p. 112.
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responsible to the British CO, 'developing into a larger regional organisation acceptable
to the new Asian states were greatly diminished'. 72 In addition, after around two months
of the merger MacDonald became preoccupied with a series of events in Malaya owing
to the Emergency, and the recall and death of Gent, after which MacDonald temporarily
took over as Malayan High Commissioner.
While the FO endeavoured to turn the Special Commission into a regional organisation,
other means of achieving regional cooperation in SEA were also sought. The early plans
to induce cooperation with other European colonial powers had been tried and discarded
because of the strong objection from India and Burma. India and Burma were opposed
to the French presence in Indochina, and after the bombardment of Haiphong by the
French on 23 November 1946 and the subsequent declaration of war by Vietnamese on
20 December (the First Vietnam War), the anti-French mood in both countries was
further heightened. Since the British hoped that these two countries would become
members of the Commonwealth after independence they could not ignore the opinions of
the Indians and the Burmese on Asian affairs.73
The immediate circumstances in India and Burma aside, many British officials of
the CO and the FO were generally sharply critical of the Dutch and French for their
failure to accept the de facto presence of nationalist movements. 74 For example, Gordon
Whitteridge of the Far Eastern Department acknowledged the necessity of helping
France with their Indochinese affairs as a means to establish an alliance with France in
Europe and to support Britain's Asian interests. However, he was at the same time
72 Remme, op.cit., p. 113. Remme also points out that `MacDonald's regional coordinating activities
never featured as prominently in the Foreign Office's South-East Asian plans as they had under
Killearn': in p. 118.
73 ibid., 90-95. For more details about the battle for Hanoi, see Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 424-26.
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critical of the French 'pulling against the tide with their policy in Indochina: the future
was with the native people not only in Indochina but throughout the Far East'. 75 Similar
opinions prevailed elsewhere in the FO, including in some parts of the FO's Western
Department which was naturally more pro-French than any other Department. Even after
an Anglo-French Treaty was signed, in March 1947, it proved impossible to replicate in
SEA the cooperation forged in Europe with Paris. 76 The British could not accede to
French requests for the purchase and transport of arms that would end up being used to
suppress the nationalist movements in Indochina. Likewise, the Dutch military assault on
Indonesian nationalists, in July 1947, forced Britain to stop selling arms to The
Netherlands.77
In March 1947 Nehru convened the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, attended
by delegates from twenty-eight Asian countries. The Conference exposed division and
intransigence over greater cooperation among the Asian countries and thus failed to
produce a permanent organisation. Nevertheless, it demonstrated the possibility of
superseding Britain's idea of Asian-European collaboration by proposals for exclusively
Asian alignments. Moreover, during the following two years after this Conference Nehru
intensified his efforts to create a leading position among South and Southeast Asian
countries for India. Australians, whose security to a great extent depended on the
stability of Asia, were also increasingly concerned at being excluded from Asian regional
74 Dennis, op.cit., p. 228. For the British criticisms on the French and Dutch regarding the latter's
colonial affairs, also see ibid., pp. 94, 99, 139.
75 PRO FO 371 63542 F1201 minute by Whitteridge, 30 Jan. 1947, cited in Renune, op.cit., p. 78.
76 S. Greenwood, `Bevin, The Ruhr and the Division of Germany: August 1945-December 1946', The
Historical Journal, vol. 29, no. 1, 1986, pp. 203-212.
77 Remme, op.cit., pp. 90-95.
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developments and showed an apparent interest in exerting greater influence in Southeast
Asian affairs.78
While the initiatives taken by India and Australia proved to be ineffective, Britain,
nevertheless, faced competition from them. The Special Commissioner's removal meant
that Britain needed a new approach, this time because of Communist expansionism in the
region. The British strongly believed in the advantages of closer collaboration between
West and East because they feared that if the Asiatic countries were left alone there
would be 'little or no cohesion' between them, but 'greater fear, distrust and even
dislike'. The FO reached the conclusion that throughout Asia there was no single power
or any combination of powers which could successfully resist Russian expansion.
Therefore the British should use their influence to weld the area into some manner of
regional cooperation in order to resist Communist expansion.79
The FO embraced the idea of using the British Commonwealth, rather than a
purely UK approach, as a nucleus upon which regional cooperation should be built. This
view was common within the Labour Party, that the Commonwealth should be not only
the basis to form 'a real pooling of the whole of the colonial empires', but also the basis
for aid to the under-developed world." This would also remove India's suspicion that
the West might try to use the regional associations as a pawn in its war with the Soviet
Union. The Commonwealth offered a framework that might induce India's active
participation without intimidating other countries in the area, particularly Pakistan and
Ceylon, who were highly fearful of India's ambition to form a Greater India at their
78 ibid., pp. 97-104.
79 PRO CO 967 84 no 69 The United Kingdom in South-East Asia and the Far East: memorandum
prepared for Cabinet by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State's Committee in the Foreign Office, Oct.
1949.
89 Bullock, op.cit., p, 114.
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expense. 81 Additionally, the British were certain that their pre-eminent position in the
Commonwealth would ensure London a leadership role in any collaborative
arrangements.
An emphasis on the need to establish stability through betterment of economic
and social conditions was added to the idea of Commonwealth-based collaboration.
Although Paskin of the CO warned the downside of the economic approach, as social
progress based on economic development would be a slow and laborious process, it was
nevertheless agreed among the British that building up conditions of stability rather than
military strength against the Soviet encroachment would be the more effective policy.
This consensus was based the idea that the Southeast Asian countries would be more
tolerant of economic cooperation with the West because of their need for economic and
financial assistance. 82 The whole region was driven by strong nationalist sentiment, and
thus highly suspicious of any approach made by the West, and it would be more or so
with any attempt to promote greater political cooperation. Therefore, the FO concluded
that economic cooperation would be the only form of greater unity that the countries of
the area were likely to accept.83
The problem with this economic approach, however, was that of how to find the
necessary resources sufficient for the development of SEA. British resources were over-
stretched due to the heavy domestic demands and from the Empire. The only solution to
this lack of resources seemed to be American participation, not only with the various
projects of the British in SEA, but also with the general economic development of the
region. Without US assistance, as the FO reiterated on several occasions, there would be
81 ibid.
82 PRO FO 371 76031 F8037 Paskin to Dening, 22 Apr. 1949; FO 371 76031 F5863 South Asia: memo
14 Apr. 1949.
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no hope of establishing any regional system of collaboration in this stance. The problem,
however, was that the Americans were most reluctant to join any kind of defence
arrangement in SEA, as US confidence had been badly dented following their ill-fated
support of the Nationalist Chinese. They were also anxious to avoid accusations of
underwriting the European colonial policies." In fact the US leaders disagreed with the
economic approach. According to them, Siam and Malaya might benefit from financial
and economic assistance, but not Indonesia and Indochina, where political instabilities
would prove an insurmountable obstacle to the effectiveness of any economic
assistance.°
At a time when Marshall Aid was already well under way in Western Europe, the
Americans were still unwilling to be involved in SEA. They consistently maintained, first
of all, that countering Communism in SEA was the responsibility of the British
Commonwealth; secondly, that there would be no financial and economic assistance from
the USA until the political situations in the Southeast Asian countries had improved; and
thirdly, that the Asian states themselves should increase their efforts to resolve the
economic and political problems. Public financing should be channelled through the
Export-Import Bank and the World Bank, not directly from the US Government. 86 In
83 PRO CO 967 84 no 69 The United Kingdom in South-East Asia and the Far East: memorandum
prepared for Cabinet by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State's Committee in the Foreign Office, Oct.
1949.
84 Douglas wrote strongly 'it is certain that the American people do not wish to do and do not wish to be
accused of doing' over the matter of forming a defence pact in SEA: FRUS (1949), The Far East and
Australia, vol. vii, part. 2, US Ambassador in the UK (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, 29 Mar. 1949,
pp. 1133-34. They reiterated their opposition to a defence pact in several occasions. Also see, PRO FO
371 76375 W4092 A Pacific Pact: Foreign Office inte1.249, 9 June 1949; FO 371 76383 W4528 memo
recording talks with Kenan in July 1949.
85 FRUS (1949), The Far East and Australia, vol. vii, part. 2, memorandum of Conversation by the
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (W.W. Butterworth), 12 Sept. 1949, pp. 1197-98.
86 ibid., pp. 1198, 1200.
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any case the US administration would have the usual problem of persuading the
Congress of the necessity of making available fresh funds for SEA.87
Towards the middle of 1949, further Communist advances in China increased the
urgency among the British to work more precisely on measures to counter Communism
in the region. MacDonald warned the FO and CO and Commonwealth Relations Office
that unless the British convinced the Southeast Asians of the British, as well as of their
own, ability to resist Communism, the Communists would seize the whole of SEA, and
then India would be under a direct Communist threat. Dening was basically in agreement
with MacDonald, but went further by promoting this self-help as a way to induce
assistance from the Americans. In addition he placed emphasis on Britain taking the
initiative to achieve international cooperation in SEA, where, otherwise 'there would be
no cooperation'. Lastly he proposed to hold a Commonwealth Conference in Colombo."
On 1 October 1949 the Communist Chinese proclaimed the People's Republic of China.
On 17 October 1949 Attlee and Bevin agreed that there should be a Conference of
Commonwealth Foreign Ministers to discuss the situation in Asia, and within two weeks
the Prime Minster of Ceylon was asked by Attlee to organise a Conference in Colombo.
Among the many issues dealt at the Conference, which opened on 9 January
1950, Communism was the most important one, and it was agreed that economic
counter-measures were most effective against Communist disturbances. Accordingly, the
British were keen to use the opportunity to bring up the issue that the USA should
contribute resources to the development of South and Southeast Asia. Washington was,
therefore, provided with a great deal of information on the meetings: the British FO
87 Remme, op.cit., p. 203.
88 PRO FO 371 76034 F8338 minutes of a meeting at the FO, 24 May 1949 and FO 371 76009 F7516
minute by Dening, 19 May 1949, cited in Renune, op.cit., pp. 190-91. In fact, at the meeting of
Commonwealth Prime Ministers in October 1948, it was already contemplated to hold other
Commonwealth meetings at the Ministerial level on foreign and economic affairs.
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supplied highly confidential daily reports on the Conference and the American journalists
were given special daily background briefings, all designed 'to keep Washington's
interest going) •89 At the same time the Commonwealth delegates were told that since the
end of the war Britain had already made contributions of £750 million, roughly half of
the total sum of the financial contributions made by the UK government throughout the
world, to the Asian countries in loans, grants, releases of sterling balances, and
unrequited exports of all kinds. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Cripps, had already
stated at a meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers, held in London in July 1949,
that Britain would not have many resources to spare. Thus, even though Bevin and other
British delegates in Colombo offered assurances that Britain would do all she could, it
was obvious that Britain would not be able to make further financial commitments to the
region very much greater than they had already contributed. Canada and South Africa
also gave warning that their help would be strictly limited owing to their own financial
difficulties. Neither India nor Pakistan was in a good position to spare capital for external
investments. Despite their enthusiasm, Australia and New Zealand were hardly in any
better position. Without capital investment and technical assistance from the USA, it was
clear that the Commonwealth alone could not hope to rescue SEA from poverty and
Communist expansion. 9° Nevertheless Bevin, in his review of the work of the Colombo
Conference, refused to implore the Americans for assistance on the basis that 'It would
be wrong for me to make a proposal to them.'91
The Australian Foreign Minister, Percy Spender, proposed the establishment of a
Consultative Committee representing the Commonwealth governments. In the proposal
89 PRO CAB 129 38 CP (50) 18 The Colombo Conference, 22 Feb. 1950, cited in Remme, op.cit., pp.
207-08.
90 The Times, 13 and 17 Jan. 1950; PRO CAB 133 78 FFM (50) 8th meeting, 12 Jan. 1950, cited in
Remme, op.cit., p. 210.
91 The Times, 17 Jan. 1950.
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he urged each Commonwealth country to provide the Southeast Asian countries with all
the help it could possibly muster in food, in consumer and capital goods, in technical
advice and in moral support. This mutual aid among all Commonwealth countries would
eventually be open to other countries willing to join in. Each country taking part in it
would examine how much it could offer in sterling credits for the provision of those
items listed above and then, when the study was completed, they would meet in Canberra
in the Consultative Committee to discuss more specific economic issues and to draw up
development plans for each of participating Asian countries.92
According to Bullock, Bevin regarded the Conference as a success. As he had
hoped before he went to Colombo, 93 the meeting managed to secure some practical
results in economic cooperation, and he attached more importance to success in this than
his failure to obtain agreements on political issues over the recognition of China,
recognition for the Bao Dai regime in Indochina, and a Peace Treaty with Japan, which
divided Britain from the older Dominions and India. 94 To him the fact that the
representatives of Britain, the newly independent Asian states, and the older
Commonwealth members met to 'discuss difficult political and economic questions
frankly, was a considerable political achievement in itself' . 95 Indeed, it was the first
conference of its kind, and the first held in Asia. Although the British took the initiative,
of the eight countries represented, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia and New Zealand
92 The Times, 13 and 16 Jan. 1950.
93 Bullock regards that the launch of the Colombo Plan owed much to the imagination and enthusiasm of
Bevin. The Foreign Secretary was intent that the meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in
Colombo should be a means of resisting Communism in Asia through the existing machinery of the
Commonwealth. He also believed in the economic approach, for raising the standard of living would be
the best way to oppose Communism, and at the same time it would be of mutual benefit to the developed
and less-developed countries by leading to an increase in trade between them and the joint opening up of
the access to resources: Bullock, op.cit., pp. 114-15, 745-47.
94 India refused to recognise the Bao Dai regime, and the Australians held to their different view on the
Peace Treaty with Japan.
95 For the details on the political issues, see Bullock, op.cit., pp. 747-48, and also The Times, 16 Jan.
1950.
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were far more concerned with South and Southeast Asia than with any other part of the
world. 96
 Although the Australians still kept the possibility of drawing a defence pact in
the Pacific area in mind, the subject was not discussed at the Colombo Conference.97
Nehru was this time in agreement with Britain that 'a Pacific pact was undesirable'
because of the absence of an assurance of American participation." More importantly
both agreed on an economic approach as the way to resolve political as well as economic
problems of the area.
The deficiency of the development plans was however visible, as their success
was to a great extent dependent on US assistance, and the immediate success of the
Conference was minimised by the subsequent sluggish response from the USA to the
Colombo Plan. In late 1949 there were some signs that the US administration was
beginning to realise the significance of SEA in relation to both the containment of
Communism and the effect that instability in SEA had on exacerbating Britain's
economic troubles. The British officials were encouraged by Truman's endorsement of
the Policy Planning Staff Paper on US Policy toward SEA, which had been published in
March 1949. The US government now agreed that improving the economic conditions of
SEA would contribute to the political stability, and that SEA would 'require US moral
and, to a limited extent, material aid'. 99 The British FO officials saw this as 'very
stimulating', for they saw the Planning Staff Paper as complementing rather than
conflicting with UK policy in SEA. The difference over the roles of India and the
96 The Times, 9 Jan. 1950.
97 Bullock, op.cit., p. 747.
98 PRO CAB 133 78 FFM (50) rd meeting, 9 Jan. 1950, cited in Remme, op.cit., p. 208.
FRUS (1949), The Far East and Australia, vol. vii, part. 2, Outline of Far Eastern Asian Policy for
Review with the President, 14 Nov. 1949, pp. 1210-14; A Report to the President by the NSC, 30 Dec.
1949, pp. 1215-20.
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Philippines in SEA, and the inter-relationship of the economies of Japan and SEA did not
much matter, so long as American thinking was on the same lines as was the British.'"
Yet the USA was still reluctant to undertake any commitments in the region. The
US policy stated that they should 'carefully avoid assuming responsibility for the
economic welfare and development' of SEA. Instead India, Australia and New Zealand
should be drawn into more direct responsibility for that. US economic aid should be
'supplementary' to that provided by the European colonial powers. In addition the
administration was more cautious with regard to the formation of regional associations
of non-Communist states in SEA, and thus refrained from taking any active part in the
early stages of the project. 1 ° 1 Even after the Colombo Conference the general view of the
US administration with SEA did not change in a great deal. Whilst the US administration
recognised the vitality of economic assistance for Asia and their determination to succeed
in Japan, Korea, the Philippines and, to a lesser degree in Indonesia, both the Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, W. Walton Butterworth, and the Ambassador
at Large, Philip C. Jessup, made clear that the US administration did not want to take up
direct financial responsibilities, other than operating through UN agencies or
International Bank of Research and Development (TBRD).
100 PRO FO 371 76025 F17668/10345/61G minutes by R.H. Scott and J.0. Lloyd, 24 Nov. 1949, and
letter from F.R. Hoyder Millar, British Embassy, Washington, to Sir Roger Makins, FO, 16 Nov. 1949.
1 ° IFRUS (1949), The Far East and Australia, vol. vii, part. 2, Outline of Far Eastern Asian Policy for
Review with the President, 14 Nov. 1949, pp. 1210-14; A Report to the President by the NSC, 30 Dec.
1949, pp. 1215-20.
102 They said this during the Bangkok Conference of United States Chiefs of Mission in the Far East
held between 13 and 15 February 1950 to discuss general matters in Asia: FRUS (1950), East Asia and
the Pacific, vol. vi , Stanton to Acheson, Bangkok, 17 Feb. 1950, pp. 18-19; Stanton to Acheson, 27 Feb.
1950, pp. 28-30. Stockwell (Stockwell, 'Southeast Asia in War and Peace', p. 37) states that from the
mid-1949 'US policy shifted from non-intervention to intervention in Southeast Asia'. Rotter (A. J.,
Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to SEA (Ithaca and London, 1987),
pp. 1-2) concludes that by 1949 'Following the summer of 1949, American policymakers found that
Southeast Asia was the critical theater in their efforts to contain communism and to effect the recovery
of the developed, non-Communist nations.' Though it might have been, there are still many evidences
that show their reluctance to be directly involved in SEA, especially before the Korean War. Their
subsequent military and economic aids for Indochina and Indonesia only came in May 1950, and this
102 This caution over economic
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aid derived from their belief that the Asian nations feared US economic imperialism, to
the degree that none of the European imperialism was considered with so much
apprehension as was the US. The Americans considered that even their assistance in the
mediation of disputes between the European colonial powers and their respective
colonies in SEA was viewed 'in part by native populations and always by Moscow' as
being intended to replace western European hegemony in the region. 1°3 Nonetheless
some emergency economic assistance, designed to remove impediments to economic
development and support the Southeast Asian governments to assist their peoples in
economic rehabilitation, was provided. Also, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson
announced an economic and military aid package to Indochina, and later $13 million in
aid was assigned to each of Indonesia and Indochina. A few weeks before the outbreak
of the Korean War, Acheson, announced US plans for economic and military assistance
to Indonesia and Indochina.104
The US administration still stood aloof from the process of establishing the
development strategy drawn up under the Colombo Plan in May 1950. It was only in
February 1951 that the USA finally became a full member of the Colombo Planning
Committee. While the Conference and the Colombo Plan demonstrated the ability for
self-help and mutual aid among the Asian nations, the Plan's main objective of generating
economic development was only marginally successful due to lack of finance. According
decision again might have been 'portentous' in retrospect, but the amount was still too negligible to
convince any part in the region, then, of the US administration's readiness to intervene in the region.
1 03 FRUS (1950), East Asia and the Pacific, vol. vi , memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Economic
Affairs, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Shohan) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant), Washington, 16 Mar. 1950, P. 62.
104 FRUS (1950), East Asia and the Pacific, vol. vi , memorandum by Acheson to the President, 9 Mar.
1950, pp. 40-44; record of the conversation between the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) and
Representatives of the British Foreign Office, 11 Mar. 1950, pp. 46-51; memorandum by the Officer in
Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Shohan) to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant), Washington, 16 Mar. 1950, p. 62;
memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Lacy) to the
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to the report published during the Colombo Plan's second meeting in London in October
1950, the development plans required £1.8 billion, of which external finance should
cover £1.1 billion. 105 By 1961, the USA was the biggest contributor to the Plan financing
a total of $8.3 billion through bilateral loans, grants and technical assistance, whilst
Britain contributed £500 million between 1951 and 1961, including the release of £250
million in sterling balances held by India, Pakistan and Ceylon. 106 The problem with the
external financial assistance was that most of them consisted of loans rather than grants,
which the recipients would have to pay back later. Moreover, the external assistance
'only supplemented the national effort, and was generally of a marginal character', as the
three-quarters of the development programmes had to be financed by the Asian countries
themselves.'" Therefore Remme concludes that limited success was achieved with the
Colombo Plan in raising living standards, and the initiatives taken in Colombo failed to
develop into an anti-Communist bloc that had been envisaged by the FO in 1949, since
India refused to be drawn into an anti-Communist alignment.'"
As it has been acknowledged, the British found US commitment to the region was
less than satisfactory, but the Korean War and the consequent danger to the security of
Asia helped US Administration understand better the significance of the strategic
position of the region against Communist aggression. In a meeting of February 1952 with
members of the Canadian Embassy staff, the State Department expressed its doubt about
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk), 22 May 1950, pp. 94-96; Remme, op.cit., p.
214.
105 Colombo Plan Consultative Committee, The Colombo Plan: Fourth Meeting at Karachi; Report of the
Consultative Committee on economic Development in South and South-East Asia, Colombo, 1952, p.
10, cited in Remme, op.cit., p. 213.
1 °6 Colombo Plan Bureau, The Colombo Plan - Basic Information, Colombo, 1962, pp. 31-2, cited in
Remtne, op.cit., pp. 214-15. Having used this information, it should be pointed out that unless sterling
equivalent of US expenditure is figured out, that cannot be compared to the British expenditure of £500
million. I find it impossible to calculate sterling equivalent because the contribution was made 'over the
period of the time'.
1 °7 Colombo Plan Bureau, The Colombo Plan Basic Information, Colombo, 1962, pp. 31-2, cited in
Rename, op.cit., p. 215.
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whether an effective defence of Western Europe could be organised if Communist
aggression was allowed to develop in the Far East. 1°9 Accordingly the priorities for US
military effort were given to Korea and Indochina, an d Military help was also provided
for the Philippines, Thailand and Formosa (now Taiwan). 110 Throughout the 1950s the
British continued to work to obtain US cooperation in SEA. Admittedly the USA was
far more heavily committed to the countries of SEA through economic development and
military aid than the UK, but the British were still sceptical about the extent of US
readiness for commitment in Asia as a whole and felt very much obliged to take the lead
in Asian affairs because, otherwise, they were afraid that the US Administration might
fail to act. ill
2.3 The Culture and Processes of Government/Business Relations
There had been a cohesive relationship in pre-war SEA between the metropolitan and
colonial governments, on the one hand, and western enterprises, on the other. The
European business communities were engaged in all aspects of the colonies' economic
activities, creating both employment and revenue for both metropolitan and colonial
governments. In general, they were favoured over local businesses in terms of taxation,
land and labour. Although Pluvier overstates the case somewhat when he asserts that
businesses 'always received the support of the colonial administrations', it is certainly
true that western firms operating in SEA were often 'favoured by a combination of legal
108 Remme, op.cit., pp. 215-6.
109 PRO FO 371 99218 F10345/9 account given by Ignatieff of a Meeting between Members of the
Canadian Embassy and the US State Department, 29 Feb. 1952.
H ° PRO FO 371 99218 F10345/12 "The US and FE" State Department's Press Release No. 503, 27 June
1952.
111 PRO FO 371 105182 F10345/1/G brief on American Policy in the Far East by R.H. Scott, FO, 24 Jan.
1953. Even in the sixties some sections of British opinion still complained that the Americans regarded
SEA and the Pacific Dominions as 'remote and of relatively marginal interest and importance': from
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measures and administrative practices'. 112
 So, the assistance given to British firms
operating in Malaya was not unique and French firms operating in Indochina enjoyed an
almost absolute advantage over both native and other western firms."3
In the post-war period, British firms in Malaya were still a powerful pressure
group, maintaining important advantages in their dealings with the London and colonial
governments in a number of ways. Firstly, they had direct access to the metropolitan
government, particularly to the CO. British businesses could also consolidate their efforts
to influence their home government through various other government Departments
which had interest in the affairs of Malaya, such as the FO, the Treasury, the Board of
Trade, the Commonwealth Relations Office, and the Ministries of Supply and Materials.
Firms sent delegations of various sizes and importance to the London government. In
response, the government would organise representations comprised not only of CO staff
but also personnel from other government Departments who had concerns with regard to
the subject matters that were broached by the business delegations. For instance, it was
normal for the Treasury and the Ministry of Supply to be present on representations
dealing with rehabilitation and war damage compensation in Malaya."'
British firms with particular interests in the Malayan rubber industry had the ever-
increasing necessity to discuss long-term policy matters with government. These
discussions covered methods of purchase, prices, and matters relating to UK-US rubber
policy, which was dealt with by the Rubber Consultative Committee (RCC), formed in
March 1946. Within the Committee, business was represented by the RGA and Rubber
Trade Association of London, and was comprised of domestic manufacturers, trade
PRO FO 371 159713 D103145/30 Selkirk, the Commissioner-General for SEA, to FO, 21 Dec. 1961;
FO 371 166355 D103145/3 Sir D. Gore, British Embassy, Washington, to FO, 19 Jan. 1962.
112 Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 49-50.
113 For more details, see ibid., pp. 41-54.
114 PRO T 220 134 note of a meeting held at the Treasury, 5 Mar. 1946.
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unionists, and trade advisers from government Departments. Government was
represented by officials from the Treasury, the Raw Materials Department of the Board
of Trade, the FO, and the CO. The tin industry had an equivalent, the Tin Consultative
Committee, for the same purpose.115
Informal approaches to government were also made by rubber and tin leaders,
such as Sir John Hay, the chairman of Guthrie and Co., J. Ivan Spens, the chairman of
the London Tin Corporation (LTC), and Sir Clive Baillieu, the chairman of the Dunlop
Rubber Co. Government often 'preferred to consult a small circle of "advisers" rather
than large, unmanageable bodies such as the RCC'. These men enjoyed a position of
considerable influence over government policy, providing direct and indirect assistance
of experts in the formulation of policy. According to White, no discussion of the role of
British business in Malaya would be complete without taking into account the influence
of Hay, who was regarded in government circles as the leader of the rubber estate
industry and as 'an indispensable arm of government in the negotiations on international
restriction'. Equally influential were Spens, who 'had privileged informal access to the
Board of Trade/Ministry of Materials', and Baillieu, who is described by White as being
'the most influential UK industrialist Malaya could call on' based on his strong
connections inside the Conservative Party. 116
Business also received backing from several notable politicians with commercial
experience in Malaya. These included Walter Fletcher, Sir John Barlow, Viscount
Marchwood, and Oliver Lyttelton who all had business experience in Malaya and were
,.......
115 White, op.cit., pp. 35-6.
116 ibid., pp. 38-41.
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Conservative MPs. They also served in successive British governments mostly in the
fields of trade and industry. 117
Occasionally these officials, politicians, and business leaders were at one on
Malayan affairs, but often for different reasons. With regard to the Union constitution,
the business leaders were anxious about the instability that they believed the Union
constitution would bring to Malaya, and 'had little time for political progressivism'.""
On the other hand, the old Malayan representatives objected to the Union constitution
because it would neglect Malays' interests, which had been the priority of traditional
British Malayan policy. Among the old Malayans, Leonard Gammons, Lords Elibank and
Marchwood expressed such views in Parliament, while Sirs George Maxwell, Cecil
Clementi and Frank Swettenham met George Hall, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, to explain their position regarding the changes, but 'came away empty-
handed'. 119 They also shared a dislike of Gent, who became a scapegoat of the Labour
government for its failure in persuading the Malays of the progressiveness of the Union
117 Walter Fletcher was a Conservative MP between 1945 and 1955. Among his career as a businessman
in various parts of Europe and East Africa, he was a chairman of Rubber Trade Association of London
(RATL) in the 1930s; Sir John Denham Barlow was a joint partner of Thomas Barlow & Brothers with
his younger brother, Thomas Bradwall Barlow who was more devoted to business in Malaya and served
several chairmanship in British Association of Straits Merchant (BASM), RTAL, RGA and British
Association of Malaysia during the period of time between 1937-1965. Sir John was a director and
chairman of estate companies in the Barlow group, and was also involved in Banking before entered into
and while was in polities. He was at first a National Liberal MP between 1945 and 1950 before switched
to the Conservatives 1951 onwards; before his long career in politics throughout 1920s and 30s and even
the forties, Viscount Marchwood (formerly Frederick George Penny) had his business career in tin
smelting in Malaya and became a director of Eastern Smelting Company, and of the parent firm,
Consolidated Smelters in 1920s; Oliver Lyttelton was the chairman of London Tin Corporation and
Anglo-Oriental (Malaya), before his long career as a politician. Among significant posts he served
before and during the Second World war, he was the President of Board of Trade between 1940-41, and
again in 1945, and was the Minister of Production between 1942-5. He became the Secretary of State for
the Colonies under the Churchill government in the peace-time, and boosted confidence with the
government among businessmen with interests in Malaya: all based in the biographical index (pp. 282-
295) of White's. Also see White, op.cit., pp. 36-8.
118 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, p. lviii; PRO CO 273 675/7 minute by J.J. Paskin to Sir G. Gater, 16 Nov.
1945.
119 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, p. lviii.
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constitution, and its lack of success in fighting lawlessness. The collapse of business
confidence in Gent speeded up his immediate recal1,120
Business enjoyed even closer party-political connections under the Conservative
government. Oliver Lyttelton was appointed the Secretary of State for the Colonies after
the Conservatives' victory in the general election on 25 October 1951. He had been
deeply involved with the Malayan tin industry throughout 1920s and 1930s, and was the
chairman of the London Tin Corporation (LTC) and Anglo-Oriental in 1937. In 1940 he
became a Conservative MP, thus began his career as a politician. With his appointment
as the Secretary of State, British business interests in Malaya 'had a knowledgeable and
sympathetic voice on the Tory front bench' 121 Lyttelton, regarded the Malayan situation
(the Emergency) as his 'first priority', and announced his intention to make a trip to
Malaya to assess the situation for himself. During his stay in Malaya and Singapore, he
made statements on British determination to stay on to protect Malaya, and to prioritise
the operational side of the Emergency. 122 To the delight of business, the Conservative
government differently from the Labour seemed to see these significant issues eye to eye
with business. Additionally, the Churchill government's enthusiastic intention to get a
grip on the Malayan situation was reflected in the appointment of General Templer as
both Director of Operations and the High Commissioner. In 1955 the Public Relations
Committee of the RGA established connections with the Far Eastern Section of the
Conservatives' Parliamentary Commonwealth Relations Committee and thus 'the voice
120 PRO CO 537 3686 no 1A letter from MacDonald to Creech Jones, 19 May 1948; CO
717/172/52849/9/1948 notes by W.G. Sullivan, 22 June 1948; CO 537 3686 no 6 telegram from
MacDonald to Creech Jones, 29 June 1948.
121 White, op.cit., pp. 37-8.
122 PRO PREM 11 122 Secretary of State's visit to Malaya: minute PM(51)1 from Lyttelton to Churchill,
30 Oct. 1951; Stubbs, op.cit., p. 136.
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of Malayan business within the Conservative Party grew louder'.123 However, broadly
speaking, the Conservatives' Malayan policy was a 'continuity of Labour ' s policy' and
its success owed much to Labour's counter-insurgency operation. 124 Having said this, it
was nevertheless the case that Lyttelton, whose experience in Malaya was outstanding,
had a much more effective working relationship with business than did the previous
Labour Secretaries of State. In this sense it is correct to say that 'Malayan industrial
circles had many more "friends at court" in the Tory governments post-1951 than during
the preceding Labour regimes.' 125
In Malaya itself, business delegations, consisting of members of local business
associations, often including Asian business interests, made visits to the Governor and
High Commissioners at King's House. Both businessmen and civil servants also met in
the local clubs, where they forged informal links. However, in spite of the multiplicity of
opportunities to make representations that were available to businessmen, the post-war
political changes in Malaya would affect, sometimes adversely, government/business
relations in a number of ways.
The constitutional changes, first of all, restrained the political role of business. In
the pre-war period, directors and managers of British firms were involved at all levels of
the colonial government in Malaya. Under the Union constitution in the post-war period,
designed to promote self-government, British directors and managers remained a
majority of members on the Malayan Union's Advisory Council. However, the federal
constitution limited non-officials' participation in government, thus decreasing business
participation in the affairs of central government. Nevertheless the Legislative as well as
nnn......
123 'Report of the General Purposes Committee', RGACM, 66, 5 December 1955, TGA, London, cited in
white, op.cit., p. 38.
124 Stockwell, 'Southeast Asia in War and Peace', pp. 48-49; Harper, op.cit., p. 310.
125 White, op.cit., p. 38.
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Executive Councils remained heavily reliant upon those nominated by business
organisations. Moreover, while it is true that there was a decline in British business
presence within councils of state after the launch of a quasi-ministerial system of
government in 1951, and then of full Cabinet government in 1955, this was to some
extent compensated for by the establishment of advisory committees. Managers and
directors of British firms were brought into the state governments as advisers to
development bodies and agencies, as the concept that overseas investment was of high
value in terms of the creation and maintenance of high employment levels and the
generation of public revenue was ever-present.126
Secondly, the Malayan government, encouraged by the British government, was
becoming more attentive to its own economic affairs rather than relying solely on private
enterprises, as it had in the pre-war period. The British government furnished Malaya
with an Economic Adviser who would assist post-war Malaya with 'first-class advice on
the economic problems' on the basis that good industrial management was needed in
order to maximise Malaya's dollar earning capacity. The British government considered
that the rehabilitation of the extractive industries and the re-establishment of production
would be 'of very great importance not merely to the territory itself but to the Empire as
a whole' 127 Cyril Pyke, the Economic Adviser to the Malayan government between 1946
and 1949, and his successor, Oscar Spencer, were both 'committed to expanding the role
of the state in Malayan economic affairs', whether for the purpose of boosting Malaya's
dollar contributions to the Sterling area or to promote national economic development.
This involvement resulted in a new level of political intrusion into economic affairs, a
situation that was also exemplified by the role of experts like the economist, Frederic
.......l
126 ibid., pp. 43-5.
127 PRO T 220 52 IF 23/01 letter from Sir G. Gater to Sir H. Wilson Smith, 31 Aug. 1945.
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Benham, and the representatives of the UK's Board of Trade and Ministry of Transport
in Malaya, who began to operate under the auspices of the Commissioner-General's
office in Singapore in 1948.128
Both officials and businessmen at the local level still enjoyed a close bond of
social identity in the rather isolated European society in the colony. 129 Thus a relatively
homogeneous culture grew out of the common identity that was shared by planters and
MCS men who were 'of the same tastes as well as background [well spoken middle
class] and used the same jargon'. While the bureaucrats in Malaya thought themselves to
be culturally superior to the business milieu, composed of such people as traders and
concession hunters,'" businessmen resented the officials' ignorance with regard to
business practices. They also disliked what was perceived as their lack of support, which
flowed from the officials' ideological liberalism, which often encompassed a passion for
social reform.' In other words, they believed that government was letting them down
and it was this division, between the political and the economic wings amongst the
expatriate population, that constituted the essential character of conflict between those
groups.
In the post-war period the cohesion in the ideas that business and officials shared
about Malaya was further undermined by the chaotic situation in the aftermath of war
and the Emergency. Business frustration and anger towards the officials manifested itself
in two ways: firstly, as a result of the lack of action in dealing with lawlessness, which
had mainly been the result of the penetration of the workers' organisations by the
128 White, op. cit., pp. 44-5.
129 M.R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948 (London,
New York and Kuala Lumpur, 1970), p. 155.
130 White, op.cit., pp. 44-7, and the quote is from Review of Butcher, British in Malaya reproduced in
Anthony Burgess, Homage to Qwert Yuiop: Selected Journalism, 1978-1985, Glasgow: Abacus, 1986,
63-6
'
 cited in White, op.cit., p. 46.PP. 
131 See Stenson, op.cit., pp. 150, 158, 233.
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Malayan Communist Party (MCP) during the early post-war years, and secondly, with
regard to the government's 'soft-hearted' doctrine, which put social welfare before the
counter-insurgency operation, resulting in a lack of progress in the suppression of
insurgents. 132 Officials' sympathy for, and liberal attitude to, Malayan workers and their
soft approach to militant unionism was borne out of a government preference for a
gradual approach to labour problems through the promotion of legitimate trade
unionism. Taking account of the changing political environment in the post-war period,
the pre-war style of suppression of unionism ln
 would be subject to open condemnation.
Therefore, urgent demands from business for the application of 'death, banishment and
particularly flogging', especially after the Kedah incident in early 1947, to address the
lawlessness, only met with a sluggish and partial response from the officials. 134 Social
welfare was one of many important aspects of British post-war policy which particularly
emphasised the need for political and social advancement in Malaya. Although some
section of British managers and directors complained of the officials' obsession with
'protection' of the existing Malay social and cultural structure, at the expense of
c development', 135 in fact, many in the commercial sector, driven by profit-making, also
showed little interest in any changes, because the changes would not match up to
businesses' expectation of stability, which was axiomatic to the rehabilitation of business
interests, and to the rapid recovery of production.
-
132 Harper, op. cit., p. 155.
133 See Stenson, op.cit., pp. 11-53.
134 PRO CO 537 2208 no 16 despatch no 19 from Gent to Creech Jones and minute by H.T. Bourdillon,
30 Sept. 1947; CO 537 2208 no 24 outward telegram no 1305 from Creech Jones to Gent, 18 Oct. 1947;
Harper, op.cit., p. 138.
135 Interview with Leslie Davidson who was an assistant manger on Unilever's estates in Johor from
1951 to 1958, cited in White, op. cit., p. 46.
98
In summary the cohesiveness of European society in post-war Malaya should not
be exaggerated' and the fundamental differences between government and business
were often revealed over such issues as constitutional change, counter-insurgency and
the process of political development. While business still had a strong voice in the
metropole through their party-political connections and through the presence of
influential individuals among the leaders of the rubber and tin industries, the closeness of
the connections between the business community and the officials in the state structures
of the colony was rapidly diminished by a sequence of post-war events. In spite of the
growing role of the colonial government, the location of the main weight of authority in
decision-making remained in the metropole. Therefore the extent to which the
intransigence and lack of cohesiveness between officials and business in post-war Malaya
reflected the overall position of the relations between government and business is
difficult to ascertain.
Conclusion
Due to the imminence of Indian independence and the Communist expansion, SEA was
increasingly significant to British regional policy-making. As we have seen, keeping SEA
stable and secure was directly related to the British national interest, and thus
cooperation with other powers and Asian countries was sought to rehabilitate the region
and to establish stability. As a way of achieving these objectives, the FO created the
office of the Special Commissioner to incorporate the work of all British representatives
and also to connect them with foreign representatives in the region. Though the office
was originally intended to advise the British government and to compensate for the
deficiencies of SEAC in dealing with economic and political matters, the Special
136 White, op.cit., p. 45.
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Commissioner was also assigned with a task of eliminating the famine and handling other
related issues. Through the existence of the Governor-General and the Special
Commissioner, whose work coordinated with that of British military authorities in the
region, Britain retained her pre-war hegemony in SEA immediately after the end of the
war. Nonetheless, it was clear that Britain alone could not effectively deal with the post-
war problems especially in the face of Communist expansion, and thus the FO sought
cooperation with other powers with interests in the region. As the possibility of working
with the returning colonial powers was rejected because of the strong nationalist
sentiment among the Southeast Asians, and as the British did not have faith in an
approach initiated by the Indians' purely Asian approach, collaboration with the British
Commonwealth was seen as the best way to promote economic, rather than political or
defence, cooperation. Essential, though, was US economic and financial aid to assist
economic development and to prevent the further advance of Communism in the
region. B7 Regardless of the Colombo Plan's subsequent minimal contribution to the full
economic development of the region, it was nevertheless a victory for the British that
they were able to show how genuine cooperation between members of the
Commonwealth and the metropolitan government might be a way of rescuing the war-
stricken region from poverty and increasing Communist expansion.
Meanwhile the locus of British regional policymaking was moving more towards
the regional level with the creation of the offices of Governor-General and the Special
Commissioner and, in the case of Malaya, as a result of the progress towards
Malayanisation and the appearance of the powerful High Commissioners. Although
Britain worked hard to present itself as a colonial power more forward looking than
137 PRO CAB 134 669 SAC (49) 15 (Revised) South-East Asia, general: brief for the United Kingdom
delegation to the Colombo Conference, 28 Jan. 1949
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backward, we should not forget the ultimate aim of British Southeast Asian policy was
to maintain and expand Britain's own interests in the region. The various British
initiatives to establish stability and to rehabilitate SEA were all based in British mistrust
of Asians' ability to achieve it by themselves and in their desire to maintain Britain's
hegemonic role in the region through British-led regional cooperation. The limited
success of British plans for the region was foreseeable from the beginning, as the British
did not possess sufficient resources to match their political ambition, but needed US
material assistance. The Colombo Plan was no exception to this.
These developments provided the background to the relationship between the
British government and British private firms with interests in post-war SEA. The strong
presence of such interests in the region was another form of power that the British
government could exercise. In addition, as the private firms were the main contributor of
dollar earnings, the government had every reason to be supportive of business. However
I have tried to show that whilst officials wanted to assist business interests, they were
hampered by intransigence amongst both those in the business sector and amongst
government officials. Reconstruction of pre-war business interests challenged the local
populations who had become more socially and politically aware through their
experiences of the war and wanted a fair share of their own economic affairs. The
liberalism and progressivism among the officials during the Labour government was itself
to some extent a hindrance to their pursuit of British national interest in SEA. The
metropolitan government was also no longer in a position to suppress Asian nationalism
without being concerned with condemnation from other countries. More fundamentally
growing political consciousness among Asians prevented the reimposition of the pre-war
form of colonialism.
101
Chapter. 3 The Work of Rehabilitation in Malaya
The economies of the Southeast Asian countries were badly disrupted during the war.
Their productive capacity was impaired by a deterioration in the physical condition of the
workforce and the loss of capital assets through war damage, and also as a result of
neglect. It was apparent that without rehabilitation of the region the objectives of the
British Southeast Asian policy — economic progress and financial stability in the region
and the extension of British economic interests — would not be accomplished.
Achievement of these objectives was directly related to how quickly the region could be
stabilised. The security of British territories also depended on the general stability of the
region, which would be facilitated by the British-led rehabilitation work which, it was
hoped, would ensure good relations between her and the countries directly involved with
the programme.
In this chapter three issues are examined with regard to rehabilitation work:
firstly, the Japanese occupation and its effects on Malaya; secondly, how rehabilitation
work was undertaken by the British authorities; and thirdly, the labour unrest which
resulted from the rehabilitation work. Without an understanding of the effects of the
Japanese occupation on Malaya, the work and direction of rehabilitation cannot be fully
appreciated. Yoji Akashi asks whether the three and a half year Japanese occupation of
Malaya was 'an interruption or a significant transformation of Malayan society' and
concludes that it induced a psychological, social and political transformation of a
politically backward land into 'a political maelstrom'.' Indeed, many features that
emerged in post-war Malaya, such as mass politicisation, the radical Malay nationalist
leadership, the increased power of the MCP and the Emergency, can all be attributed in
part to the period of the Japanese occupation. Certainly, indoctrination of Malay youth
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with a Japanese spirit of 'self-discipline, self-reliance, and self-sacrifice' contributed to
the creation of radical youth organisations in the post-war period, such as Angkatan
Pemuda Insaf (API, or Youth for Justice Corps), a militant youth organisation which
agitated for Malay independence within Indonesia. 2 Also, the MCP, the most important
element in the Emergency, gained prestige through its resistance to the Japanese
occupation. Without understanding these sections of the society, post-war Malayan
political and social development can hardly be explained.
However, my research suggests that the occupation was more 'interruption' than
'transformation' as the direct contribution of the Japanese to the independence
movement was minimal. Whether for good or for bad, independence was achieved by the
'moderate' section of Malayan society, who took a gradualist approach to self-
government, and who also understood the inevitability of British influence and the
necessity of British cooperation if the process was to be successful. I also suggest that as
far as the British metropolitan government was concerned, the occupation was seen as an
interruption in colonial rule and to the stability that existed, despite the uneasy co-
existence between Malays and migrant workers from India and China. 3
 The Japanese
occupation was also detrimental to the relative stability that had been achieved in the
export economy, where foreign earnings had enabled the Malayans to overcome the
shortages of rice and other foodstuffs in the country.
I then go on to discuss the relief and rehabilitation works undertaken by the
British Military Administration (BMA), and the Malayan Union. Rehabilitation work
included not only short-term measures, such as supplying consumer goods and
1 Akashi, op.cit., pp. 65-6, 83.
2 ibid., pp. 66-73; Cheah, op.cit., p. 116.
3 In 1947 the Malayan population living in the Malay peninsula consisted approximately of 49 per cent
of Malays, 15 per cent of Indians, and 34 per cent of Chinese: in A. Short, The Communist Insurrection
in Malaya 1948-1960 (London, 1975), p. 254.
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subsistence food, but also long-term measures intended to improve the economic
structure of the region, such as the expansion of secondary industries and projects for
general improvements in the standard of living. As supplying food and goods was to be
accomplished on a regional basis, the British government assigned to the Special
Commissioner the task of increasing production of rice and of connecting import and
export areas for the smooth distribution of food. Therefore, the analysis of rehabilitation
in Malaya includes an explanation of the British government's efforts to rehabilitate the
region as a whole under the Special Commission.
Many FO documents relating to SEA show that British interests dominated
London's endeavour to rehabilitate the region. However, at the same time, there was
also a feeling of moral responsibility among the Labour Party leadership and the officials.
The Labour government faced a dilemma. On the one hand, it was torn between the
reality of the need to control overseas expenditure and, on the other hand, by a strong
feeling of responsibility to assist the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the colonies and
other Southeast Asian countries with which Britain had long historical links. Another
driving force behind the British government's effort to carry out a programme of
rehabilitation was its belief that rehabilitation work would 'yield a higher return than new
development and may be as significant in building up political resistance to
Communism'. 4 Underlining the need to secure the UK's interests, local British
authorities worked with British private business interests in the region and used their
expertise.
Authors, such as Stenson, Stubbs and Harper have argued that neither the BMA
nor the Malayan Union could provide for the basic requirements of the population, and
4 PRO PREM 8 1407 Part I report by the Far East (Official) Committee of the Cabinet on Economic and
Social Development in South and South-East Asia and the Far East, 1 Dec. 1951, p. 5.
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that low wages, rice shortages and high prices' became characteristics of both
administrations. They contend that the administrations were highly corrupt and inefficient
in their control over the distribution of relief supplies and rationing and that officials
persisted with a somewhat ineffective laissez-faire attitude.' Indeed, the official history
of the BMA confirms that the provision and distribution of relief supplies often lacked
orderliness and that 'looting, pilfering, or misappropriation' accounted for 'a very big
portion' of the relief supplies. In the case of Burma, issues worth more than 10 per cent
of the total relief supplies imported to that country were unaccounted for.6
Although Stenson is most critical of the economic and political policies of the
BMA and the Malayan Union, he recognises that supplies of basic requirements were
largely affected by 'factors beyond their control'. He also acknowledges that
rehabilitation work was adversely affected by unfavourable terms of trade which the
Malayan government did not have much influence over. His main criticism of the officials
is that they lacked the desire to implement reform, as they were more concerned with
reconstruction of the pre-war economic structure. Stenson puts a particular emphasis on
the Administration's lack of enthusiasm for 'the rehabilitation of the population', which
was evident in the decision to maintain pre-war wage levels for government employees
as a counter-inflationary measure regardless of rises in the cost of living. As a result,
low-paid workers suffered most hardship.' I entirely agree with this view and believe that
the government's biggest mistake with regard to rehabilitation work was the sacrifice it
imposed on the labourers, which led to dissatisfaction and labour unrest. It also has to be
said that such measures were inconsistent with government's declared desire to establish
the social presence of the state.
5 Stubbs, op.cit., pp. 13-4; Harper, op.cit., pp. 42-3; Stenson, op.cit., p. 70 regarding the distribution of
food and vital supplies.
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While Stenson's assessments are not entirely unjust, his charge that inefficient
and ineffective government policy was primarily responsible for the general instability
and disorder, undermines the proposition that MCP was able to distract the government
from the formulation and implementation of an effective policy. 8 The MCP and its
associates had been quick to establish themselves during the interim period, and
expanded their influence through organised labour, while the government maintained a
'liberal', but 'laissez faire' , 9 attitude towards the trade unions and political parties. While
it is true that the Malayan government's unwillingness to deal with the MCP and militant
organised labour was a cause of the instability, 10
 more important was the MCP's ability
to seize the opportunities and provide organisation and leadership for the labourers. The
MCP's intervention ensured that independently organised strike action was effective and
persistent. Stubbs is correct to state that slow economic progress left 'many Malayans
disillusioned with the British colonial administration'. 11
 However, the economic
grievances alone did not create the instability, which was more complex and varied in its
causes. Stenson himself points out that after March 1947 'the economic struggle was
strictly subordinated to the political', 12
 and focuses on the MCP's direct influence on the
unrest. Harper stresses the dynamics of power struggle within the Chinese community.
Indeed, behind the dynamics of lawlessness was the MCP's political struggle, which was
primarily waged through the trade unions, but also manifested itself as an internecine
conflict influenced by the process of political developments in Malaya and China. These
political divisions took the form of a fierce internal power struggle within the Chinese
6 Donnison, op.cit., pp. 254-56.
7 Stenson, op.cit., pp. 84-86.
8 ibid., pp. 67-69.
9 This expression is originally from the Secretary of State for War, John Strachey. See PRO PREM 8
1406 Part II Strachey to Attlee, 11 Dec. 195
10 Stubbs, op.cit., p. 15; Stenson, op.cit., pp. 72.
11 Stubbs, op.cit., p. 22.
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community, mainly between the MCP and the followers of the Kuomintang (KMT), and
these forces competed for power in every section of the Chinese community. Often this
struggle resulted in inter-communal violence, which while it deflected the threats against
European business personnel, still contributed to the widespread disorder. 13 Therefore, as
far as government and business were concerned, the MCP and their associates
contributed to post-war instability through organising the labour protests and other
'subversive' political activities. This combined with the extreme conditions of economic
hardship served to intensify social and political instability.
We should not neglect the positive aspects of rehabilitation work undertaken by
the governments, including the wartime planning on that matter and the actual
implementation. Research on wartime planning for Malaya indicates clearly that the
British government and the planners (mainly the CO officials under the M1PU 14) showed a
decisive understanding of the nature of the post-war problems in the country. The
planners sought solutions to the problems that might arise, ranging from famine to
communal conflicts. Undeniably the British were driven by their ambition to relinquish
their role as a regional power based on a regional organisation. However, the
establishment of the Special Commission and the use of that organisation to tackle the
food situation, a situation that required regional co-ordination, is evidence of British
willingness to deal with the post-war situation. The officials, many of whom had just left
internment camps, often delayed their own departure, remaining in Malaya in order to
assist with rehabilitation work and play a part in re-establishing the administration. In the
process they were not only faced with insurmountable obstacles, but often they also
12 Stenson, op.cit., p. 206.
13 Harper, op.cit., pp. 109-14.
14 See, Donnison, op.cit., 139-40.
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found it difficult to sustain their own living because of low pay and inflation. 15 As
Stenson points out, rehabilitation work was dependent on matters such as shipping and
the importation of food and other goods, over which the Malayan governments had little
control. Conditions of general instability, disorder and hardship in Malaya thus
exacerbated the difficulties that faced the officials when trying to carry out essential
work.
3.1 Japanese Occupation and Its Effects on Malaya
The Liaison Conference of 20 November 1941 laid down the principles of Japanese
policy in SEA. In the approach that was determined at the conference the Military
Administrations 'aimed at consolidating Japan's power, subordinating the region to
Japan's requirements and expediting the acquisition of resources vital to Japan's national
defence'. 16
 After the successful invasion of Malaya in February 1942, 17 the Japanese
commander, Tomoyuki Yamashita, issued a self-congratulatory declaration on the
conquest of Singapore — the 'insurmountable fortress' and 'the connective point of the
British Empire to control British India, Australia and East Asia'. The declaration
explained that the Japanese aimed to eliminate British influence, and to promote social
15 Stubbs, op.cit., pp. 32-34.
16 Pluvier, op.cit., p. 192.
17 Japan had first concluded a Franco-Japanese Treaty on 30 August 1940, to acquire a strong foothold
in French Indochina and a base from which the Japanese air force could reach any part of SEA and
China. Further military concessions to Japan were followed, permitting the Japanese army to station
forces in Tonkin and march through Indochina, while also providing several bases for the Japanese air
force and navy. On 9 December 1941, Japanese attacks took place simultaneously in various places in
Asia and the Pacific. Troops landed at Kota Bharu in north-eastern Malaya, in southern Siam and Hong
Kong, while at the same time the Japanese air force bombed Singapore, some targets in the Philippines,
and Pearl Harbour in Hawaii. War was declared the very next day by Great Britain, the USA and The
Netherlands. Nevertheless, the Japanese troops drove British forces down the west coast of Malaya
without meeting any serious resistance. On 11 January 1942 the capital of the Federated Malay States,
Kuala Lumpur, fell, while Singapore was captured on 15 February 1942. This was the beginning of a
three-and-a-half-year occupation by the Japanese in Malaya. For the details of the circumstances before
and the during the negotiations for the Treaty and military concessions, see Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 107-133.
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development in an oriental spirit of 'give and take'. 18 The Japanese 25th Army,
converted from an attacking force into an army of occupation, was made responsible for
the defence and administration of Malaya and Sumatra. During the first few months of
occupation, the regime concentrated on restoring peaceful conditions in the occupied
territories and suppressing the local people with terror tactics, including the massacre of
Chinese in Malaya and Singapore, the so-called ' sook ching' .19
The Japanese Military Administration practised strong central control over
Malaya and Singapore throughout the occupation. Each province was under a Japanese
governor, but the division of provinces in Malaya greatly resembled the pre-war
administrative structure of states. Japanese military officers and civilians occupied the
top positions within the central government, and a large number of Malays were
employed in local government to fill the administrative gap left by British officials and to
compensate for the lack of local knowledge and language problems among Japanese
bureaucrats. It was natural for the Japanese to rely on Malay support, given their fear
and distrust of the Chinese population as potential enemies owing to their strong
resistance movements in China and in Malaya.2°
After consolidating its position in the country, the military regime started to
restructure the Malayan economy as a part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was a self-sustaining regional bloc
connecting the technical and manufacturing power of Japan and the industrialised areas
18 Declaration of the Commander of the Nippon Army, Syonan Times, 21 Feb. 2602, cited in Kratoska,
op.cit., pp. 44-5.
19 For the detail of the terror tactics, see Cheah, op.cit., pp. 95-7.
29 Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 53-70. As we can see the Japanese Military Administration was restructured
based on the pre-war colonial administration. The Sultans were at first deprived of much of their
powers, including their pre-war allowances, as well as properties. This policy was then reversed from the
beginning of 1943; the Sultans retained their titles and authority in religious matters, though not their
status as sovereign powers. For the details of the Japanese policy on the Malay Sultans, see Pluvier,
op.cit., p. 214 and Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 67-70.
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of the East Asia with the agricultural and raw material producing outer territories. Under
a regime of central economic planning, a series of regulations were introduced
throughout 1943 to promote economic reconstruction and to acquire supplies for the
military. Malaya was to supply natural resources, whilst achieving self-sufficiency in
agricultural and industrial output within the country. 21
 At the same time, the Japanese
Military Administration undertook mobilisation and militarisation of young men, mostly
Malays, who formed the volunteer units such as Auxiliary Servicemen, Volunteer Army
and Volunteer Corps. These recruits were given Japanese-style military training, and
mainly used to tackle anti-Japanese guerrillas, who were generally Chinese. 22 As a result
of mobilising one section of the population to control another, communal tension
escalated throughout the occupation period, and eventually came into the open prior to
and beyond Japanese surrender. The Malayans had grown used to the adoption of drastic
measures, whether to settle old scores or to punish informers and collaborators. This was
largely as a result of the experience of tight and brutal rule under the Japanese whose
frequent use of violence created a climate of brutality within the whole society, where the
'Japanese Army was an agent of Japanese values and behaviour'. 23 The intensity of total
mobilisation in Malaya during the occupation brought about profound changes to the
society in general. However, the main focus of this research is on the economic aspects
of the Japanese occupation because the famine and shortage of supplies, and structural
economic changes that resulted were the most immediate and fundamental problems
which faced the returning British. Indeed it was the economic grievances which
exacerbated the initial problems of a social and political nature that the British regime
21 Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 154-55.
22 Cheah, op.cit., p. 104.
23 ibid., pp. 107-08.
110
faced, whilst the psychological changes that had taken place amongst the Malayans, were
initially unrecognised.
Immediately after the occupation, the Japanese Malay Military Administration took full
control of communication, transportation, financial and commercial facilities. 24
 Having
consolidated their position in Malaya during 1942, from 1943 onwards the Japanese
began to introduce a number of economic reforms, designed to centralise the economy
and to promote self-sufficiency within the country, and among the Japanese military.
Firstly, various measures were taken to develop local industry and make maximum use
of existing manufacturing facilities, which would ultimately reduce the need to supply
Malaya with Japanese manufactured goods. Secondly, various controls over materials
and goods essential to 'life' and necessary for the smooth operation of the Military
Administration were introduced under an ordinance for the Control of Important
Matters and Materials, in August 1943, in order to conserve goods and ensure their
effective utilisation. Throughout 1944 controls on a range of products including all sorts
of vital foodstuffs such as rice were much more prevalent, and these particular products
could not be exported or imported without approval from the state governor, since these
were the main requirements of the Japanese troops.25
Despite the intervention in production and trade, food shortages and inflation in
Malaya were out of control by 1944, and the numerous experiments with existing
industrial facilities also failed. The occupying administration mainly concerned itself with
supplying military requirements, and so could not deal effectively with local economic
problems. Similar economic problems also prevailed throughout SEA. In economic
24 Pluvier, op.cit., p. 192.
25 Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 154-57.
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terms the Japanese rule of SEA was fundamentally similar to that of the western colonial
powers in the region. Had Japan been capable of performing the dual functions of
supplying SEA with capital and consumer goods, and at the same time absorbing the
regional products, the initial collapse of the economies of SEA might have been
prevented. However, Japanese wartime industrial output was far from adequate for the
supply of all countries in the Co-prosperity Sphere inclusive Siam and Indochina, whose
special political status allowed them at least limited freedom of action on their internal
political matters. 26
 Moreover, 'her economic basis was too small' to undertake the huge
regional products. 27 What Japan needed from the region for her war efforts was very
specific, consisting mainly of rice, oil, rubber, raw cotton, iron ore, tin, bauxite and
timber. 28 Japan could, however, supply very little of what SEA needed, such as textiles,
chemicals, manufactured articles and capital goods, because of the urgent demand of the
army and the shortage of shipping. In fact, the acute shortage of shipping capacity was
fundamental to the difficulties that plagued Malaya, and SEA as a whole, as it brought
trade, whether internal or external, virtually to a standsti11.29
These problems were especially severe in Malaya, for the Malayan economy
relied heavily on its exports. Among the raw materials Japan needed for her war efforts,
Malaya produced bauxite, iron, and above all rubber and tin." But Malayan rubber and
tin production was far too great to be absorbed by the Japanese economy — of 442,000
tons (the average annual production between 1935 and 1941) of Malayan rubber,
26 Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 269-70. According to Japanese plan, the Sphere comprises Japan, China and the
rest of the East Asia, together with the whole of SEA, possibly also including India.
27 ibid., p. 273.
28 ibid., p. 274 and also see Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 243-45 for Japanese interest in Malayan bauxite
production, iron and manganese ores, and coal.
29 There is a detailed study of the loss and build-up of tonnage, and the eventual collapse of
transportation, in Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 274-5. Also see, Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 159-161.
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434,384 tons had been exported, while domestic consumption was almost negligible. In
1944, 136,500 tons of rubber was produced and only 15,000 tons were exported. Also,
Malayan tin production was eight times Japan's requirements.31
The effect of collapse of the export economy was immediate. People who were
directly involved in the export industries, and those who worked in the ports and in the
export-related industries, such as rubber processing and tin smelting industries, were put
out of work and not all could be absorbed by the Administration's military construction
schemes. 32 In pre-war Malaya, public revenue had been generated primarily from levies
on exports of rubber and tin and imports of liquor and tobacco, and also by taxation of
the profits of mainly British companies in the Malayan extractive industries." During the
occupation these customs duties and taxes virtually disappeared, and the financial
situation was exacerbated by the inadequate taxation of Japanese firms because their
role in army procurement exempted them from taxation. Due to insufficient revenue, the
military government could hardly support both military requirements and the local
economy. 3 4
Eventually the Administration resorted to printing money to meet its financial
requirements. As a result, the value of the occupation currency sharply declined, and
inflation, which had been already caused by the shortage of food and of other essentials,
became worse. Restrictions on inland trade were lifted as a way to improve the supply
of civilian goods, and the Administration also allowed free movement of goods in
30 According to Japan's Commodity Materialization Plan, Japan was interested in Malayan 'coal and
iron rather than its rubber and tin', whereas they wanted to extract oil, nickel and bauxite from the NEI:
Stockwell, 'Southeast Asia in War and Peace', p. 7 and Hall, op.cit., p. 825.
31 For more details of Malayan rubber production under the Japanese occupation, see Kratoska, op.cit.,
p. 227, especially Table 8.3 (based in OSS, R&A No. 2589, The Rubber Industry of Southeast Asia: An
Estimate of Present Conditions and Anticipated Capabilities, 16 Dec. 1944, pp. 6, 10); for Malayan tin
production, see Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 240-41.
32 ibid., p. 181.
33 ibid., pp. 71-2.
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Malaya, Java and Sumatra. At the same time a Price Control Ordinance was introduced
on 10 September 1943 as a measure to stabilise prices and inflation, but proved to be
ineffectual because of the ever-increasing deficiency of vital goods. In the final months
of the war, the Administration was compelled to print more currency to meet the urgent
military requirements.35
Within this intractable economic situation, the most pressing problem of all was
the shortage of food. During the pre-war years Malaya imported two-thirds of its annual
requirements of rice from Siam, Burma and Indochina. Whilst agricultural activities in
Indochina and Siam were relatively intact, those in Burma were disrupted by the
occupation, and worsened by the forced recruitment of labour. In any case, production
declined further throughout rice exporting territories due mainly to exaction of the
Japanese military forces and the loss of any incentive to plant extra. The difficulties with
distribution of food owing to the collapse of transport and shortage of fuel, and the
disappearance of the traditional trading networks, largely in Chinese hands, made the
food situation even worse.36
As the supply of imported rice was inadequate to meet the needs of the
population, local food production became a major preoccupation of the Japanese
Military Administration. Several experiments on new cultivation techniques including the
introduction of new varieties of rice were carried out in an attempt to increase yields.37
All these experiments however, brought uniformly poor results throughout SEA,
including Malaya. During the 1930s the colonial government in Malaya had made various
efforts to overcome the deficiency of food by promoting rice cultivation, and succeeded
34 Pluvier, op. cit., p. 279.
35 Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 154-5, 213.
36 ibid., pp. 247-8.
37 ibid., p. 270; Harper, op.cit., p. 39.
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in reducing the gap between domestic production and imported rice.' s Although figures
are not available for rice production during the Japanese occupation, it is clear that it fell
— the size of the Malayan rice harvest in 1940 was about 335,000 tons, and in 1946 it
was about 227,000 tons, not recovering its pre-war production level until 1948.39
Peasants were not motivated to plant more than their own needs since the official prices
were too low and the much hated rice police confiscated any surplus. The deterioration
and neglect of drainage and irrigation, relocation of population, and recruitment of
forced labour also contributed to the failure of rice production." The food situation in
Malaya may have been worsened by the transfer of the four northern territories, Kedah,
Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, to Siam on 18 October 1943, for over 60 per cent of the
Malayan rice crop came from these territories.41
While the Japanese controlled the sale and movement of foodstuffs, they
encouraged people to support themselves through subsistence agriculture. A three-year
Food Sufficiency Plan was introduced to encourage large increases in local food crops,
and a Grow More Food campaign encouraged people to plant vegetables and root crops
instead of rice. People were moved from towns and cities to rural areas where they could
38 During the 1930s domestic production in Malaya increased from 160,000 to 330,000 tons, while the
imports rose from 590,000 only to 635,000: Malayan Agricultural Statistics, 1949, Tables 30 and 31 in
Kratoska, op.cit., p. 248.
39 Based in Table 11.14. Production and Net Imports of Rice in Malaya, in Kratoska, op.cit., p. 34.
40 Harper, op.cit., p. 39 and ICratoska, op.cit., p. 274. It was the Malay District Officers and their
subordinates who requisited rice, labour and volunteers (often forced recruitment) for the Japanese war
effort, a result which brought strong antagonism against them from both Malays and Chinese: Cheah,
op.cit., pp. 101-03, 108.
41 Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 86, 269. For the reason for the cession of the 4 northern states, see Cheah,
op.cit., p. 98. The 4 northern states of the Malayan peninsula were the main rice producing area, while
the southern part of Malaya had substantial plantation industries, producing relatively little rice. Most of
the literature on Malaya focus on the historical background of and the reasons for the transfer than the
effects of the hand-over to the Malayan economy, and hardly to the production and distribution of rice to
the rest of the peninsula. The Siamese government wanted to obtain somewhat independent
administration on these areas without being overruled by the Japanese authorities. For instance, the
District Officers in Kelantan were told that 'all requests made by Japanese should be referred to the Thai
authorities and no action should be taken without approval'. However, it is dubious how much this
worked over practical matters, such as exaction of rice for the military purpose: based in Kratoska,
op.cit., pp. 85-6, 88, 269.
115
grow their own food. At the same time the military government released land from forest
reserves and authorised tree cutting on rubber estates and smallholdings in order to
provide space for food cultivation. In Selangor some lands reserved for Malays under the
Malay Reservations Enactment were given to non-Malays for food cultivation.42
The Japanese Administration knew that the capacity to provide food, and not the
ideals associated with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, was the 'most
important factor in gaining the support of the Malayan population' . 43 This aim was not
achieved as the series of ordinances and controls failed to produce any positive result in
increasing food production, nor did the efforts towards self-sufficiency of the agricultural
output. There was also a failure to achieve self-sufficiency in industrial output, due to the
shortage of equipment that could be spared from military supplies in Japan. The dilemma
was that from the administration's point of view, 'industries for public welfare had first
priority', but in reality they came second due to the urgent demands of the occupying
army. 44
 Consequently, most Southeast Asians lacked many of their basic needs during the
war.
The three and a half years of Japanese occupation — a period that saw the imposition of
a total war on the whole Malayan society — had a grave impact on the peoples in
Malaya and the country's economy. The prime objective of the Japanese Military
Administration in Malaya was to mobilise the country in order to establish Japanese
hegemony over Asia within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In such
circumstances the locals were subject to conscription for forced labour, and forced to
provide 'voluntary' services for military or paramilitary organisations. The basic pattern
42 ibid., pp. 259-62.
43 ibid., p. 247.
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of the Malayan economy under British colonial rule, that of an export-orientated
economy, almost collapsed. The Malayan economy crumbled through shortages of food
and basic consumer goods, which led to the emergence of a flourishing black market,
inflation and unemployment. Similar to the situation in the rest of the region, the mass of
the population in Malaya was faced with unprecedented economic hardship. The
Japanese Military Administration somehow managed to maintain order by relying on
brutal rule. Such conditions of order, however, collapsed during the interim period, and
thus when the British returned, they found the country completely uprooted. Post-war
political and social developments in Malaya cannot be completely explained without
understanding the politicisation and militarisation of the Malays and their indoctrination
under Japanese rule. However, during the immediate post-war period there was no time
to pay attention to these long-term effects of the war and the occupation, as famine was
at large throughout the region.
3.2 The Work of Relief and Rehabilitation in Malaya
3.2.1 The Rehabilitation Work of the British Military Administration for Malaya
Under international law, an occupying military force has certain minimal obligations with
regard to the administration of occupied enemy territory, such as prevention of starvation
of the civilians, but there was no such legal obligation for an army re-occupying its own
territory. Nevertheless, it was morally much more significant for a returning government
to take care of the needs of its own subjects who had been so deprived during the war.
Providing adequate food and clothing, along with a clear demonstration of the returning
power's overwhelming military superiority, were the best forms of propaganda to direct
44 Japanese Monographs 103, pp. 15-6, cited in Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 180-1.
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at both the enemy and their own subjects. 45 As the unexpectedly early ending of the war
had deprived the returning colonial powers of the opportunity to re-establish their
reputation as a serious military force in the eyes of the local populations, a smooth
provision of relief supplies and rehabilitation work became more significant to them.
Preparing for the relief and rehabilitation of the British territories in SEA took
place from the very beginning of the wartime planning period. A survey of civil relief
requirements for the Far East began immediately after receiving Cabinet approval in
November 1943 and was completed in May 1944 under the chairmanship of Sir Hubert
Young, who had already accomplished this task for post-war Europe. The work of relief
for the British territories in SEA including Hong Kong covered two years, divided into
four six-monthly periods, and dealt with eight categories of supplies: food, agricultural
supplies, communal requirements, soap, clothing and footwear, medical supplies,
individual household requirements, and newsprint. A second working party by W.B.
Brett began, in mid-1944, to complement the work of the first working party by covering
many other important categories such as transportation requirements,
telecommunications, public utilities, broadcasting requirements, fuel, and the repair and
maintenance of industry. Moreover, ad hoc arrangements were made to prepare
estimates of the other categories not dealt with by either of these two working parties.46
After the USA dropped atomic bombs in Japan at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the
Japanese surrendered unconditionally. Britain's plan to liberate Malaya was immediately
called off, and the Military Administration was established on 1 October 1945. The re-
entry of British troops into Malaya was well received by local people. Maintaining this
enthusiasm by supplying their needs, in particular food, was a most urgent matter.
45 Donnison, op.cit., p. 237.
46 ibid., pp. 241-45.
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Therefore, SEAC headquarters not only dealt with matters arising from the care of
prisoners and internees and repatriating the Japanese troops, but was also concerned with
economic affairs. 47 The Supreme Allied Commander was ultimately responsible for the
BMA in Malaya, but the Chief Civil Affairs Office (CCAO) became the principal
executive officer in the Military Administration. Accordingly the CO discharged to the
CCAO a responsibility for rehabilitation, and the War Office approved this. The subjects
dealt with in the directives to the Military Administration embraced every aspect of an
administration that would establish conditions for the resumption of a civil government,
including finance, industry, economic infrastructure, social welfare, health and education.
Among these subjects, 'Malayan Citizenship' and 'Chinese policy' reflected the peculiar
Malayan situation and British hopes for the establishment of a new state structure in
Malaya." The opportunity for the Administration to 'make changes at once' during the
Military Administration period, rather than allowing Malaya to resume the direction of
pre-war British policy, had been lost during the wartime planning period, for the War
Office felt that the BMA was a caretaker administration which should 'confine itself to
handling the transition' to civil government."
The BMA concentrated especially on maintaining basic subsistence in order to
create and sustain the stability upon which the successor civil government would be
based. The strong political implications of food supplies were understood from the very
beginning. A 'failure to meet the country's food needs seemed likely to damage Britain's
47 PRO CAB 21 1954 Appointment of Special Commissioner in SE Asia: outward telegram no 656 from
the Cabinet Office to Mountbatten, 13 Feb. 1946.
48 As the head of the Civil Affairs Service, and in charge of the Military Administration for Malaya, the
CCAO, Major-General Hone, was responsible for the formulation of civil affairs policy, and for the
direction and co-ordination of all civil affairs activities in mainland Malaya as well as in Singapore. He
was also in immediate charge of the issues arising out of relief and rehabilitation work, such as
'supplies, rationing and food control, postal services, printing and publicity, trade and industry, and
labour': Donnison, op.cit., pp. 141-5, 157, 163-4.
49 Kratoska, op.cit., p. 308.
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political credibility'." However, it was soon found out that there was less food
stockpiled in the country than the Young Working Party had anticipated, and it
immediately had to appeal for increased quantities of rice. Even worse, as soon as it was
realised that food shortages would continue, the readily available stocks disappeared into
black markets in search of higher prices.51
Supply of an adequate amount of rice for Malaya was dependent on obtaining
more rice from the pre-war rice exporters in SEA, namely Burma, Siam and Indochina.
Among these countries, Burma was not only the biggest exporter, but also the only
British territory. The early re-occupation of rice exporting areas in Burma also raised
hopes of obtaining rice from Burma for export to Malaya. However, as it was pointed
out in the previous chapter, Burma had been badly affected by wartime destruction and
was driven by internal political instability. 52 Moreover, the wartime Burmese government
planning undertaken for the purchase and distribution of rice and other essentials was
never completed. As a result, the Military Administration had to improvise a scheme to
make rice available for immediate use in the deficit areas in Burma, and then to export
the surplus to the neighbouring countries, mostly to India and Malaya. Owing to the lack
of experienced officials, there was delay in the provision of essential equipment for the
mills. This, together with a low fixed rice price, affected the progress of this task, before
it was handed over to the government of Burma." Burma was then only able to furnish a
negligible quantity of rice, which was insufficient to meet the whole region's need. 54 A
factor exacerbating the difficulty of the situation was that the Burmese government soon
50 Ibid., p. 339.
51 Ibid., p. 340,
52 'Of all occupied countries Burma suffered worst at the hands of the Japanese:: for more details see
Hall, op.cit., pp. 823-24.
53 Donnison, op.cit., pp. 263-68.
54 PRO CAB 21 1954 F5093/87/61 despatch from M.E. Dening to Bevin, 25 Mar. 1946.
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levied a substantial export tax on rice, and on more than one occasion, 'shipments of rice
originally destined for Malaya were diverted elsewhere' by the London government.55
Another source of rice in SEA was Siam. Almost immediately after the Siamese
declaration of war against the Allies the British had begun planning for post-war Siam as
a part of the more general planning process for post-war SEA. Obtaining Siamese rice
had been regarded as a form of compensation by neighbouring countries, especially
Malaya and the NET, and by the British, who had suffered a great deal as a consequence
of Siamese collaboration with Japan during the Pacific War, and who thus felt entitled to
demand rice as compensation. However, the Americans' decision to ignore the Siamese
declaration of war complicated the British planning process. Despite opposition from
officials, notably Dening whose inclination was to 'forget and forgive' the Siamese
declaration of war, the Ministry of Food was particularly enthusiastic about the idea of
free delivery of Siamese rice to feed Malaya. It described the free delivery of rice as 'just
requirements' and 'definite obligations'. 56 Siamese rice would be delivered directly to
Malaya, in addition to the allocations and distribution arranged by the International
Emergency Food Council (IEFC). However, the Siamese, backed by a sympathetic
America, cleverly traded the British off Food rationing in Malaya was becoming worse
throughout 1946. 57 As a result, the British government repeatedly compromised by
paying for rice deliveries, which began as free provision, and even then the anticipated
level of deliveries was never fully fulfilled.58
As the prospect of obtaining sufficient rice was grim, the early discussions on
supplies of free rice for the Malayans were dropped, but rationed rice was charged for,
55 M. Rudner, 'The Malayan Post-War Rice Crisis: An Episode in Colonial Agricultural Policy', Kajian
Ekonomi Malaysia, 12 June 1975, pp. 1-13, in Stubbs, op.cit., p. 20.
56 Tailing, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, pp. 22-36.
57 Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 341-44; Stenson, op.cit., p. 84; Stubbs, op.cit., p. 21. See Table 11.12 in
Kratoska (p. 341) for the details of rice exports from Buma, Siam and Indochina.
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together with water and electricity supplies." Even worse, the rationing for foodstuffs,
such as rice, sugar and salt, hardly ever operated properly because of poor
administration. Control over distribution required a certain standard of administration,
and it was not attainable during the BMA period. As the Administration greatly suffered
from a shortage of personnel, and the morale among the British officials hit rock bottom,
efficiency with administering rehabilitation work was poor. Due to an acute shortage of
supplies, exacerbated by a situation in which there were 'no imports, decreased
production, and no effective transport systems', inflation continued. Control of prices
could have been an option to restrain inflation and at the same time to make goods more
affordable, but in reality the extreme scarcity of goods made this impossible to
implement. 6° The Military Administration instead fixed the wage of government
employees to the pre-war level as a measure to counteract inflation. However, by
November 1945 when average food prices were about eight times that of 1941, the
fixing of wages caused the price-wage gap to worsen dramatically. The price-wage gap,
in addition to the wage disparity, was the main cause of the discontent among the low-
wage earners. Stenson points out that had the wage policy taken account of the price
level and had there been effective measures to distribute the limited supplies, then the
effect of the wage restraint would not have been as disastrous to the mass population. In
reality, however, neither measure was possible. 61
Malaya was, in fact, allocated more relief supplies than Burma — it was roughly
three times higher in Malaya in terms of the value per head of population. The MPU used
its close contact with the War Office and the Ministry of Supply to obtain more
58 Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, pp. 108-128.
59 Stenson, op.cit., p. 67.
60 Donnison, op.cit., pp. 226-28, 254.
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resources than Burma planners. Therefore the continuation in shortages in Malaya simply
reflected the gravity of the situation in the country. 62 The continued existence of a black
market was also a key indication of the fact that Malaya had 'a real shortage' of things,
and of how difficult it was to go back to normal conditions after the economic structure
had been completely gutted. Under such circumstances, the government's acceptance of
illegal business practice as a post-war reality should not be subjected to undue criticism
nor be seen as the product of complacency or neglect, but it should be positively
understood as an aspect of the government's flexibility in dealing with a difficult
situation. In particular the estate managers and owners often bought up rice in the black
market to feed their labourers, while there was no any other source available. As Killearn
rightly puts, the more rice for the labourers meant the less unrest and 'less fertile soil for
agitators to work on'.63
The BMA also endeavoured to restore normal trade channels and industry.
Although the revival of trade and industry in the re-occupied territories was not strictly
the responsibility of the military administrations, the BMA recognised that restoration of
certain industries would contribute to the provision of employment for locals, of labour
for the administrations and the production of otherwise scarce essential commodities,
which saved imports and created exportable surpluses. The swift re-establishment of
normal economic activities would also help prevent unrest in the re-occupied
61 Stenson, op. cit., pp. 68-70, 84. Stenson also points out that the wage policy was intended to avoid
being forced in making further wage increases when the economy returned to a normal level of
performance, in p. 69.
62 Donnison, op. cit., pp. 254-55.
63 Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 342-43. Killearn's statement on this issue is originally from Killearn to Bevin,
18 Aug. 1947, Cabinet. Official Committee of Food Supplies from South East Asia and Certain Other
Countries. Report on the Activities of the Office of the Special Commissioner in South East Asia during
the Second Quarter of 1947. S.E.A.F. (47)40. Burma Economic 3701/46, IORM/4/761, cited in
Kratoska, op.cit., p. 343.
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territories." The Administration thus selected a few British private firms for
involvement. They represented mining, light engineering, tubing, refrigeration, motor,
brewing and traction, and banking and insurance, which were required most urgently for
the purpose of general rehabilitation of the area. Orders of materials from these
industries were prioritised, and the Administration assisted with release of members of
these firms from internment or from military employment. 65 As is discussed further in
Chapter 4, the Military Administration also played a key role in assisting the
rehabilitation of various industrial sectors. This was most notably the case in the rubber
and tin industries, in spite of the fact that it had no direct authority over its functioning,"
as were the rice mills and the copra and palm oil, timber, and pineapple-canning
industries. 67
Another important factor in the restoration of the general economy was a smooth
circulation of money, which was a prerequisite to promote investment and restore normal
business activities." The Japanese currency had been demonetised upon the entry of the
British troops, and this immediately contributed to the loss of confidence in the money
economy, and reduced incentives for the peasants to produce more than they needed.69
However controversial the decision to demonetise was, such a move was inevitable if
further inflation was to be restrained, as the Japanese Military Administration had issued
around nineteen times the amount of money in Malaya than that which would be issued
under normal circulation. 7° The major negative consequence of the demonetisation was
64 Donnison, op. cit., p. 257.
65 ibid., p. 261.
66 ibid., p. 159.
67 ibid., p. 262.
68 For the amount of money put into circulation under the military period, see Kratoska, op. cit., p. 326,
and particularly Donnison, op.cit., p. 225.
69 PRO CAB 21 1954 F5093/87/61 despatch from M.E. Dening to Bevin, 25 Mar. 1946.
70 Donnison, op.cit., pp. 222-23. The percentage was recalculated by the author based in the figure in
ibid., p. 223.
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that people's savings were wiped out, and as a consequence many people did not have
enough money to buy necessities such as food and fue1. 71 In order to re-establish the
monetary system the Military Administration endeavoured to put British currency into
circulation through the employment of a large, otherwise idle, labour force on the
estates. The strategy was predicated on the assumption that the wages paid to the
labourers, which would be ultimately reimbursed by the estate owners to the
Administration, would assist to circulate money. At the same time, collection of various
taxes began in order to offset the adverse effects of too much money being circulated and
also to revive the revenues in preparation of the return of civil government. Thus,
collection of duty on rubber exports had already begun before the end of 1945, while on
other import, export, excise, and entertainment activities duties were collected from
1946.72
The limitations of the BMA, as a military organisation, to handle civil affairs had
already been foreseen during the planning period. In order to compensate for the lack of
experienced officials in Malaya, and at the same time to maximise the use of expertise
from private firms, cooperation between the BMA and British firms with business
interests in Malaya had already been discussed and laid down in the planning process.
The Administration primarily handled imports of relief and technical supplies, but retail
distribution of the relief supplies was assigned to a Supplies Distributing Unit, which
consisted of civilian merchants with business experiences in pre-war Malaya. As
mentioned earlier, another group of private firms was also working closely with, and
71 Stubbs, op.cit., p. 13.
72 Donnison, op.cit., p. 229.
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under the sponsorship of, the Administration to revive the industries most urgently
required for rehabilitation work.73
3.2.2 Social Policy and a New Social Partner"
Rehabilitation work and the provision of relief supplies for post-war Malaya were
measures that were formally based on humanitarian concern, but at the same time they
were expected to help regain the allegiance of people in Malaya, and thus to boost
British influence and prestige in the country. In addition, when the British returned to
Malaya, they had the Malayan union constitution that would form a new state structure
in Malaya. An emphasis was given to 'self-government' as the ultimate objective of the
constitution, which would serve to provide the necessary impression that British
imperialism did not lag behind, but was sufficiently progressive to adapt to the increasing
nationalist fervour among the Asians. The vagueness on the time framework for the
granting of self-government gave the British plenty of room to retain their imperial
privileges. The big task which facing them, with regard to introducing the new Malayan
constitution as a legitimate working basis for the new state structure, was to build an
infrastructure of consensus upon which Malaya would be firmly placed. Therefore,
firstly, Britain needed to find where new partnership could be established. The prompt
collaboration of the Malays — the partners of British colonial administration in pre-war
Malaya — with the Japanese during the occupation period made the British cautious
about the qualification of the Malays as a stable new partner under the new state. On the
73 Cooperation between the BMA and British private firms in Malaya was distinct, but not unique.
Another marked examples of cooperation between them can be seen in Sarawak and North Borneo,
where the British had major interests in the oil and rubber industries. Open cooperation between the
returning British troops and British firms in Burma was rather restrained because of the recognition of
the strong political consciousness that prevailed in the country. Yet the rehabilitation work on the main
industries of Burma was assisted by the agency of British firms formerly engaged in the trade in Burma:
Donnison, op.cit., pp. 183-7, 257-63.
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other hand, the Chinese who had strongly resisted Japanese rule, seemed to be better
prepared to accept Malaya as a home than they had been in pre-war times, when their
loyalty had laid firmly with China. Through constitutional reform, and especially common
citizenship for all peoples, Britain provided the Chinese a more concrete stake in Malaya,
in which country they normally resided and owned businesses. Without the cooperation
of the Chinese in the process of the reorientation of the British colonial rule in Malaya it
would not be possible to establish a strong unified Malaya, a principle in which British
Malayan policy in the post-war period was based. After all their numbers were almost
equal to that of Malays in the Malay peninsula and many of them possessed important
commercial power.75
Harper has emphasised the British endeavour to establish their social presence in
post-war Malaya. Under the BMA, a programme of relief work and the implementation
of social policy, together with the relaxation of restrictions upon the societies and
organisations, was to inspire new collaboration from the Malayans, and thus to re-
establish continuity of British influence and prestige in the colony. The relaxation of
control over the societies and organisations, however, contributed to expansion of the
influence of extremist elements of society, as such institutions became politicised instead
of responding to the social needs of the people and moved in the direction of opposition
to British colonial rule. In these circumstances, a change of course during the BMA
appears to have been almost inevitable. In fact, despite the laissez-faire policy being
applied to organised labour, the General Labour Unions (GLUs) had never been officially
recognised as the representatives of labour. Their plan for a large-scale demonstration in
February 1946 on the anniversary of the fall of Singapore was called off after a warning
74 The basic idea in this section is based in Harper, op.cit., Ch. 2 'The Malayan Spring', pp. 55-93.
75 ibid., p. 57.
127
from the BMA, and in Singapore the demonstration organisers were arrested. This
incident clearly showed British determination not to permit any open campaign that
would impede British colonial rule. Indeed from January 1946 onwards the BMA began
to reverse their policy over the societies and organisations by resuming the registration of
societies and the trade unions, and the trade union movement was being re-directed
under the guidance of the government-appointed Trade Union Adviser, J.A. Brazier.76
In the face of strong opposition from Malays to the Malayan Union, especially
the clause of a common citizenship, Gent and MacDonald convinced the CO to revise the
Union constitution. The British authorities feared that the mounting Malay opposition
might result in a recurrence of communal fighting between Malays and Chinese. In the
face of such a scenario they also felt the need to support the comparatively moderate line
of UMNO against the radical Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), the leadership of which
was comprised of forces holding both the Communist and extreme Indonesian nationalist
outlooks. '" On 25 July 1946 an Anglo-Malay Working Committee comprised of 12
representatives, was set up to draft an alternative constitution. The new proposals
provided a framework that would allow for differential treatment between Malays,
British subjects, and others in the procedure for automatic qualification for 'first
generation' Malayan citizenship. This marked some significant departure from the
principles that were contained with the Malayan Union and the re-establishment of the
old Anglo-Malay partnership. 78 Such confidence-building measures were the means by
which a consensus with the Malay population would be forged, thus ensuring their
cooperation with the new state structure.
76 Stenson, op.cit., pp. 65-80.
77 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, pp. lx-lxiii. For more details on Malayan political parties during the BMA
period, and the relations between the constitutional changes and British search for collaborators, see
Harper, op.cit., pp. 83-93.
78 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I pp. lx-lxiii, and author's own notes in pp. 241, 255, 265.
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While it is the case that a colonial power seeking to establish a social basis for the
consolidation of their rule would try to implement aspects of social policy that might
assist such a process, pre-war paternalism was not suitable in the circumstances that
prevailed in post-war Malaya. The Malayans were now more conscious of the
importance of their position within the colonial structure and of Britain's need for their
cooperation if they were to re-establish their position in Malaya. On the part of the
British they lost opportunities to replace their pre-war policy based in 'divide and rule'
with a direct allegiance from the communities as a whole to the colonial state and with a
broader social base resting on a more ethnically plural constituency in post-war Malaya.
Had the British and Malayan governments been able to successfully activate such an
inclusive policy, then this might have served at least to minimise the tendencies in
Malayan society that had resulted in conflicts between the communities, and between the
different ideologies and discontent within the Chinese community.
Another point that should be made here is that the need for dollars led the British
to place emphasis upon the need for rehabilitation of the extractive industries. This
emphasis on the restoration of pre-war economic structures led to a concentration on the
purely economic regeneration of the Malayan economy at the expense of wider socio-
economic reconstruction. This occurred despite the British understanding that a
progressive social policy was required to benefit the broader layers of workers and thus
ensure social stability and fend off the Communist threat. In hindsight it might be argued
that the establishment of a broad social consensus could have provided a solid basis upon
which the new post-war state structure could rest, and thus the situation that came to
constitute the Emergency might have been avoided. After all, such a consensus based on
the implementation of a liberal social policy was taking place in the metropole at the
time.
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3.2.3 The Malayan Union and Rehabilitation Work
In March 1946 Dening reported that, though there was much that remained to be done,
there had been steady progress towards recovery in Malaya — a progress that compared
favourably to that achieved in other Southeast Asian countries. 79 In reality, problems
with supplies of food and consumer goods, low wages and inflation were far from
resolved; on the contrary, they had merely been handed over to the successor
government.
The resumption of civil government (the Malayan Union was established on 1
April 1946) did not bring immediate economic recovery to Malaya, for the Union
suffered from acute shortages of finance, and of important supplies and machinery."
Rice shortages continued to be problematic, and became most acute at the end of 1946."
According to the report of the Chief Secretary of the Malayan Union, Alexander
Newboult, the cost of buying food during this period 'consumed up to 70 per cent of the
budget of many families'. 82
 Rice rationing was reduced by almost one-half in the
immediate months after the return of the British from 4.6 oz per person per day to a 2.5
oz by late 1946. Throughout 1947 the rice ration rose to approximately a third of the
average pre-war rice consumption (15 oz per capita per day), but this increase in ration
levels was often accompanied by price rises. This frequent price fluctuation of officially
rationed rice ('from week to week and from region to region') brought an adverse effect
on stability of ordinary life.83
79 PRO CAB 21 1954 F5093/87/61 despatch from M.E. Dening to Bevin, 25 Mar. 1946. It was his last
report as the Political Adviser of the SEAC.
80 Stubbs, op.cit., pp. 17-8.
81 Stenson, op.cit., p. 84.
82 PRO CO 537/3004 and P/PM1, Chief Secretary 530/48 (ANM), cited in Stubbs, op.cit., p. 21.
83 Stubbs, op.cit., p. 21.
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Being afraid of the inflationary effect of wage rises, the Union continued to
restrain the wages of government employees. However, the problem was that the
government's wage policy was not applicable to the private industry. At least in the first
half of 1946 when many private industries, especially rubber factories, engineering shops,
and trading firms, were booming, the employers were prepared to pay high wages to
attract labour and also to avoid any interruption in business. As a result, the disparity in
wages between government employees and workers in the private industries increased.
The Indians were 'usually employed in government services or in the rubber industry
they bore', thus they were disproportionately subject to government's policy of wage
restraint." In the face of the intensifying discontent among the Indian workers, the
government offered an increase of the basic minimum wage and an allowance to meet
high living costs. This increase, however, was not sufficient to meet the general
inflationary tendency in prices: the rise of wages of government employees in November
1946 was 2.86 times of the 1939 level, whilst controlled prices alone rose 3.52 times that
of 1939. Therefore, the disparity between wages and real market prices was even bigger
than this figure suggested." The consequent frustrations felt among the Indian workers
were subsequently exploited by the MCP, which 'were prepared to go to unusual
lengths' to win the allegiance of Indian labourers because of the importance of the Indian
workers in the European sector of the Malayan economy."
In 1947 there were signs of improvement in the economy, as rubber production
recovered rapidly to its pre-war level. However, in real terms the price of rubber was
'little better than that of 1941', and thus the earnings from rubber production in addition
to high inflation did not provide the same degree of buying power to the Malayan
84 Harper, op.cit., p. 131.
85 Stenson, op. cit., pp. 85-6.
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government as it had done in the pre-war years. While the price of tin had nearly doubled
since 1939, the earnings from tin exports were not a provider of additional finance to the
government as tin production in 1947 was only one-fifth of its 1939 leve1. 87 As a result,
the shortages of food and goods continued.
3.2.4 Supplies of Rice and Goods on a Regional Basis and the Role of the Special
Commissioner
The extreme scarcity of rice remained one of the greatest problems throughout the post-
war period in Malaya. The British realised that rice supply was a regional matter, only to
be resolved on a pan-Southeast Asian basis. Some sort of machinery was needed to
connect the rice exporting and importing countries, and to arrange distribution of the
foodstuffs between the countries. 88 Immediately after the end of the war the SEAC
ultimately dealt with matters of economic administration arising out of military
government and was particularly concerned with the procurement and distribution of rice
throughout the area. However, as the military administrations would be terminated with
the return of civil governments, the FO considered the continued need for some
organisation to deal with similar problems. Although as yet it was unclear as to what
extent the organisation should take a role in the area, where normal trading activities
would resume as soon as the civil governments were established, the idea of having such
an organisation was pressed by the FO. The office of the Special Commission was
established as a coordinating machinery between British and non-British territories in the
86 Harper, op.cit., p. 131.
87 Stenson, op.cit., p. 85.
88 Tailing, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, pp. 46, 108, 133.
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region, 89 and among the many tasks assigned to Killearn, Bevin particularly emphasised:
, ... your Mission should for the present continue to concentrate on grappling with the
food situation ... .'90
In March 1946, Killearn took over the job of the Overseas Reconstruction
Committee, which had previously dealt with the economic breakdown. 91 He also became
responsible for all economic functions hitherto exercised by the SACSEA, concerning
food distribution, transportation, coal supplies and economic intelligence, which were
not passed to any one individual Governor. Killearn's role with regard to the food crisis
was to take all possible steps to alleviate the food crisis by increasing food production
and distributing foodstuffs to the deficit areas. At the regional level, his task was to liase
with the rice importing and exporting countries and with other interested parties, such as
Australia and New Zealand, on issues such as nutrition, educating the public about diet,
co-ordinating economic intelligence, rail and sea transport, the supply of coal, and health
intelligence. These issues were discussed in the conferences, committees and meetings
that he and his advisers convened, and also during their visits to the neighbouring
countries. 92 Killearn also communicated directly with the London government through a
Special Committee, the UK Official Committee on South East Asia (Food Supplies),
which was set up to co-ordinate action by government Departments regarding food
problems and related economic questions in SEA.93
89 PRO CAB 21 1954 Appointment of Special Commissioner in SE Asia: outward telegram no 656 from
the Cabinet Office to Mountbatten, 13 Feb. 1946.
90 PRO FO 371 54021 F9713/333/61 telegram, 9 July 1946, cited in Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and
the Onset of the Cold War, p. 133.
91 PRO FO 371 63549 F6687/261616 FO to Killearn, Singapore, 17 May 1947.
92 PRO CAB 21 1955 F6151/6151/61 South-East Asia: Work of the Special Commission during 1946:
despatch no 119 from Killearn to Bevin, 12 Apr. 1947.
93 PRO CAB 21 1954 Survey of co-ordination within the territories of South-East Asia: inward
savingram no 12 from 1Cillearn to FO, 17 June 1946. The Commission also supplemented the efforts of
other organisations to ship rice out of Siam, which was in a relatively better situation than other
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The efforts made by SEAC and the Special Commissioner were covered by the
organisations set up under the auspices of the British Ministry of Food. 94 The UK invited
the rice deficit countries in South and Southeast Asia, and the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers (SCAP) to Singapore to discuss the rice shortage. It was important to
obtain cooperation from the US government in framing the future policy of the SCAP,
because the latter was buying rice from SEA on behalf of Japan and offering higher
prices than any other country in the region could afford. This started to affect the
distribution of rice in SEA because more rice was flooding out of SEA than should have
been.95 If the governments of India, Ceylon, Indonesia, and Malaya were unable to
import enough rice, the food deficits would bring the gravest economic danger to them.
There were also international organisations with which the British organisations had to
liase: the Sub-committee on Rice, established in Singapore by the Rice Committee of the
1EFC; the ECAFE: a specialised agency of the UNO; the Food and Agricultural
Organisation, including the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council and the International Rice
Commission; and the World Health Organisation. All these organisations worked
together with basically the same purpose in mind.96
countries: PRO FO 371 63549 F6687/2616/6 FO to the Special Commissioner in South East Asia,
Singapore, 17 May 1947,
94 PRO FO 371 76041 F10598/1103/61 Economic and Social Development in the Far East and SEA:
preliminary report by the Working Party, the Far Eastern Official Committee, 12 May 1949. A large
proportion of the total legitimate (it was a normal practice among the Siamese, Chinese, and other non-
European traders to make millions of Straits dollars by evading the orderly schemes, fixed prices,
government control etc.) export of Siamese rice was made through the Siam Rice Agency in which the
Borneo Company with some other British companies took a prominent part. Harrisons & Crosfield also
assisted the Malayan Federation government with the distribution of rice in Northern Malaya. See H.
Longhurst, The Borneo Story: The History of the First 100 Years of Trading in the Far Eat by the
Borneo Company Limited (London, 1956), p. 104, and P. Pugh, et al., Great Enterprise: A History of
Harrisons & Crosfield (London, 1990), p. 168.
95 PRO FO 371 84536 F21073/1/G tripartite ministerial talks in New York, 12-14 Sept. 1950.
96 PRO FO 371 76041 F10598/1103/61 Economic and Social Development in the Far East and SEA:
preliminary report by the Working Party, the Far Eastern Official Committee, 12 May 1949.
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The Japanese failure to satisfy the basic needs of the mass of the population in the
region put the returning power under pressure to succeed as a way to secure their
position in post-war SEA. The British government considered that 'it would be
disastrous if the return of the Allies was associated with post-war famine'. 97
 Since the
British-led SEAC was in charge of liberating the whole region, the adequate supply of
food and consumer goods was Britain's primary concern and her post-war position was
directly affected by her ability to cope with the food crisis in the region during the
military administration period. Towards the end of 1940s sufficient food supplies were
also highly significant in relation to the campaign to prevent Communist encroachment in
SEA. The whole of SEA was strongly influenced by the availability of rice. If rice was
cheap and plentiful, people were contented, and all was well. If rice became dear and
scarce, social and political instability quickly followed." It was notable that where
starvation was prominent, so were the Communist activities. Moreover, only stability
achieved in the region could satisfy a world need for raw materials, such as, rubber, tin,
rice, and vegetable oils, which were formerly exported from the Southeast Asian
countries. The British government considered that if they could at once send in adequate
supplies of food and consumer goods, recovery of the economy could be expected to be
automatic and swift."
When in June 1946 the Combined Food Board in Washington was reconstituted
as the IEFC, and began to regulate the allocation and distribution of surplus food in
SEA, Killearn's work concentrated on helping with the fair distribution of rice supplies.
In the following October an IEFC Sub-Committee on Rice was established in Singapore,
97 Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, p. 46.
98 PRO T 220 385 Financial Assistance for Rice Development Programme in the Colonies 1952-55.
99 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, p. 4.
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and, as a result Killearn's operation was brought within the direct orbit of IEFC.
However, allocations and distributions of foodstuff relied on the precision of information
on the availability of rice in the producing countries for export and the fairness of
requests submitted by food deficit areas, and at the time only the office of the Special
Commissioner could provide them. IN Therefore, instead of being overshadowed by the
presence of the IEFC, Killearn's previous work, the results of which had accumulated
over time, was invaluable to the operation of that body. For instance, meetings of the
LEFC Sub-Committee on Rice were arranged, by common consent, to take place
immediately after the Monthly Liaison Officers' Meetings, which were held in Singapore
under chairmanship of Empson, the Economic Adviser to Killearn. These meetings were
attended by representatives of all territories with which the Office of the Special
Commissioner was concerned, in order 'that the programme for rice shipments prepared
at these meetings might conveniently be reviewed by the sub-committee and approved or
amended as necessary'.ioi
The rice situation improved to some extent from the mid-1947 onwards, though
the problems with food shortages in South and Southeast Asia continued throughout the
rest of 1940s and 1950s. The main reason for this was that, even in 1949, the combined
exports of rice from the three exporting countries — Burma, Siam and Indonesia —
amounted to less than half of the pre-war total. The increasing population in the area,
and the continuous preference for rice over wheat caused the problems of supply to
persist. 1°2 Nevertheless, evidence of an improved rice situation can be seen in the
100 Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 341-2.
101 PRO CAB 21 1955 F6151/6151/61 despatch no 119 from Killearn to Bevin, 12 Apr. 1947.
102 PRO FO 371 76041 F10598/1103/611949 Economic and Social Development in the Far East and
SEA: preliminary report by the Working Party, the Far Eastern Official Committee, 12 May 1949. Also
see and CAB 21 1955 F6151/6151/61 South-East Asia: work of the Special Commission during 1946:
despatch no 119 from Killearn to Bevin, 12 Apr. 1947, for the details of rice situation in SEA
immediately after the war in comparison with the pre-war years.
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dissolution of the machinery designed to resolve post-war rice problem. For example, the
Liaison Officers' Meetings, which had continued to operate under the Economic
Department of the office of Commissioner-General after the termination of the Special
Commission, became unnecessary because of the improving rice situation, and the last
Liaison Officers' Meeting was held in November 1949. As rice became more available,
international arrangements for its procurement and distribution under the 1EFC were
breaking down, and the system of allocation finally came to an end in December 1949.103
The British military administrations and SEAC worked on normalising the money
economy in the re-occupied countries, but it was soon apparent that the mere offer of
money wages would not re-establish the economies, where there were no goods to be
bought!" The British authorities perceived that a flow of consumer goods would
provide the Southeast Asians with incentives to earn and to produce a crop surplus to
pay for the goods. m5 For instance, the Dutch showed grave concern at their inability to
buy cotton yarn and piece goods from Britain, for the supply of cotton goods had a
direct bearing on the productive capacity of the Indonesian population.1°6
Before the war Japan had been the major source of affordable manufacturing
goods for the Southeast Asians, but it was no longer an alternative source of supply.
Britain was also having difficulty producing sufficient goods to meet domestic and
overseas demand. Apart from irregular and uncertain supplies of industrial raw materials,
there were shortages of steel, containers, and packing materials, delays in delivery of
103 Remme, op.cit., p. 118. In 1949 the price of rice in the black market was not much different from
that of the rationed rice: in Kratoska, op.cit., pp. 343-44.
104 Donnison, op.cit., p. 237.
105 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, pp. 4-5.
1 °6 PRO T 236 1291 memorandum by the Treasury, 12 Apr. 1947, pp. 4-5.
137
plant and machinery and, in particular, difficulties in obtaining permission to repair, re-
build or expand manufacturing premises caused big delays in the reconstruction of British
industry as a whole.'" Above all, due to the shortage of dollars, priority in exporting
available goods was given first to the dollar area, and then to the British territories. Thus
in spite of the emphasis given to the significance of a smooth supply of all kinds of
consumer and capital goods to the Southeast Asian countries, Britain was not able to
entirely satisfy their needs.
In these circumstances, the need for an expansion of secondary industries in
Malaya was well recognised, not only as a way to diversify the Malayan economy from
extractive industries, but also as a solution to the shortage of consumer goods in the
Malayan and neighbouring markets in the region. Prior to the war, the secondary
industries in Malaya mainly produced goods for local consumption, and the main
emphasis was given to the processing and finishing industries, which were
complementary to the entrepot trade of Singapore. After 1946 various industries were
established, designed to provide for the supply of the manufactured goods. The British
believed that a carefully controlled encouragement of secondary industries in general
would lead to a higher standard of living. If goods were too expensive, and there was no
alternative source of cheap ones, they would not be bought at all, and this would directly
affect their work on rebuilding the economy. The urge toward a general advance in the
standard of living in SEA was both in the interests of the inhabitants and of Britain. A
higher standard of living meant an advance in purchasing power. If such circumstances
could be achieved then it was expected that the Southeast Asians would buy a wide
107 PRO T 230 134 summaries of replies of National Union of Manufactures on Questionnaire on Export
Trade, Dec. 1947. The Board of Trade in a summary of information on British competitive ability
suggested that the high costs of fuel due to the high price of coal in the UK imposed a more serious
handicap on the British exporters than raw materials costs: T 230 167 1950 B.T.S.(G.A) (49) 3 The
Competitive Position of United Kingdom Manufactures: memorandum by the Board of Trade.
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range of goods from British sources.1°8 Moreover, economic development in SEA would
counter Communism, and thus the British government took positive steps to encourage
local industrial development for which they could provide technical or financial aid.'"
Accordingly there were various plans initiated by the public organisations such as
the Singapore Improvement Trust, which laid out industrial estates in Singapore.u°
There were also public acts designed to develop the colonies,'" Historically public
enterprises in the British Empire had concentrated on constructing the basic
infrastructure such as transport, power supplies, social services, and agricultural
improvement, while the rest of the field was 'left almost entirely to the private sector'.112
It was more so for the places like Hong Kong and Singapore, and Malaya, which had
resources of capital and skill. As a result, despite the prominent part played by the central
and colonial governments in the industrial expansion of Malaya, the actual
industrialisation of Malaya was to a great extent indebted to private capital, especially
British private firms, including the managing agencies and merchant firms. The large
cement factory at Rawang in Selangor was established by Associated Portland Cement
Manufacturers Ltd. and Malayan Collieries Ltd; Lever Brothers built a factory in Kuala
Lumpur to produce soaps and edible fats; the Borneo Company was involved in
108 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, P. 5.
109 PRO FO 371 76041 F7438/1103/61 First Meeting of the Far Eastern (Official) Committee Working
party, 19 May 1949; FO 371 76041 F10510/1103/61 The Colonial Office paper on the Economy of
Malaya and Singapore, 28 July 1949. For the British concern over Malaya's utter reliance on tin and
rubber in relation to her relationship with the USA, see PRO CO 1022 266 or Hansard, 27 Feb. 1952.
110 D.J. Morgan, Developing British Colonial Resources 1945-1951, The Official History of Colonial
Development, vol. 2 (London, 1980), pp. 348-49.
111 For example, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDWA) was to utilise for developing basic
social services, for establishing indispensable public utilities and public services, and improving
agriculture and the conditions of a sound economy: Morgan, Developing British Colonial Resources
1945-1951, pp. 348-49.
112 White, op.cit., p. 6.
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producing building materials.' 13 In addition, many more managing agencies with interests
in rubber plantations established their own rubber processing factories. By 1951, a dry
battery factory, oil and soap factories and a glass factory were already in operation in
Malaya.'"
3.2.5 Rehabilitation Work and the Resurgence of the Trade Union Movement
We have seen that the relief and rehabilitation work showed only a somewhat slow
progress and was essentially ineffective in raising the living standard of the workers.
Stubbs criticises the inability of the BMA and the Malayan government to provide 'food
and security', while Harper charges the government with failure to maintain basic
subsistence and provide a social presence. Such failure resulte d in the subsequent
difficulties in re-establishing authority over the Malayan society. 115 Stenson describes the
main features of the rehabilitation period as 'instability, uncertainty, disorder and
economic hardship'. He admits that these were 'the inevitable consequences of war', but,
he also argues, these factors were increased as a result of the ineffective economic and
political policies of the British authorities." 6 However, true as it was that the
rehabilitation work proved to be ineffective, it cannot be said the government was solely
responsible for the subsequent instability. The MCP contributed to a large extent to the
continuous unrest by instigating politically-motivated strikes through intimidation of the
113 G.C. Allen, and A. G. Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya; A Study in
Economic Development (London, 1954), p. 262.
114 PRO PREM 8 1407 Part I Report by the Far East (Official) Committee of the Cabinet on Economic
and Social Development in South and South-East Asia and the Far East, 1 Dec. 1951, Appendix A:
Country Surveys: Individual Studies, p. 11. It was reported that although the operation was still
insufficient, the future of secondary industries looked far brighter in comparison with food production,
for the production of food and raw materials made a very slow progress. For more details, see PRO FO
371 76041 F10593/1103/61 A Preliminary Report by the Working Party on Economy Social
Development in the Far East and Southeast Asia, 12 May 1949.
115 Stubbs, op.cit., p.25 and Harper, op.cit., pp. 55-93.
116 Stenson, op.cit., pp. 67-71.
140
labourers, while there was a degree of 'a feeling of contentment' among the labourers,
who were otherwise not prepared to go on lengthy strikes," 7
 We should also not forget
the fact that the violent conflicts within the Chinese community in the rural area
accentuated the unrest and under laid the chaos before the outbreak of the Emergency. 118
The Times reported in September 1945 that the growing political consciousness
in the NEI, Burma, and Indochina took the form of straightforward nationalism and the
struggle for independence, whereas in Malaya emphasis was on the economic side of
things. The Malayans were believed to have every economic motive to assist the
returning British. Thus, struggle between capital and labour rather than a struggle
between nationalists and the metropolitan power would soon come to work as a factor
disturbing to established British interests. 119 This prediction proved to be correct, and the
conflicts between capital and labour in Malaya became more complicated because of the
involvement of the MCP and its affiliates, which often found opportunities for agitation
in the presence of economic grievances and of communalism, and they frequently used
violence as a political weapon.
When the British managers returned to Malaya, they found the labourers
generally 'unruly' and 'reluctant to accept supervisory authority. Nowhere was this more
true than on rubber estates ... In the absence of the European managers during the
wartime, a considerable tension between the Asian staffs, who had continued to run the
estates for the Japanese, and the labourers had developed. The latter felt a profound
mistrust of the former. After the British returned, the labourers were reluctant to accept
117 ibid., pp 199 ff.
118 ibid., pp 194
119 The Times Sept. 26, 1945. It is generally accepted that despite an awakening of political
consciousness among Malayans, a Malayan nationalist movement hardly existed towards the end of
1945.
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control by the Asian staff, and sometimes staged lightning strikes and assaulted
conductors or clerks.I20
Another source of constant irritation among the estate workers was the disparity
in wages received by Chinese and Indian estate labourers, a situation that persisted under
the unsettled conditions of the immediate post-war period. For instance in Ulu Langat,
Indian tappers received between $1.30 and $1.50 a day, whilst Chinese tappers were paid
a maximum daily wage of $2.23. 121 While Chinese workers could exploit the favourable
employment situation in which their employment under the pre-war contract system had
much been reduced (and additionally many of whom had an extra-earning through
planting vegetables and cash-crops), Indian estate labourers were 'undernourished, clad
in rags, poorly housed and poorly paid' . 122 The second form of disparity in wages, as
explained earlier, was caused by the wage policy of the BMA and the Malayan Union,
which only retained the 1939 basic wage level for government employees.
The chaos in the aftermath of the war had fuelled the rapid rise of labour
movement. Throughout the BMA period especially during the first half of 1946, there
was 'a spontaneous trend towards strike action and unionisation', for example, the
development, independent of external political influence, of Indian Labour Unions in
many estate areas. 123 However, the trade unions were usually established by MCP or
MPAJA members, and without the leadership of 'the politically conscious, vanguard
organizers of the MCP' and their disciplined organisation and coercive power, the
spontaneous movement by the labours themselves would not have formed anything like
the organised force that the strikes throughout 1946 and 1947 constituted. During the
Interregnum after the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, and before the arrival of
120 Stenson, op.cit., pp. 94-5.
121 Harper, op.cit., p. 131.
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the British troops at the beginning of September, the real occupying force in almost all
inland towns in Malaya was the MPAJA. The MCP's desire to obtain freedom of
political activity led them to seek official recognition. Thus, the MPAJA cooperated with
the BMA to regain the control of the countryside before voluntarily, yet reluctantly,
disbanding in December 1945. Thanks to the assurance from the British authority that
the MCP could operate openly, the MCP, while its top leaders still remained
underground, established offices in all major towns, cities and states of Malaya and
organised the various front organisations. The Communists initiated the revival of the
pre-war GLUs in the towns: the Singapore GLU was inaugurated in October 1945, as
was the Pan-Malayan General Labour Union (PMGLU) on 15 February 1946. These
organisations were 'by far the most successful and by far the most important for MCP
policy'
 .124
The European staffs were only gradually coming back, and thus close supervision
of workers on the estates was not yet possible. The Police, whose morale had been badly
run down during the Japanese occupation and who were showing slow processes of
recovery, could not effectively address the unrest. 125 At the end of October 1946, when
free immigration of Indian labourers to Malaya was finally banned, workers were still
scattered throughout the country because of the dislocation during the war, and also due
to the collapse of old systems for the recruitment and control of labour. The labourers
were now free to move to seek jobs with better wages, and thus well informed about
employment conditions. All these factors greatly improved the bargaining power of the
labourers, 126 who became increasingly determined to acquire more control over their
122 Stenson, op.cit., pp. 120-24.
123 ibid., pp. 99-100.
124 ibid., pp. 54-63.
125 ibid., pp. 90-91; Short, op.cit., p. 27.
126 Stenson, op.cit., pp. 83-4.
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own affairs.127 Eventually workers' rejection of the strict discipline and of managerial
paternalism, on which the pre-war employment system had been based, clashed with the
major employers who were determined to resist substantial reform of the employment
system and wage increases.
In 1947 rubber production was coming back to the pre-war level, and there were
more consumer goods available together with other signs of the economy improving.
The living conditions of labourers, however, hardly improved because of the high living
cost. Malayan workers, who had welcomed British return with expectation of a rapid
economic recovery to its pre-war level, were dissatisfied with the ineffective
government's economic policy, and the consequent hardship imposed on them. The MCP
used these general economic grievances to infiltrate the ranks of the much-agitated
labourers.128
The managers and planters granted concessions in response to the strikes and
demonstrations throughout 1946. They also turned toward the government and put
forward strong demands to address the agitators. Government was, however, reluctant
to intervene in labour protests, which to them seemed to be more like industrial disputes
caused by the disparities in wages than Communist-instigated political action. Gent
believed that managers contributed substantially to the strike wave by enticing labour
from each other's estates, thus creating a situation in which wage rates varied widely.129
During the strike wave of January-February 1947 the demands from the employers to
assert firm measures to control labour was again rejected by the Governors of Singapore
and the Malayan Union. 13° Employers argued emphatically that the country was 'in
127 Harper, op.cit., p. 134.
128 ibid., p. 134.
129 PRO CO 537 2173 Gent to Creech Jones, 24 June 1946, cited in Harper, op.cit., p. 134.
139 Straits Echo, 4 March 1947, cited in Stenson, op.cit., p. 157. McKerron, the Acting Governor of
singapore, refused to accept that trade unions alone were responsible for the strikes.
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serious danger' and that 'if political agitators were allowed to continue their "subversive
programme" the country's rehabilitation would be seriously delayed'. 131 Gent still
rejected taking any form of arbitrary action against political agitators or strikers, but
emphasised the necessity for negotiation, compromise and 'educative action' aimed at
both employers and employees. 132
Business was further alarmed by the considerable labour unrest, violence,
intimidation and lawlessness throughout Malaya. 'Many of these strikes were
unnecessarily disruptive.' Gradually the economic motive or worker's welfare was
neglected, but 'the strike itself was of primary importance', and the workers became 'an
organizational tool to be forged and manipulated by PMGLU for the long-term policy
objectives of the MCP'. 133 The unions used coercive methods to reinforce their authority
over the workers and also to collect funds, which were the main financial source for the
MCP. The disorder was exemplified in the most intense dispute of all, at Kedah. The
Kedah incident began amongst Indian labour on the Harvard and Dublin Estates from
July and August 1946, but by early 1947 the strikes had spread throughout South and
Central Kedah. It was only in April 1947 the Police intervened to arrest the main leaders
and reinstated law and order, albeit by means of opening fire on a crowd at the Dublin
Estate. Harper and Stenson have identified this incident as a turning point in labour
relations in Malaya, which 'signalled a new period of collusion between employers and
the security forces'. 134 Stenson explains further that the Kedah incident contributed to
convincing the officials of the significance of the role of the plotting of political agitators
131 Strait Times, 7 Feb. 1947, and T.U.A., 4/1946, Employer representation to Gent, 3 Feb. 1947, cited in
Stenson, op.cit., p. 156.
132 Gent believed that mere membership of the GLUs or participation in strikes should not be subject to
punishment (PRO CO 537 2166 FF8-12 minute 3 of the 6th Governor-General's Conference in
Singapore, 11 Mar. 1947). The colonial government was 'accountable to a socialist administration in
London and Governor Gent took this very seriously': Harper, op.cit., p. 136.
133 Stenson, op.cit., p. 107.
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in the widespread unrest. As a result, 'stronger official backing was given to the
enforcement of the trespass law as well as to police action against all forms of
intimidation and violence', and this contributed to the subsequent 'gradual ending of the
period of almost completely uncontrolled union activity on estates'.135
Indeed strikes subsided after the Kedah incident. There was, however, no
established uniform view on labour relations on the part of business and officials. Instead
each of the two sectors showed intransigence in avocation of its own strategy. As the
rubber price dropped during mid-1947, managers were alarmed by rising production and
labour costs, and thus began to ignore demands from the estate unions, and 'to exercise
their powers of dismissal' and to seek 'eviction orders to expel labour activists from their
properties'. This hardening of attitude brought severe criticisms from officials, on the
other hand it helped to establish strong authority over the labourers. 136 By then the
economy had improved, and the labour market was re-established along 'the pre-war,
paternalist, closed-society estate system'. The employers had been assisted in achieving
such an objective by the fact that the estate and mine workers were not 'a genuinely self-
conscious proletariat' and were thus not 'related to the owners and managers solely by
the economic nexus'. This enabled a situation to arise in which, once the normal routine
of work was re-established, there was a revival of the close social ties between the
employers and the workers.'37
By 1948 production of rubber had reached its pre-war level, and the level of tin
production was also improved. By mid-1947 the food situation had improved to such an
--
134 Stenson, op.cit., p. 161; Harper, op.cit., pp. 134-5. The particular quote is from Harper, p. 135.
135 Stenson, op.cit., p. 161.
136 'Brazier lambasted the planters for their short-sightedness; Gent told the Colonial Office, that many
of them should have retired before the war and were "lost and pig-headed" in the new conditions.': PRO
CO 537 2173 Gent to Bourdillon, 24 June 1947 and MU Labour/158/47 Brazier to Commissioner of
Labour, 19 Sept. 1947, cited in Harper, op. cit., p. 138
137 Stenson, op.cit., pp. 161, 200.
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extent that the government scrapped internal controls on the movement of rice, and in
1948 its production had reached pre-war levels. 138 As imports of rice did not recover
sufficiently, the general mass of the population, particularly the wage earners, still found
the cost of food high.'" Yet the gap between the price of rice and wages narrowed,
relatively speaking, and there were also more goods available from an alternative source,
the black market. As a result the economic conditions, even for the low-wage labourers,
improved in comparison to the period immediately after the end of the war. Despite that,
the MCP's activities continued, as their ultimate aim to create a Malayan Republic
remained unfulfilled, and in these circumstances 'the economic struggle was strictly
subordinated to the political' 140 In any case, violence and lawlessness were escalating
from another direction, the frontier. The colonial governments had been trying to assert
their respective authorities over the squatters who were living on the fringe of the
forests, and were evading the law to the irritant of the Malays and the state governments.
The MCP was also anxious to mobilise the squatters who were also the source of labour
for the estates and mines near where they squatted. The situation was especially bad for
the Chinese estate and mine owners whose premises were located in an isolated area, and
thus who were subject to continuous pressure 'from the MCP intimidators based on the
surrounding jungle'. They eventually brought in the members of the Chinese nationalist,
anti-Communist, KMT and its youth association in an attempt to control their workers
and to resist their seemingly endless demands, which further escalated violence. These
intensifying conflicts, between the Chinese estate and mine owners, and the MCP and the
MCP-led workers, as a matter of fact, developed quite separately from those between the
138 Kratoska, op.cit., p. 343.
139 The price of rice in 1948 was 'over five times as much as it had in 1941', whilst the standard wage
rate in the rubber industry rose to less than three times that of 1941, from $0.55 a day only to $1.30 a
day in 1948: Federation of Malaya Annual Report, 1948, P. 46, cited in Stubbs, op.cit., p. 21.
14° Stenson, op.cit., p. 206.
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MCP and the colonial government. The internecine conflicts within the Chinese
community and their turning toward the secret societies for backing can partly be seen as
a result of the resonance of the traditions of Chinese society in which there had been a
close connection between commercial powers and secret societies. However, it was also
partly a reflection of the contemporary political developments in China, where the civil
war between the Communists and the KMT was in raging. In Malaya, MCP shootings of
KMT strike breakers, contractors and the heads of labourers resulted in counter-attacks,
and vice versa. These incidents were more frequent in Malacca, large parts of Johore and
Pahang, and Perak — the so-called 'areas of former MPAJA strength' — where the
labourers had virtually been taken over control by the MCP. The MCP's struggle to
control the estate and mine workers accentuated the existing divisions of the Chinese
community, resulting in more violence which was to some extent redirected to their
conflicts with the European sector of the estate economy. In these circumstances not
only the British planters and managers but also Chinese staff were the victims of
violence. The alarming incidents, particularly those in Perak, challenged the colonial
government, and undermined its function of maintaining law and order. This crisis of
authority underlay the declaration of the Emergency. 141
Conclusion
Economic hardships in post-war Malaya were the inevitable result of the war and of the
transition from Japanese occupation to British rule. The difficulties that would arise out
of the adverse economic conditions had been foreseen during the planning period, but
due to the abrupt end of the war (it had been the belief among the wartime planners that
the war would end in November 1946), there was no detailed economic planning in
141 ibid., pp. 149, 194-97, 222; Harper, op.cit., pp. 94-148.
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drawn up other than that for relief supplies and for the restoration of the economic
infrastructure. In addition, the SEAC was not fully equipped to deal with the economic
problems because of lack of manpower and resources. 142 Relief and rehabilitation works
were often retarded by shortages of supplies and by the disruption of communications
and shipping. Of course, these obstacles were beyond the control of the authorities, and
yet the officials worked remarkably hard to establish at least some level of normality in
the face of what might be seen as 'impossible' circumstances. The British government's
initiative on the provision of food and its distribution, through organisations established
under auspices of the state, especially the Ministry of Food, and through the office of the
Special Commission, was invaluable in alleviating the food situation. However, the
extreme shortages of food and consumer goods were not easily rectified, and, indeed,
they continued. The consequent economic difficulties served to destabilise Malayan
society, the worst affects being felt by the poorest sections of society. This situation was
a key factor in the proliferation of demonstrations, work stoppages and strikes, together
with the fact that the labour protests were systematically organised by the MCP and its
affiliates. Stubbs, Stenson, and Harper charge the government of being responsible for
the continued hardship in Malaya during the rehabilitation period. Stenson also criticises
the government's inability to deal effectively with the MCP and militant organised
labour. My analysis in this chapter is in accord with the view that the nature of the
government's relief and rehabilitation work was inadequate. There was also a lack of
enthusiasm amongst officials for the implementation of schemes to improve labourers'
welfare, especially in situations where they had to confront the attitudes of combative
employers. From the business point of view, they saw the officials and their complacency
as an additional burden over and above the problems that they experienced in their
-
142 PRO CAB 21 1954 F5093/87/61 despatch from M.E. Dening to Bevin, 25 Mar. 1946.
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attempts to get a disciplinary grip on their workforces. Indeed they saw the role of the
officials as being one that exacerbated the difficulties over imposing labour discipline.
Nevertheless I argue that neither economic grievances nor the lack of success of
governmental policy was solely responsible for the general instability of the post-war
Malayan society. There were other major difficulties that made the situation extremely
difficult, not least the strong presence of the MCP and success of its activities. It is
evident, from the fact that the improving economy in 1947 did not contribute to a decline
in the MCP's activities, that the political strength of the Communists cannot simply be
put down to the presence of conjunctural economic difficulties. On the contrary, there
were deeper political reasons for the weight of the MCP presence and this presence was
given further clout by the willingness and the ability of the MCP and the unions to resort
to coercive actions against workers, many of whom would not have otherwise
participated in militant activities. The conflicts between the MCP and the Chinese
employers, that latter being backed by the secret societies, also merged with the MCP's
struggle against the colonial government and the British section of the estate economy,
increasing violent incidents in the process. On the other hand, it is undeniable that
economic improvements failed to improve the living standards of the labourers because
of the continuous disparity between their wage levels and the high price of goods.
Additionally, by then the British plan to establish unified multiracial society in Malaya
through restructuring the constitution had already been abandoned. Instead government
policy merely served to reaffirm the old partnership between the British colonial
authorities and the Malays, leaving little room to manoeuvre for the Chinese and Indians.
Thus constitutional changes failed to eliminate communal conflicts in society. In such
circumstances the cause of the instability and disorder of post-war Malayan society
cannot be attributed to one specific factor. Instead it ought to be seen as the result of
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presence of a cluster of adverse circumstantial features that arose in the aftermath of the
war and Japanese occupation. The general economic hardship, the constant strikes and
demonstrations, and the inefficient and ineffective nature of the government's policy
towards the MCP and its insurgent activities all took place against the background of the
persistence of already existing communal conflicts in society. All these aspects
contributed to the general instability and disorder that marked the nature of the
rehabilitation period in Malaya.
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Chapter. 4 Interactions between State and Firm in the Early Years of
the Post-War Period
The complexity of the Malayan issues in the post-war period particularly with regard to
the relations between Malaya's dollar earning capacity and domestic economic
difficulties in the metropolitan government has inspired much debate. Martin Rudner
interprets British post-war strategy in Malaya as being one that sought to continue to
exploit the people in the colony, particularly at the expense of the weakest section of the
society, for instance, the Malay smallholders. Focussing his research on British post-war
policy in the Malayan rubber industry, Rudner concluded that Britain endeavoured to re-
establish the pre-war dominance of the British estates in the Malayan rubber industry.
Systematic discrimination against the poorest Malay smallholders by the Malay
aristocrats who used hereditary discrimination as a way to conserve their privilege
persisted, even after independence. While Rudner shows almost a complete lack of
interest in the Emergency and its effects on commodity production, his studies
concentrate on the pre-war administrative discrimination of the Malay smallholders
regarding, for instance, the rubber restriction scheme, and the post-war discrimination in
terms of replanting, financial assistance, and the provision of supplies. Nor was Rudner
interested in the interaction between government and business. He portrays the British
metropolitan government, hardly swayed by an interruption of business, as the villain
responsible for the exploitation of the colony.' Although not stated explicitly, his work
regards British enterprises in Malaya as an entity that merely served and pursued the
I M. Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya, 1945-48', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol.
1, ISS. 1, 1970, pp. 23-36; 'A Reply to P.T. Bauer's Comment on Post-War Malayan Rubber Policy',
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,1SS. Iv, 1973, pp. 300-304; 'Malayan Rubber Policy: Development
and Anti-Development during the 1950s', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 7, 1976, pp. 235-259;
'Development Policies and Patterns of Agrarian Dominance in the Malaysian Rubber Export Economy',
Modern Asian Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, 1981, pp. 83-105.
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government's interests under the protection of the latter, rather than as an independent
influential entity that was capable of surviving the difficult times otherwise.
Nicholas White, as distinct from Rudner, refuses to accept government as a
homogenous entity. He argues that government was 'often just too dispersed,
representing too many varied viewpoints' within departments, for examples, the CO, FO,
Board of Trade, Treasury and the Bank of England, to have a coherent voice to support
business. 2 His studies on the relationship between government and business seek to
identify the nature of these relations during the rehabilitation period and he concludes
that their mutual interest in establishing British business in the Malayan extractive
industry was to a great extent limited by the continuing lack of cohesion between them
upon, particularly, provision of finance.3
My own findings in this chapter concur with White's view that there were
conflicting interests and considerations within the Departments of the London
government, especially between the CO and the Treasury, as there were between the
metropolitan government and the Malayan government. On the one hand the British
government focused on how to continue the dollar earnings in Malaya, but on the other
financial assistance for the Malayan government and British firms in the extractive
industries was rejected on account of the consideration that the reconstruction of the
domestic economy had to take priority. British businesses' attempts to influence
government on various issues regarding the rehabilitation of the Malayan extractive
industries, such as rubber price fixing, taxation and financial assistance, and the provision
of supplies, were often frustrated by lack of cooperation and of assistance on the part of
government. Neither was the profitability of private firms brought in as a factor for
2 White, op.cit., p. 16.
3 N.J. White, Business, Government and the End of Empire: Malaya, 1942-1957 (Oxford, 1996).
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consideration. This chapter explores further the way in which business continued to exert
their influence with regard to the resumption of British business interests. In the process
it will also be shown that the British government's actions were limited by the domestic
economic difficulties, rather than any lack of intention to assist British firms in the
Malayan extractive industries. I also examine here the driving forces that played a
determinant role in shaping the nature of business-government relationships, such as the
contribution of British businesses in Malaya to the dollar earnings, and its limitations.
The issues of financial assistance, rubber price fixing, taxation and the provision of
supplies are considered in relation to Rudner's claim that the British government's post-
war rubber strategy was to re-establish the pre-dominance of pre-war British estates
companies. 4 The difference between the wartime planning undertaken by government and
business is also assessed in the process of explaining the difficulties involved in
implementing their plans during the rehabilitation period.
4.1 Dependencies First Policy
In re-establishing trading activities the British gave priority to the British Dependencies
to the South of the Tropic of Cancer. About three quarters of British trade interests were
South of the Tropic, and at least half were in the British Dependencies within that area.
Their early rehabilitation would bring economic advantages and help achieve political
stability, upon which trade relations and the well being of British local firms were
dependent. Rehabilitation would also be advantageous to the British economy, as exports
of raw materials from the area to the USA would support sterling exchange with dollars.
The Foreign Office concluded therefore, that efforts towards early recovery of the British
4 The issue of Replanting is not considered here because, firstly, I find that it was rather the replanting
scheme of 1952 that affected the productivity and future of the industry than the 1947 scheme, and
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Dependencies were likely to be most effective and that rehabilitation would have the
greatest effect on the British economic position in the Far East.5
On the other hand, the British leadership, which never considered the Southeast
Asian countries individually, because of their physical closeness and their close strategic
and economic links, did not think the economic improvement within the British
territories sufficient. The balance of economic development in the whole region was
significant, for instance, for the entrepots in Malaya such as Penang, Singapore, and
Malacca, which largely depended on trade with Indonesia, Siam and other neighbouring
countries. 6 Apparently, without the latter's primary products and good market prospects,
even a successful operation of rehabilitation in Malaya could not do much good.
4.2 Interactions between State and Firm with Regard to Early Resumption of
British Business Interests in Southeast Asia
There is much correspondence between the British government and British enterprises in
SEA, stressing the significance of early resumption of British commercial interests as a
prerequisite to ensuring a strong position in the market. For example, British concerns in
the Philippines maintained that the only way of obtaining a stake in the Philippine market
in the post-war period, which had been known as an absolute US fiefdom, would be an
early advance into the country. In early September 1945, the Secretary of the London
secondly, other issues dealt with here were more relevant and significant during the rehabilitation
period.
5 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, pp. 3, 47, 50. The report (in p. 50) also concluded that a supply of
British consumer goods there was a first necessity.
6 For instance, a good deal of Malayan dollar earnings were in respect of entrepot trade in Indonesian
origin rubber and tin which were processed in Malaya for re-shipment to Europe and the USA. There
are files emphasising of great importance to Malaya to retain her entrepot trade in Indonesian exports
and imports: T 236 1292, T 236 2561, T 236 2647, PREM 8 1407, etc.
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Committee of Representatives of British concerns in the Philippines sent a letter to the
Department of Overseas Trade to emphasise the significance of the time factor:
If British trade is to retain or increase the share it has hitherto
held in the Philippines and not lose all to American
enterprise, it is absolutely essential that the British firms
interested in the Islands pre-war, be enabled to get their staffs
back there with the least possible delay.'
Long before the end of the war, in January and February 1945, British businessmen with
interests in the Philippines had already organised themselves. They formed the so-called
Manila party and requested that the FO assist them in their returning journey to the
Philippines. However, without confirmation from Washington that the US authorities
favoured their journey, the FO could not give them any assurance.' The difficulties
anticipated in the early advance in the Philippines were basically due to the fact that it
was required of British subjects who wished to return that they must obtain a US military
permit and visa. Moreover, quota restrictions on the return of businessmen to the
Philippines discriminated against British businessmen in favour of Americans. 9 Their
position was further worsened by British manufacturers' inability to supply goods and to
improve on deliveries for export.°
Despite the urgent need for business to re-enter SEA, this was not feasible in some
areas due to the difficult conditions, mainly caused by the political instability. In
particular, British firms and managing agencies in the NET, such as the Anglo-Dutch
7 PRO FO 371 46376 F6980/4025/61 letter from the Secretary of the London Committee of
Representatives of British Concerns in the Philippines to Department of Overseas Trade, 3 Sept. 1945.
8 PRO FO 371 46335 F1276/182/61 FO to Washington, 3 Mar. 1945.
9 PRO FO 371 46376 F7622/4025/61 Washington to FO, 28 Sept. 1945.
19 PRO FO 371 46376 F8176/4025/61 letter from Fred Wilson & Co., Ltd, Manila, to FO, 18 Sept. 1945,
regarding supply and delivery time of British Diesel Engines that used to have a very good market in the
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Plantations of Java, British-American Tobacco, Harrisons & Crosfield, Unilever, and
Shell, were anxious to obtain an assurance of protection of their properties. Being deeply
concerned with the perceived result of serious damage and loss to their interests in the
absence of well directed measures for the protection of British interests in general, the
directors of the firms above wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Bevin, to ask for every help
to at least despatch their experienced people to the NET." The significance of an early
investigation into the nature and extent of war damage to business interests before, and
in preparation for official demarches was better understood among business groups than
in government circles. L.B.S. Larkins, a former Commercial Agent in Batavia, wrote to
the Department of Overseas Trade; 'I wish to emphasise the importance of the time
factor as others will be well off the mark when the time comes.'12
Some in the NET pushed the British government further, asking the FO to be more
active in its readiness for restoring trading facilities, and also to be prepared to negotiate
the terms of war compensation with the Indonesian and Dutch governments on behalf of
British business interests, and if not these, directly with the Japanese government.13
However, although the British government and its relevant Departments were in
agreement with business, such a course of action was not yet possible due to the
hostilities between the nationalist Indonesians and the Dutch.
As far as Malaya was concerned, the British government showed courtesy towards
British companies and managing agencies with interests in rubber and tin in terms of re-
country, but was on the verge of losing 'an extremely lucrative market' unless British manufacturers
improved supply and deliveries.
11 PRO FO 371 46348 F84681629161 letter from the Directors of the Anglo-Dutch Plantations of Java,
Ltd., British-American Tobacco Co., Ltd., Harrisons & Crosfield, Ltd., Lever Bros. & Unilever Ltd., and
Shell Transport & Trading Co., Ltd., to Bevin, 10 Oct. 1945.
12 PRO FO 371 46348 F3319/629/61 minute written by L.B.S. Larkins, 0.B.E., formerly Commercial
Agent at Batavia, which was sent by Lord Farrer, Department of Overseas Trade, to Sterndale Bennett,
FO, 22 May 1945.
13 ibid.
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entry to the country. The staffs in the industries were given priority in re-entering the
country to inspect the war damage. Until its termination in November 1946, the SEAC
— ultimately the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia — had power to permit,
or not, the return of firms and personne1. 14 Despite endeavours to provide the necessary
facilities as soon as was practical, the effort was often distorted by the shortage of
transport. By the end of November 1945, it was still not certain in most countries of the
region when passages would be available. Somehow the CO initiated arrangements for
civilians to apply for admission to Malaya, Hong Kong, North Borneo, and Sarawak.
However the people who were directly related to 'the interests of the territory as a
whole' (this requirement was initially a reference to the staff in rubber and tin industries)
were given priority for entry, and 'the equality of opportunity' came second. Therefore,
despite the admission of civilians into these territories being subject to the consent of the
military authorities, the staff of rubber companies who were members of the Malayan
Rubber Estate Owners' Company and the Borneo Rubber Estate Owners' Company, and
the staff of tin companies represented on the Rehabilitation Committee of the Malayan
Chamber of Mines, did not need to apply in writing to the C0.15
On the other hand, businessmen themselves were more pro-active than reactive to
the rehabilitation work. Before the NET were liberated, a few quite prominent British
businessmen, who were evacuees from Java, worked for the Import and Export
Department in the Royal Netherlands East Indian Commission at Brisbane in Australia. 16
All industries were assumed to be making their own plans for the resumption of
operations on the liberation of the territories when they were permitted to do so. The
14 PRO FO 371 46340 F2962/299/61 1945 H.A. Harding to S. Redman, War Office, 26 Oct. 1945.
15 The Times, 29 Nov. 1945.
16 PRO FO 371 46348 F4295/629/61 letter from Lord Farrer, Department of Overseas Trade, to
Sterndale Bennett, 3 June 1945. The appointees were former rubber and tea brokers; each was employed
158
Malayan estate industry and the tin industry were also responsible for their own
rehabilitation but, differently from other industries, on the understanding that they would
receive all possible assistance from the British government. The CO welcomed the
formation of a Rehabilitation Committee organised by each industry, and the
representatives of private firms assisted the buying agencies of the Ministry of Supply;
for instance, representatives from the two big smelting companies, the Straits Trading
Company and the Eastern Smelting Company worked in the Ministry of Supply's tin
purchasing agency. In addition, thanks to the support from the CO, a Committee of
Inspection, composed of representatives of the rubber estate industry, tin mining
industry, copra estate industry and oil palm estate industry, was sent to Malaya to
prepare reports on the condition of properties.17
Government worked closely together with private companies but in retrospect this
was probably more to do with the government's un-preparedness for assuming
responsibility for the direction of economic affairs in the liberated SEA. As a result, the
military authorities actively encouraged the involvement of businessmen who had
previous local experience in civil affairs organisations. As the success or failure of their
post-war business in the region largely depended on how quickly the economic and
political conditions were brought back to normality, it was of mutual interest to business
and government that the rehabilitation work should be completed with as little delay as
possible.
by Gyselman & Steup, and Dunlop & Kolff, and a former Departmental Manager of Maclaine Watson &
Co.
17 PRO FO 371 46340 F6023/299/61 memorandum by the Colonial Office on the Relief and
Rehabilitation of Malaya, 27 Aug. 1945; The Times, 8 Dec. 1945 in PRO FO 371 46422
F10803/9327/61.
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British private firms were particularly vulnerable during the war, and were easy targets
because of their deep involvement in the extractive industries, normally located in the
rural areas where the actual fighting was carried out. Although the form and degree of
destruction differed from one firm to another and from region to region, destruction in
general badly affected resumption of business. 18 A deliberate and systematic programme
of destruction was undertaken by the advancing and retreating Japanese soldiers, and
also by the retreating Allies. Before evacuating Malaya and Singapore Commonwealth
soldiers destroyed the bridges, engineers in the tin mines dynamited their mining dredges
and planters set fire to their factories before slipping into the jungle to start fighting
activities for the duration of the war. Managers in the oil fields in the NET destroyed all
facilities before retreating to prevent them being used by the advancing Japanese troops.
As a consequence 'What the British had created was not merely being deserted; it was
also being physically destroyed.'19
Apart from the physical destruction the greatest losses to British firms were of
human resources. Most of the European managers and assistants who stayed behind
were killed or interned (often dying in the internment camps because of maltreatment and
malnutrition). Many junior officials, shopkeepers, planters, and engineers who did not
flee fought alongside regular British troops, often proving to be more courageous. From
1943 onwards these forces were increasing in number and penetrated Japanese-held
18 In the banking sector, King's book on Hongkong and Shanghai Bank tells the chaotic situation
aftermath the war in detail. Each branch was confronted with different difficulties in a various degree,
and there were only three branches to survive, but still many officers in these three branches had been
interned while others had joined the services. In addition to the loss of journals, the specific difficulties
regarding resumption of banking business were mainly laid on the fact that civil requirements had often
to take second place, on the timing of liberating staff, and the availability of transportation. Nevertheless
the Head Office of the Bank in Hong Kong was re-established on 20 June 1946. Some re-opened, while
some others permanently closed the branches. See F.H.H. King, Volume IV of the History of the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation: The Hongkong Bank in the Period of Development and
Nationalism, 1941-1984 From Regional Bank to Multinational Group (Cambridge, New York, Port
Chester, Melbourne, Sydney, 1991), pp 42 ff.
19 Woodcock, op.cit., p. 230.
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Malaya and Borneo establishing contact with the bands of guerrillas who were mostly
Communist Chinese, and when they were captured, they were treated as prisoners of war
and interned together with the soldiers. 2° Their situation is well described in the letters
written by these businessmen to various Departments of the government at home and to
the headquarters of their own companies. A letter from W.A. Robertson, a former
Commission Agent in Java, to L.B. S. Larkins, formerly a Commercial Agent at Batavia,
conveys some impression of the damage to personnel during the war as those who
survived the camps were also broken in health. The letter seems to have been written just
before the end of the Pacific War as the writer was not sure at that moment whether the
prisoners (here he is referring to imprisoned British businessmen) were still alive.
Robertson says that relatively few British businessmen and employees of firms were able
to leave the country, and most of those left in the hands of the enemy would not be fit to
carry on their work in the Tropics. The letter relates that the General Manager of Cable
& Wireless Ltd. and the managers of other prestigious enterprises like B.A.T., Lever
Brothers, Dunlop, P.&.T. Lands, Harrisons & Crosfield (Java), Maclaine Watson & Co.,
Ross, Taylor & Co., Francis Peck & Co., Heatt & Co., Rowley Davis & Co., etc., were
all imprisoned during the war. 21 It could be suggested that the war experience of British
private business interests in Java was similar to that of British business in SEA in general.
Larkins sent a minute based on Robertson's letter to the Department of Overseas Trade
in London to demand of the Department responsible for British subjects and enterprises
20 ibid., 
pp. 226-33. According to Woodcock Q. 232), most of them remained behind because of their
sense of responsibility, pride and practicality. There are also some details of the hardship that the British
civilians had to endure under the Japanese occupation. For instance, Sir Vandeleur Graybum, the Chief
Manager of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, who was at first left free for
administration sake, but eventually interned and died in prison. There are more examples of these
unfortunate cases in ibid., p. 227.
21 PRO FO 371 46348 F3319/629/61 extract from W.A. Robertson's letter (a former commission agent
in Java) to Larkins, which was sent by Lord Farrer, Department of Overseas Trade, to Stemdale Bennett,
FO, 22 May 1945. 
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overseas that something should be done to ensure their well-being. The main reason for
his plea was:
... we should not wish to see those very business
enterprises which in the past have devoted their energies —
particularly the agents and specialist importers — the
furtherance of UK export trade, left in the lurch when
business relations return to the Indies.22
4.3 Rehabilitation of British Business Interests in Malaya
Rubber was introduced into Malaya as early as 1877. Demand then increased due to the
rise in ownership of motor cars in the USA and the high requirement for rubber before
and during the First World War. Interest in rubber production grew so fast that the
acreage of land controlled by rubber planters in Malaya increased from around 2,000
acres in 1898 to 46,000 acres in 1905, to 541,000 in 1910, and to 2,181,000 in 1920. In
1920 Malaya already accounted for 51 per cent of world exports of rubber. 23 Although
the fortunes of rubber production were almost entirely dependent upon the international
price of rubber in the world market, in 1938 rubber already represented 47.8 per cent of
the value of Malaya's exports, 24 and the USA was the biggest recipient by far, taking
40.84 per cent of the export by value. 25 Moreover Malaya produced approximately 29
per cent of the world's total output of tin in 1938, and the tin smelted in Malaya
accounted for 16.9 per cent of the total value of Malayan exports in the same year. The
22 ibid.
23 • Brown, Economic Change in South-East Asia (Kuala Lumpur, 1997), p. 19.
24 This estimation of rubber exports in Malaya includes both Malayan origin as well as exports from the
NEI and other adjacent countries sent to Penang and Singapore for trans-shipment overseas.
25 This is re-calculated from the figure of the destinations of Malaya's gross exports of rubber in PRO
FO 371 46340 F9425/299/61 Unrevised First Draft of the Handbook paper on Malaya, Research
Department of the FO, to Sterndale Bennett of Far Eastern Department, FO, 15 Oct. 1945, p. 9.
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USA was also the biggest recipient of the product of the Malayan tin smelters, taking 55
per cent of it. 26 This figure shows not only the significance of extractive industries to the
Malayan economy, but also the dollar earning capacity of Malaya prior to the Second
World War. The whole picture in the post-war period was not so much different from
that pre-war.
4.3.1 Wartime Planning for the Malayan Extractive Industries
4.3.1.1 State's Wartime Planning in Malaya: Reconstruction, Rationalisation and
Efficiencies
In August 1942, just a few months after the fall of Singapore, the CO had already drafted
a memorandum on the future of Malaya, Singapore and British North Borneo, and
around a year after, by mid-1943, the War Office had set up a Malayan Planning Unit
(MPU) headed by Major General R. Hone. The Unit was in charge of 'the dual task of
planning for the civil affairs administration of Malaya during the period of military
government, and also for the permanent civil administration after military rule ceased'.27
In the meantime, the Treasury and the CO began to talk about the potential for
the vitality of Malaya in meeting Britain's post-war strategic and economic needs, and
the significance of re-establishing Malaya's extractive industries for the imperial
economy. A successful re-establishment of these industries, and the consequent
resumption of dollar-earnings, was a prerequisite for the recovery of the Malayan
economy as well as that of the Empire as a whole. However, the British government's
26 Mines in the neighbouring countries, such as Siam, Indochina, Burma, China, and even Australia,
Alaska and part of Africa, sent their ore to Malaya to be smelted. The total tonnage of tin sent by these
were responsible for around 29.5 per cent of the total tin smelted in Malaya: PRO FO 371 46340
F9425/299/61 Unrevised First Draft of the Handbook paper on Malaya, Research Department of the FO,
15 Oct. 1945, pp. 8-10.
27 A.J. Stockwell, 'Colonial Planning During World War II: The Case of Malaya', The Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 2, no. 3, May 1974, p. 338.
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intention was not only to restore the Malayan economy, but also to use the
reconstruction era 'to rationalise the rubber and tin industries and maximise dollar
earnings'. As far as the government was concerned, the highly disorganised and complex
links between individual operating companies and the investment groups were
responsible for the inefficiency of the industries. Rationalisation of the industries through
restructuring the agency houses and the estates was therefore urged by many of those
who staffed the Departments of government.28
The CO was also concerned with the difficulties anticipated in the rehabilitation
of the rubber and tin industries and the re-establishment of their production, particularly
with the provision of supplies for these industries. It was a situation that would be
further complicated by the shortages of food and other consumer goods, price control,
anti-inflation measures, etc. The wartime planners in London had already foreseen a
shortage of essential equipment and supplies during the post-war rehabilitation period.
Thus, when the Rubber Growers' Association's Reconstruction (Malaya) Committee
under the leadership of Sir John Hay proposed a scheme in 1944 to establish the Malayan
Rubber Estate Owners Company (MREOC) in order to provide 'all estates operating in
Malaya with necessary supplies and equipment', the CO gave full support to the business
initiative and the proposals were soon forwarded to the War Cabinet for approval. While
the MREOC as the government's agent would take steps to facilitate the earliest possible
resumption of estate production in Malaya, the CO would assist the smallholdings with
the requisites of production. There were also other exchange mechanisms, for example,
the Rubber Produce Buying Unit and Tin Ore Buying Agency, operated under the
28 White, op. cit., p. 66.
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auspices of the Ministry of Supply, whose role it was to purchase the available rubber
and tin product immediately after the liberation of Malaya.29
In the pre-war period, the British government had shown a rather laissez-faire
attitude towards business interests overseas, while apparently there had been
collaboration between the public servants and businessmen at the local level. During the
wartime planning period there seemed to be a mutual understanding among the relevant
Departments that it was time for the British government to get a grip on Malayan
economic affairs. Moreover, an enabling state was required at the local level to guide
economic development, which was regarded as too significant to be left to the British
agency houses." Later came the idea of appointing an Economic Adviser who could
assist Malaya in the economic field, which the Treasury also supported in the belief that
good management would lessen the inevitable commitments of Britain to the post-war
rehabilitation work in Malaya. 31 Thus, if the Malayan Union scheme was intended to
bring out administrative efficiency by creating 'a unitary state embracing the Malay
peninsula as a whole and a citizenship scheme applicable to all races', 32 a parallel
rationalisation of the industries was going to unleash Malaya's full economic potential.
It is doubtful however, whether a partnership between British business in Malaya
and the British government in planning for reconstruction fully emerged, because
government excluded business from the process of planning for the future of the Malayan
economy. For instance, closer cooperation with business was prevented by the War
Office's reluctance to admit any commercial representatives 'to even a partial knowledge
29 Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya', pp. 24-6.
313 White, op.cit, p. 68.
31 PRO T 220 52 IF 23/01 Economic Adviser for Malaya: letter from Sir G. Gater to Sir H. Wilson
Smith, 313 Aug 1945.
32 Stockwell, 'Colonial Planning during World War II: The Case of Malaya', p. 333.
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of their military plans'. 33 'Moreover, it was outside the MPU that officials and politicians
secretly planned Malaya's post-war economic order.' 34 Nevertheless, it may not have
been government's intention to absolutely exclude business from the Malayan
rehabilitation schemes drawn up by Whitehall. For instance the CO kept the special
representatives of the Rubber Growers' Association (RGA), Sir John Hay and H. B.
Egmont Hake, informed of developments, albeit under strict confidentiality.35
4.3.1.2 Firms' Own Post-War Planning
Businesses had their own agendas with regard to post-war planning and development
and to many of them reconstruction meant no more than a mere resumption of the pre-
war business. Some recognised the significance of proposals for the rationalisation of
industries, though motivated by different interests than those of government. Sir Clifford
Figg, an RGA Council member and the CO's business adviser, for instance, believed that
the Malayan rubber industry should be rationalised 'through the merger of smaller estates
with bigger undertakings to strengthen "the standing of the plantation industry and its
powers to negotiate as a whole and enabling much more to be done in the way of
research and development". 36 However, leaders of the rubber industry itself were divided
over the question of post-war rationalisation. On the one hand stood Sir John Hay who
wanted to use the MREOC to rationalise the operation of the industry during the
rehabilitation period, and on the other stood Egmont Hake, chairman of the RGA for
1944-45. In September 1943 Egmont Hake argued before the RGA council that 'new
33 BoE, OV 65/3, note by Fisher, 17 Aug. 1943, cited in White, op.cit., p. 65.
34 White, op.cit., p. 65. Unfortunately White does not clarify which organisation or who made the plan,
if not the MPU.
35 RGACM, 54, 6 Sept. and 4 Oct. 1943, cited in White, op.cit., p.65.
36 BoE, OV 65/3, note by Doll, London, 13 Apr. 1943, cited in White, op.cit., p. 66.
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policies and new approaches' were needed for the post-war development, 37 but argued
that the industry had no need for further rationalisation since, 'the agency system had
already streamlined the rubber industry's many units, and that the RGA and the United
Planting Association of Malaya (UPAM) had achieved a degree of coherence in an
otherwise 'excessively individualised industry' 38 Some sections of the Malayan tin
industry also suggested amalgamation of tin mines as a remedy for unity and efficiency,
but any such plans were prevented by the rivalry between firms in that industry. The
British investment groups were still 'keen to preserve the multiplicity of operating units
which generated lucrative directorships, agency fees, and commissions', despite their
recognition of the need to trim the over-wrapped organisational and operational
structures within the system of the managing agency which increasingly became obstacles
to the effective co-ordination of productive activity. After all, rationalisation meant
giving up their lucrative earnings through the system of a managing agency.39
4.3.2 Rehabilitation Period
4.3.2.1 Inspection of War Damage on the Malayan Extractive Industries
As it has been explained above, the British government recognised the importance of re-
establishing the Malayan extractive industries as early as possible. The personnel of
British firms in the Malayan extractive industries were therefore given priority for entry
into the country for the purpose of inspection of war damage and rehabilitation of the
industries. However, the companies themselves mainly initiated the practical work.
The Times of August 10 described the overall picture of the rubber situation in
Malaya, presenting perhaps a more optimistic picture than that which might have been
37 RGACM, 54, 6 Sept. 1943, TGA, London, cited in White, op.cit., pp. 68-9.
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expected. According to the report, no more than 5 per cent of the 3,500,000 acres of
Malaya rubber plantation were destroyed by the Japanese who had made space on the
land in order to enable an increase in food production or had just wantonly destroyed the
plantations. The Times also reported the discoveries of a great mound of dumped rubber
that could be immediately used for export and publicised the observation that most of the
rubber trees had been left untapped during the war and would therefore produce a higher
rubber yield than was usual. There were, of course, young trees which had been
smothered by undergrowth, but according to the article, the rubber trees in general were
relatively intact.°
That particular piece of writing and others with a similar story line painted a bright
picture of the general condition of the Malayan estate industry. However, it should be
borne in mind that these articles covered only a few areas in the vast region, and the
newspaper itself admits this.'" In fact, the capacity to produce rubber had been lost by
both direct cutting down of the trees and the inattention to young or clonal seed trees.
The estate houses were virtually stripped of everything that was removable and the
looting of machinery and equipment was widespread. 42 More importantly, the impact of
the war threatened to throw the economic system of Malaya completely out of gear.
Malaya was in Japanese hands for more than three and a half years and during that time
nothing came into or went out of the country. Industry in most cases came to a standstill,
records disappeared, vast numbers of the most active and intelligent members of the
38 H.B. Egmont Hake, The New Malaya and You, London, 1945, p. 84, in White, op.cit., p. 69. Also see
ibid., p. 90, fn. 29.
39 White, op.cit., pp. 66-70.
40 The Times, 4 Sept. 1945, J.M. Baber, Chairman and Managing Director of Alor Pongsu Amalgamated
Estates, wrote The Financial Times from Kuala Lumpur to correct the correspondents' statement that
'only a small number of trees were tapped': The Financial Times, 16 Aug. 1949.
41 The Times, 4 Sept. 1945. It was true that 'some estates were practically unaffected while in other areas
complete estates were cut out.': PRO CO 825 86/1 memorandum for Commonwealth Conference,
London, Sept. 1950.
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population were removed, and many of them did not survive. 43 In particular,
communications were difficult, if not impossible, as a result of the destruction of many
rail and road bridges. There was also a vast labour shortage, and hardly any field of
economic activity was not adversely affected by this. For instance, according to the local
shipmasters there was a shortage of labour at every level, and the shortage of both
mundane labour and of experts with local experience resulted in an inevitable lack of
centralised control. In addition, there were insufficient wages and food for Asian
labourers who were generally in a weak and undernourished condition after the Japanese
occupation." In the rubber industry, there was also little or no labour immediately
available at the plantations. Moreover, the particular difficulties anticipated in the
industry lay in the field of plantation water supply and distribution, the treatment of latex,
local transport, etc. 45 In contrast to the impression given by some articles in The Times,
the FO, CO and DO files report massive destruction on the estates. The situation for the
resumption of business in general was extremely grim.
In spite of the anticipated difficulties, the Rubber Growers' Association
Commission completed its report on the Malayan rubber industry (which also covered
British North Borneo and Sarawak) by mid-October, and gave it to the Military
Administration that was primarily responsible for the work of rehabilitating the region.46
Yet it is not certain how accurate and detailed the report was, because ordinary rubber
42 PRO CO 825 86/1 memorandum for Commonwealth Conference, London, Sept. 1950.
43 PRO T 236 3301 memorandum on the Federation of Malaya for Commonwealth Conference, London,
Sept. 1950. See T 230 199 copy of The Colombo Plan for Economic Development in South and South-
East Asia, London, Oct. 1950, for the details on physical ravages of the war, and those of economic
dislocation and inflation, and political and social disturbances aftermath.
44 The Times, 16 Aug. 1945.
45 The Times, 4 Sept. 1945.
46 The Times, 16 Oct. 16 1945 The newspaper doesn't include the copy of report. There are two sources
where the copy might be found: first, The Tropical Growers' Association, London Rubber Growers'
Association RGACM 54-70 council Minute Books, 1942-61, and Arkib Negara Malaysia, Kuala
Ltunpur, the Federal Records in British Military Administration 1945-46 (this idea is based in the
bibliography of White, op.cit., pp. 303-04).
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planters (and mining executives) were not allowed to return to Malaya until the
beginning of November.
The effects of the war on the tin industry were much more serious than in rubber
for a number of reasons. Firstly, both sides deliberately destroyed the heavy equipment
used in the mines, and they could not easily be replaced because production lines in the
western countries had been stopped for several years due to the transformation of heavy
industry to war production. Secondly, the mines were heavily dependent on regular
supplies of fuel, electricity, water, power etc., and a resurrection of sufficient acquisition
levels of these supplies was not feasible in the immediate future. Thirdly, as in other
fields, it was almost impossible to expect a smooth supply of labour immediately after the
war, though the labour in some of the mines was working almost to the end of the war
under Japanese instruction, and were thus not so scattered as those in the rubber
plantations.47
Some engineers from the tin industry were already due to arrive in Malaya on 29
September 1945. However, the Board of the London Tin Corporation was not able to
give any news about the condition of the mines and equipment until November. The
Times explained that conditions in Burma were not yet suitable for an inspection, and
that the Siamese government was not responding to their request for an inspection
because the two governments were still technically at war." Later in November the
Colonial Office tin mining expert arrived in Malaya to work on a survey of the industry.
This is comparable with the early completion (by mid-October) of an inspection by the
RGA, and it is not certain why an early report could not be made by the industry itself.
47 The Times, Sept. 17 1945. See PRO CO 825 86/1 memorandum for Commonwealth Conference,
London, Sept. 1950, for the detail of damage (for instance, the scorched earth policy during the
withdrawal in 1941-2) and poor maintenance of the mining equipment.
48 The Times, 29 Sept. 1945.
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4.3.2.2 Assistance by the British Military Administration for Malaya for the
Rehabilitation Work
Along with the constitutional changes in Malaya, the British policy-makers also made
plans to rationalise the Malayan extractive industries so that a 'new economic order
would accompany the new political order for Malaya'. 49 Plans devised in the metropole
were being implemented at the local level under the Military Administration. Although
the Military Administration was 'not directly concerned with the revival of the rubber
and tin mining industries', it was expected to give considerable assistance in providing
facilities, for instance, for Inspection Committees (organised by the industries
themselves) to survey plantations and mines." In the meantime, Mountbatten, the
Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, was reminded that Malaya was the
principal contributor to British dollar resources, and told to assist the inspection teams to
enter and complete their task. 51 In addition, the Labour Department of the
Administration started moving the sick from the rubber estates to the hospitals, and
employed the rest in maintenance work on the estates, pending the return of the estate
managers. 52 A scheme was also set up under the Administration's initiative to clear and
repair the damages before the planters' arrival, and to arrange army tools and
engineering equipment to enable the tin mines to undertake essential preliminary
rehabilitation work." Inspection Committees for the copra and palm oil industries were
also given facilities for surveying estates and plantations. The Administration also
conducted a survey of rice mills, and loans were made to the timber and pineapple-
49 White, op.cit., p. 67.
50 Domison, op.cit., p. 261.
51 PRO WO 203/5300 Telegram from War Office to SACSEA, 11 Oct. 1945, cited in White, op.cit., p.
65.
52 Donnison, op.cit., p. 159.
53 The Times, 6 Nov. 1945.
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canning industries. 54 Large construction programmes to repair roads, harbours, ports,
factories were undertaken in order to create conditions necessary for the resumption of
normal economic activities. 55 At the same time the Military Administration handled
imports of relief and of technical supplies, while retail distribution of the relief supplies
was handled by several commercial enterprises, previously operating in Malaya, then
selected and 'sponsored' by the Administration, through a Supplies Distributing Unit."
4.3.2.3 Rehabilitation of Malayan Extractive Industries and Malayan Dollar
Earning
During the inter-war period Malayan rubber was the largest single US dollar-earning
export from the Sterling area and would continue to be so in the post-war period."
Thus, the wartime planning on rationalisation of the rubber and tin industries was
ultimately aiming to ensure that these industries would continue to earn dollars, and thus
play a vital role in the defence of sterling. By 1946 the rubber industry was operating at
74 per cent of its 1940 production capacity, thanks to the Malay smallholders who
achieved production levels of 108 per cent of 1940 levels in comparison to the estates
who were only producing at 52.3 per cent of 1940 levels; by 1947 rubber production
reached its pre-war level of production." However, the position of the tin industry and
54 Donnison, op. cit., p. 262-62.
55 Kratoska, op. cit., p. 306.
56 See Donnison, op.cit., p. 258 for the list of the firms.
67 Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya', p. 23.
58 PRO T 236 3301 memorandum for Commonwealth Conference, London, 4 Sept. 1950, p. 6.
RUBBER PRODUCTION
(In tons)
Year Estates Small-holdings Total
1940 331,589 212,726 544,315
1941 307,424 188,002 495,426
1946 173,515 229,692 403,207
1947 359,865 285,364 645,229
1948 402,907 294,071 696,978
1949 400,009 270,248 670,257
172
its rehabilitation was still grim. Tin production in 1946 was only of 10.5 per cent of that
in 1940, and 33.5 per cent of the pre-war level in 1947, and 68.1 per cent in 1949. While
gravel pump mines, normally owned by the Chinese, went on relatively smoothly,
achieving 77.5 per cent of their pre-war operation rate by 1949, 73.8 per cent of
dredging, mainly run by western firms, was in operation." Nevertheless, Malaya's net
contribution to the dollar pool was already US $118 million in 1946. This compared to
US $37 million from the net contribution of all the other colonies combined. 60 Although
both the Malayan government and private firms struggled to finance their rehabilitation
work, still Malaya's dollar earning capacity continued to grow throughout the Attlee era.
According to the 1948 forecast, there were only four really large dollar earners among
the colonies, Malaya, the Gold Coast, Gambia, and Ceylon; and of these Malaya was
overwhelmingly the greatest. The 1948 forecast gave the FO some guidance as to
Malaya's significance as a dollar-earner:
The forecast for 1948 was that the Colonies (which then included
Ceylon) as a whole would have a net dollar surplus of $ 178 m,
59 It should be noted that the tin industry never recovered its pre-war production rate. The Smelting
industry, the majority of which was run by British enterprises, was also badly affected by the shortage of
steel; the slow delivery of electrical equipment and refractors for furnace walls and floors; and more
fundamentally, by inadequate electricity supply, transport facilities, cargo handling.
PRO T 236 3301 memorandum for Commonwealth Conference, London, 4 Sept. 1950, p.7.
CATEGORIES OF MINES IN OPERATION
Year
1941
Dredging
103
Gravel Pump
668
Hydraulic
31
Other methods
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1946 18 (17.5 %) 102 (15.3 0/0) 23 73
1948 67 (65.1 %) 464 (69.5 0/0) 22 80
1949 76 (73,8 %) 518 (77.5%) 19 73
PRODUCTION OF TIN
(In long tons)
Year
1940
Production of Tin
80,651
1946 8,432 (10.5 %)
1947 27,026 (33.5 %)
1948 44,815 (55.6 %)
1949 54,910 (68.1 %)
Percentage added by the author
60 Stubbs, op.cit., p. 18.
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and of this Malaya's contribution was expected to be no less than
$ 172 m. In fact, it looks as though Malaya's net earnings in
1948 were about $ 230 m (including Singapore's entrepot
trade).61
As the Malayan extractive industries were the main dollar earners, there was a certain
appreciation of the contribution of these industries to the UK economy. H. McNeil, the
Minister of State, emphasised:
It would clearly be disastrous if Malaya lose one of the
principal sources of vital raw materials, as a result of which
the economy not only of the UK but of the US also would
suffer very severely.62
According to the document, British Policy in the Far East, published by the FO in
October 1951, the dollars that Malaya earned were 'of an importance roughly equal to
that of two thirds of UK exports to the US of America, and Canada'.63
61 PRO FO 371 76049b F5704/114/61 letter from H. McNeil, Minister of State and UK Delegation to the
United Nations, to C.P. Mayhew, Parliamentary Under Secretary, 2 Apr. 1949.
62 ibid. This sort of contribution of the colony to the metropolitan economy is also applied to the
economic relations between the NEI and The Netherlands. Reid states that the NEI alone gave the
Netherlands a status of a major power. Despite the relatively open attitude of the Dutch colonial
government's towards the foreign competition, the main bulwark of the investment came from the
Dutch, for instance 73 per cent by 1930. It was estimated that between one in five and one in ten of the
population in the Netherlands depended directly on the NEI for their livelihood. To the Netherlands it
looked clear that if they happened to withdraw from the colony, this would dramatically reduce their
national income and eventually push the Netherlands into pauperisation: from A. Reid, 'Indonesia:
Revolution without Socialism', in R. Jeffrey (ed.), Asia-The Winning of Independence (New York,
1981), P. 133, and Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya, p. 288. The
suggestion on the probable pauperisation of the Netherlands was from P.S. Gerbrandy, Indonesia
(London, 1950), p. 27.
63 PRO FO 371 92065 F1022/34/951 memorandum on British policy in the Far East, 30 Oct. 1951.
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4.3.2.4 An Examination of Issues Related to Rehabilitation: Lack of Finance, High
Taxation and Provision of Supplies
As has already been noted, the wartime planning on rationalisation of the rubber and tin
industries was ultimately aimed at ensuring that the industries concerned would continue
to earn dollars. However, White points out that there was neither rationalisation, as the
wartime planning had intended, nor re-establishment of pre-war British business
interests, and my analysis suggests that neither was achieved in the way in which Rudner
claimed that it had been in his studies on British rubber strategy for post-war Malaya.
The plans for rationalisation were simply nullified by the urgency of an ever-increasing
dollar deficit in the British Empire, which demanded a swift restoration of pre-war rubber
output. The Malayan rubber industry was in the position of being obliged to secure
quotas based on output prior to the Japanese occupation in order that it might be better
positioned in the international price and output negotiations. As a result, by the end of
1946, rubber and tin producers started organising themselves along pre-war agency
lines."
However, an immediate restoration of Malayan extractive industries also proved
to be problematic, mainly due to lack of finance. Both public and private investments
were extremely scarce because of the British government's post-war policies, which
severely restricted the funds that were available to the Malayan administration.
Moreover, the Malayan government could not float any loan in Britain due to Bank of
England policy which, until 1948, 'discouraged colonial governments from floating loans
on the London market', and thus Malaya had to finance her own rehabilitation. The
firms' rehabilitation work was made more difficult by the productive under-capacity of
British industry, as it disrupted provision of supplies and equipment. In 1947 colonial
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governments were restricted in their access to imports not only from the UK but also
from other foreign countries. Malaya's businessmen, desperate for important supplies
and machinery for rehabilitation purposes, wanted the restrictions lifted, but the Malayan
administration had to defend Whitehall's policies. Not surprisingly this conflict of
interests created friction.65
Subsequent disagreements between the British government and British private firms with
business interests in Malaya were caused, not by government's rejection of assistance in
the re-entry of business personnel, nor by the intransigence in the attitudes of many in
both sectors about the way in which reconstruction and rehabilitation work should be
undertaken. Instead it was mainly through government's reluctance to actively assist
businesses' reconstruction efforts by refusing to finance them directly and prolonging the
payments of promised money. The Treasury was apparently reluctant to supply funds to
British enterprise in Malaya due to the acute capital shortage in the UK, and thus
persisted with the view that 'recovery should be financed by the Malayan government,
supplemented, if necessary, by an interest-free loan from the UK Exchequer' 66 In
contrast to this, the CO was more supportive to and cooperative with private business
interests. In a memorandum on the Relief and Rehabilitation of Malaya, published on 27
August 1945, the CO made a promise that the industries would receive all possible
64 White, op.cit., p. 70.
65 Stubbs, op.cit., p. 17. In fact, there was also a problem with the supply of goods for general purposes.
The British government were well aware of the relationship between the capacity of the UK to supply the
goods that Malaya needed on a competitive basis with the USA and the possibility of Malaya remaining
as a member of the Sterling area: from PRO CO 537 6089 no 5 Malaya and the Sterling Area: minute by
A. Emanuel to Sir H. Poynton, 26 Apr. 1950.
66 PRO CO 852 623/5 record of a meeting held at the Treasury, 26 Feb. 1945, cited in White, op.cit., p.
71.
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support from the government for their rehabilitation work.° However, the estimate of
the cost of rehabilitation of the rubber and tin industries in Malaya initially excluded the
extra expenses that would make good the losses on the estates, thus rectifying the
interruption of economic maintenance and the reduction of the labour force, which meant
that the British companies and managing agencies would have to take up these extra
costs.68
The tin industry was the worst hit by the war. It was officially estimated at the end
of 1945 that no fewer than 22 out of 126 dredges in Malaya had only scrap value, while
the remainder were in varying states of lack of readiness. 69 Undoubtedly, financial help
was essential to restore the productive capacity of the industry. However, negotiations
on financial aid took a long time to complete and, even then, were not satisfactory; in
March 1946 advances at 3 per cent interest from the Malayan government funds were
agreed upon, with further long delays in payments. 7° Nevertheless, the tin industry was
privileged to receive even that much attention from both British and colonial
governments in comparison with others, especially trading companies, which received
hardly any attention at all. After the decision to advance financial assistance to the tin
industry, the Malayan government was flooded with applications from all classes of
67 PRO FO 371 46340 F6023/299/61 1945 memorandum by the Colonial Office on the Relief and
Rehabilitation of Malaya, 27 Aug. 1945.
68 PRO CO 825 86/1 memorandum for Commonwealth Conference, London, Sep. 1950. The cost of
direct rehabilitation of rubber industry in Malaya was estimated to be around Malayan $200 million,
while it was estimated that the cost of rehabilitating the tin industry would be between Malayan $70 and
75 million. The extra costs that were left to the managing agencies and British companies could be
substantial: in T 236 3301 memorandum for Commonwealth Conference, London, 4 Sept. 1950, p. 5.
69 The Financial Times, 13 Apr. 1946.
79 PRO T 220 134 note of a Meeting between Adviser to the Secretary of State and Malayan Chamber of
Mines held at the Colonial Office, 14 Dec. 1945. Simms from Malayan Chamber of Mines pointed out
that the Malayan government was likely to profit considerably from the enhanced price of tin due to the
war and that the enhanced revenue would easily cover the cost of rehabilitation. Hall at once rejected the
suggestion saying that the main issue was rather a question of confidence, not one of where the money
was to come from, but in effects the CO did not have a say on matters regarding rehabilitation funds.
Nevertheless, Spens also from the Malayan Chamber of Mines asked if the CO would approach the
Treasury for further funds for the rehabilitation of all the industry.
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industry for financial assistance towards rehabilitation based on assistance given to the tin
mines.n In response to the request, George Hall, the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
told Sir Edward Gent, the Governor of the Malayan Union, to firmly repudiate any
suggestion that they were under any kind of obligation to extend similar treatment to
other industries, merely because assistance was given to the tin industry. 72 Thus, most
businesses had to depend on funds obtained from the banks while the banks themselves
faced various difficulties, caused both by factors that had arisen in the aftermath of the
war and as a result of the cessation of operations during the Japanese occupation.73
Any further assistance from the Malayan government to business was out of the
question. Whilst collecting revenue was not an easy task immediately after the war, due
to the loss of relevant documents and to the general devastation, Malaya herself was
compelled to use up her reserves to finance rehabilitation measures and to meet various
outstanding war claims. Subsequently the Malayan government used up her pre-war
reserves that rapidly diminished 'from $210 million on 1 April 1946 to under $43 million
by 1 January 1948'. 74 In the absence of direct financial help from the UK government
except for the exemption of UK claims in respect of the military administration for
Malaya, the financial position of post-war Malaya was made so difficult that some
thought 'bankruptcy a possibility'. 75 In 1949 the issues regarding the grant for war
damage were still under negotiation between the metropolitan and Malayan
governments, and would not be resolved soon as there was a fundamental difference
71 PRO T 220 134 Gent, to the Ministry of Supply and Treasury, 27 June 1946.
72 PRO T 220 134 G. Hall to Gent, 2 Aug. 1946.
73 Kratoska, op.cit., p. 324.
74 PRO CO 717/153 'Federation of Malaya-Financial Position', 1948, cited in Stubbs, op.cit., p. 17.
75 Stubbs, op.cit., p. 17. To find out more about the series of deficit budgets of the Malayan government
for a longer period of time up to 1950, see PRO T 220 160 CO note for the Treasury, Mar. 1950. The
whole cost of the British Military Administration for Malaya up to April 1946 was estimated at £12
million: from PRO T 220 160 Economic and Social Policy in Malaya: CO note for the Treasury, Mar.
1950
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between the British and Malayan governments as to who should bear the cost of a war
damage scheme. 76 The lack of capital affected not only rehabilitation work but also the
long-term progress of the extractive industries.
Another constraint on rehabilitation of business was heavy taxation. At the end of 1945,
the extractive industries were already showing signs of the adverse effects of high
taxation and the increasing production costs that resulted. British companies and
managing agencies involved in the Malayan rubber industry were furious about the heavy
taxation imposed on them. Sir John Hay, in his statement prepared for the annual general
meeting of the Kamuning (Perak) Rubber & Tin Company, Ltd., on 27 November 1945,
expressed his anger towards the government, particularly with regard to the lack of any
well integrated policy towards the rubber plantation industry on the part of the
government. He pointed out that export tax had increased by over 200 per cent on the
rate charged immediately prior to the war. If the cost of transport and shipping was
included, the overall cost of transporting rubber from the estate and putting it on the ship,
including payment to the agent, had risen to the equivalent of 2,000 per cent above the
pre-war rate.77
With regard to the taxation policy of the Malayan extractive industries, the
British government faced a dilemma. On the one hand, every encouragement had to be
given to the inflow of private capital because of the commercial dependence of Malaya
upon private enterprise; on the other hand, any excessive drain of income out of Malaya,
while Malaya was largely dependent on income from the exports of the extractive
76 PRO T 220 86 despatch no 1 from Gurney to Creech Jones and minute by J I C Crombie, 8 Jan. 1949.
77 The Times, 21 Nov. 1945. Regarding the adverse effects of the wide spread responsibility on policy
making, Sir John said, 'A knowledge and understanding of the complexities of the rubber problem
cannot be gained by busy officials giving to them a few odd moments which they can occasionally spare
from their many preoccupations'.
179
industries, had to be prevented. The Treasury kept a close eye on the considerable drain
through remittances to China and through the payment of dividends to overseas
enterprises. Mineral regulations and export taxes, and income tax were necessary evils,
because these allowed not too great a share of the national income to leave the country.
At the same time they directly resulted in increasing the cost of production, which was
inconsistent with the governmental policy to encourage the price of rubber to be as low
as possible.78
As explained above, the MREOC was set to organise supplies to help out the
rehabilitation work of the estates, while the CO was in charge of non-participators in the
MREOC scheme. The issues regarding provision of supplies have drawn much interest
from certain scholars, who have used this matter to explain Britain's determination to
restore and maintain the pre-war predominance of the British estates in the Malayan
rubber industry. Rudner, in particular, has argued that this specific policy served the
interest of British-owned estate companies to the detriment of proprietary estates and
smallholdings. 79 According to him, while the MREOC facilitated 'the earliest possible
resumption of estate production' by arranging essentials for rubber production, such as
acids, tapping equipment and fungicides, smallholdings as well as the local estates of the
Malaya-domiciled estate owners, including the Chinese, were neglected. Moreover, the
big British estates enjoyed special treatment through 'an indirect subsidy from the
government through the distribution of relief supplies, especially cheap rice and clothing
for estate labour', while the rest of the estates had to provide these for themselves by
78 PRO T 236 2741 C.D. (49) minutes of the 7 th Meeting of the Colonies Committee on Colonial
Development, 30 May 1949, p. 4.
79 Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya', p. 27. The basis of his argument on British post-war
rubber policy between 1945 and 1948 was the unfair treatment on Malay smallholders and the local
estates in terms of the provision of essential equipment and supplies and rubber replanting scheme.
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trading on the free market, bearing a comparative cost disadvantage. The CO's
corresponding failure to supply the essentials for Malay smallholdings and the local
estates, in addition to the discriminatory treatment by the Rubber Research Institute of
Malaya in favour of the estate sector, while virtually ignoring the smallholders, further
hampered the contribution of government to the smallholders' and local estates'
rehabilitation effort." Stubbs, in agreement with Rudner, explained that the local owners
of rubber estates, as well as the smallholdings, had to turn to the black market to acquire
their materials at a much higher price, while the MREOC ensured supplies to the large
British estates and properly distributed them at a fair price." Rudner concluded that
British rubber strategy, formulated in the early post-war period, not only undermined the
development of an independent and prosperous smallholding peasantry, effectively
serving to exclude this sector from holding a stake in the state of affairs, it also
jeopardised the long-run competitive position of Malayan rubber in the international
market, eventually leading to the virtual decay of the industry by the mid-1950s.82
Superficially at least, there appears to be some basis for Rudner's argument. First
of all, it was true that the supplies ordered for non-participators in the MREOC scheme
actually did not arrive in Malaya in time for their rehabilitation work. Secondly, the
supplies destined for smallholdings were often re-routed via the free market." However,
White points out that in the case of the Chinese, they had their own stocks and also
rapidly made good deficiencies through the purchase of looted materials. Whilst it was
true that Malay smallholders had inadequate supplies of processing materials, it quickly
80 ibid, pp. 24-8, 35.
81 Stubbs, op.cit., p. 14.
82 Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya', pp. 35-36.
83 ibid, p. 27. According to Rudner, the major problem with the distribution of essential supplies to
smallholdings was that there was no channel to 'ensure that supplies actually reached smallholders'.
However, the individual members of the MREOC scheme were also forced to enter the black market to
buy supplies at vastly inflated prices, for the Company was badly organised: White, op.cit., p. 83.
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became clear that, apart from coagulants, there was actually little demand for the
materials. On the other hand the MREOC turned out to be badly organised and thus
ineffective, a situation that was worsened by lack of transport."
More importantly, the smallholders were quick to get their holdings back into
shape after the end of the war despite post-war shortages and dislocation, and quickly
started producing. As Rudner himself admits, the official rubber price was low, but not
low enough to eliminate the smallholder tapping. 85 The Table on Rubber Production
prepared for the Commonwealth Conference shows how quickly smallholding
production expanded, and in 1946 smallholders were already producing more rubber
than they had done in 1940. 86 Their operation was more impressive when compared to
the sluggish progress made by the estate sector of the industry. It is my contention that
the Malay smallholders, were, in fact, an active entity, who not only grasped
opportunities, but also who understood the need to retreat during the recession. These
flexibilities seemed to have been the strength behind their survival. Due to his emphasis
on the discriminatory public policy towards the smallholdings, Rudner omits to show the
vigour and opportunism of the smallholders, while the role of the MREOC and the CO's
failure to supply equipment are exaggerated. Overall, it is fair to say that Rudner's
argument contains certain important inconsistencies. By emphasising the fixing of rubber
prices, he somewhat undermines his own argument that the British government acted
simply on behalf of the British company estates, with the longer-term intention of re-
establishing Malaya's capacity for dollar earning. The British government, in line with a
recommendation from the Rubber Buying Unit of the Ministry of Supply, fixed the
rubber price much lower than business expected: at only 10 d. per pound much short of
84 Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya', pp. 26-7; White, op.cit., p. 83
85 Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya', p. 32.
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1 s. 6 d. per pound — the price that was desired by the rubber producers. Business itself
had previously regarded 'steady prices' to be more beneficial than 'high prices'," still
what was an acceptable price to them was, for example, that which was sufficiently high
enough to be able to sustain the extra-expenditure on rehabilitation work. What
perturbed the rubber industry the most, apart from the price itself, was the way in which
it was fixed: without any prior consultation or agreement with the industry, nor any prior
consideration of production costs. According to Sir John Hay the price was fixed by
'powers arbitrarily', on the basis of the suggestion made by the Rubber Buying Unit,
even before they entered Malaya. Business accused the government of jeopardising 'the
sterling area of gold-dollar earnings', and 'Malaya's national income' and also the future
political stability of Malaya. However, the British government had its own agenda." In
addition to a consideration of the inflationary effects of fixing high rubber prices, the
government was also concerned about future competition from synthetic rubber (unless
the price of natural rubber was sufficiently low and production showed consistency, US
synthetic rubber production would be forced to expand). Underpinning this price fixing
was the British government's belief in setting the price at a level 'which the American
Government are willing to pay and the quantity they will buy at that price'." Business
reacted furiously to the rubber price. Hay emphasised the importance of the industry to
the Eastern territories and the outstanding contribution it had made, and could again
make, to British overseas trade. According to him, the absence of an integrated policy
86 See footnote 449.
87 H.B. Hake, The New Malaya and You, p. 98, in Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya', p.
28.
88 All quotations are taken from Chairman's address to Kamuning (Perak) Rubber and Tin Co. Ltd.
Annual general meeting, 27 Nov. 1945, Chairman's address to Kuala Muda Rubber Estates Ltd., general
meeting, 21 Dec. 1945, T.B. Barlow, President's address to RGA general meeting, 25 Apr. 1946, in
Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya', pp. 28-34.
89 Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya', pp. 29-31. The quotation was stated by G. Hall
during the Parliamentary debates on 6 Feb. 1946.
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towards the rubber plantation industry was caused by the absence of an integrated
machinery of responsibility within the government on these matters. Governmental
responsibility was too widely spread for it to be felt acutely in any one quarter, and as a
result hasty decisions were made regarding matters concerning the rubber industry,
without proper inquiry into the facts and without mature consideration. As a result, a
policy of charges was imposed on the industry without taking account of the effect of
high taxation, which resulted in rising production costs for an industry which already
bore a heavy burden from its rehabilitation commitments. This situation conflicted with
the authorities' constant exhortations to keep production costs low, to take a long-term
view, and to refrain from grasping for high profit at a time of scarcity.
Thus, Rudner's conclusion might be disputed on the basis that, given the
evidence that he himself brought to the fore, instead of arguing that the aim of British
post-war rehabilitation of the Malayan rubber industry was to re-establish British estates
to the detriment of the Malay smallholders he could have argued that British post-
liberation rubber policy was satisfactory neither to British estate interests nor to the
interests of the smallholders. Whilst it is true that he did not claim that both government
and business worked together to re-establish themselves, he did not either pay particular
attention to any possibility that business might have influenced the government's
decisions in the process of delineating the post-war rubber strategy. Rather he attributed
to the government fill responsibility for the development of the strategy for the rubber
industry.90
90 M. Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya, 1945-48', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol.
1, ISS. 1, 1970, pp. 23-36; M. Rudner, 'Development Policies and Patterns of Agrarian Dominance in
the Malaysian Rubber Export Economy', Modern Asian Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, 1981, pp. 83-105.
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Conclusion
The analysis undertaken in this chapter on the resumption of the Malayan extractive
industries and other related issues suggests that while the government never lacked
intention to assist businesses' rehabilitation, which was evident in their active help with
re-entry of personnel of the industries and the assistance given for inspection, the actual
rehabilitation work was hampered by lack of material support from the metropolitan
government. Due to the shortage of dollars in Britain, rationalisation of the industries
based on wartime planning gave a way to an attempt at the immediate resumption of
productive output. However, this proved impossible, mainly because of the lack of
finance and equipment. The slow progress made by the tin industry is an exemplification
of the significance for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction of that sort of
assistance. Despite the fact that reconstruction of the extractive industries was of mutual
benefit to both government and business, the process of rehabilitation became a source of
irritation in the relations between them, for neither was financial assistance forthcoming,
nor was the provision of supplies smooth. Additionally high taxation — which meant
high production cost — and the low rubber price became a source of antagonism in the
government/business relationship. In this sense, Rudner's analysis lacks the overall vision
of the way in which domestic economic difficulties in the metropole, as well as those
experienced by the colonial governments, affected reconstruction of the rubber industry,
in which British firms were the major player. Instead he over-emphasises Britain's need
to restore the pre-war production levels. The following two chapters will seek to
illuminate the limitations on the power of each of these sectors to influence developments
in what were essentially extremely adverse objective circumstances. An examination also
exposes not only the lack of cohesion in the dealings between government and business,
it also tends to reveal a lack of cohesive strategy internally within the offices and
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structures of government over the way in which a colony should be governed and the
Malayan Emergency be fought.
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Chapter. 5 State and Firm: The Malayan Case
The following two chapters will analyse the interactions between the British government
and British private enterprises in Malaya, Indonesia, and Siam. The analysis of such
relations in each of these countries follows quite a similar structure. First, war experience
and its implications for post-war problems are briefly outlined; next post-war difficulties
are dealt with; lastly, the way in which government and business reacted to these matters
is analysed. A comparative analysis of the Siamese and Indonesian cases of government
and business interactions during the Attlee period is undertaken in Chapter 6. What the
two actors, business and government, had to deal with was different in each of these two
nations, but while the experiences of British private enterprises were diverse, the
reactions to the events as a whole were not entirely dissimilar. Indonesia is a good
example of the close working relationship between the two main actors in seeking to
overcome the difficulties created by the hostilities between the Dutch and the
Indonesians, as well as by the general instability after independence. British business
interests enjoyed relative stability in Siam, but at the same time Siam was the one among
these three countries where business and government felt the strongest US competition
and where business feared of the recurrence of the ultra-nationalism of the 1930s. The
Malayan case includes two distinctive, but not entirely separate, matters: firstly, the
Malayan extractive industry in relation to the UK's dollar deficit and colonial resources
development, and secondly, the Emergency. The Malayan experience was unique due to
Britain's colonial relations with the country. Therefore it is more appropriate to present
the analysis of Malaya separately from the other two case studies. Nevertheless a
cautionary comparative comments are made on the more complex nature of the
interactions in Malaya.
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5.1 Dollar Deficit in the United Kingdom and Colonial Resources Development
When the Second World War finally ended, Britain found itself in enormous debt
because of excessive war expenditure. Exports and income from overseas sources were
running at abnormally low levels. Worse still, Britain had far more commitments abroad
than any other country in the world. Thus immediately after taking office, the dominant
concern of the Attlee government was to reduce resources allocated to other than
national economic recovery.' However, this was soon found to be unrealistic in the face
of a Soviet foreign policy, which often clashed with Britain's stance and business
interests abroad. Britain simply did not have enough resources to both re-structure the
economy and to maintain the manpower and commitments of a world power.
When Lend-Lease ended in August 1945 Attlee wrote that all there was available
in Britain was 'what was in the pipe line and even that looked like being in jeopardy'.2
Britain had not had sufficient opportunity to reorganise itself on a peacetime basis. The
British government had no choice but to immediately ask the USA for a loan. Apparently
there was a strongly bitter feeling among the British people towards the USA over the
ending of Lend-Lease. They felt resentful of the need to obtain a loan from the USA, and
this feeling was exacerbated by the context of the negotiations on the loan being that
apparently the US Administration was reluctant to become entangled in European affairs.
Indeed, some officials in the US Administration openly declared that the USA and the
Soviet Union could get along better without Britain in between.' Somehow Keynes
1 A. Gorst, 'Facing Facts? The Labour Government and Defence Policy 1945-50', in N. Tiratsoo (ed.),
The Attlee Years (London and New York, 1991), P. 192. According to Gorst, the attempt to reduce the
commitment on defence actually started immediately after VJ day.
2 C. Attlee, As It happened (Melbourne, London and Toronto, 1954), p. 129.
3 Ibid., p. 132.
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managed to secure a loan of $3,750 million 4
 from the USA, which would help finance the
three-year transitional period after the war.
Inasmuch as the British had resented the position in which they found themselves
in the loan negotiations, which lasted almost three months, the government's continuous
efforts to export more to the hard currency areas were well received by various
government Departments. The Committee on Exports was set up under the
Chairmanship of the Secretary for Overseas Trade, Hilary Marquand, who was
succeeded by Harold Wilson, to supervise and coordinate the work of all government
Departments concerned with exports. The Treasury considered that,
... exports to the Western Hemisphere, especially North
America, are literally worth their weight in gold at the present
time. And that is true of many hard currency countries in
Europe, such as Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal and certain
others.'
Despite all these efforts, exports were growing unexpectedly slowly. The major
difficulty in rebuilding the export trade was that Britain was almost in a state of vacuum;
for instance the appropriate infrastructure for rebuilding such as fuel and power,
transport facilities, finance etc., were all lacking. 6 There were also shortages of
manpower, raw materials, and of industrial power and equipment. The delay of
demobilisation brought heavy criticism of Bevin, and caused much turbulence within the
Labour government, damaging the party's integrity. At the Annual Conference of the
Trades Union Congress (TUC) in September 1945, Bevin was severely criticised
4 Bullock, op.cit., p. 202.
5 PRO T 230 8 Export Drive: Progress Report by the Committee on Exports set up under the
Chairmanship of the Secretary for Overseas Trade, Oct. 1947, p. 4 (file p. 105).
6 F. Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers: The War and Post-war Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Earl Attlee
(London, Melbourne, Toronto, 1961), p. 90.
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regarding the conservative nature of his plans for demobilisation, a factor that was
interrupting the implementation of reconstruction plans, including projects such as the
housing programme. Moreover, there were strong demands for manpower in the civilian
and export industries. The General Secretary of the TUC pointed out that, by June the
following year, the USA would be keeping only two and a quarter million men under
arms when Britain would be keeping three and a half million.'
Britain's dollar reserves continued to decline further throughout 1946 and early
1947, a situation that was exacerbated by the unrestricted use of the dollar pool by other
Sterling area countries. The pool of dollars was available to all members of the Sterling
area, and the allocation of dollars from the pool was not controlled by London. Instead,
the whole thing was based on a purely voluntary arrangement, by which each member
made a gentlemen's agreement to be as economical as possible in its use of dollars.' The
fuel crisis caused by the shortage of coal stocks in the exceptionally severe winter of
1946 and 1947 worsened the shortage of dollars by holding up transport and the
production of manufactured goods, and cost Britain 1200 million in lost exports. 9 The
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, warned in March 1947 that Britain was using
up US Credits at a reckless and ever-accelerating speed and thus the situation was
showing every sign of getting out of control. m He warned the Cabinet on 5 June that if
the present rate of drawing on the US Credit continued, this Credit would be exhausted
as early as the end of 1947. 11 However, his prediction on the timing of exhaustion of the
7 ibid, p. 124. Britain would have demobilised only 1,400,000 men and women while the United States
would have released 8,200,000 in the same period.
8 PRO T 236 61 Sterling Area: R.H. Brand, Washington, to Lord Keynes, Treasury, 14 June 1945, p. 4.
9 A.E. Hinds, 'Sterling and Imperial Policy, 1945-5', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, vol. 15, no. 2, Jan. 1987, p. 155.
1 ° PRO CAB 129 017 C.P. (47) 100 Exhaustion of the Dollar Credit: memorandum by H. Dalton, 21
Mar. 1947, p. 1.
"PRO CAB 129 020 C.P. (47) 221 Balance of Payments: memorandum by H. Dalton, 30 July 1947, p.
1. On 30 July 1947, Dalton again (and this time more correctly) warned that the Credit would not last
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Credit proved to be too optimistic when sterling was finally made freely convertible on
15 July 1947.
On several occasions, before and after the convertibility crisis, the Labour
government undertook detailed studies on Britain's chronic dollar deficit, the results of
which did not indicate the presence of problems much different from those which had
been evident ever since it took power. The main item of foreign exchange expenditure in
post-war Britain was overseas commitments, particularly civil supplies for Germany and
the cost of military forces abroad. 12 The expenditure was also greatly affected by the
rapid rise in American prices, which meant depreciation in the value of the dollars lent to
the British. The Minister of Defence, in line with the constant efforts made by the Labour
government to lessen overseas commitments, stressed the urgent need to restore a
balanced peace economy at the earliest moment, because the heavy demands made on
national resources, both of manpower and material by the Armed Forces, distorted the
country's efforts to re-build the post-war national economy. After all, 'a successful
defence policy must find its roots in healthy social and economic conditions'. 13 Yet, as
late as 1 July 1947, British troops were still widely distributed in Germany, Austria, Italy
and Venezia Giulia, Greece, Palestine, Egypt, the rest of the Middle East, India, Burma,
and the rest of the Far East (principally Malaya), and elsewhere.14
beyond November and would probably be exhausted in October, or even possibly September. Worse of
all, he admitted that there was no reason for hoping that the rate of drawing would fall in the near
future.
12 ibid. Britain was liable for half of the deficit in the balance of payments of the combined zone. The
estimate of British liability in the mid-1947 was £80 million a year of which at least £45 million were
dollars. This ever-rising dollar bill to feed the Germans was a most unwelcome and unexpected mis-use
of American Credit.
13 PRO CAB 129 017 C.P. (47) 52 Statement Relating to Defence: memorandum by the Minister of
Defence, 7 Feb. 1947, p. 4.
14 PRO CAB 129 020 C.P. (47) 221 Balance of Payments: memorandum by H. Dalton, 30 July 1947, p.
6. According to the Joint Memorandum (PRO CAB 129 025 C.P. (48) 61, 23 Feb. 1948) by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Defence on Overseas Military Expenditure, about 70
per cent of the total expenditure of £79 million was accounted for by expenditure in Palestine, Egypt,
Malaya, Gibraltar and Malta, the first two countries accounting for some 40 per cent of the whole. It was
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On 20 August 1947, the same day that the decision to free the convertibility of
sterling was withdrawn after a month of turmoil, there was a meeting of Ministers to
consider various questions that had arisen from the balance of payments situation and
reference was made to the possibility of securing assistance in balancing payments with
the USA by increasing exports of primary products from the colonies." In fact, this
strategy of using colonial resources to tackle Britain's most urgent and obvious post-war
economic problems (primarily in this case the adverse balance of payments and huge
external debts) was not completely new. Nevertheless, there was a subtle difference
between the practical measures for immediate action before and after the convertibility
crisis. Exports of primary produce from the colonies to America were more frequently
thought of as a possible remedy for the economic problems during and after the
convertibility crisis. On 16 August 1947, the discussions on the possibility of increasing
exports of primary products from the colonies together with food ration cuts, the
reduction of foreign travel allowances, and the export of agricultural machinery reflected
the frustration widely felt by the British in circumstances of the sudden acceleration in
the exhaustion of the US loan." After a few days, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, told his fellow Ministers that Britain should try to re-
establish, and improve upon, the pre-war position in which exports of primary produce
from the colonies to America were among her principal earners of dollars.17
due to British military strategy at that time founded on three principles, the defence of the United
Kingdom, of essential sea communications and of the Middle East: PRO CAB 129 029 C.P. (48) 206
memorandum by Attlee on Defence, 24 Aug. 1948, pp. 1-2.
15 PRO CAB 129 020 C.P. (47) 242 Balance of Payments: Production of Dollar-Earning Colonial
Commodities: memorandum by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23 Aug.
1947.
16 PRO CAB 129 020 C.P. (47) 233 Balance of Payments: memorandum by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, 16 Aug. 1947.
17 PRO CAB 129 020 C.P. (47) 242 Balance of Payments: Production of Dollar-Earning Colonial
Commodities: memorandum by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23 Aug.
1947.
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Accordingly, the practical possibilities of increased supplies of rubber and tin
were sought out. In the case of Malayan rubber, supplies could be made available
immediately for sale to the USA, whereas there would be no immediate increase in tin
output, although it was thought that there were possibilities for a longer term expansion
of output over a period of years. The CO was already expediting projects in hand. The
two most important things here were the rehabilitation of the Malayan tin industry and
the development of lead deposits in Tanganyika. In both cases progress was held up by
difficulties in securing the delivery of equipment (and in the latter case, also by
difficulties of securing technical staff). Other Ministers were already asked for assistance
to meet these needs and for help in getting over these difficulties. 18 At the same time, a
message was sent out by Creech Jones in which the colonial peoples were told to help
Britain overcome the economic crisis by economising on dollar imports and increasing
their production.°
It was under these circumstances that the Colonial Development Corporation was
established to provide new and additional means for the colonies to promote production,
which would help to strengthen the resources of the Sterling Group and to assist the
balance of payments within the Empire." There was a strong belief within the
government, especially within the CO, that it was necessary for a public corporation,
instead of private enterprise, to provide the technical experts and the capital required in
order to investigate all the potentialities for economic development in the colonial
territories and to promote the schemes which were needed to realise those
18 Ibid., pp. 1-3. However, now we all know that the assistance was hardly sufficient and fast enough, for
the progress of repair and replace of dredges and other equipment related to the industry was slow, and
Malayan tin industry was still fighting to get the war compensation in 1949 and even 1950.
19 Ibid., p. 2.
20 File 19286/4, Economic, Part I, 1947 (CO 852/867), item 8, cited in Morgan, Developing British
Colonial Resources, 1945-1951, p. 320. The colonial resources here are referring to foodstuffs and raw
materials which would be supplied to the UK or sale overseas.
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potentialities. 21
 The essential criteria for developments in the colonies were: firstly, to
establish indispensable public utilities, develop basic social services, and improve
agriculture and the conditions of a sound economy, which were mainly utilised by the
funds of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act; and secondly, provision for the
undertaking of ad hoc schemes for the development of individual industries to increase
the production of commodities required either in the Empire or overseas or both.22
In operating the big ad hoc development schemes in the colonies, the public
Corporation would not be in competition with private enterprise, but it would seek to
prevent the latter from exploiting big industrial development opportunities. 23 Yet the
public schemes would not eliminate private interests. On the contrary, Creech Jones
elaborated on the expectation that the new schemes initiated by public Corporations
would contribute to increasing the volume of investment to the colonies by private
enterprise. 24 After all the Corporation would not dictate the development, but operate
only after receiving the full consent of the government of the colony concerned, and also
in collaboration with any local Development Corporation that was set up or that already
existed. 25
 When the Cabinet's consideration of plans for establishing an Overseas Food
Corporation and a Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) was publicly announced,
the Governors were assured that the purpose of the public Corporations would 'not [be]
to supplant private enterprise, but to supplement it'. 26 The FO was also assured that the
aim of the Corporation would be to complement rather than displace private enterprise,
21 PRO T 220 31 Colonial Development Corporation: to J.I.C. Crombie, Treasury, 9 May 1947, pp. 11-
12.
22 PRO T 220 31 Development of Colonial Resources: memorandum by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, May 1947, pp. 43-47.
23 PRO T 220 31 letter from E.A. Shillito, to Compton, 15 May 1947.
24 PRO T 220 31 letter to Playfair, 15 May 1947.
25 Morgan, Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951, p. 321.
26 File 18706/9/68, Economic General 1947-48, item 37, a secret telegram on 15 June 1947 to the
Governors in the Colonies, cited in Morgan, Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951, p. 332.
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by undertaking projects which private enterprise was unwilling or unable to put in hand
or which 'for particular reasons may be unsuitable for private operation'. 27 The CDC
therefore received schemes from not only the CO, but also private individuals, and was
also free to make its own plans. 28 After all, the establishment of a public Corporation was
designed to fill a gap in the machinery for colonial development.
The ultimate goal of the CDC was to increase colonial production to assist the
adverse balance of payments in the UK and the Empire as a whole. The Malayan
extractive industries were among the biggest dollar earners within the Empire and
therefore one would assume that they would be one of the main beneficiaries of the
schemes. However, the outcome of the CDC programme does not show this to be the
case. The government's enthusiasm to develop colonial resources was often set back by
the fact that colonial orders for equipment were subordinate to home demands. The CO
hoped that the Ministry of Supply would give colonial demands higher, or at least equal,
priority to domestic demands. However, the situation for supply was worsened by the
fuel crisis, which delayed the whole programme of production by between four and five
months. As far as the Ministry of Supply was concerned, since the Prime Minister's list
of priorities did not include any work for export, 29 colonial orders were to continue to
take their turn in the queue." In any case, according to the statement of priorities by
region and by commodity, the guidance of the Corporation prepared by the CO clearly
27 File 18706/9/68, Economic General 1947-48, item 41, letter of 21 June 1947 from Sir Sydney Caine to
Sir Edmond Hall-Patch, cited in Morgan, Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951, p. 331.
28 File 18706/9/68, Economic General 1947-1948, item 88, letter of 15 Apr 1948, from the Minister of
State, the Earl of Listowel, to the Governor of Singapore, Sir Franklin Gimson, cited in Morgan,
Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951, p. 334.
29 File 17025, Economic (Supplies) 1947 (CO 852/790), item 8, letter of 28 August 1947, and item 5,
letter of 23 August 1947 from G.H. Harrison, Ministry of Supply, to F. Hollins, Ministry of Food, cited
in Morgan, Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951, p. 334.
39 Morgan, Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951, p. 191.
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shows that Malaya was regarded as a country with capital and human resources.31
Moreover the main aim of the CDC was to induce industrial development in the colonies.
As a result investment went to improving secondary industries in the colony; producing
various kinds of consumer goods, particularly those that fulfilled the economic needs of
the colony; and also to reducing dollar imports, such as fertilisers, packing materials, and
building materials. 32 As we will see, in the meantime British companies in the Malayan
extractive industries were struggling to obtain capital for their rehabilitation work, while
neither the metropolitan nor the colonial government was prepared to provide them.
5.2 Interactions between State and Firm during the Emergency
During the rehabilitation period, British businesses in Malaya were dissatisfied with the
degree of assistance given by the British government. In Britain the export drive to the
hard currency countries entailed ignoring other countries' needs, and Malaya being the
colony with the biggest dollar earnings among the colonies was unable to obtain the
much needed manufactured goods for its rehabilitation work. Consequently, provision of
supplies was inadequate and war compensation did not arrive in time to help the capital-
starved private firms. In theory, the Malayan extractive industries, in which the British
firms had particular interest, should have benefited from the public funds designed to
develop colonial resources, but in practice, they were not the main beneficiaries. In
addition, when the Malayan economy was beginning to improve and with the rubber
production catching up to the pre-war production level, the Emergency broke out. The
Emergency, which lasted almost twelve years, had a number of implications for the
future of British business interests in Malaya. This occurrence was unfortunate for them
31 ibid, p. 364.
196
when their rehabilitation work was already constrained by lack of capital, as it exhausted
their tight working capital even further.
The British governments' commitments to defending sterling and the need of the
Malayan governments to obtain the revenue were 'broadly synchronized with the needs
of British business in Malaya'. 33 Historiographical arguments have attributed a key causal
role to these mutual interests in the sources and the origins of the Emergency and the
process of the counter-insurgency. Caldwell saw the counter-insurgency as a policy of
zero-tolerance to any disturbance of Malaya's dollar earning function. Malaya was 'a
British economic asset' and without its dollar earning, the British economy would suffer
from an adverse balance of payments. If Britain was forced to withdraw from Malaya
because of the insurrection, she would need further financial assistance from the USA,
and this would also result in intolerable consequences for the post-war international
capitalist structure, which was headed by the USA. However, Caldwell's work fails to
explain American reluctance to be involved with Malayan affairs despite their keen
interest, and to assist Britain, whose expenditure on the counter-insurgency strained the
domestic economy, by resisting British requests for price supports for Malayan rubber
and for the lowering of the fixed rate for synthetic rubber. 34 More importantly, his work
does not explain the government's sluggish response to businesses' request for sterner
measures to deal with the lawlessness that disrupted rehabilitation of the extractive
industry, and the re-establishment of production of rubber and tin?' Stenson, in his
32 ibid, pp. 334-35. There are various reports on this process of industrial development schemes being
implemented around 1950 and 1951, often involving established private firms in the area: see Chapter 3.
33 White, op.ciL, p. 124.
34 Rotter, op.cit., pp. 54-5.
35 M. Caldwell, 'From "Emergency" to "Independence", 1948-57', in M. Amin and M. Caldwell (eds.),
Malaya: The Making of A Neo-Colony (Nottingham, 1977), pp. 217-249. In fact, Caldwell's view on
British relations with Malaya in connection with the USA's post-war economic strategy was similar to
that of the communists at the time, who argued that British imperialism merely served as 'one of
insatiable economic exploitation on behalf of the United States': from The Lines of Propaganda in
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studies of industrial conflict in Malaya from around 1935 up to the Emergency, sums up
that the employers pushed the MCP to rebel, and pushed government to react. Although
the employers in the post-war period never achieved the same degree of closeness with
officials that they had enjoyed pre-war, their strong and concerted action nevertheless
helped revive a policy of cooperation on the part of government. After all there existed a
close bond of social identity between businessmen and officials, which was nurtured by
the existence of isolated, yet privileged social clubs in the colony. 36 Short's work focuses
on governmental policies and the operational side of the counter-insurgency. He found
`the most remarkable feature of the insurrection' was the fact that 'government
continued to govern', which was made possible because there was hardly any panic
exodus amongst the local officials, police officers, planters, tappers, and ordinary
workers at the District level. Members of these key sectors stayed put, despite the
physical dangers that they faced, thus helping the government to build stability (or at
least 'the impression of stability', as he puts it) and to continue to govern?' White
objects to both the views of the neo-colonialist historians and to those who have
identified the existence of a so called, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism'. Instead he identifies the
existence of a high degree of intransigence in relations between government and
business, as well as the divisions within the officialdom and within business. With regard
to the Emergency, he also finds wide divergences between them on the specifics of
counter-insurgency?'
The events surrounding the Emergency are chronologically discussed here. This
discussion will not focus on the operational side of the counter-insurgency, but will place
Connection with the Expansion of the Army, published by the Lenin Publishing Press, July 1948,
Malaya, in Short, op.cit., p. 108
36 MR Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948 (London, New
York, Kuala Lumpur, 1970).
37 Short, op.cit., p. 500.
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particular emphasis on issues directly related to British enterprises. Issues relevant to
business during this time include: the financing of the counter-insurgency and consequent
taxation issues, recognition of the Communist Chinese government, British government's
intentions with regard to the social and economic development of Malaya, the feelings of
inadequacy and physical insecurity on the part of those in business and so on. During the
Emergency, British private firms worked hard to direct the officials and influence
governmental policies related to the counter-insurgency. To a great extent the survival
and future of business depended on the government's policy and its determination to stay
on in Malaya. The British establishment was in no position to overlook business interests
due to the latter's contribution. It is in the light of such conditions that the interactions
between the parties are assessed here. The aim of this assessment is to provide insight
into British Malayan policy during the Emergency and into the way in which business
sought to influence the governments, in order to discern the extent to which government-
business relations were marked by an overarching consensus based upon a symbiosis of
interest, or, on the contrary, whether at the heart of such relations lay a conflict of
perceived interest and therefore a conflict in the nature of the measures that were
required to deal with the Emergency situation. It is certainly the case that there was
intransigence in government-business relations over a number of issues. The first of the
conflicts between the two to be examined here, are over strategies that were advocated
for dealing with the labour unrest.
The studies on the struggles between capital and labour in post-war Malaya in Chapter 3
show that general economic hardship was a fundamental factor in the upsurge of labour
unrest, but also that the MCP utilised the situation in order to take full advantage of the
38 N.J. White, Business, Government and the End of Empire: Malaya, 1942-1957 (Oxford, 1996).
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dissatisfaction that was widely felt among labourers. When British planters and managers
returned, they were shocked by the poor living and health conditions experienced by
their workers, and as a result, they often sought to obtain rice on the black market to
feed their workers." The employers responded to strikes with concessions.° Soon
however, they found the rise in wages stretching them to their economic limit, and the
strikes 'posing a threat to the traditional structure of Malayan industry and
employment'. 41 Business began to put the Malayan government under constant pressure
to take coercive measures, but such pleas were rejected by the Governor, Gent. 42 Some
officials maintained a liberal attitude toward organised labour. 43 One can locate such
attitudes in the general context of the essentially progressive nature of the post-war
Malayan regime, sensitive as it was to liberal sentiments at home and at the international
level. In such circumstances officials were resistant to calls for the implementation of
coercive measures that would amount to the infringement of civil liberties, especially in
circumstances where all the alternatives to such a course of action were yet to be
explored and their potential exhausted. 44 When the pleas for the use of stronger measures
against the 'subversive' elements fell on deaf ears, the employers started, unilaterally, to
exert stronger measures against work stoppages, demonstrations and strikes. This mainly
took the form of expelling those who they considered troublemakers and also of the
enforcement of the trespass law to stop any outsiders entering estates. 45 The government
" Harper, op.cit., pp. 129-30.
40 Production bonuses in rubber estates and profit sharing in tin mines were common practices: in
Stenson, op.cit., p. 94.
41 ibid., p. 153
42 PRO CO 537 2166 FF8-12 minute 3 of 6th Governor-General's Conference in Singapore, 11 Mar
1947; CO 537 2208 no 16 despatch no 19 from Gent to Creech Jones and minute by H.T. Bourdillon, 30
Sept. 1947; CO 537 2208 no 24 outward telegram no 1305 from Creech Jones to Gent, 18 Oct. 1947.
43 Stenson, op.cit., p. 150.
44 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, pp. lxiv-lxv.
45 Stenson, op.cit., pp. 160-61.
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officials were furious with businesses' independent actions of the dismissal of workers,"
but by then it was obvious that Brazier's 'non-political unionism' could not deter the
direct influence of the MCP on organised labour. Neither could the assistance of the
Police effectively serve to prevent the MCP from agitating amongst the labourers.
It is clear that there was no consensus between government and business on
precisely how to deal with the industrial unrest which formed the precursor of the
situation of Emergency. It seems that the extent to which the labour unrest was met by
an intransigent approach on the part of government and business respectively depended
upon the degree of seriousness that each attached to the MCP's direct involvement and
therefore their respective assessments of the possible consequences of labour unrest. As
far as business was concerned, the estate managers were already convinced by early 1946
that the aggression, led mainly by the MCP, would hamper the return of the estates to
production.'" The government regarded the labour protests more as industrial disputes
caused by the disparities in wages, rather than identifying them as Communist-instigated
political action." In fact, the government had its own plan to control organised labour,
which would in turn contribute to controlling the labour indiscipline, especially the
activities of the General Labour Unions (GLUs), without resorting to any arbitrary
action. Under the guidance of Brazier, the Trade Union Adviser, the government put
every effort to separate the spontaneous trend towards strike action from the militant
leadership of the Pan-Malayan General Labour Union (PMGLU)." In spite of attempts
to portray the registration of all existing unions, between the end of September 1946 and
March 1947, as a mere formality, in reality the effect of such a policy was that the unions
46 Harper, op.cit., pp. 136-38.
47 PRO BT 64/1878, RCC (46) 1 Amendment, Mar. 21, 1946, cited in White, op.cit., p. 102.
48 PRO CO 537 2173 Gent to Creech Jones, 24 June 1946, cited in Harper, op.cit., p. 134.
201
would either be 'registered and controlled, or, if unregistered, declared unlawful'," thus
depriving the State Federations of Trade Unions and the Pan-Malayan Federation of
Trade Unions (PMFTUs) of funds amounting to between 20 and 25 per cent of
individual unions' subscriptions to the Federations." Although registration was effective
in weakening the PMFTUs and its control over its affiliates, that alone did not provide
the government with machinery that prevented them from resorting to disruptive
activities, nor did it remove the linkage between organised labour and the MCP. To be
fair, it is possible that Gent was not furnished with sufficient information on which to
base a decision on what appropriate actions could be taken to heed warnings on the
MCP's disruptive activities, due to the absence of adequate intelligence." Nor did the
CO have sufficient evidence to conclude that there was serious trouble in Malaya. The
immediate threat arising from Communist activities was regarded as 'slight', even at the
end of May 1948 when the insurrection was imminent. The Assistant Secretary to the
CO, J.B. Williams and the Assistant Under-Secretary, G.F. Seel, admitted that there was
'the greatest immediate danger' of Communist attempts to gain control of the trade
unions, yet his assessment was that the main threat to public order came much more from
mere bandits than from members of left-wing organisations." Stenson claims that the
Malayan governments at first took 'some tentative steps towards reform' helped by the
liberal attitude among officials, but began to exert a more authoritarian approach under
strong pressure from commercial interests. 54 Whilst it is true that business, after having
re-established themselves, could practice more concerted action to put pressure on the
49 Stenson, op.cit., p. 113. On 25 August 1946 the Pan-Malayan General Labour Union opted for an
official recognition, and the resultant reformation as the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions: in
Stenson, op.cit., pp. 135-36.
50 T.U.A., 7/1946, Brazier to Col. Sec. Singapore, 24 Oct. 1946, cited in Stenson, op.cit., p. 137.
51 R.T.U. circular, Oct. 1946, cited in Stenson, op.cit., p. 136.
52 
see Stubbs, op.cit., pp. 68-9; Short, op.cit., pp. 77-90, for more about the inadequate intelligence.
53 PRO CO 537 3755 minute by J.B. Williams and G.F. Seel, 28-31 May.
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government, nevertheless, government never yielded to business pressure on important
issues, such as banishment and flogging. Moreover, business was not impressed by the
government's response, which it tended to regard as sluggish. As we will see, the
government's reluctance to implement stronger measures against 'subversive elements'
at an earlier stage was repeatedly referred to as one of the main reasons behind the
government's loss of control over the situation before the declaration of the Emergency
and was responsible for the outbreak of the Emergency.
In this initial period of labour militancy we can definitely discern an important
difference in the strategies of the British government and its officials, on the one hand,
and what constituted general business opinion, on the other. While such differences were
not based upon qualitative difference in the interests of these two sectors, they were
based upon a differing attitude towards trade unionism in general. On the part of the
politicians and officials these attitudes tended to be predicated upon liberal Fabian or
Labourist political ideas, which differed from those held by the businessmen in Malaya,
who continued to be hostile to independent trade unionism per se. Such differences were
the foundation upon which stood the differences in the assessment of the extent of the
threat that was posed by MCP influence within the Malayan trade union movement.
Turning to 1948, as the volume of industrial unrest grew steadily labour unrest was not
only more widespread, also the forms of violence used during the strike were much more
intense, with even murder often being resorted to. 55 The considerable labour agitation
among estate workers particularly in northern Malaya gradually shifted further south in
February 1948. The Malayan government started taking action to restrict union activities
54 Stenson, op.cit., p. 233.
55 Short, op.cit., p. 33.
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and the Registrar of Trade Unions ordered that the All-Malayan Rubber Workers
Council be dissolved and on 18 February all contributions to the funds of the
unregistered PMFTUs from registered unions were outlawed.
Between May and June 1948 there was another wave of strikes led by the MCP.
During May alone 'there were eight murders, two attempted murders and five cases of
arson' in the Federation. The Amendments to the Trade Union Ordinance of 1940 were
hurriedly passed on 3 June to declare illegal the unregistered trade unions including the
PMFTUs. By the end of May information was received from various sources that the
MCP was mobilising its armed forces under the name of the Special Service Corps, and
that the leading members of the Party had disappeared and had gone into the jungle for a
•course of military traitung. 56 In retrospect these pieces of information, together with the
intensified violence at the beginning of June, were sufficient to indicate that the MCP
was intent on resorting to direct action. However, the officials were reluctant to admit
that the threat of lawlessness came much more from the Communists than from
organised common criminality.
'During the first two weeks in June there were 19 cases of murder and attempted
murder and 3 cases of arson.' 57 On June 1, 1948, a strong force of police had to be used
to clear the Chinese labourers who had taken control of an estate in Johore. During the
following weeks there were more strikes and murders of European planters in Perak and
Johore. The armed Chinese were becoming bold, raiding a police station near Johore.58
The business circles severely criticised officials 'for not acting more forcefully to
66 PRO CO 537 3753 no 35 Effect of action by governments in Malaya to counteract Malayan
Communist Party plans': supplement no 11 of 1948 issued with Malayan Security Service Political
Intelligence Journal no 15/48 of 15 Aug. 1948.
57 ibid.
68 PRO PREM 8 1406 Part I C.P. (48) 171 The Situation in Malaya: memorandum by the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, 1 July 1948.
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suppress 'lawless and criminal' elements which had led in turn to the 'suspicion that the
Government was unable to stop it'.59
On 12 June 1948 Gent was given the exclusive authority to use the Banishment
Ordinance against any persons whose undesirable activity could not be prevented by
recourse to the normal process of law without prior reference to Creech Jones, the
Secretary of State. An enactment of Emergency Powers Bill empowered the High
Cotnmissioner to proclaim a state of emergency. However, proscription of the MCP was
still rejected, for Creech Jones himself did not consider this an appropriate approach on
two grounds: firstly, because, in principle he did not agree with the banning political
parties or prosecution of persons merely for being members of them; secondly, because
the proscription of the party might drive the Communists underground, thus making it
more difficult to monitor their activities." Indeed, not only did the government have a
different assessment of the threat posed by the MCP. It was also the case that they had a
strategy, at an international level, of seeking to deal with communism on a world-wide
scale. Hence, any excessively aggressive moves against the MCP may have had negative
repercussions in relations with other Communist parties, such as, the Chinese
Communists, and not least the one in power in the USSR. British businessmen in Malaya,
however, had no need to take such matters into account; they were operating on a
wholly more parochial basis — profitability. Nevertheless action had to be taken at the
political level. A state of emergency was proclaimed on June 16 in certain areas of Perak
and Johore, and extended on June 17 to the whole of the state of Perak and on June 18
to the remainder of the Federation."
59 PRO CO 717/210/2 telegram from Federation, 4 June 1948, cited in White, op.cit., p. 103.
60 PRO CO 717 167/52849/2/1948 if 314-317 outward telegram no 70 from Creech Jones to M.J.
MacDonald, 12 June 1948.
61 PRO PREM 8 1406 Part I C.P. (48) 171 The Situation in Malaya: memorandum by the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, 1 July 1948; also see PRO CO 71'7 167/52849/2/1948 1302 inward telegram no
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However, the declaration did not bring an immediate solution to, or an
improvement in, the situation, therefore business opinion remained dissatisfied. As far as
business was concerned, 'if unofficial warnings given in the past of pending trouble had
been heeded and sterner measures applied, then present, troubles might not have
arisen'. 62 Calls for Gent's immediate replacement seemed to have been made as early as
September 1947 by the Johore Branch of the United Planters Association. 63 At this point,
business had already lost confidence in Gent. This state of affairs that existed between
Gent and the business community deteriorated sharply during the intensive strike wave of
early 1947, which spread throughout South and Central Kedah, when he refused to use
banishment to restore law and order." Malays also continued to show animosity towards
Gent, largely due to his role in the establishment of the Malayan Union. This situation
became a cause for concern on the part of the Commissioner-General, MacDonald, in the
face of escalating labour unrest during which the Malayan government would need close
cooperation from the Malays. He thus discussed the matter of the recall of Gent with
Creech Jones in January, during his visit to London, and the decision to replace him was
taken in mid-Apri1. 65 Therefore, while Tan Cheng Lock perceived the decision to replace
641 from Gent to Creech Jones, 17 June 1948 about Gent's decision to extend Emergency Regulations
over the whole Malaya.
62 PRO CO 717 172/52849/9/1948 NO 10/12 outward telegram 750 from Creech Jones to Gent, 22 June
1948.
63 PRO CO 537 2208 no 16 despatch no 19 from Gent to Creech Jones; minute by H.T. Bourdillon, 30
Sept. 1947. Johore was one of the significant rubber plantation areas of the peninsula (ICratoska, op.cit.,
p. 269). The main reason for the recall of Gent by the planters particularly in Johore seems to be the
intense strikes in that area where the strong presence of the ex-MPAJA guerrillas stirred up the estate
workers; for instance, in May 1948 the police who went into an estate to restore order, were confronted
with violence, thus further reinforcements had to be called in: PRO CO 537 3753 no 35 supplement no
11, 15 Aug. 1948.
64 At their meeting with Creech Jones and other CO personnel on 22 June 1948, the business
delegations, especially S.B. Palmer and H.H. Facer (United Planters Association of Malaya), and E.D.
Shearn (Malayan Association) elaborate the way in which their advice and suggestions were ignored by
the High Commissioner over the period of time: PRO CO 717 172/52849/9/1948 no 15 notes by W.G.
Sullivan of a meeting between the CO and a delegation representing European business interests, 22
June 1948.
65 A.J. Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, Malaya, Part II: Communist
Insurrection, 1948-1953 (London, 1995), the author's own note in pp. 13-14.
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Gent as having been 'wholly prompted by the strong pressure from European unofficial
quarters and direct representations made to the CO by European vested interests and big
business connected with Malaya', it is clear that such a decision was made earlier." In
any case, business delegations made to the CO on 22 June 1948 provide evidence of a
complete loss of confidence with Gent. At this meeting Creech Jones assured the
business delegations that the government was well aware of the gravity of the situation in
Malaya, which was referred to not in terms of it being 'a trade dispute only', as many
sections of business might have expected from the government, but as 'something more
than ... an industrial dispute' and as a result the functioning of established authority was
being challenged. On the one hand, he assured the business delegation of the
determination of the British government to do everything in its power 'to root out the
causes of it', on the other, he emphasised that the Malayan government was given full
powers to deal with the situation, such as: the banning of unregistered trade unions; an
extension of the Banishment Ordinance; and other related considerations, for example,
better equipping of the Police.
However, these promises were not very enthusiastically received by the business
delegations who were still pessimistic about Gent, who, they believed, would not actually
use these powers if they were given to him. Although Creech Jones rejected the criticism
levelled at Gent, the collapse of business confidence in Gent precipitated his immediate
recall, which was prompted on 26 June.° Gent, however, never made the journey, but
was killed in an air-crash on his way back to London.
66 PRO CO 537 3686 no 23 inward telegram no 733 from Sir A. Newboult (OAG) to Creech Jones, 4
July 1948.
67 PRO CO 717 172/52849/9/1948 no 15 notes by W.G. Sullivan of a meeting between the CO and a
delegation representing European business interests, 22 June 1948; Short, op.cit., pp. 116-19: good for
the growing uneasiness between Gent and MacDonald.
207
Having assured the business delegations that the British government would do
everything it could take to get a return to normal conditions and to restore order, Creech
Jones still objected to the proscription of the MCP, indicating that he continued to be
willing to 'maintain a progressive approach' as he was still concerned 'about the political
repercussions of proscription'." The declaration of the Emergency did not bring any
marked change in the situation in July. In addition MacDonald reported that there was
conclusive evidence that 'the Malayan Communist Party was actively responsible for
planning and directing this campaign of violence and terrorism', 69 though watertight
proof of MCP involvement in the violent attacks was still (even months later) lacking.7°
Creech Jones and Bevin finally accepted the need for a ban on the MCP and on 19 July
the Cabinet agreed to authorise MacDonald to declare the MCP, and certain connected
parties, such as New Democratic Youth League and PETA (Ikatan Pembela Tanah Ayer:
Communist Party's Malay Front) to be illegal organisations.71
The War Office, somewhat vividly, listed the methods employed by the insurgents as: the
murder of law-abiding Chinese and of managers and senior officials on the outlying
rubber estates and tin mines, the intimidation of workers, and the destruction of buildings
on mines and estates, of machinery and other properties. 72 When the Emergency was
declared, the Malayan garrison remained militarily weak, as a result of the continued
absence of improvements in levels of men and military supplies. Almost all sections of
the Army, the Airforce and the Police were understrength, and on 4 July 1948 the
68 Stockwell, Malaya, Part II, the author's own note in p. 50. Also see Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, p. lxvi.
69 CAB 128 13 CM 52 (48) 5, Cabinet conclusions, 19 July 1948
79 Stockwell, Malaya, Part II, notes 2 and 3 in p. 51.
71 PRO CAB 128 13 CM 50 (48) 3, Cabinet conclusions, 13 July 1948; CAB 128 13 CM 52 (48) 5, 19
July 1948; CO 537 3753 no 35, supplement no 11 of 1948, 15 Aug. 1948.
72 PRO PREM 8 1406 Part I C.P. (48) 171 The Situation in Malaya: memorandum by the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, 1 July 1948; PREM 8 1406 Part I note by the War Office on the Military situation
in Malaya, 18 Aug. 1948.
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Federal Executive Council was given secret information that there was 'no prospect at
present of military reinforcements from abroad'.73
At a meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on 22 June 1948, the defence of estates and
mines was discussed by MacDonald, Gent, and other personnel from the Malayan
government. MacDonald emphasised the significance of maintaining the economic life of
the country, and thus of defending the principal resources, such as rubber and tin. He
advocated the use of regular forces for static guarding of the estates and mines for a
short period till other devices were ready, since there was no any other manpower readily
available. The Deputy Commissioner of Police took the threat to plantations and mines
'lightly' on the grounds that the planters and managers had been 'advised to form their
own defence unites and steps were being taken to issue arms to them' and that they were
given a warning to take an extra caution for their own and their families' safeties.
MacDonald's suggestion of using the Army temporarily for static guards on estates and
mines brought an immediate objection from Gent and the Major-General Boucher, the
General Officer Commanding Malaya. Gent, in particular, completely discarded the
suggestion of 'the defence of every plantation and mines' as Impossible' .74
Nevertheless, provision of armed guards on rubber estates to restore confidence
among those in the business was alive, in the form of the Special Constables. The Special
Constabulary, formed on 26 June 1948, was a force of voluntarily recruited armed men
(mainly Malays, but also including Tamils and sometimes even Chinese). In the early
stages, training was often in the hands of estate managers and tin mine-owners, for many
estates and agency houses had already been recruiting people to guard their properties.
The recruits were also trained by special training teams provided by the Army, by the
73 Short, op.cit., pp. 113-14.
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Police, by officers seconded from civilian government Departments, and by the Palestine
Police sergeants who also helped to organise the defence of the estates and the mines.
The first party among the eventual 500 of them arrived on 5 August.75
Throughout the Emergency, it was emphasised that the counter-insurgency
operation was based on police work rather than regular force, and this belief was closely
linked to the decision not to apply martial law in combating the disturbances.
Immediately — the day after the declaration of the Emergency — Gent gave an
instruction to all Departments of the Federation government to give every assistance to
the Police. 76 An increase in police force numbers was planned at the early stage of the
operation, and there were further expansions over the period of time. A voluntary
auxiliary police was also raised to relieve the heavy duties of the Police.77
On 14 July the Acting High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya,
Alexander Newboult, received representations by the leading Malayan rubber and tin
industries in Malaya. The business delegations told Newboult that unless the situation
improved in a few months time, they could not guarantee continuity of production, and
demanded an immediate reinforcement of two further brigades. Newboult promptly
discussed this matter with the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Far East.78
Subsequently Newboult; MacDonald; and the Defence Committee, Far East sent
telegrams to the British government to urge support for the despatch of additional
reinforcements. However, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet Office suggested that
'the despatch of reinforcements at the present time to any part of the world needed
74 ibid., pp. 114-117. Gimson, the Governor of Singapore, Major-General Charles Boucher, the General
Officer Commanding Malaya, Langworthy and Lieutenant-Colonel John Dailey, the Commissioner of
Police and the head of Intelligence respectively were also on the present.
75 ibid., pp. 124-28; Woodcock, op.cit., p. 242.
76 J.B. Perry Robinson, Transformation in Malaya (London, 1956), p. 166, in Short, op.cit., p. 122
77 Short, op.cit., pp. 128-132.
78 PRO PREM 8 1406 CP (48) 190 Cabinet memorandum by Creech Jones, 19 July 1948.
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careful thought'. The policy governing the size of the army after the war required a rapid
run-down, dependent upon that there would be peace and reduction in British post-war
commitments. However, many of these commitments had not been reduced (see section
5.1), nevertheless the extra effort required of the army had been just about managed.
Under the circumstances, further reinforcements meant that the British government
'would need to face a big risk'. Thus the Committee thoroughly examined the drawbacks
regarding the despatch of such forces; first, the main trouble areas were identified, then a
decision as to which area the first brigade that was ready should be sent was made. 79 The
conclusion was drawn that the brigade should be sent to Malaya on the basis that:
Malaya was the only place in all three areas where we were
actively fighting against Communism and it was British
Empire territory. Moreover, our own nationalists were being
killed. We could not stand this nor could we afford to lose
Malaya to Communism."
Philip Noel-Baker of the Commonwealth Relations Office reached the same
conclusion: that while there were great obvious potentialities of serious trouble in
western Europe and Middle East, the situation in these two areas was still not so
immediately critical as that in the Far East, though the British were taking grave risks,
particularly in the Middle East.81
It is not certain whether the subsequent decision to send further reinforcements
was made as a result of, or at least under the influence of, the business representations
made to Newboult. By the time the representations were made, the British Ministry of
79 PRO PREM 8 1406 Part I D.O. (48) 16 th of Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 13 Aug.
1948.
80 ibid.
81 PRO PREM 8 1406 Part I The Situation in Malaya: memorandum by Philip Noel-Baker of the
Commonwealth Relations Office, 18 Aug. 1948.
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Defence seemed to have been already prepared to send one or possibly two brigades, but
'should this be essential'. And yet there is no indication that they thought the time has
arrived and nor MacDonald seems to think that the operations should move from one
phase to another: from merely restoring law and order to 'liquidate the guerrilla bands
whose headquarters are in the jungle' using stronger measures. 82 With limited
information on this matter, it is difficult to decide whether that was a coincidence. If not,
we face another confusion of whether MacDonald publicly declared his plans of
operation. It was thus possible that business without any prior knowledge of the
activities inside the British government and the Defence Ministry might themselves have
thought that it was time to apply stronger measures which naturally required more armed
presence; or alternatively, in this case with their prior knowledge of the plan for
operations, they might have urged the government to move on to the next phase.
Reinforcements were sent from Hong Kong; and in the following October a
further three battalions of the Brigade of Guards arrived in Malaya. This was 'the first
time that Guards had ever served abroad except in war', which obviously showed the
weight attributed to the significance of protecting Malaya by the British government. It
was announced that the first armoured car regiment was on its way, though it arrived
only in February and March 1949. Also, gradually, the air force was strengthened."
In 1948 the morale among British business in Malaya, which always remained sceptical
about the government's seriousness in meeting the dangers posed by the Emergency, was
close to collapse." There was uneasy feeling within the expatriate business communities,
and among British officials including policemen and soldiers, that the British government
82 PRO PREM 8 1406 CP (48) 190 Cabinet memorandum by Creech Jones, 19 July 1948.
83 Short, op.cit., pp. 113-136.
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might abandon the colony. Walter Fletcher, the businessman converted politician (a
Conservative MP between 1945-1955), was reported to have said that 'Britain should
state clearly she intends to stay in Malaya for many more decades ... until political
stability had been reached.' 85 The Malayans, who had already had the experience of the
British suddenly withdrawing in the face of Japanese advance, were also afraid of being
again left alone to deal with the insurgency, and the events in Burma, where 'the
premature withdrawal' brought disastrous consequences, assured them of the need to
keep the British colonial government until stability was re-established.
The Malays and Chinese were equally afraid of each other's aggression and
retaliation that might escalate if the British would have to withdraw early. The Chinese,
whose cooperation would be more than vital for a successful counter-insurgency
operation, but whose confidence with the British and Malayan governments had been run
down, especially by the constitutional change to the Federal structure by which the pre-
war Anglo-Malay collaboration was restored, needed to be assured that the British had
no intention of leaving Malaya within the foreseeable future. 86 In his letter to Sir Thomas
Lloyd (the Permanent Under-Secretary of State of the CO), the new High Commissioner,
Sir Henry Gurney, emphasised the need for a statement that should affirm that 'we intend
to stay in this country at least until they are able to stand on their own feet and maintain
their independence', to rebuild confidence among peoples of Malaya, which would in
return contribute to 'the restoration of peace and good order and the ending of our
Emergency'. 87 On 2 April 1949 it was agreed between Attlee, Creech Jones, Alexander
84 Harper, op.cit., pp, 154-55.
85 PRO CO 537 4741 no 27 letter (reply) from Sir T. Lloyd to Sir H. Gurney, 2 Apr. 1949.
86 PRO CO 537 3758 no 25 letter from Sir H. Gurney to Sir T. Lloyd, 20 Dec. 1948.
87 PRO CO 537 4741 no 16 letter from Sir H. Gurney to Sir T. Lloyd, 24 Feb. 1949. Also see CO 825
76/2 no 7 inward telegram no 337 from Sir H. Gurney to Sir T. Lloyd. Minutes by N.D. Watson, J.D.
Higham, Creech Jones, Rees-Williams, 18 Mar. 1949, for the related issues regarding restoring
confidence of peoples in Malaya.
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(the Minister of Defence) and Shinwell (the Secretary of State for War) that the Prime
Minister himself should address a statement on that matter," and this was done on 13
April 1949.89
Almost a year after the declaration of the Emergency, the counter-insurgency operations
were showing slow progress. Gurney was extremely concerned with 'the Communist
drive in China', which had proved to be 'a boost to bandit morale and a check to willing
co-operation from some Chinese'. The degree of Chinese allegiance to the Malayan
government was still ambiguous, and in the absence of an effective administrative
control, the squatters, mostly Chinese, were known to support the guerrillas, providing
foods and information, though they often cooperated with them as a result of
intimidation and physical threat. In these circumstances, the sequence of events in China
and the final take-over of the country by the Communists in October 1949 put the British
officials in Malaya under constant pressure.9°
As the Communist was the de facto government in China, recognition of the
Communist regime seemed to be an inevitable step to take on the part of the British
government. Yet, three major problems with the recognition of the Communist China in
relation to British counter-insurgency operations in Malaya were recognised: firstly, the
consequent boost to morale among the insurgents; secondly, problems that would occur
with the presence of the Chinese Communist Consuls; and, thirdly, confusion might
88 PRO CO 537 4751 no 68 minute by Attlee, 2 Apr. 1949.
89 See Stockwell, Malaya, Part II, p. 127 note 2 for more details of the statement made by Attlee in the
House of Commons on 13 Apr. 1949.
99 PRO CO 537 4751 no 122 letter from Sir H. Gurney to J.J. Paslcin, 2 June 1949. The take-over of the
Communists of the whole China in a foreseeable future had been always a possibility after the end of the
war, and a constant concern among the British officials. Therefore, British authorities kept watchful eyes
on the events in China, for its consequence would be absolutely disastrous to Malaya and to the whole
region: PRO CO 537 3755 minute by J.B. Williams and G.F. Seel, 28-31 May 1948.
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occur among the Malayans, as the recognition might imply an approval of Communism.91
Among these, the British were most afraid of the subsequent establishment of the
Chinese Communist Consuls that would be appointed throughout the Federation of
Malaya and with whom the local Chinese would be called upon to register. In that way,
the Chinese government would become associated with the Communist insurgents in
Malaya, and there was 'a great danger in that they would be a means of supplying
information, money, leaders, and possibly arms to the bandits'. Nevertheless, some
sections of the British government were adamant that it was important 'to have ...
diplomatic touch with the new Government' and the adverse effects to the British
operations in Malaya might be reduced through 'some agreement on the [their] non-
interference in Malaya ' 92 Even risking criticisms of their clearly inconsistent attitude
towards Communism in Malaya and in China, the British government and mandarins
maintained their position with regard to recognition on the basis that:
The type of Government established in any country is the
business of the people of that country. ... The Communist
Government controls the greater part of China and is at
least acquiesced in by a great majority of Chinese people.93
At the same time every effort had to be made to minimise the disastrous
consequence of recognition to the counter-insurgency operations in Malaya. The British
CO and FO, and the British authorities in Malaya refused to identify the insurgency in
91 PRO CO 537 6089 no 17 joint CO-F0 note, Dec. 1949.
92 PRO CO 537 4374 no 5 report by Field Marshal Sir W. Slim, Nov. 1949.
93 PRO CO 537 6089 no 17 joint CO-FO note, Dec. 1949; FO 371 F17630/1017/61S Telegram from
Commissioner General (Acting Deputy) for SEA to the Secretary of State, 22 Nov. 1949. Field Marshal
Slim also said that 'Whether the Government is recognised or not, it is, and will be in fact, the
Government of China and the Chinese population of Malaya will regard it as such.' Thus, he rather
preferred to recognise the de facto government in China, but at the same time to minimise the adverse
effects on Malaya through a diplomatic route with the new government: PRO CO 537 4374 no 5 report
by Field Marshal Sir W. Slim, Nov. 1949.
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Malaya with either Communism in China or International Communism. 94 The British
government was, on the one hand, hesitant to represent the Emergency as merely a war
against colonial unrest, but on the other hand, more reluctant to identify it with
International Communism, thus trying hard for publicity to 'avoid writing up
International Communism in such terms as to make it seem a powerful bandwagon onto
which people would be wise to jump'. 95 It was very important to draw every possible
distinction between them to dissociate Communism from any object of local Chinese
loyalty. At the same time the British government wanted to make sure that the
recognition did not mean
weakening in our resistance to Communism anywhere when
it directly affects our interests ... if the Communists in China
indicate, . . , an unyielding determination to support para-
military or open aggression in Southeast Asia, we shall
certainly meet their challenge as we have met the MCP
challenge.96
There was, however, a growing opposition to the recognition within the Malayan
government. Gurney even tendered his resignation to the CO protesting against it.
Although he was not successful in his aim, his actions played a major contribution in
drawing up the initial Cabinet decision that 'no Communist consul should be appointed in
Malaya for the duration of the Emergency , . 97 Despite the precautions taken with regard
to the recognition, these measure proved insufficient to ensure minimising the damaging
94 PRO FO 371 76005 F17630/1017/61S telegram from Commissioner General (Acting Deputy) for SEA
to the Secretary of State, 22 Nov. 1949.
95 PRO FO 371 76005 F17630/1017/61S J.H. Watson, FO, to O.H. Morris, CO, to 1 Dec. 1949.
96 PRO FO 371 76021 F15689/10140/61 Sir H. Gurney to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 Oct.
1949.
97 PRO CAB 129 39 CP(50)75 joint Cabinet memorandum by Griffiths and Younger (Minister of State
at the Foreign Office, 1950-1951), 21 Apr. 1950; Short, op.cit., pp. 213-16.
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effect on the British community in Malaya. The former President of the United Planting
Association of Malaya lamented the British business community's sense of loss as a
result of this decision in May 1950:
We, out there, do not question the action of the British
Government in recognising the Communist Government of
China although we don't understand it — but you will
appreciate Sir how much more difficult it has made our task
in Malaya.98
Such a decline in British morale in the country contributed further to the loss of
businesses' confidence in the intentions of the British government with regard to the
future of Malaya.
During the Emergency 356 British civilians, mostly planters and miners, were killed,
while others who survived had to live under extremely difficult conditions. 99
 It had been
feared that Europeans engaged in mining and rubber planting might decide to leave
Malaya for goo
resigned or retired early. 10 ' Firms were finding it increasingly difficult to obtain young
trained men to replace them due to the present danger to life.'
Guerrilla incidents during the first half of 1949, after having decreased to almost
half of the previous average between June and December 1948, quadrupled (with over
98 PRO CO 537 5979 memorandum of Meeting with the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the CO,
10 May 1950, memorandum no. 2 (presented by H.H. Facer, the ex-President of the United Planting
Association of Malaya).
99 Woodcock, op.cit., p. 242 and see the same page for more details of the life of planters and miners,
and the family. See PRO CO 537 7265 memorandum of Meeting, 19 Dec. 1950, for the strains on the
families in the UK of the British planters and managers.
1°° PRO CO 537 5979 memorandum of Meeting, 10 May 1950, memorandum no. 2 (by H.H. Facer).
101 PRO CO 1022 39 memorandum of Meeting between a Deputation from the RGA and the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, 15 Nov. 1951.
dm° and such fears seemed well-founded as many European personnel
217
four hundred a month being recorded) after that. The attacks reached their peak in early
September 1950. As soon as the situation began to deteriorate in 1950, business again
urged the British government to make another public statement that would reassure
those who feared the possibility of an early withdrawal of Britain from Malaya 103 The
general lack of confidence, widespread within the British community, was, according to
the deputation of British businesses in Malaya, not so much due to fear of banditry as to
the possibility of Representative Government being granted to Malaya prematurely,
which might put the continuity of normal business operations at risk. Thus British firms
wanted to be assured that Malaya would remain 'a central British responsibility second
to none' 104, until they deemed Malaya to be competent to govern herself as a united
nation within the Commonwealth. 105
 When James Griffiths, who succeeded Creech Jones
as the Secretary of the State for the Colonies on 28 February 1950, visited Malaya in
following May and June, business delegations urged him to intensify counter-insurgency
operations to ease the continued insecurity, and also pressed him to make a public
statement that 'British rule in Malaya would be maintained for another twenty-five
years' 106 Griffiths not only declined to do so, but also made his position very clear: that
the tempo of granting self-government should be increased in view of the situation
marked by Communist control in China. 107 He was well aware of the fact that business
102 PRO CO 537 7265 memorandum of Meeting, 19 Dec. 1950.
103 PRO CAB 128 17 CM 37(50)1 Cabinet conclusions on reports by Griffiths and Strachey following
their visits to Malaya, 19 June 1950; CO 537 5961 no 25 item 1 of minutes of fifteenth Commissioner-
General's conference at Bukit Serene, 7 June 1950.
1 " PRO CO 537 5979 memorandum of Meeting, 10 May 1950, memorandum no. 1 (by H.B. Egmont
Hake of the Rubber Growers' Association)
105 PRO CO 537 5979 memorandum of Meeting, 10 May 1950, memoranda nos. 1, 3 and 4. In his
memorandum (no. 4), Sir Sydney Palmer of the RGA said that he thought that it would take them at
least twenty to twenty five years before they were ready for representative government.
106 PRO CAB 128 17 CM 37(50)1 Cabinet conclusions, 19 June 1950.
107 In fact, the idea of a transitional period of 25 years before the grant of self-government in Malaya was
not new, but had been accepted by the wide section of the Malayan society including Malayan Chinese,
Indian leaders and the more conservative Malays: see PRO CO 537 5961 no 25 item 1 of minutes of
fifteenth Commissioner-General's conference at Bukit Serene, 7 June 1950.
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bore 'a very heavy burden', 1° 8 and was thus sympathetic, but at the same time he was
also critical of the backwardness of the business community in Malaya. It was clear that
the government and the business community did not see eye to eye on economic and
social issues: whilst a large section of the European population still hoped for a return to
the conditions which existed in pre-war Malaya, Griffiths reinstated the responsibility of
the British government to offer the Malayan workers greater opportunities for economic
and social betterment. As the government was competing with the MCP, who criticised
the former for concentrating 'every resource of force, decree law, intimidation, and
propaganda upon crushing the Malayan people's struggle', 1°9 and who claimed to be an
alternative to British colonial authorities, it was considered to be of great importance 'to
demonstrate to the workers in Malaya that a non-Communist regime offered them
greater opportunities for economic and social betterment than any Communist
regime'. 11° Business was, however, more concerned with short-term stability and making
a quick profit. Throughout 1950 and 1951 business was anxious to obtain an assurance
that the British government was ready and prepared to fight to hold Malaya. Any
statement made by the authorities to prove otherwise was taken seriously; for instance,
when General Briggs stated that there was a possibility of withdrawing the military from
Malaya if the Emergency went well, and deploying them elsewhere, business immediately
made a request to Griffiths for an explanation.m
The Attlee government on the one hand struggled to persuade the business
interests to be more conscientious about the welfare of their workers, and on the other
encouraged the Malayan government to work more diligently on the economic and
1 °8 PRO CO 537 7263 no 42 memorandum by Griffiths, 6 July 1951.
109 Caldwell, op. cit., p. 219.
110 PRO CAB 128 17 CM 37(50)1 Cabinet conclusions, 19 June 1950.
111 PRO CO 537 5979 brief for Secretary of State for Visit of Joint Delegation of Malayan Interests on 19
Dec. 1950.
219
political development of the country. After having been re-elected in the general election
of February 1950 with a much smaller majority, the Attlee government began to take a
more systematic approach to Malaya, establishing the Cabinet Malaya Committee, and
appointing General Briggs to coordinate the military and police activities. These were
responses to an ever-more urgent situation in which Malaya increasingly swallowed up
funds, and caused alarm when viewed in the context of Communist success elsewhere in
Asia. The Secretary of State for War, Strachey, who accompanied Griffiths to Malaya
heavily criticised the officials of the Malayan regime for failure to implement the
metropolitan government's declared objectives (see the main introduction of this thesis
for the detail), blaming their adherence to an 'out of place, and out of date, form of
liberalism [which] is joined ... by a disastrously conservative bias in regard to the
political, democratic and economic development of the country'. He emphasised the need
for 'firmness', and vigour' on both the military and police side of the campaign and on
economic and political development.112
In fact, such initiatives had been taken at the local level, under Gurney, who had,
throughout 1949, made serious attempts to diagnose problems and recommend solutions
to the Emergency, based on what General Sir Gerald Templer would later call the
'winning of hearts and minds'. Gurney advocated the creation of a social base amongst
the ethnic-Chinese population and worked on improvements in the standard of living to
counter Communism. A solution was also sought to problems by the decentralisation of
the federal structure through the introduction of the 'member system', while General
Briggs endeavoured to link up districts, states and the centre of operations through a
series of war executive committees, and planned provisions for the resettlement of
112 The quotes are from PRO PREM 8 1406 Part II minute by Strachey, to Attlee, 11 Dec. 1950. Also see
CAB 211681, MAL C(50)21 memorandum by Strachey for Cabinet Malaya Committee, 17 June 1950;
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squatters. We see another example of local initiative in MacDonald's recommendation to
the Secretaries of State to speed up the process of self-government during their visit to
Malaya. 113 The problem with these local schemes was that they were based on the long-
term plans. Therefore by the time Griffiths and Strachey were in Malaya, they had not
taken effect. 114 Taking into account the extent of local programmes it has to be said that
although Strachey had a case, especially in relation to the Malayan regime's inactivity on
the promotion of non-Communist trades unions, one should be guarded about accepting
his overall criticisms as legitimate. Nevertheless, his frustration was also driven by
concern about political developments outside Malaya:
In the long run we can suppress the rising and do the job, if
we are let alone to do it (italic in origin). But we may only
have a short time to settle the business in Malaya. If we
look at the position in the rest of S.E. Asia, it is far from
reassuring. Any further Communist successes there are
almost certain to react in Malaya ... . 115
Regardless what was going on within the political authorities and despite some
division between the metropolitan and colonial governments, the interactions between
the metropolitan and colonial governments and the firms were necessarily active. In any
case, the confidence felt among the British firms with their role and contribution to the
British and Malayan economy (and the whole Empire) made them more forthcoming than
they would otherwise have been. After all, in times of dollar shortages in the UK and the
CAB 128 17 CM 37(50)1 Cabinet conclusions, 19 June 1950.
113 Stockwell, Malaya, Part 1, pp. lxvii-lxix; PRO CAB 129 40, CP(50)125 Cabinet memorandum by
Griffiths, 13 June 1950.
114 Stockwell, Malaya, Part I, p. lxviii.
115 PRO CAB 211681, MAL C(50)21 memorandum by Strachey for Cabinet Malaya Committee, 17
June 1950.
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Sterling area, they were the main actors in the Malayan extractive industries — the
biggest dollar earners. Moreover, the British firms in the rubber and tin industries were
major contributors to the Federal revenues and the biggest employers in Malaya. 116 J.M.
Baber, Chairman and Managing Director of Alor Pongsu Amalgamated Estates,
explained that one might say rubber had been the 'Cinderella' of industries in the post-
war period, but, ' ... in effect, it has played the part of the "Fairy God-mother" by being
the biggest dollar earner upon which Britain's present position is entirely dependent'.
Together with tin, the rubber industry was saving the Federation from the ravages of
Communism because if estates would have to shut down, it would 'indeed lead to an
atmosphere of discontent in which the dying threat of Communism would again
thrive' 117
The confidence of British firms in Malaya and their close communication with the
governments can be judged positively when compared to the policy of Unilever's
Indonesian subsidiary which consciously did not make any attempt to use the British
government to bring pressure to bear on Sukarno because the company was well aware
of the fact that they did not have much to offer for Indonesia's export economy. Its role
as a manufacturer of goods for local consumption made it a light-weight when it came to
bargaining power. 118 In contrast to this, British firms in Malaya did not hesitate to
contact the governments and the relevant Departments. Indeed, if necessary they
launched campaigns to persuade the British government to act in line with their interests.
116 '
According to the 1947 census report, the number of persons engaged in rubber cultivation was over
half a million if we take into account the dependants of these persons it can be estimated that 1.5 million
persons or one-quarter of the population of the Federation depend on rubber cultivation for all or most of
their livelihood. This is fairly conservative figure for it leaves out those engaged in rubber trading and
the manufacture of rubber goods.': PRO PREM 11 873 High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya
to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 1951.
117 The Financial Times, 16 Aug. 1949, Malayan Rubber Position; Post-war "Cinderella" of Industries, by
J.M. Baber, Chairman and Managing Director of Alor Pongsu Amalgamated Estates.
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For instance a business delegation arranged meetings with the Secretaries of State for the
Colonies; a deputation of local business organisations and leaders saw High
Commissioners of the Federation and the Commissioner-General; and big names like Sir
John Hay and Egmont Hake made personal visits to the British government. Close
communication with the relevant government Departments was regarded by business as
essential for smooth operation during the Emergency. Hay, in response to the request by
Lloyd of the CO to make an immediate and practical suggestion, urged the CO to
arrange meetings between some senior administrative or Police officers, recently returned
from the Federation; firms with business interests in Malaya, such as the RGA,; and the
corresponding organisations of tin miners, bankers etc., so that business could have
better access to information including about those matters that could not be made
public. 119
Despite business confidence and its influence in government circles, they still lacked the
power to influence some of the most significant issues, such as financing the counter-
insurgency, including taxation, and the operational side of the counter-insurgency. In
fact, during the meetings between the British authorities and business, two issues were
constantly raised: the financial burden imposed on business and the lack of progress on
counter-insurgency. Around the end of 1949 the rubber and tin industries were still
struggling to get war compensation. Sir Sydney Palmer, a prominent proprietary planter
and visiting agent, and also the immediate past President of the United Planting
Association of Malaya, pointed out that many estates had already exhausted reserve
funds which had been spent on rehabilitation work. Only payment from the government
118 D.K. Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas; The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895-1965 (London, Stanford,
1978), p. 313.
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from the war damage account would be able to tide over most estates. In addition 1949
was one of the most difficult years for natural rubber: the Export Tax doubled in early
1948, and soon after, Income Tax was introduced.' 20 The price fall and ever-increasing
production costs affected the rubber industry badly , and even more so the tin industry.
By the end of 1948 mining costs were more than double what they had been before the
war, as a result of the increased cost of materials, power and wages. 121
 And the
Americans' stockpiling policy had made the situation worse. US requirements for tin,
which had originally been intimated as being of the order of some 50/60,000 tons a year,
were actually revised at a figure of some 20,000 tons per annum. Thus the British and
Federation governments were worried that this unexpectedly low purchase would not
only worsen the UK's dollar position, but that it would also bring repercussions for the
Malayan tin industry, which in turn could result in unrest and further internal security
problems for the Malayan government.122
British firms were becoming more and more dissatisfied with the heavy taxation
imposed on them to assist the increasing general government expenditure. The Chairman
of Malayan Tin Dredging Ltd., Southern Malayan Tin Dredging Ltd. and Kramat Pulai
Ltd. vented his frustration at the Annual General Meeting in December 1948:
119 PRO CO 537 5979 T.I.K. Lloyd, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, CO, to J.J. Paskin, CO, 28
Mar. 1950.
120 The Financial Times, 18 June 1949. See Stenson, op.cit., pp. 173-76 for more about the introduction
of Income Tax and business' strong resistance that delayed the implementation of the Tax.
121 PRO T 220 134 Chairman's Address to Members at the Annual General Meetings of Malayan Tin
Dredging, Ltd., Southern Malayan Tin Dredging Ltd., and ICramat Pulai Ltd., 15 Dec. 1948.
122 PRO T 220 134 Minute on Malaya Tin by W. Russell Edmunds, 29 June 1949. The Truman
Administration was concerned with large increases in governmental expenditures in the face of
declining revenues, thus requested the National Security Council to revise the size and nature of the
governmental programmes, those which were designed for overseas commitments and national security
for the fiscal year 1951. As a result more than a third of the expenditure allocated for stockpile purpose
was going to be cut back However, the Korean War that followed immediately after a few months made
any reduction of the military expenditure including stockpiling of critical and strategic materials
impractical. See FRUS (1949), vol. i, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 347-389
for more details on the process of re-evaluation of the expenditure programmes in July 1949.
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The cost of a full and efficient police force and organisation
is, properly, the responsibility of the Federation, but the
consequences arising from the manifest neglect (and refusal
to heed warnings) of the Colonial Office, the root cause of
the necessity for the present armed forces [bold in
original], should be borne by the British Treasury.123
Contrary to the assumption made by the British government the expenditure
necessary in 1950 considerably exceeded that of 1949. Griffiths immediately took steps
to increase revenue in the form of 'an increase in Companies rate of Tax to 30 per cent
and the imposition of increased export duties on rubber and tin'. On the other hand he
suggested that the British government, for its part, should 'bear fifty per cent of
expenditure arising directly out of the emergency and incurred by the Federation
Government so long as the emergency lasts' in the belief that the form of a fixed
percentage would bring a 'very great political value to the Anti-Communist cause in
Malaya'. 124 Gaitskell, the Minister of State for Economic Affairs, who was deputising for
Cripps, instantly refused to sanction any further contribution, despite Griffiths'
contention that Cripps had made a prior agreement with him on financing. Instead
Gaitskell merely pointed to the fact that the British government was already bearing the
full cost of the British Forces employed in Malaya (£36 million up to October 1950), in
addition to other extras that amounted to over 1.12 million. He was certain that the
amount of this contribution would, in itself, be more than enough to convince the
Malayans of Britain's commitment and cooperation with Malaya in the latter's fight
123 PRO T 220 134 Chairman's Address at the Annual General Meetings, 15 Dec. 1948. Business often
reminded the government of the fact that the former's advice on several occasions tendered to the
government of the dangers in Malaya months before the emergency started, was not taken seriously and
as a result the authorities failed to act upon advice in time: from CO 537 7265 memorandum of Meeting,
19 Dec. 1950.
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against insurgents.125 Griffiths, very disappointed, again argued that unless the British
government took what he considered to be a fair share of the financial burden for
policing the Emergency, the Federation government would not be able to implement its
own development plans. This, in turn, would be detrimental to Malaya's future
development and also be contrary to the British government's wish, 126
 Gaitskell,
however, persisted in the argument that Britain could not assist Malaya any further
because British economic resources were 'severely strained' due to the Korean War and
to the consequent requirements of the new defence programme, in contrast to the 'more
buoyant revenue position' enjoyed by the Malayan government thanks to the war
boom.127
Indeed as far as the British government was concerned, commitment to the
Emergency was an additional financial constraint to those that already existed. With the
declaration of the Emergency in June 1948, extra forces, including several hundred of the
aforementioned former members of the Palestine Police, had been sent into Malaya. The
period of national service had been increased from 12 to 18 months in December 1948,
which resulted in raising the expenditure on arms production in 1949 by one-third.
Between 1948 and 1949 the British 'were spending 20 per cent more on defence than the
rest of the Brussels Powers put together and a greater proportionate share of their
national income than the Americans'. 128 Therefore the Treasury was adamant that only 'if
commodity prices, and consequently Malayan tax revenues, fell sharply would additional
124 PRO T 220 281 FF 69-79 letter from Griffiths to Cripps, 18 Sept. 1950.
125 PRO T 220 281 FF 101-103 letter (reply) from Gaitskell to Griffiths, 29 Sept. 1950.
126 PRO T 220 282 FF 1-7 letter from Griffiths to Gaitskell, 24 Oct. 1950.
127 PRO T 220 281 FF 101-103 letter (reply) from Gaitskell to Griffiths, 29 Sept. 1950; T 220 282 FF
150-15 4 letter (reply) from Gaitskell to Griffiths, 29 Sept. 1950 and 15 Nov. 1950.
12$ Bullock, op.cit., pp. 612-13.
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assistance be considered' . 129 The attitude of the Treasury was that Malaya 'should tax
herself to the limit of her capacity'.'"
On the Part of business, the mounting dissatisfaction with taxation led its leaders
in 1950 to urge the British government to 'accept responsibility for the full cost' of the
campaign, 131 for the Emergency was not an intensive domestic disturbance, but a warm:
'an Empire defence against a threat to the Empire'.' Business now portrayed the
Emergency as part of the larger struggle of Communism for power in SEA, and thus the
counter-insurgency as being of supreme significance not only to Malaya, but also to the
whole Empire, and to the world. 134 Underneath this interpretation, there was careful
consideration of who should take financial responsibility for the counter-insurgency. As
far as business was concerned, the British government should agree to accept the full
cost of the campaign. From the point of view of the British government however,
rehabilitation work in Malaya and the measures taken to defeat the Communist
insurgents had cost both metropolitan and Federation governments very large sums of
money and would continue to be a heavy financial burden for both of them, especially in
the case of the counter-insurgency operations. In addition, development plans, such as
drainage and irrigation schemes, opening up of new rice areas, hydroelectric power, etc.,
were already underway or under consideration.' 35 Thus further financial commitment was
not feasible under such circumstances. Accordingly the government expected what it, in
129 PRO T 220 281 Griffiths to Cripps, 18 Sept. 1950 and note by Clough, 27 Sept. 1950; T 220 282
Note by Clough, 28 Nov. 1950, cited in White, op.cit, p. 121.
13° PRO T 220 281 note by Colonel Russell Edmunds, 7 Oct. 1950, cited in White, op.ciL, p. 121.
131 PRO CO 537 5979 memorandum of Meeting, 10 May 1950, cited in White, op.cit., p. 121.
132 PRO CO 537 5979 memorandum of Meeting, 10 May 1950, memorandum no. 5.
133 PRO CO 537 5979 memorandum of Meeting, 10 May 1950, memorandum no. 1.
134 ibid.
135 PRO PREM 8 1407 Report by the Far East (Official) Committee of the Cabinet on Economic and
social Development in South and South-East Asia and the Far East, 1 Dec. 1951, Appendix A: Country
Surveys: Individual Studies, p. 11.
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turn, considered to constitute a fair share of the burden to be shouldered by private
business interests, after all the operation would directly benefit them.
Business, however, did not agree with government. The Deputation from the
RGA to the CO on November 1951 emphasised the fact that the rubber industry was not
only paying both an Export Tax which was out of all proportion to taxes levied on any
other industry and an Income Tax, but it was also contributing to general government
expenditure, in the form of regrouping the labourers and expenditure on the provision of
defensive measures. They also highlighted the effects of the termination of stockpiling
and increased competition from synthetic rubber, which would jeopardise the chances of
survival on many estates. 136 Adding to these factors were the loss of crops due to the
physical damage on the trees, and disruption of working conditions caused by the
Emergency, all of which added to increases in their levels of expenditure, but these costs
were scarcely considered, if not ignored, by the British authorities.'" In addition, the
rubber industry was badly affected by delays in replanting, resulting in a situation in
which it was predicted that output in 7-10 years time would only increase 'very slightly,
if at all'. Tin mining also suffered severely, experiencing considerable loss of life and
damage to property. Even up to the time when the memorandum was written for the
preparation of Commonwealth Conference in September 1950, the tin mining equipment
damaged by the effects of war was not all replaced due to delays in machinery
deliveries.'"
n.-...""
136 PRO CO 1022 39 memorandum submitted by the Deputation from the RGA to South East Asia
Department of the FO, 15 Nov. 1951.
131 PRO CO 537 7265 memorandum of the Meeting between the Secretary of State, CO, and RGA, 24
July 1951.
138 PRO T 236 3301 memorandum for Commonwealth Conference, London, 4 Sept. 1950.
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Apart from these indirect costs of physical damages, industry also partly financed
the Special Constabulary scheme. 139 The Federation government paid for each Special
Constable (M$70 per month) up to an allocated number, and thus 'any employed over
and above that number had to be paid for by the estates and mines themselves' •140
Additionally, the individual companies contributed very large sums towards the costs of
defence of their own estates, providing armaments for the staff441 and 'armoured cars,
floodlighting, emergency leave and emergency personal accident insurance for the staff;
auxiliary police and security officers'.142
Another part of the counter-insurgency effort, the Briggs Plan, which, though
effective, cost the firms dearly. This Plan was submitted for consideration to the British
Defence Co-ordination Committee, Far East, in Singapore in May 1950, and its first
execution began in Johore in the following June. The main objective of the Plan was to
cut off the guerrillas from food and intelligence supplies by resettling squatters in a
protected area with barbed wire and searchlights. As the costs of regrouping labour,
which was an essential element in the Briggs Plan, were added to existing defence
contributions, the British business leaders considered this to be a further injustice.
Business argued that the Plan was 'of benefit to the whole country and not to estates and
mines only' 143 and as such the cost 'should be borne by the community' . 144 Gurney,
-
139 See PRO CO 537 7265 letter from J.D. Higham, CO, to Sullivan, 12 Oct. 1951 for the details of the
areas of the financial responsibility inclusive the Special Constabulary Scheme laid on both the
government and the owners of the private properties.
140 short, Communist Insurrection, p. 126, in White, op.ciL, p. 120.
141 PRO T 220 134 Chairman's Address at the Annual General Meetings of Malayan Tin Dredging,
Ltd., Southern Malayan Tin Dredging Ltd., and Kramat Pulai Ltd., 15 Dec. 1948.
142 PRO CO 537 7265 memorandum of the Meeting between the Secretary of State, CO, and RGA, 24
July 1951.
143 CO 537 7265 replies by Gurney and notes of discussions between Gurney and business deputation
(representing the Rubber Producers' Council, the FMS Chamber of Mines, the Malaya Chinese Mining
Association, and the FMS Chamber of Commerce), 21 June 1951.
144 CO 537 7265 memorandum of the Meeting between Secretary of State, CO, and RGA, 24 July 1951
and memorandum on the Subjects for Discussion with the High Commissioner by the Deputation, 21
June 1951.
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however, was adamant that the Federation government would not consider any
contribution towards the cost of regrouping since 'by regrouping added protection
would be afforded to estates and mines', 145 'which might otherwise have been forced
through loss of labour etc. to close down' 146 Moreover, 'this was a measure of special
protection for which in an Emergency individuals could reasonably be expected to accept
liability'. 147 Business did not give up, but a month after their leaders' discussion with
Gurney, another representation was made to Griffiths in July to thrash out an answer to
the question of whether extra expenditure arising wholly or partly from the Emergency
should be met by individual companies or by the government. Moreover, the problem
with the regrouping of labour on rubber estates inevitably arose as not all estates needed
concentration, thus the cost of regrouping was very heavy in some areas while in others
no further spending for that purpose was necessary.
Griffiths that if the government would take up the cost of regrouping of labour it would
mean additional taxation, and that 'they would not mind that because then the
expenditure would in their view be equitably distributed' .149
To business eyes, government was responsible for damaging business interests. For
example, business firmly believed that when rubber prices (Ch. 4) were temporarily high,
during the rehabilitation period of 1945-46, the British companies would have been able
to pay the colossal costs incurred for rehabilitation and this would have provided them
with a mechanism to deal with the settlement of war damage claims. Instead the
--
145 PRO CO 537 '7265 replies written by Gurney and notes of discussions between Gurney and the
business deputation, 21 June 1951.
146 PRO CO 537 7265 Gurney to Paskin, 3 Sept. 1951, cited in White, op.cit., p. 119.
141 PRO CO 537 7265 replies written by Gurney and notes of discussions between Gurney and the
business deputation, 21 June 1951.
14$ PRO CO 537 7265 memorandum of the Meeting between the Secretary of State, CO, and RGA, 24
July 1951.
149 PRO CO 537 7265 summary of the Secretary of State's Reply to the Representations made by the four
members of the Deputation, 24 July 1951.
1" Business leaders pointed out to
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government controlled prices, keeping them at pre-war level and there was a 'failure to
come to any understanding as to a just settlement of war damage claims' 150
Another notable difference between government and business concerned the
post-war development plan for Malaya. In spite of the lack of finance, the British and
Federation governments could not delay their plans for social and economic development
in Malaya, which the government firmly believed would assist towards easing the
Emergency. 151 Business, however, found it ineffective to divert the counter-insurgent
efforts, for instance, to social welfare schemes. To them, strong military action was the
only alternative left in order to get a grip on the situation, and as the leaders of the
mining industry would have it: 'first things first' 152
Business was unhappy about the progress of the counter-insurgency. After all
there were never more than 7,000-8,000 (a peak figure in 1951) armed guerrillas. 153
 The
business leaders and delegations representing local business organisations made several
visits to the CO, and Gurney (before his assassination in October 1951) throughout 1950
and 1951 to urge tougher and more effective measures in containing the MCP. Business
requested more troops at the beginning of 1950, and also, around a year later, the
declaration of Military Law, for they judged the whole situation in Malaya to have
150 The Financial Times, 16 Aug. 1949; also see M. Rudner, 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya,
1945-48', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 1, ISS. 1, 1970. Nevertheless business had some
sympathisers within the British political establishment. There was recognition of the extent of the
burden imposed on both business and the Federation government regarding rehabilitation costs and
expenditure on defence purposes. The Members of the House of Lords who spoke during the wider
debate charged the British government with an attempt to subject Malaya to a very raw deal with regard
to these matters and urged the government to reconsider them and avoid making another major mistake
in relation to that country (alluding to difficulties surrounding the Malayan Union Scheme). Lord
Milverton, in particular, who had spent many years in Malaya (and was known among the British
businessmen throughout Malaya as a wise and far-seeing administrator) warned, in relation to Malaya
that ... if we do not face the facts of the present there will be no future to face.': PRO T 220 134
Chairman's Address, 15 Dec. 1948. In another occasion Lord Milverton said a similar thing to the
Secretary of the State, J. Griffiths, on their Meeting on 19 Dec. 1950: ... it was useless to divert man-
power to planning for the future unless drastic steps were taken at once to ensure that there would be a
future for which to plan', in CO 537 7265 memorandum of Meeting, 19 Dec. 1950.
151 FRO CO 537 5979 extract from Official Report of 15 December, 1950.
152 ibid., and CO 537 7265 memorandum of Meeting, 19 Dec. 1950.
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reached a critical stage where anything might happen. These requests, however, were
firmly rejected.154
While it is the case that this chapter is about government-business relations in Malaya
during the latter period of Attlee's Labour government, it is necessary to briefly outline
the nature of the early period of the preceding Tory government, under Churchill. This
allows an element of comparison between the two parties in government, in order to
identify the extent to which a different party in power marked a change in colonial policy
and equally, and perhaps more importantly, the extent to which continuity was evident.
Such an assessment enables the historian to shed light upon the extent to which the
Attlee government's policies in Malaya can be seen as being specifically 'Labour' and to
what extent they were a product of a general consensus amongst the political and state
elites in Britain.
On 6 October 1951 Gurney was assassinated in an ambush, and after a month the
insurgent forces were inflicting the heaviest weekly casualties that the security forces
were to experience. In following December Briggs retired. Short writes that 'It was the
worst of times.' Indeed the government policy on the Emergency seemed to have lost a
clear sense of strategy by the end of 1951. 1" By this time it also appeared that the
country was heading for 'economic chaos'. Detrimental effects were felt in the areas of
both industrial efficiency and capital assets themselves, and this was most acutely the
case in the areas of replanting, prospecting and in the inflow of capital. The major
economic interests scorned those who sought to put social welfare before the
suppression of the insurgency, and the government's leniency in dealing with captured
133 Hall, op. cit., p. 791; Short, op.cit., p. 472.
134 All from various files in PRO CO 537 5979 and 7265.
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participants in its operation. 156 The Malay rulers were also becoming impatient with the
slowness of the progress.'57
In Britain, there was a general election on 25 October in which the Conservative
party under the leadership of Churchill won an overall majority of 17. 158
 Churchill
formed his government on 27 October, and Oliver Lyttelton was appointed the Secretary
of State for the Colonies. Lyttelton certainly did not waste any time, but immediately
declared that he regarded the Malayan problem as his first priority, and informed the
Cabinet of his intention to visit Malaya.'" During the preparatory meeting with the
business delegations before his departure, various issues, such as the Briggs Plan, the
possibility of the introduction of Martial Law, the future appointment of the High
Commissioner, problems with rubber replanting and tin prospecting, and difficulties with
recruiting European staffs were discussed. m Before his departure, he was asked by
Churchill to write a memorandum on the situation in Malaya. The first on his list of
priorities in that memorandum was to reassure the planters and miners of the
government's determination and ability to support them, and to bring the anti-
Communist campaign to a successful conclusion.'"
Lyttelton left London on 26 November, and arrived at Singapore on 29
November. In addition to his meetings with various sections of the Malayan society
including British businessmen and the MCS, he made a statement both in Malaya and in
Singapore. Though the tone of each statement differed slightly, they both carried two
155 Short, op.cit., pp. 305-06.
156 PRO CO 1022 39 memorandum submitted by delegation of joint Malayan interests at a meeting at
the CO, 15 Nov. 1951, cited in Harper, op.cit., p. 155.
157 PRO CO 1022 148 no 2 savingram no 83 from M.V. del Tufo to Lyttelton, 25-28 Oct. 1951.
158 Stockwell, Malaya, Part II, the author's own note in p. 304.
159 PRO PREM 11 122 minute PM (51) 1 from Lyttelton to Churchill, 30 Oct. 1951.
169 PRO CO 1022 39 no 3 CO record of a meeting between Lyttelton and a business delegation, 15 Nov.
1951.
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significant messages: firstly, an emphasis on the operational side of the counter-
insurgency and, secondly, a gradualist approach to granting self-government in Malaya,
in other words, an assurance of British government's determination to stay on in Malaya.
The significance of political and social progress was well recognised as an essential part
of the struggle against militant Communism in Malaya, but Lyttelton stressed the
urgency on addressing the 'immediate menace' because 'the best way of maintaining the
people's confidence in Britain and of opening the path to political, social and economic
progress was by winning the Emergency' 162 With regard to the granting of self-
government to Malaya, after having considered the various of aspects of the Malayan
situation, particularly the communal problems and the progress of the counter-
insurgency, he concluded that a premature grant to self-government would bring
confusion, and 'almost certainly to civil war, and to throw the Malays into the arms of
the Indonesians', thus to adapt the old wisdom of Testina lente' . 163 His message to
Malaya was exceptionally clear in his broadcast in Singapore on 11 December: 'we will
protect it, we will stay, we will never quit until our aims ... have been achieved'!"
To the delight of business Lyttelton was approaching Malayan affairs with the
vigour that business had considered to be lacking from the Labour's Secretaries of State,
Creech Jones and Griffiths. In contrast to his predecessors and other Labour Ministers
who attached an equal significance to political and social developments as to the question
of the counter-insurgency, 165 Lyttelton seemed to understand business rhetoric of 'first
—
161 PRO CAB 129 48, C(51)26 The Situation in Malaya: Cabinet memorandum by Lyttelton, 20 Nov.
1951.
162 PRO PREM 11 639 F51 inward telegram no 1214 from Lyttelton to Churchill, 8 Dec 1951; Short,
op.Cit., p. 331.
163 PRO CAB 129 48 C(51)59 Cabinet memorandum by Lyttelton, 21 Dec 1951.
164 PRO CAB 129 48 C(51)59 text of broadcast in Singapore on 11 Dec. 1951 in Cabinet memorandum
by Lyttelton, 21 Dec 1951.
165 For instance, Strachey, the Minister of Defence, stressed, 'great firmness and vigour ... on the
rnilitary and police side ... but equal firmness and vigour in pressing on with the economic and political
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thing first', thus putting more urgency on the success of the campaign, as well as being
absolutely explicit about British intention to stay on in Malaya. He also boosted the
morale of businessmen and of the MCS by reassuring them that in the aftermath of
granting of self-government that Britain would still have an important role to play in
Malaya and that therefore their career prospects would not be diminished in the new
circumstances. 166
His understanding with the problems that business faced, however, did not mean
that the business lobbying always brought a positive result. In fact, there were issues on
which Lyttelton never agreed with business. For example, when he was 'forcibly urged'
by the expatriate business community during his visit to Malaya, firstly, 'to bring down
all severity of the law' in order to apply hard punishment for paying protection money
and, secondly, 'to dispense with the normal procedure and speed up the administration of
justice through drumhead courts', he rejected these suggestions at once He labelled these
requests as 'point-blank', because 'At the point of a gun you would pay rather than be
murdered', 'and so would I, and you know it'. He was particularly upset with the second
proposal, so 'poured scorn' upon it: ' ... if we suspend the law because we are too
incompetent to secure order, that is the end of us, of our mission and our ideals. Never
... will I agree to suspend the processes of law. Speed them up I will, if I can, but their
principles must remain intact.' 167 This is a good example of the difference between
officialdom and business. Politicians and officials held principles with regard to good
governance. These principles, of natural justice and upholding the rule of law, had been
pursued over the period of time and thus were deeply ingrained in the political culture
and psychology of the political and civil service elite who enjoyed ideological hegemony
development of the country', in his minute to Attlee: PRO PREM 8 1406/2 minute from Strachey to
Attlee, 11 Dec. 1950.
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over the whole of the British polity, and thus they could not be dismissed merely for
convenience. Business however, could be as flexible as it was necessary.
The Conservatives, even as an Opposition, proposed tougher measures for
restoring the situation in Malaya through force of arms. Although this approach 'limited'
them to concentrating on the immediate problem, as opposed to viewing things on the
basis of a wider perspective regarding the Malayan issue, this way of doing things
satisfied business better than did the approach adopted by the Labour governments.'"
Therefore it was correct to say, as it was pointed out in section 2.3, that business had
more friends under the Conservatives than they had under Labour, at least at the
beginning.
Immediately after Gurney's assassination, business had been pressing the government to
appoint a new High Commissioner, 'someone of the very highest prestige, possessing
very much greater powers' than Gurney or General Briggs. 169 Lyttelton went further than
business, suggesting that one man should be in command and take responsibility for
military operations and civil administration, in order to eliminate the possible conflict
between the authorities and also to draw a quick decision process instead of wasting time
through 'long drawn-out discussions [only] to reach an accommodation and compromise
between two points of view' . 1" The decision to appoint General Templer to carry out
such a task was taken as a wise decision by both governments.
Business pressured the government in another area, this time about the Police and
its disorganisation. Short was convinced that it was the 'increasingly powerful and
166 PRO CAB 129 48 C(51)59 Cabinet memorandum by Lyttelton, 21 Dec 1951.
161 Short, op.cit., pp. 332-33.
168 ibid., p. 326.
169 PRO CO 1022 39 no 3 CO record of a meeting between Lyttelton and business delegation, 15 Nov.
1951.
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vehement' representations by Malayan estate interests that effectively convinced
Lyttelton that the Commissioner of Police, 'Gray must go'. 171 As Short does not specify
the exact dates of these delegations, it is difficult to come to full clarity about the
sequence of these events. In fact, Lyttelton already recognised that the Police force was
'in utter disorder', and that Gray did not have 'the necessary grasp of organisation'.
Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery of Alamein, who was then the Deputy Supreme Allied
Command, Europe, was also urging Lyttelton to replace Gray (among others in
significant position in the government), who according to him was 'in a hopeless state'
and also 'unfit' for his jobs. 172 Whilst it is difficult to assess which was the strongest
influence on the subsequent decision to appoint the new Commissioner, this was one of
the rare events about which the political, military and economic interests agreed.
In many respects, the Conservatives were willing to get a grip on the Malayan
situation. The new Conservative government undertook some detailed studies, and open-
ended meetings between government and business were often arranged. The
Conservatives' determination to make progress on the counter-insurgency was greatly
assisted by increased revenue thanks to the Korean War boom, and the impact made by
Templer.
The price of rubber had begun to increase steadily, even before the outbreak of
the Korean War, and dramatically rose during the War. Meanwhile, the duty collected
from the exports of rubber rose from $28.1 million in 1949 to $214.1 million in 1951.
The return from rubber exports together with duty from tin exports and increased income
17° PRO CAB 129 48 C(51)59 Cabinet memorandum by Lyttelton, 21 Dec. 1951.
171 Short, op.cit., p. 306.
172 PRO CAB 129 48 C(51)59 Cabinet memorandum by Lyttelton, 21 Dec 1951; PRO PREM 11 121
letter from Field Marshall Lord Montgomery to Lyttelton, 27 Dec. 1951. Montgomery's assessment on
the Malayan situation, which was sent to Field-Marshal Slim, Lyttelton and Churchill, has another
extreme statement on Gray and his job: 'No one in his senses could imagine him as a good
Commissioner of Police.': from 260, 4 Jan. 1952.
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tax contributed to the dramatic increase of the total revenue of 1950 from the estimated
$273.7 million, to $443.4 million, and in 1951 to $735.4 million. This budget surplus
generated by the high commodity prices during the Korean War boom of 1950-52
assisted the Federation government 'to carry through rapidly the resettlement
programme, the seven-fold expansion of the Police, the raising of 240,000 Home Guards
and of four more battalions of the Malay Regiment'. 173
 The rubber and tin companies,
which had suffered from the slump in prices in mid-1949 together with the adverse
effects of the Emergency, were also saved from further financial difficulties or even a
possible bankruptcy, and could fortify themselves better.174
Templer arrived in Malaya in early February 1952 with directives that specified
his primary task as being to defeat 'communist terrorism', and the ultimate policy of the
British government in Malaya as establishing 'a fully self-governing nation'. He brought
new able people with him, such as Donald MacGillivray and General Sir Robert Lockhart
as his deputies, and a new Commissioner of Police, A.E. Young. Under the new set-up
the changes were implemented: the well being of the MCS, who suffered from poor
working and living conditions, was thoroughly considered. The questions of forming a
sound police force, building intelligence work, and obtaining full anticipation from the
people by informing them 'the truth about what was happening' were also listed as the
key priorities. More importantly his presence was felt everywhere, as 'he was not only
there, but was most certainly seen to be there'. 175 According to an article of The Strait
173 PRO CO 1030 17 The Protection of Estates and Mines: Policy resulting from the High
Commissioner's Meeting with Planters and Miners, 8 May 1953.
174 Stubbs, op.cit., pp. 108-14; Short, op.cit., pp. 346-349.
175 ibid., pp. 336-44; Stubbs, op.cit., pp. 140-48.
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Times, Templer 'invigorated the administration from the day he arrived) . "6 Indeed he
energised the Malayan situation.'
The early optimism among business about the Conservative government must
have begun to fade soon after high taxation and the inadequate security again became
contentious issues between them. In addition, in contrast to the early attitude towards
addressing the Emergency before anything else, the Conservatives now did not want to
lose the balance between 'Emergency demands on expenditure and the needs for long-
term development'. The local elections were held in Malaya from February 1952
onwards. As the prospect of self-government in the country was becoming more real,
social and economic development was becoming more significant for the Malayans to
prepare themselves for the future. The hope of a swift victory was also already given up
by then, and ultimate success in defeating the insurgents seemed to depend 'as much
upon social and economic development as upon police and military operations'. This was
especially the case in the light of a situation in which life had come to be normalised and
where morale was good, yet still unreliable. The question of maintaining high morale in
such circumstances came to be seen as the factor upon which the whole future of British
interests in Malaya were dependent upon.178
The demand for Malayan rubber and tin ended as soon as the Korean War
entered into a stalemate in 1952 and eventually ended in July 1953. On the part of
business, the loss of the Chinese market due to the strategic embargo on rubber exports
to the country after it was confirmed to be directly involved in the War, followed by the
marked fall in the prices of rubber and tin, badly affected the Malayan extractive
..nn•••••
176 Strait Times, 1 Jan. 1954, cited in Stubbs, op.cit., p. 145.
171 Short, op.cit., p. 343.
17$ PRO T 220 284 F23 letter from Lyttelton to Butler, 30 July 1953.
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industries as well as rubber processing industry in Singapore.'" Independently of the
ongoing discussions between the British CO and Treasury on financial assistance for
Malaya, the Federation government itself had to economise their spending in the
prospect of balance deficits for the coming fiscal year, and the only way to achieve all
these was to reduce Emergency expenditure by a considerable sum. Accordingly,
General Templer warned the planters and miners that a reduction of 10,000 Special
Constabulary, which would be made by the end of 1953, and that if the drop in national
revenue continued, a further reduction in Special Constabulary funding might well be
possible by the end of 1954. 1" This reduction of Special Constabulary meant more
burdens on the estates and mines if they wanted to keep the same degree of security that
they used to as a result of government assistance, which, of course, was greatly assisted
by business contribution in taxation: 'The CO estimated that in 1954 locally-domiciled
rubber companies were paying 53 per cent of their profits in taxation, while UK-
domiciled firms paid 64.5 per cent.'181
An official source of the Foreign Office records that in 1951 SEA accounted for a
greater proportion of the total world return of investment than in the three preceding
years thanks to the greatly increased return from Malaya. According to the comparative
data for 1938 and 1951, 'in the pre-war period, the Commonwealth countries of South
Asia provided two-thirds of the return from the region, but in 1951 their contribution had
shrunk to a little over one-third; whereas Malaya's share had risen from about one-eight
179 Overseas Economic Survey, Malaya, March 1951. HMSO, London, 1952, pp. 3-6, cited in Short,
op.Cir., p. 349.
Bo PRO CO 1030 17 The Protection of Estates and Mines: Policy resulting from the High
Commissioner's Meeting with Planters and Miners, 8 May 1953.
181 FRO CO 1022 71 Minute by Harding, 4 Jan. 1954, cited in White, op.cit., p. 119.
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to over ha If . 182 The same source also noted that in spite of all hazards, British
investments in 1954 were moving from South Asia to SEA, especially to Malaya.m
An acceptance of these statements, literally without any examination on other
relevant factors, misguides us. One has to question whether there had been a real
enthusiasm among investors to rush into Malaya. The only possible explanation for the
great return of 1951 seems to me to have been the Korean War boom and the resultant
massive company profits that were remitted to Britain in the form of lucrative dividends.
By the second half of 1952, the boom had already showed signs of downturn and the
Federation government predicted a budget deficit for the fiscal years of 1953-1954. After
a year in July 1953 Lyttelton began to press the Treasury for a pledge of financial
assistance for the Malayan government, which, despite the high taxation and local loans,
faced the extreme deficit of about £.10 tnillion. 184 In the meantime the political process
towards independence was running smoothly. The electoral success of UMNO-MCA
(Malayan Chinese Association) Alliance after the formation of their partnership in
January 1952 went from strength to strength, sweeping the municipal and town council
seats, and then came their victory in state elections. The initial climax was when the
UMNO-MCA-MIC (Malayan Indian Congress) won the federal election in July 1955
with an overwhelming majority in 51 of the 52 seats contested. Another significance of
the elections was that the electoral campaigns throughout the period provided a platform
'PRO FO 371 111917 D1152/3 UK Economic Interests in the Far East, South-East and South Asia, 20
July 1954, p. 3.
I" PRO FO 371 111917 UK Economic Interests in the Far East, South-East and South Asia, 20 July
1954, cited in Stockwell, 'British Imperial Strategy and Decolonization in South-East Asia, 1947-57', in
D. Bassett, and V.T. King (eds.), Britain and South East Asia, Hull, Centre for South East Asian
Studies, Occasional Paper 13, 1986, pp. 81-2, in White, op.cit., p. 122.
1 " PRO T 220 284 F23 letter from Lyttelton to Butler, 30 July 1953. The deficit was covered by outside
loans from the British government, Brunei and Singapore: Overseas Economic Survey, Malaya, March
1951. HMSO, London, 1952, pp. 3-6, cited in Short, op.cit., p. 349.
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for the voice of non-communist Malayan nationalist (in other words, anti-British)
sentiment."'
The British and Malayan governments were convinced by Tunku's leadership as
well as about the inevitability of acceleration in the independence process.' 86 However,
this orderly development did not necessarily provide the business communities in Malaya
with a feeling of stability and certainty.' 87 The Emergency was 'still far from won' and
the guerrillas could still inflict heavy damages to the plantation economy. 188
With regard to the move of investment towards SEA around 1954, if the report
correctly reflecting the reality, then it must be said that the investors might have seen a
future in an independent Malaya despite their fear of the dictatorship of nationalism,
natural to any newly-born independent country. Again if the Treasury was right in
assuming that 'private investment was powerfully influenced by such unpredictable
factors as world market trends, the state of security, political feeling and so forth', but
above all confidence, Malaya during this period must have had some qualities in its own
right that convinced the business interests to invest into the country.
empirical evidence suggests the opposite. Although the process towards self-government
was smooth yet rapid and Tunku promised a peaceful transition and continued
cooperation between Malaya and Britain, there was still uneasiness among the business
community about the political future of the country.
185 Stubbs, op.cit., pp. 208-19.
186 Hall points out other factors that contributed to the decision to grant independence for Malaya, such
as 'the Alliance's willingness for Malaya to remain in the British Commonwealth and to conclude a
defence agreement permitting Britain to maintain military bases, including a Commonwealth strategic
reserve, in the country': Hall, op.cit., pp. 886-887.
187 Harper, op.cit., p. 203.
188 PRO T 220 284 F23 letter from Lyttelton to Butler, 30 July 1953.
189 PRO T 236 3301 memorandum on the Federation of Malaya for Commonwealth Conference,
London, Sept. 1950.
189 However, some
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As we will see in Chapter 7, the British agency houses in Malaya had already
begun to diversify the location of their businesses at the end of 1940s and beginning of
1950s. In March 1951 an economic survey organised by the HMSO reports this feeling
of uneasiness among the business community and a 'consequent decline in the incentive
to engage in fresh industrial and commercial enterprise'. 190 March 1951 was the time
when Malaya was about to feel the full impact of the dramatic commodity price rises and
the new prosperity that affected the whole society. Still Harper points out a register of
unease among the Asian, particularly ethnically Indian, business community in Malaya.
Such anxieties over the progress of the Emergency and the political future of Malaya,
where many of them were not eligible for citizenship, were evident in the increasing
transfer of wealth out of Malaya, owned by these sectors, which was now taking place
on a large scale, as well as the rapidly increasing remittances among Indian labourers.
The almost ten-fold increase with their remittances to India between 1949 and 1951
probably owed much to the War boom, together with, as Harper rightly explains, the fact
that the Indians saw business opportunities in the process of industrialisation in India and
there was a relaxation of tax on remittances to boot. It should also be taken account that
at this time, British firms did not enjoy an especially favourable position over the local
enterprises. 191 The Emergency entered into a relatively calm stage as the MCP focused
more on building up political ground in accordance with the October 1951 directives,
which put an equal emphasis on military and political activities, and thus there were
comparatively fewer guerrilla incidents. In spite of this development Asian business,
especially small Asian estates, which had been exposed to the full force of the MCP's
'Liberation War' and often forced to provide the bulk of payments to the MCP,
190 Overseas Economic Survey, Malaya, March 1951. HMSO, London, 1952, pp. 3-6, cited in Short,
op.cit., p. 349.
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unsurprisingly had little faith in the prospect of smooth progress. In addition, after having
lost money in Ceylon, Burma and Indochina, the Indian businesses were being cautious in
Malaya as the political future of the country was yet uncertain,'
Indeed the orderly process of independence through local and federal elections
hardly provided assurance of their future to the business community in Malaya. European
investment was however, far from being in decline. On the contrary 'the consumer
revolution of the 1950s saw the establishment of more European concerns — Unilever,
IC — producing soaps, beer, tobacco and biscuits locally. The construction boom
created an upsurge in production of cement, bricks and plywood.' These investments
in manufacturing consumer goods might face a fierce local competition especially after
independence. Even so, these manufacturing firms had the advantage being in a position
to export their goods to the neighbouring countries, whilst the British firms in the
Malayan extractive industries did not. Their products were by and large dependent on the
US market, in which there was a bigger risk that the dollar earning capacity of the
industry might tempt the newly independent country to strategically and gradually
expropriate foreign business interests from the country. The result was 'estate
subdivision' which was becoming normal practice, especially among British estate
companies, between 1955 and 1960. Disposal of their holdings in this particular manner
was caused by 'the deepening doubts over their ability to compete in future in world
rubber markets, compounded by anxieties over Malayan nationalism on the coming of
independence'. Putting the suggested adverse effects of the subdivision aside, this
particular episode assures us that real fear within the expatriate business community,
191 B.R. Tomlinson, 'British Business in India, 1860-1970', in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, and G. Jones
(eds.), British Business in Asia Since 1860 (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 92-116.
192 Harper, op.cit., p. 203.
193 Rajah Rasiah, 'Foreign Investment and manufacturing growth in pre-independent Malaysia'
(unpublished paper, 1992), in Harper, op.cit., p. 202.
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especially among those in the British companies, was evident. As independence was
approaching 'British investors became "somewhat anxious" of their holdings in
Malaya'.194
By June 1953 the guerrilla units were finding increasingly difficult to secure food
and support among the 'masses', which altogether made them difficult to return to the
offensive on a broad scale. In spite of such difficulties for the insurgents MacGillivray
and Templer continued to warn that 'the end of communist terrorism in Malaya is by no
means in sight'. 195 Insomuch the 'strictest possible control of food supplies and
restrictions on movement of food, vehicles and individuals in certain areas and at certain
times' was effective, these, especially the food denial operations, created bitterness and
hostility among the suffering masses. Thus, the concept of the White Area was created
where, in the opinion of the local authorities, such harsh measures were no longer
needed, and thus it was possible to give the people some breathing space, and to
encourage their cooperation and at the same time to lighten the burden of government by
reducing a number of guards used to supervise the practice of the restrictions. The first
execution of the policy came in September 1953 in a part of the central district of
Malacca. During the next two and a half years almost half of the entire population were
affected. The White Areas were declared, and expanding, yet, the guerrillas continued to
be able to inflict much damage to the plantation economy. The apparent upward turn in
investments directed towards SEA should not be taken literally. Before a full assessment
can be drawn, a number of other factors need to be taken into account. Though it should
be studied separately, the move might have been the result of the accelerated process of
194 Rudner, 'Development and Anti-Development
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Chapter. 6 Interactions Between State and Firm During the Attlee
Government: A Comparative Studies on the Cases of British Business
Interests in Indonesia and Siam
In this chapter parallels are drawn between Indonesian and Siamese cases in order to
highlight the similar reactions of the British authorities and British enterprises to almost
entirely different circumstances during the post-war period. The major issues and
obstacles to British businesses in Indonesia were the physical insecurity of workers and
staff, the political uncertainty, and also the Dutch and Indonesian governments' policies,
which were detrimental to the interests of foreign business. In Siam the British feared US
competition and a recurrence of anti-foreign sentiment in the country.' The differing
background and characteristics of the sequence of events in these two countries make a
straightforward comparison difficult, and therefore the conclusions drawn will not be
more than tentative.
6.1 The Historical Relations of Indonesia and Siam with Foreign Business Interests
Indonesia and Siam do not have the same historical experiences of interaction with the
Western powers. Indonesia was a Dutch colony for more than three centuries, except for
the brief interlude of British rule between 1811-1816 under Sir Stamford Raffles, who
later established the free port of Singapore in 1819. 2 During the early period of the
1 Such sentiment might be described as being 'more nationalist' than 'anti-foreign', for the Siamese
government of the 1930s, despite its pursuit of an economic nationalist agenda, accepted the presence of
foreign influences upon Siamese matters, though understandably it was primarily because of the
Siamese's fear of losing their sovereign power if they pushed the foreign powers too far.
2 Under the Dutch colonisation the existing structure of the indigenous society, in which the peasantry
had previously been able to force the aristocracy to respect their rights, became far more hierarchic and
authoritarian to suit the Dutch administration. While the indigenous merchant class was nearly
eliminated, the Chinese, with the support of the Dutch and to a large extent of native aristocrats, became
indispensable to the Indonesian economy through their intermediary position as retailers of imports, and
collectors of local produce. Area leases provided the Chinese with political and economic authority over
the leased villages or districts and they were also given various monopolies over such matters as the
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discovery of the Indonesian Archipelago, expeditions from England had normally met
with stubborn and brutal opposition from the Dutch. They had previously expelled the
Portuguese and thus had no intention of sharing the rich resources of the Archipelago
with the latecomers. 3 However, the introduction of rubber and other tropical products,
and the discovery of oil in North and South Sumatra and in Eastern Borneo at the end of
the nineteenth century further attracted various foreign interests, including the British,
French, Belgian, German, Swedish, and Americans. 4 The Dutch, who did not have
enough capital to develop the abundant natural resources in the Archipelago, finally
permitted foreign capital, while simultaneously ensuring that they did not discriminate
against its own interests.' In the field of agricultural development, while Dutch capital
was still dominant in Java, British and other foreign investments outweighed Dutch
interests in the opening up of the Outer Islands, which became the main focus for new
economic development in the NET. The production of coffee, copra, pepper, sugar,
tobacco, tin, oil and rubber in these Outer Islands rapidly increased in the hands of
foreign enterprises, and the Islands surpassed Java by 1930 as fields of investment and as
source of exports.6
Among the non-Dutch sources of foreign capital imports, British investment was
distinctive in terms of its scale and the variety of business interests. For instance, it was
the British who took a lead in the expansion of the tea industry in the Archipelago.7
British participation in the Indonesian rubber industry was the most important
terms for the collection of road tolls, bazaar fees, customs duty etc.: G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and
Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, 1952), pp. 1-36.
3 Woodcock, op.cit., pp. xx-xxi.
4 The production of copra, palm oil, sugar, coffee etc., made Indonesia to become the archetypal tropical
agricultural exporter: Reid, Indonesia: Revolution without Socialism', p. 121; D.W. Fryer and J.C.
Jackson, Indonesia (London, 1977), p. 153.
5 Pluvier, op.cit., p. 43.
6 M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present (London, 1981), pp. 144-45.
7 Allen and Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya, p. 31-2.
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investment: of the issued capital of all rubber companies operating in the NEI around
1910, 69 per cent of the total was British, Dutch 17 per cent, Belgian and French
together 13 per cent. Another example of British investment active in Indonesia was oil,
the second largest foreign exchange earner after rubber. The Shell Transport and Trading
Company (British) and 'de Koninklijke' merged to create Royal Dutch Shell in 1907, and
by 1930 the company was producing around 85 per cent of the total oil production of the
NEI. 8
Estimates of the amount of British capital directly invested into the Archipelago
vary, though it was probably between £50 million and £60 million. 9 Due to Dutch
economic liberalism British capital was admitted on the same terms and conditions as
that from The Netherlands. Although The Netherlands no doubt had some preference in
the supply of goods purchased by the NET government, import duties were still not
unduly high and there were no official preferential duties. British interests in the
Indonesian Archipelago varied from agriculture, manufacturing industries (mainly
mineral oil, cigarettes, molasses), retail, trade, shipping, to banking and insurance.°
Siam, contrary to the Indonesian experience, was never colonised by a Western
power. She was the only Southeast Asian country that had managed to maintain her
independence, but such 'independence' was nominal, rather than real." The maintenance
8 J.A.M. Caldwell, 'Indonesian Export and Production from the Decline of the Culture System to the
First World War', in C.D. Cowan (ed.), The Economic Development of South-East Asia: Studies in
Economic History and Political Economy (London, 1964), pp. 88-89. American companies, Caltex and
Stanvac, obtained major concessions in the 1920s.
9 The Economic Survey of the NEI by Economic and Industrial Planning Staff in the Treasury estimated
the total direct British investment in the NEI at £56 million excluding the indirect form of investment
represented by British holdings of NEI government loans: see PRO T 236 1290, 1291, and 1292 and FO
371 76162.
19 PRO T 236 1291 memorandum on British Trade in the Netherlands East Indies by the British
Chamber of Commerce for the NET, March 1947, pp. 1-2.
"Aldrich is outspoken in denying the existence of Siam's status of independence, preferring to attribute
to Siam an 'informal colonial status' in relation to Britain, though later he toned down his
characterisation of Siam, describing it as being subject to 'informal British dominance'. Indeed, it is the
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of such formal sovereignty came with high costs: firstly, in the form of the hand-over of
large, yet peripheral, territories to the British, and the French 12; secondly, in the form of
foreign intervention, through a series of unequal treaties forced upon the Siamese, which
resulted in 'ceding to the Western powers a variety of similar economic, legal, and
diplomatic privileges'. 13 Prior to the war, the British enjoyed a dominant position in Siam
among the Western powers through the strong presence of British Advisers to the
Siamese government, and of substantial business interests. There were also close
financial and economic ties between the two countries, firmly based in the Siamese
reliance on British loans and in the fact that the Siamese trade was bound with the British
Empire, especially with Malaya. The British Advisers were able to ensure that Siamese
political policies reflected the broad interests of the informal metropolis. The role of the
British Financial Adviser often went beyond the original remit of assisting the Siamese
government with technical aspects of the Siamese economy, and focussed on maintaining
British economic and financial interests, thereby exercising a degree of political influence
in Siam. 14 British diplomats, though rarely having good relations with British financial
case that the British Legation was seen by many at that time as having the attributes of a 'High
Commission': Aldrich, op.cit., pp. 1-6. In fact, the expression of 'High Commission' was not Aldrich of
own, but seems to be that of the Americans: (see Aldrich, footnote 4, in p. 3). Nevertheless his explicit
explanation on the informal British dominance in Siam in comparison with the growing tendency in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century of indirect rule in India, Burma and Malaya, through the
presence of advisers and residents, suggests that his own view is not far different to regard British
Legation as a 'High Commission'. Also see P. ICratoska and B. Batson, 'Nationalism and Modernist
Reform', in N. Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. three: From c. 1800 to the
1930s (Cambridge, 1999), p. 288..
12 In 1909 Siam transferred its right of sovereignty over the states of Kedah, Perils, Kelantan and
Trengganu to Britain, which later formed the Unfederated Malay States. Although these territories had
been under the suzerainty of Siamese crown, they were in real term the Malay states in terms of religion,
race, and language. The lost territories in French Indochina were, however, populated with ethnic
'Thai', thus became subject to the increasing Siamese irredentism in the late 1930s and beginning
1940s: Aldrich, op.cit., pp. 177-78. Also see Stowe, op.cit., Ch. 8 'The Triumph of Irredentism', pp.
143 -178.
13 B.A. Batson 'Siam and Japan: the Perils of Independence', in A. McCoy (ed.), Southeast Asia under
Japanese Occupation (New Heaven, 1980), pp. 267, 270.
14 Aldrich,n op.cit., pp. 70-71. Also see ibid., p. 9, for William Doll's account of the objectives of his
aims as the Financial Adviser (1936-42, 1946-51).
253
officials in Bangkok, 15 also worked on keeping British interests in the country. Josiah
Crosby, for example, the British Minister since 1934 was known for his sympathy for
Siamese nationalism, 16 but he also considered his task as being 'to uphold and expand
Britain's predominant influence in Siam'. 17 Nonetheless, this independent status
permitted the Siamese to initiate internal political developments. The June 1932 coup
that overthrew the absolute monarchy of Siam did not involve any foreign intervention or
influence, though foreign representatives were subsequently informed of the events and
assured of their safety. 18 Siamese independent decision-making is also shown in the
presence of economic nationalism in the 1930s, through which the Siamese attempted to
'impose greater Siamese control over the economy as a whole'. 19 Indeed, the Siamese
were not completely uninfluential and the formal independent status, in addition to their
diplomatic, albeit opportunistic, ability, helped them through the period. According to
Stowe, Siam remained 'an oasis of peace' during the inter-war period, especially before
the 1932 coup and the subsequent tendency toward economic nationalism in the nation's
political thought occurred. She used this phrase to describe the Siamese ability to remain
'stable and serene' in the face of increasing tension elsewhere in Asia, due to the rising
conflicts between Asian nationalism and European colonialism. Stowe's expression also
implies an existence of stability in the country on which any expatriate firms relied
heavily to maintain their business interests.29
The attempts by the British to open up trade with Siam throughout the early
nineteenth century finally bore fruits in 1855 when Sir John Bowring succeeded in
15 See ibid., pp 157 if for the divergence and interdependence between the British diplomats and the
Financial Advisers.
16 ibid., pp. 154-56, 172, 369.
17 J.A. Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand: A Story ofintrigue (London, 1991), p. 94.
18 ibid., p. 21.
19 ibid., p. 36.
20 ibid., p. 7
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obtaining a commercial treaty with the Siamese. This treaty was immediately followed by
similar treaties with other European countries as well as the USA, and by an influx of
foreign merchant houses, mostly British. The proceeding few decades saw almost no
changes to the business environment. It was only between 1880 and the outbreak of the
First World War that the numbers of trading firms expanded, as the Siamese economy
itself developed and rice exports grew rapidly. This was also the time that the British
companies became directly involved in teak extraction to replace the already exhausted
Burmese teak forests. Siam did not possess natural resources that the Western countries
desired other than timber and relatively rich tin ore. The economic backwardness of the
country with under-developed crucial economic infrastructure, such as roads, railways,
and circulation of currency, limited business opportunities for foreign enterprises. 'Siam
in 1914, and even in 1940, was a poor, sparsely populated, and overwhelmingly agrarian
country.' There was neither a rich internal market for western goods nor sufficient
revenue for the government to boost development projects in which the Western firms
could take part. In addition, the political sovereign state of Siam was a 'hindrance' to
foreign firms, for the former increasingly wanted to retain their control of economic
matters. The Siamese governments' dilemma was that they needed foreign enterprise to
modernise the economy which was otherwise almost completely dependant on rice-
growing, but the extension of foreign businesses brought further foreign political
intervention to protect their subjects and business interests.21
During the inter-war period Britain and the British Commonwealth countries
were the most significant as the principal suppliers of imports to Siam, and the biggest
markets of its exports of rice, tin, and rubber. The British also had substantial interests in
21 M. Falkus, 'Early British Business in Thailand', in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines, and G. Jones (eds.),
British Business in Asia Since 1860 (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 117-56. The quotation is from p. 125.
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Siam in banking, shipping and trading and extraction of tin and teak, and had the biggest
number of residences and of people employed by the Siamese government as foreign
experts and technicians. 22 The position of Financial Adviser, the most important among
foreign advisers, instituted in the 1890s, continued to be held by British nationality until
1951 when the system was abolished. 23 The pre-eminence of the British position in Siam
made the Siamese government cautious in permitting further extension of British
interests in the country, and attempted to keep balance between the foreign influences.
British investments were 'extremely limited' in, for example, railway construction,
together with urban infrastructure and plantations, because of the country's
backwardness and poor internal communications. On the other hand, the Siamese
government was determined to control its own railways by providing capital for the
development as far as possible from its own source as a means not 'to allow any one
country to become too powerful' 24 This was due to the position that once Siam was
dependent on foreign capitals for construction, it was certain that the major capital
investment would come from the British.
The desire to control its own economic affairs was hardened by the Siamese
experience of the Great Depression, during which time its tight bond with the British
imperial system of finance and trade was questioned. Siam's biggest export industry, the
rice trade, was hit by the reduction of imports by the commodity producing Malaya and
22 PRO FO 371 46545 F4298/G report by the Far Eastern Committee on Policy towards Siam, 14 July
1945, p. 16; FO 371 46544 F3491/296/G40 revised draft report on terms for Siam, 31 May 1945, P. 22;
Fallcus, op.ciL, pp. 121, 155-56; Aldrich, op.cit., p. 7. British capital investment in Siam was around a
third of those in the NEI in the late 1930s, which was around £20 million (Fallcus, op.cit., p. 117, and
Aldrich, op.cit., p. 7). A survey of British capital interests in Siam, drawn up by the Far Eastern
Committee one day before the Japanese surrender, suggests that if the banks, the Borneo Company, the
Anglo-Thai Corporation, and Burma Corporation were gathered together, they would cover about 95 per
cent of British economic and commercial interests in Siam: PRO BT 11 2515 letter to D. Carter,
Trading with the Enemy Department, 21 Aug. 1945.
23 Falk-us, op.cit., p. 121, and also see, Aldrich, op.cit., pp. 161-63 for the British efforts to preserve the
system of advisers and the position of the Financial Adviser for the British nationality.
24 Falkus, op.cit., pp. 124-25.
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Indonesia. Britain's departure from the gold standard in September 1931, without any
prior discussion with the Siamese, after having persuaded Siam to enter the system two
years earlier on, left her alone to deal with the sharp fall in exports and of the value of its
currency reserves (about £5 million) held in London. This incident not only damaged
Britain's prestige in Siam, but also made the Siamese 'to strengthen the nationalist
demand for the removal of foreign control over the country's economic life'.25
Subsequently, a series of measures were taken to promote Siamese participation in
business and industry through state enterprises. New taxes on income and business
premises were imposed, and tariffs were readjusted. As a result, the economic climate for
foreign firms became increasingly difficult. 26 Additionally Britain faced fierce competition
from Japan, the USA and Germany. Whereas the British might appear to dismiss the
scale of the economic interests of the USA in Siam, there was in fact rising tension
among the British prior to 1937 with the prospect of American becoming 'the most
confident challenger to Britain's economic position' in Siam. The threat in fact came not
by any direct challenge from them in Siam, but by the global ascendancy of US economy
in terms of manufacturing and by the growing power of the dollar. 27 The appeal of the
'relatively liberal attitude' of USA in the Philippines to the Siamese also appeared to be a
threat to the dominant position of Britain in Siam. 28 In fact it was Japan who replaced
Britain from 1937 onwards as the biggest source of Siam's imports, occupying 28.3
percent between 1936 and 1937 compared with Britain's 11.6 per cent, 29 and its growing
strategic interest in Siam from the late 1930s was evident by their encroachment to the
25 Aldrich, op.cit., pp. 6-7, 61-74. The quotation is from Hall, op.cit., p. 808.
26 Stowe, op.cit., pp. 49, 102, 118-19.
27 Aldrich, op.cit., pp. 16-19.
28 ibid., p. 77.
29 ibid., pp. 182-83; Falkus, op.cit., p. 155. The Japanese share of Siam's imports was mere 3 per cent in
1928: Stowe, op.cit., p. 92.
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country through the 'mediation' during the Siamese irredentism movemene° Japan's
increasing strategic interest in Siam however, resulted in strengthening the position of the
USA in strategic thinking of Siam and the European colonial powers as 'the key
determinant' for them in SEA.31
Prior to the war the Americans did not possess any matching scale of commercial
interests nor did they enjoy any direct political influence over Siam. They also failed to
take advantage of Britain's declining prestige in the country during and after the Great
Depression by contemptuously refusing Siam's request for a loan, participating in 'highly
acrimonious' disputes over oil issues, and continuing the hard-line policy of Washington
as opposed to the soft approach of the local American authority in Siam. British
dominance in Siam remained intact at least by the mid-1930s despite the continued
decline of British power elsewhere in Asia in front of the successful territorial expansion
of Japan over East Asia. Her position, however, floundered towards the end of 1930s
due to war pressures in Europe, and the consequent decline of the benefits to Siam of
association with sterling. The war in Europe also boosted the relative significance of the
US role within the strategic considerations among Britain, Japan and Siam: while Britain
was increasingly preoccupied by the tension in Europe, the USA was now considered to
be 'the absentee-arbiter of the European empires in Asia'. Siamese expectation of the
USA as a counterweight to Japan in Asia did not materialise however, because of the
Americans' reluctance to perform such a role. 32 In these circumstances when the Siamese
Premier, Pibul Songkram, was given an ultimatum to either allow the Japanese troops to
3° Stowe, op.cit., Ch. 8 'The Triumph of Irredentism', pp. 143-178. Also see Baston, op. cit., pp. 269-73
for the Japanese increasing strategic interest in Siam prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War.
31 Aldrich, op.cit., p. 16.
32 R.J. Aldrich, The Key to the South: Britain, the United States, and Thailand during the Approach of
the Pacific War, 1929-1942 (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford, Singapore, New York, 1993). The quotation is
from ibid., p. 195.
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transit the Siamese territory and to provide supplies for them, or face the consequences,
he was not in a position to refuse the requests.n
6.2 The Japanese Occupation in Siam and Indonesia
The wartime experience of the NET differed to a large extent from that of Siam. While
Siam was comparatively unscathed by the war, Indonesia experienced a similar, if not
bigger, scale of mobilisation, militarisation and politicisation of the population as
occurred in Malaya. Siam retained her political sovereignty, but the economy was tightly
tied to that of Japan's due to the regional economic interdependence. As a result of this
dependence its economy suffered from the collapse of the export economy, shortages
and inflation. 34 Despite these problems basic foodstuffs in general were still abundant
throughout wartime, and basic utilities and household goods were provided." The
residing Japanese troops in Siam, which never numbered less than 50,000," were kept
physically isolated by the Siamese governments' deliberate efforts, thus their direct
influence on the everyday lives of the population at large was somewhat negligible.
According to Aldrich, the Siamese war experience was 'uniquely untraumatic'. 37 By
33 Stowe, op.cit., pp. 209-225.
34 As a result of the collapse of the export economy, there was a catastrophic slump in government
revenue, which was mainly derived from tariffs on foreign trade. By August 1942 Pibul had already
declared that 'the country was on the verge of bankruptcy'. The large credit and cash loans, which had
been forced on Siam by Japan on several occasions, and the establishment of an artificial exchange rate
between baht and Japanese yen, in order to ensure that the Japanese were able to purchase a large
volume of commodities from Siam, substantiated the devaluation of the Siamese baht, and thus
exacerbated inflationary pressures. The figures prepared by the Siamese government in 1944 to argue
against Japanese demands for further loans show that the cost of living index for Bangkok had risen to
almost three times that recorded in 1940. Yet, Siam was comparatively much better off than, for
example, Burma and Malaya, where the Japanese circulated money more than sixteen and eighteen
times respectively than the level that was usual: Batson, op.cit., pp. 267-302. The quotation is from
Stowe, op.cit., pp. 233. The calculation is based in Donnison, op.cit., pp. 222-23. Also see ibid., pp.
311-12 for examples of price increases during and immediately after the end of the war in Burma and
Malaya
35 Batson, op.cit., pp. 276-78; Stowe, op.cit., p. 239
36 Stowe, op.cit., p. 239
37 Aldrich, op.cit., p. 30.
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contrast, the Japanese occupation period in Indonesia' s was described as having turned
the economic and social conditions of the country completely, 'upside-down, dissolved,
and destroyed'. 39
 The Japanese divided Indonesia into three parts: Java and Sumatra
came under the control of the Japanese Army and the rest of the islands under the Navy.
Each area had own autonomy and contacts between them were strictly controlled, while
overall ultimate responsibility was given to the Japanese Southern Area Command in
Saigon.° In the economy, Indonesia experienced similar degree of exploitation and
destruction to its economic structure as in Malaya. The pre-war ownership of all
plantation land and contractual arrangements between the hereditary rulers, the
plantation companies and the former Indies government were disavowed. Attempts to
keep the plantations in production were eventually relinquished by late 1943 due to
rapidly growing food shortages. The rubber, oil palm, tea and tobacco estates were
accordingly cleared, then divided into small-holder cultivation for food production to
grow rice, corn, maize and other urgently needed food crops. This breakdown of the
plantation system and of production of commercial crops brought massive dislocation of
the export-oriented Indonesian economy, which never recovered to the same degree
Another significant issue with regard to the Japanese occupation in Indonesia is the
controversy around the claim that Japan led the country to its subsequent
38 The Japanese while fighting their way into Singapore in January 1942 launched the first attack on
Sumatra, and after having capitulated Malaya and Singapore on 14 February, the Japanese troops moved
further into the Indonesian archipelago. On 12 March Java was captured, then was Sumatra on 28
March. Although the clear-up operations in the rest of the Indonesian archipelago took them a few more
months, but after the capitulation of the main islands, Borneo, Java, and Sumatra, the Japanese started
establishing their authorities, and from then on the three years and four months of Japanese occupation
began in Indonesia: Pluvier, op.cit., pp. 179-187.
39 This was said by Adam Malik who became a vice-president of independent Indonesia: in A. Reid,
'Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword', in A. McCoy (ed.), Southeast Asia under Japanese
Occupation (New Heaven, 1980), p. 27.
40 M. van Langenberg, 'North Sumatra 1942-1945: The Onset of A National Revolution', in A. McCoy
(ed.), Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation (New Heaven, 1980), p. 43 and Reid, 'Indonesia:
From Briefcase to Samurai Sword', p. 23. Sumatra formed one part together with Malaya and Singapore
under the 25th Army, while Java came the rule of the Japanese 16 th Army.
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independence. 42 Indeed there are certain factors that seem to confirm the Japanese'
point, in the sense that they eliminated the two major stumbling blocks that blocked the
way of the Indonesian nationalist movements in the pre-war period: firstly, the internal
divisions among the pre-war political leaders, and secondly, 'the absence of any
substantial contact with the "masses". Under Japanese protégé and force, the previously
antagonistic political party leaders, based in different religious groups and ethnics, were
obliged to join a unitary propaganda body which was established to consolidate Japanese
occupation and to promote its war efforts, and this contributed to unite the leaders. The
leaders were also mobilised in rallies and public speeches to promote labour and military
conscription, and this resulted in keeping in close touch with the populace. Though
'unintentionally', these activities imposed on the leaders contributed to the growth of
Indonesian nationalism by providing a leadership. By the time of the Japanese surrender,
Java had prominent figures who were already ready to take over power and claim
independence, and whose leadership was recognised by the people. Since Java was the
centre of pre-war politics, the emergence of national-level politicians in Java was
significant, and 'their acceptance of Sukarno's and Hatta's pre-eminence was more than
half the battle' .43
41 Van Lartgenberg, op.cit., pp. 51-52.
42 Reid, 'Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword', p. 16.
43 ibid, pp. 21-22. In addition to the emergence of these leaderships, the consolidation of a particular
definition of Indonesian identity that occurred as a result of abolition of Dutch, re-writing history with
particular focus on the glory of pre-colonial past and the implanting of the national flag and anthem as
symbols of national identity, all contributed to raising anti-colonial consciousness among Indonesians:
see ibid., pp. 24-25. While the nationalist leaders were mobilised to consolidate Japanese power in
Indonesia, a large proportion of Indonesian youth went through Japanese methods of discipline in
schools and youth groups and propaganda bodies, where the heaviest emphasis on 'physical fitness,
toughness, discipline, patriotism, and a spirit of sacrificial service to the group' was imposed on. This
mobilisation of the population for military purposes was the 'most striking contribution of the Japanese
period', to the transformation made on the Indonesians whom according to Reid 'the mildest people on
earth' (ibid., p. 27).
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6.3 The Case Study in Indonesia
After the end of the war British troops of the SEAC went into Indonesia to liberate the
country from Japanese occupation and to keep law and order until a civil government
was re-established. Their task became more complicated because of the conflicting
interests between the Indonesian Republicans and the Dutch over the future political
status of the country. The Dutch were not prepared to accept the Republic, but wanted
to implement their Commonwealth scheme within which the NET would remain bound to
The Netherlands, and this was not acceptable to the Indonesians. In these circumstances,
the military authority of the SEAC became increasingly involved in the local politics. The
Allied Command put constant pressure on both side to reach an agreement, first of all to
accomplish the practical task of fulfilling the directives, which was not possible without
the assistance of the Republicans, and secondly to dissociate themselves from this
politically complicated situation that was damaging to Britain's reputation as a colonial
power. In July 1946 the SEAC transferred authority over the Outer Islands to the Dutch,
and in the meantime the efforts to bring both side to a round table negotiation continued.
After the conclusion of the Linggajati Agreement on 12 November 1946 in which the
Dutch recognised Republican rule de facto over Java, Sumatra and Madura, British
troops then completely withdrew from Indonesia by the end of November." The Dutch
began to assert a firm position in the Outer Islands with which their Commonwealth
scheme went ahead. The leadership of the Indonesian Republic already showed the signs
of divisions over the way in which their nationalist struggle should be conducted,
44 Killearn had a mediating role during the round table negotiation between the Dutch and Indonesians,
which produced Linggajati Agreement. Subsequent to the conclusion of this Agreement, Britain did not
again mediate directly but nevertheless offered advice and assistance to both sides in an endeavour to
enable the Agreement to be brought into effect.
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'negotiation' or 'armed confrontation'. In these circumstances the Linggajati Agreement
soon lapsed, and the first Dutch Police Action followed this in July 1947.45
During the outbreak of hostilities between the Indonesians and the Dutch, British
companies had waited to resume their businesses. 46 Until peace was restored,
repossession of business would have to be restricted to the Dutch controlled areas. In the
case of estate companies, speculating on the conditions of the plantation was extremely
difficult, for a journey would have had to be made to the interior. It was therefore plain
that unless some stable government was established in the NET, it was not possible to
safeguard British economic interests. Complete independence for Indonesia was a
possibility to build stability. Alternatively, if the Dutch and Indonesians decided to
maintain their traditional financial and economic links regardless of their conflicting
political interests, it would also serve the British interests. 47 Around 1947 the view
among British authority on the effect of the future independence of the NEI to the British
interest was grim. The Economic and Industrial Planning Staff of the British Treasury
pointed out that even if there were to be a complete rupture from The Netherlands, it
was 'exceedingly doubtful if the Republicans could organise their economy at anything
like its pre-war level without expert Dutch assistance'. If this happened, the British were
afraid that there might be a long period of economic dislocation. It was also feared that
the Indonesians might: impose heavy export taxes on produce; prevent the movement of
capital or profits from the country; separate primary production from processing, leaving
46 Stockwell, 'Southeast Asia in War and Peace', pp. 27-30.
46 The major British companies in the NEI were Royal Dutch Shell, the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corp., and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, Unilevers, the British-American
Tobacco Co., Howie Gold Mines Ltd., Sumatra, Calico Printers (textile plant), and other manufacturing
and trading enterprises in corporation with the Dutch manufacturing concerns. It was estimated that
British shipping carried 29 per cent of the country's foreign trade. The largest single item of British
investment was represented by the plantations, and amongst rubber was the biggest occupying 72 per
cent of the whole investment: PRO T236 1292 Economic Survey of the N.E.I written by Economic and
Industrial Planning Staff, May 1947, pp. 10-12.
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only processing in the hands of foreign interests; adopt a policy of eliminating long term
leases for upland plantations (substituting short term leases); and adopt a policy of
nationalisation of industries." In October 1947 the Dutch government finally gave
permission for the plantation companies to resume occupation of their estates. Faced
with uncertainty about how the situation would develop in the future, British companies
had difficulty committing themselves to reconstruction of the estates.°
The Dutch military action in July 1947 brought world-wide condemnation of the
Dutch and the matter regarding the transfer of power in the NEI was brought before the
Security Council of the UNO. In reality, the Dutch obtained a stronger position as a
result of the action, putting further territorial pressure on the Republicans whose capital,
Yogyakarta, was threatened. This newly obtained strength culminated in the Renville
agreement in January 1948, in which the Indonesians accepted the current demarcation
line and set up the United States of Indonesia before the Dutch withdrew their troops
from the country. The Republicans' position was evidently weakened, and violence and
strikes continued between the Indonesian factions. In these circumstances, widespread
general insecurity persisted and civil war seemed possible by the end of August 1948.5°
Further problems held British companies back from re-possessing the estates.
These were mainly of two kinds: firstly, the very heavy taxation and the ban on remission
of profits imposed by the Netherlands East Indian government, and secondly, lack of
working capital for rehabilitation owing to Dutch action in refusing Bank credits and the
reluctance of the British government to permit the export of sterling for investment in the
47 These ideas are from PRO T 236 1291 and 1292.
48 PRO T 236 1291 memorandum by the Treasury, 12 Apr. 1947, Appendix. C, p. 6.
49 PRO T 236 1294 letter from A.P. Grafftey-Smith, Bank of England, to Ellis-Rees, 24 Oct. 1947
regarding the NET.
80 Ricklefs, op.cit., Ch. 5. 'The Destruction of the Colonial State, 1942-50', pp. 185-221.
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NEI. 51 As a result, when the estate companies had come to the end of their resources in
the NET, they were faced with the question of whether they could continue to function at
all. A. Mathewson (the Managing Director of Harrisons & Crosfield), of Sumatra Tea
Estates Ltd., which was the only tea factory in the East Coast of Sumatra in working
order in January 1948, reported that there was no option but to abandon its plans for
rehabilitation; he would first arrange to take care of the remaining assets on the estates
and bring the European staff back to Europe.52
Faced with these problems, British businesses in the NEI made representations to
the British government, and to the Dutch in London, the Hague and Batavia. In addition,
a committee was set up in the NET for the purpose of facilitating discussions between
representatives of British firms and Dutch authorities to go through all these matters.53
As the NET was still under Dutch rule, close communication with the Dutch authorities
was vital if the various problems regarding remittances of profits, taxation, exchange
control, price of products, security of tenure, pre-war deposits with government, and
equality of treatment and opportunity for British enterprise and British nationals were to
be resolved. Without certain guarantees from the NET and Dutch governments on these
matters the British companies could not undertake any new or long-term investment in
the NEI. Thus, when the Dutch Commissioner, van Hoogstraten, visited London, the
Netherlands Indies Committee of the RGA promptly took the opportunity to see him.54
51 PRO T 236 1295 letter from G.C. Whitteridge, FO, to A. Gooden, Batavia, 2 Feb. 1948.
52 PRO T 236 1295 A. Mathewson to Cotzen, 23 Jan. 1948.
53 PRO T 236 1296 minute sheet (about the Meeting with Alons [Head of the Department of Finance,
NEI] and others from the Board of Trade, the FO, the Bank of England, the Export Promotion
Department, Delegate for Indonesian Affairs in the Hague, and Deputy Trade Commissioner for
Indonesia in London) from M.D. Montgomery, Treasury, to Rowe-Dutton, 6 Apr. 1948.
54 PRO T 236 1295 The Netherlands Indies Committee of the RGA (Incorporated), to van Hoogstraten,
20 Jan. 1948. The actual meeting was held on 12 Nov. 1947, but on 20 Jan. 1948 the Committee was
sending him a brief of the major points discussed.
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Apparently the active response on the part of business in resolving their problems
helped secure the attention of the British government to what otherwise might have been
regarded as peripheral matters in terms of location and scale. 55 The Treasury, the FO, the
Bank of England, and the Ministry of Food, alarmed by Sumatra Tea Estates Ltd.'s case,
immediately met to discuss the general matters concerning British business interests in
the NEI. At this meeting, M.D. Montgomery of the Treasury explained that even though
in the long term the question of sterling remittances depended on the intentions of the
Dutch, small remittances should still be sent out to keep the estates in a working
condition. Some of the participants carefiilly pointed out that the situation may have been
exaggerated, for all the information had come from the companies themselves.
Nevertheless, a positive conclusion was drawn as it was agreed to send small amount of
capital to the NET for the immediate needs of British firms. 56 As a result of this
cooperation between business and government, in August 1948 the British Consulate
General in Batavia could report some progress on the whole that the Dutch were
showing a genuine desire to meet the wishes of British interests in the NEI.57
Nonetheless, as most of the estates run by British companies were located in
isolated areas, there were risks of raids by armed gangs. It is difficult to make
55 As the Commercial Counsellor of British Consulate General, Batavia, explained to the Export
Promotion Department, Board of Trade, there was nothing the NEI could produce which could not be
found elsewhere. Moreover, even if goods from the British companies in the NEI were sent to hard
currency countries, all foreign currencies earned by the companies would go to the NET Exchange
Control which meant the UK would obtain no benefit from that move. Yet some of the products in the
NEI, such as, sugar, edible oils and sisal, which Britain badly needed, were the only alternatives to the
products from the dollar areas. At the Ministry of Food, John Strachey, Minister of Food, also stated the
significance of NET food products to Britain. Nevertheless, geographically, politically and even
commercially the NET was not the most privileged to the British: PRO T 236 1295 letter from
Commercial Counsellor of British Consulate General, Batavia, to the Export Promotion Department,
Board of Trade, and FO, 2 Mar. 1948; conversation between Ellis (Ministry of Food) and Lee (Bank of
England) from a note of a meeting in the Treasury among Treasury, Bank of England, FO, and Ministry
of Food, 30 Jan. 1948.
56 PRO T 236 1295 letter from G.C. Whitteridge, FO, to A. Gooden, Batavia, 2 Feb. 1948, and note of a
Meeting, 30 Jan. 1948.
57 PRO T 236 1296 British Consulate General, Batavia, to J.0. Lloyd, South East Asia Department, FO,
24 Aug. 1948.
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generalisations about the experiences of British companies in relation to re-possession of
their estates, but the difficulties were not dissimilar to each other. The South Asahan
district in East Sumatra, for example, was newly occupied at the beginning of 1949.
Prior to the war there were approximately 40 estates in the area, of which about half
were British-owned or British-represented, particularly by Harrisons & Crosfield and
Guthrie & Co. As soon as the areas were considered safe, owners were compelled to
assume immediate repossession by the Dutch authorities, who even threatened to assign
the estates to the temporary administration, NMI (N.I. Beheers-Instituut), otherwise. In
the absence of sufficient military cover (the companies were even told by the DEZ
[Departement van Economischezaken] to provide their own police force), the companies
were reluctant to expose their staff to the foreseeable dangers. Eventually the companies
sent their men to look over their properties before re-occupation. The conditions of
machinery and estate buildings, hospital and factories, and roads and safety were the
primary concern. There were also many other factors that governed the prospects of
getting these estates back into production, and among them, the chief and most
perplexing matter was the labour question. Under Japanese occupation the labourers in
the estates were transferred to other areas to work, while others were sent into forced
labour for military installations."
The condition of the infrastructure varied from estate to estate and some were
less lucky than others. For instance, G.P.G. Thomson and C.L. Corner, two British
partners owning Si Ringo Ringo Estate, had already stated their desire to sell the
property even before coming back from Australia where they were still convalescing. By
the beginning of 1949 most of the British companies in this district, just like others in the
58 PRO FO 371 76171 F2059/146/62 British Consulate General, Batavia, to South East Asia
Department, 27 Jan. 1949, pp. 1-4. This report was originally written by Chambers, the Acting Consul
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Archipelago, were not sure when or even whether to reoccupy their estates. After all, it
was a difficult decision to make, especially when it was doubtful whether the Dutch
authorities, despite their insistence on re-possession of the estates by British companies,
had sufficient personnel and resources to clear the area entirely of the predatory hordes.59
At this juncture SEA was gravely threatened by the recent advances of
Communism in Asia. The British government was concerned that the sudden withdrawal
of Dutch power might leave Indonesia chaotic and helpless in the face of opposing
threats of Communist infiltration. 60 After the second Dutch Police Action, the Security
Council of the UNO was asked once more to intervene. A cease-fire was ordered and
both sides again went into talks that subsequently altered the whole situation. At the end
of June the Dutch troops withdrew from the Republicans' capital and the armistice was
signed in August, followed by a peace conference in The Hague. On 2 November 1949
the Dutch and Indonesians, with the assistance of the United Nations Committee for
Indonesia, reached an agreement on the transfer of sovereignty to a federal republic of
sixteen states under the Netherlands Crown.
Throughout this time British businesses in the NET longed for a peaceful change
over in sovereignty. The future prospects of their interests and, in fact, those of all
foreign businesses in Indonesia, depended upon the extension of peaceful government
and on the establishment of a liberal administration and a stable currency. They hoped
that after the hand-over of sovereignty, private trading would be permitted and tariffs
would not unduly discriminate against British imports. Therefore, Sir John Hobhouse of
the British Chamber of Commerce for Indonesia said to Dening, the Assistant Under-
Secretary of State of the FO, that the British government should be ready to establish a
at Medan.
59 ibid.
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satisfactory modus vivendi for British interests with the new Indonesian government as
soon as it was set up. 61 The British government, in the same way as they had not wished
to see the business interests fall into ruin or be taken over by the Dutch, were in favour
of reaching some satisfactory arrangement with the new goverrunent. 62 Naturally the
question of how far the British government was prepared to deal with the Indonesian
government in order to safeguard British interests was raised by business, especially by
those with interests in plantations which were particularly vulnerable to anarchy and
banditry in comparison with other forms of business.° Understandably they were so
afraid of the internal condition of the country after the Dutch withdrawal, which might
leave them face to face with strong forces of anarchy and banditry, that the Anglo-Dutch
Plantations of Java, Ltd. even suggested R.H. Scott of South East Asia Department of
the FO to explore 'the possibility of uniting with American commercial interest in
Indonesia' .64
On 27 December 1949 the provisional government was constituted, but the
Indonesians decided to cut their link with the federation during the referendum held in
August 1950 to form a unitary type of government instead. Despite the progress made
on the country's sovereign future, British firms found that little improvement could be
expected in business perspective until the new administration was firmly established.
From 1950 onwards the great bulk of Dutch and Eurasian civil servants were dismissed
or resigned, leaving the middle or upper ranks of the civil service chaotic and inefficient,
60 PRO CAB 128 15 CABINET 10 (49) Indonesia, 8 Feb. 1949, p. 56.
61 PRO FO 371 76162 F15711/1154/62 Sir John Hobhouse, the British Chamber of Commerce for
Indonesia, to M.E. Dening, Nov. 1949; FO 76162 F17984 The Anglo-Dutch Plantations of Java, Ltd. to
R.H. Scott, South East Asia Department, 28 Nov. 1949.
62 PRO T 236 1296 minute sheet from M.D. Montgomery, to Rowe-Dutton, 6 Apr. 1948.
63 PRO FO 371 76162 F17984 The Anglo-Dutch Plantations of Java, Ltd. to R.H. Scott, South East Asia
Department, 28 Nov. 1949; G.C. Denham, The Managing Director of the Anglo-Dutch Plantations of
Java, Ltd., to C.A. Stewart, HMG's Consulate General, Batavia, 14 Nov. 1949.
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while the lower grades were overstaffed. The economic conditions were even worse than
those of the political. The rehabilitation of the economy had been largely put aside due to
the prolonged war. The most fundamental problem was the perception of the economy
among the Indonesians. It was a matter that subordinated to the question of their
political pride. Nationalist sentiment was so intense that 'measures seriously affecting her
export-oriented economy were deliberately taken in order to displace Western,
particularly Dutch, economic enterprise'. As a result, there was a shortage of trained and
experienced personnel. Production declined, and so did the government's revenue, which
depended upon export and import duties.°
The difficulties that faced British firms in Indonesia after Independence were
two-fold: firstly, the lack of reasonable internal security and, secondly, the lack of a fair
and balanced commercial and taxation policy. In the absence of law and order, the
thieving of trucks and produce was common; the seizure of estates by squatters and
murder of staff was also frequently reported; requisitioning of cars and other supplies of
British plantation companies by local units of the Indonesian army was normal practice;
there was no end to wage disputes, for all the propaganda and intimidation were
directed, for political reasons, at the labour force.° These problems were worsened by
the hardships which had arisen from the currency devaluation and new foreign exchange
measures under the new government. Taxation was a big problem, and the high level of
taxation on salaries of European employees deterred new recruitment. 67 Yet most foreign
64 PRO FO 371 76162 F15711/1154/62 The Anglo-Dutch Plantations of Java, Ltd. to R.H. Scott, South
East Asia Department, FO, 28 Nov. 1949.
65 Hall, op.cit., pp. 895-896.
66 PRO FO 371 83749 FH1124/2 J.B. Roberts to R. Cargil, British Consulate, Medan, 24 July 1950, in
reply of Cargil's letter concerning the reports appeared in AN'TARA (Indonesian News Agency), p. 2;
PRO FO 371 83752 letter from K. Younger, FO, to D.W. Kermode, British Embassy, Djakarta, 9 June
1950.
67 PRO FO 371 83752 minute written by H.B.C. Keeble, 6 June 1950; letter from K. Younger, FO, to
D.W. Kermode, British Embassy, Djakarta, 9 June 1950; Denham to R.H. Scott, FO, 10 July 1950.
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nationals were willing to proceed with their own post-war plans, as the Indonesian
government officials stated that they wanted cooperation with foreign enterprises. On the
other hand, none of the officials had ever proclaimed that this was their long-term policy.
As a result of the future being so insecure, no foreign companies were prepared to
extend their commitments in Indonesia."
Not surprisingly for a newly independent country there was a general anti-foreign
feeling at large in Indonesia, and this was clearly reflected in the research of the influence
of foreign investments in East Sumatra and the problems created by their presence,
commissioned by the External Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives of the
Indonesian government in June 1950. The report proposed that the government should
disentangle itself from the grip of foreign capital in order to better people's conditions in
East Sumatra because the majority of the investments were not favourable towards the
improvement of the labourers' conditions in their concessions. One of the findings of the
report was that since the foreign plantations were a major source of foreign exchange,
representing 35 per cent of Indonesia's exports, the foreign companies did not feel the
necessity of readjusting the wage structure, because the Indonesian government, having
common interest with them, would assist them in any labour-management dispute. The
report also concluded that the land leased by the foreign plantations, but still idle, should
be re-distributed to alleviate the conditions of the farmers, to ease the fighting between
old and new occupants, and to increase foodstuff production needed to feed the
Under the Dutch rule the taxation of individuals was also very heavy. The NET Committee of the RGA
(Incorporated) submitted a figure that showed the comparative weight of taxation of the European staff
in the NET and in a number of other Eastern countries producing similar commodities. According to this
figure, NET income tax represented two to four times as great as in other countries: T 236 1295 The NEI
Committee of the RGA (Incorporated) to van Hoogstraten, 20 Jan. 1948.
68 PRO FO 371 83749 FH1124/2 J.B. Roberts to R. Cargil, British Consulate, Medan, 24 July 1950 in
reply of Cargil's letter concerning the reports appeared in Antara, p. 2.
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territory. 69
 Only some of the details in the report were true. However, regardless of the
accuracy of the report, the negative attitude towards foreign business interests in the
report simply reflected the general feelings among Indonesians."
The strategy to deal with the new central government as well as local
governments was, of course, different from that adopted toward the Dutch authorities in
the NEI. In order to resolve their difficulties, the British companies made independent
representations to the Indonesian authorities directly or through the British Embassy or
through British Consular Offices. The relationship between the British firms in the NET
and the British Embassy in Batavia is worth mentioning. Just before Indonesian
independence, the South East Asia Department of the FO enquired about the possibility
of setting up some body or organisation to look after the interests of British firms in
Indonesia and to promote Anglo-Indonesian trade. This issue was immediately raised
between the British Embassy in Batavia, and the local managers of British companies in
discussion with their London offices. While the managers were emphatically against the
suggestion of re-opening a Branch Office of the British Chamber of Commerce for
Indonesia because of the bad reputation it had with Indonesians, they agreed that they
could see little that a Chamber of Commerce could do that could not be done by the
Embassy. The local general manager of the British-American Tobacco Co., for instance,
agreed upon the need for a representative British organisation, but an organisation with
which the Embassy could work to look after community interests in genera1.71
69 PRO FO 371 83749 FH1124/1 ANTARA (Indonesian News Agency) - June 13 and 14: R. Cargil to
R.H. Scott, South East Asia Department, FO, 19 June 1950.
7° PRO FO 371 83749 FH1124/2 J.B. Roberts to R. Cargil, British Consulate, Medan, 24 July 1950 in
reply of Cargil's letter concerning the reports appeared in ANTARA: this was sent to R.H. Scott, South
East Asia Department, FO, and it was followed by another letter that stated that the figures in Antara
were more or less precise, but there was no shortage of land.
71 PRO FO 371 83752 FH1151/1 Stewart, British Consulate, Batavia, to R.H. Scott, South East Asia
Department, FO, 29 Dec. 1949.
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The British companies not only made personal visits to the relevant Departments
of the British government to ask for assistance, but also had a meeting with Sukarno and
the Sultans. However, as far as the British government was concerned, the new
government should be treated with much more caution than the previous Dutch colonial
government. For instance, when H.B.C. Keeble of the FO carefully suggested a
possibility of Denham, the Chairman of the Anglo-Dutch Plantations of Java, Ltd., and
Mathewson, the Managing Director of Harrisons & Crosfield, writing a memorandum to
the Indonesian authorities regarding the illicit tapping of estate rubber, squatting, the
murder of estate staff, this was thoroughly reflected on by the relevant personnel in the
FO and the British Embassy in Batavia. Both bodies concluded that it was best not to
proceed with the letter so as not to irritate the local government, which was to British
eyes obviously incompetent, but nevertheless trying its best to prevent these kinds of
crimes. 72 In the process of making this decision both D.W. Kermode, the British
Ambassador, and K. Younger of the FO agreed that only specific cases that seemed to
offer a reasonable chance of solution as a result of action by the Indonesian government
should be put forward. 73 Besides, since the Indonesians were showing every sign of
disapproval of the presence of foreign investment, British business interests could best be
served by representing their claims to the Indonesian government through the British
Embassy or Consular offices, unless there were specific evidences of active
discrimination against British firms. In addition Kermode pointed out that British firms
72 PRO FO 371 83752 FH1151/3 minute by H.B.C. Keeble, 6 June 1950; FO 371 83752 FH1151/3 letter
from K. Younger, FO, to D.W. Kermode, British Embassy, Djakarta, 9 June 1950; Denham pointed out
how anxious the companies were in general under the extreme insecurity, which made them to incline to
stress unfortunate events such as murder of assistant in Java too strongly.
73 PRO FO 371 83752 FH1151/3 letter from K. Younger, FO, to D.W. Kermode, British Embassy,
Djakarta, 9 June 1950.
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must adapt themselves to the changed political conditions and devote greater attention to
the social welfare of Indonesian labourers.74
The situation in Indonesia at around the end of 1950, after the formation of the
Republic of Indonesia, dramatically deteriorated. Mathewson informed both Kermode
and Scott of the FO that the odds against British firms were becoming almost impossible.
British firms started considering either abandoning or selling their business interests.
Bevin suggested that Kermode should make representations to the Indonesian
government, but the Ambassador replied that it was better to retreat from certain estates,
particularly the isolated ones. Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, business was
already profitable mainly thanks to the Korean War boom. 75 As long as business was
profitable, British firms were more than willing to stay in spite of the odds against them.
As explained above, government and business worked together to deal with the
difficulties, and were active participants rather than passive observers. In order to
survive, business sometimes adopted a tactic that was seldom acceptable in normal
business practice. The Dutch authorities in the NET were trying to gain as much sterling
as they could out of the British firms by refusing them anything but short term credits. In
response to this British firms asked the British Treasury to refuse their applications for
financial assistance to retaliate against the Dutch authorities, alleging that their hands
were tied by the British Treasury. Though the British Consulate in Batavia denied this
allegation by van Hoogstraten, he secretly admitted that while it may not have been
74 PRO FO 371 83752 FH1151/10 letter from D.W. Kermode to K. Younger, 22 July 1950.
75 PRO FO 371 83753 FH1151/25 despatch from D.W. Kermode to Bevin, 14 Nov. 1950. Kermode
reported back to Bevin what he had been informed by Fletcher, the Representative of the Anglo-Dutch
Plantations of Java. Ltd.
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widespread, certain British firms, notably Harrison & Crosfield, were indeed adopting, or
endeavouring to adopt, these tactics.76
After the end of the war, in the face of growing hostility between the Dutch and
the Indonesians, American competition was hardly a major issue. 77 Nevertheless both the
Dutch and the Indonesians publicising their expectations of US loans and credits often
irritated the British. From the very beginning the British had no doubt that the USA
would be the NEI's most valuable export market and source of capital in the post-war
period. The economic and financial prospects of Indonesia depended on how quickly the
production of commercial crops could be restored to pre-war levels, but this required
new capital. In any case, new capital imports were needed not only for reconstruction
purposes but also to promote new industries, 78 and the only promising source for this
capital was the USA. However, the problem with US loans and credits was that they
normally included provisions detrimental to British interests, for instance, the goods
purchased out of the proceeds were to be carried in American ships. 79 Therefore the
76 PRO T 236 1296 British Consulate General, Batavia, to G.C. Whitteridge, South East Asia
Department, FO, 10 Apr. 1948.
77 American corporations such as Union Carbide, Goodyear, and General Motors had established
themselves in pre-war Indonesia. Standard Oil had made attempts to obtain a stake in oil production in
the NEI through the purchase of shares in the Royal Dutch Co., but was eventually blocked by the Dutch.
A year after the dissolution of Standard Oil in 1911, Jersey Standard made the first break-through in the
NEI, through its Dutch marketing affiliate. Goodyear, and General Motors established plants in Java in
the 1920s: M. Wilkins, The Emergence ofMultinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from the
Colonial Era to 1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970), pp. 78-9. Yet total American investments were
only around seven per cent of all foreign investments in pre-war Indonesia, far smaller than Dutch and
British investments: G.D. Homan, 'The US and the Netherlands East Indies: The Evolution of American
Anticolonialism', Pacific Historical Review, vol. 53, 1984, p. 428. However, as far as trade was
concerned, the USA had bigger interests than the UK in the NET prior to the Second World War, taking
13 per cent of NEI products, and providing 12 per cent of her total imports in 1938, while the UK
accounted for 5 per cent and 7 per cent of each respectively. As considerable portions of the exports to
Singapore (16 per cent) were ultimately passed on to other countries, chiefly the USA and Britain, they
might have had bigger trade interests than the figure suggests. Although both were interested in rubber
and tea, there was hardly any conflict in terms of obtaining raw materials, for there were other alternative
sources in the region: PRO T 236 1292 Economic Survey of the N.E.I written by Economic and
Industrial Planning Staff, May 1947.
78 PRO T 236 1292 Economic Survey of the N.E.I written by Economic and Industrial Planning Staff,
May 1947, p. 5.
79 PRO FO 371 83773 FH1392/4 Report by Sir John Hobhouse on Government Financed Shipments
from USA to Indonesia, to M.E. Dening, FO, 1 May 1950.
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British feared that a large proportion of British interests in the NET might be taken over
by the American financial imperialism of this kind. 80 Moreover there was a danger that
the NEI might easily gravitate away from the European and into the American sphere of
influence as the Philippines had half a century before.81
After his five day visit to the Hague, R.H.S. Allen wrote;
... , the Netherlands government would do anything to
secure an American loan or credits, even on terms
unfavourable to Britain in the NET which would largely tip up
the trade of that area with the US.82
Van Hoogstraten, firstly, said how urgently the NET needed a loan from the USA, then
admitted that their future policy would be dependent upon the conditions of such a loan.
At this juncture the only thing Britain could do was to remind the Dutch that the UK had
made big loans to The Netherlands, which helped them give credits to the NEI.83
Around 1952 the British FO was still flooded with reports and statements by
British businesses in Indonesia about the difficulties or impossibility of continuing their
business. The factors of general lack of security, the never-ceasing demand for increased
wages, and the squatting of estates were everywhere. In the case of Unilever they not
only had a problem with the procurement of raw materials, but they also 'lost as much as
ten percent of their manufactured products by pilferage'. Since no insurance company
would insure goods in Indonesian ports, Unilever had to run its own insurance scheme to
8° PRO CAB 128 15 CAB 10 (49) Indonesia, 8 Feb. 1949, p. 56. These issues were all debated or
mentioned in the House of Lords Debate of 19 Jan. 1949.
81 PRO T 236 1292 Economic Survey of the N.E.I written by Economic and Industrial Planning Staff,
May 1947, pp. 6-7.
82 PRO T 236 1291 report by R.H.S. Allen, 27 Mar. 1947.
83 PRO T 236 1294 note by M.D. Montgomery of a Meeting held in the Treasury, 14 Nov. 1947. In fact,
it was Ellis-Rees who pointed that out to van Hoogstraten.
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take care of their business." Nevertheless, the UK Trade Commissioner in Malaya
reported the FO at the end of 1952 that 'this most difficult market' was getting as much
attention from private traders as others and there was a steady flow of British
businessmen going to Indonesia. However, they preferred 'to keep their staffs and stocks
in Malaya ready for use in Indonesia as opportunities occur'. 85 The post-war chaos did
not deter most of British businesses from continuing to operate, though without a
complete commitment. As the report on the influence of foreign interests in Indonesia
correctly assessed, British business interests firmly believed in their contribution to the
Indonesian economy as well as the welfare of the population by creating employment and
revenue for the government. 86 This confidence of British business interests persisted and
this was hardly altered by newcomers such as the USA.
6.4 The Case Study in Siam
The task of the SEAC to liberate Siam was accomplished relatively early and the troops
under the Command started to leave the country in January 1946. The Anglo-Siamese
Peace Agreement and International Cooperation terminated the state of war with Britain
in January 1946, followed by an agreement in March on the resumption of trade. The
disputes over the territories of the French Indochina were resolved in October 1946 as
the Siamese returned the territories to Indochina. In the following year, Siam became a
member of the UNO.
84 PRO FO 371 101105 FH1102/1 British Embassy, Djakarta, to Murray, South East Asia Department,
FO, 10 Jan. 1952.
85 PRO FO 371 106831 FH1151/2 letter from UK Trade Commissioner in Malaya, Singapore and Kuala
Lumpur, to S. Bennett, FO, 28 Nov. 1952.
86 The director of the Anglo-Indonesian Plantations, Ltd. stated: ' . . it is clear that we are indeed a very
valuable asset in the eyes of Government . . . we are by no means a minor item in the economy of
Indonesia and are most certainly large contributors towards the welfare of the population.' PRO FO 371
106832 FH1151/54 Director's Report and Statement of Accounts for the Forty-Third Annual General
Meeting of Members of the Anglo-Indonesian Plantations, Ltd., 24 Nov. 1953. In p. 14.
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Despite this smooth transition to peace time, Siamese internal politics lacked
stability, for the immediate post-war years were much dented by a series of coups and
counter-coups. Siam had by 1948 had eleven different governments since the war. In
November 1947 a military coup provided a chance to place Pibul Songlcram once again
in the position of premiership through the general election held in January 1948. He
survived till 1957, but there were several attempts to unseat him. 87
 There was also strong
nationalistic tendency in terms of concessions and leasing which made British firms
difficult to renew them. Despite this there was relative stability, and British businesses
benefited from low taxation, absence of government controls on their business practice,
and a fully convertible currency. 88
 There was nevertheless the feeling of uncertainty
among British firms in Siam regarding their future position. The mixed feeling of
confidence and the fear of being replaced by American commercial interests were always
present amongst them in post-war Siam. The possibility of the Pibul government
resorting to the pre-war ultra-nationalism — cultural and economic — also loomed.
Differently from what might have been expected, the British did not seem to be
much alarmed by the possible recurrence of Siamese nationalism under Pibul, who had
already led the 1930s' nationalist movement, but more concerned with American
competition in the country. The Foreign Office files in Siam of the Public Record Office
during the period concerned are the evidence that shows how extremely sensitive the
British were to each move made by the Americans. The development of US economic
87 Seth Pramoj who had led the Tree-Thai Movement' during the wartime became the Prime Minister
after the end of the war. He was soon replaced by Khuang Abhaiwongse in January 1946, and then the
long-awaited Pridi Banomyong became the premier in March 1946. Pridi, being accused of
responsibility for the death of the King, stepped down and handed over the premiership to Thamrong
Nawasawat in August 1946, who was in that position for around a year before being forced to leave by a
military coup that provided a chance for Pibul Songkram. Hall, op.cit., pp. 856-58; Stowe, op.cit., pp.
362-65. The spellings of these names followed J.D. Stowe's. See, Biographical Notes in ibid., pp. 367-
80.
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interests in Siam, concessions, whether political or economic, and other forms of
assistance given to her, were closely watched, examined and analysed by them often with
an emphasis on how those would affect British own interests. Among the issues dealt
within those files, Siamese requests to Britain for loans and capital goods and equipment,
the jealousy and bickering between the business communities, the Siamese desire for
dollars to purchase necessary goods, and US assistance to Siam for the purpose of
obtaining concessions over Britain's war claims were the frequently mentioned subjects.
I would first like to explain the mutual suspicion between them, then move on to British
fear of being replaced by American commercial interests because of Britain's inability to
provide Siam with concessions and goods. The local competition between the two
communities and other related issues such as the jealousy of the Americans over the
presence of the British Financial Adviser, close communication between British political
authorities and commercial interests in Siam, and Siamese request of dollars for their tin
ore and rice exports are also examined.
Commercial interest was one of the most visible conflicts between the UK and USA in
Asia, and Siam was one of the places where the conflicts were most acute. To the
western countries looking for raw materials and markets for their manufactured goods,
Siam was not at all the most commercially prestigious country in SEA. In comparison
with Indonesia and Malaya, Siam possessed far fewer natural resources. US commercial
interests had overall a much bigger stake in Indonesia and Malaya than in Siam.
However, there was hardly any ground upon which they could establish a firm position in
these countries because of their political relations with the metropolitan governments.
88 C. Wilson, Unilever 1945-1965 Challenge and Response in the Post-War Industrial Revolution
(Cassell, London, 1968), p. 243; Longhurst, op.cit., p. 106.
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The Siamese market had been opened up a relatively long time, and the country was
comparatively stable and not much influenced by political developments in the
neighbouring countries. However, these merits hardly explain all the attention that she
received from the powerful western countries, especially from the USA.
The British grew suspicious toward the USA during the war, being alarmed by
the USA ignoring the Siamese declaration of war against the Allies and afterwards
assisting the Siamese in resisting British war claims. British understanding of US interest
in Siam was that the former had both a sentimental concern for Siam's future and
commercial if not political ambitions. 89
 There was in fact a mutual suspicion between the
UK and the USA. The US State Department was equally suspicious of British intentions
in Siam lest the British impose control upon Siam, which would be incompatible with
Siamese desire toward freedom, sovereignty and independence. 90 The USA was anxious
that Britain might attempt to restore the pre-war informal dominance in Siam, while the
British believed that the Americans had a desire to replace them with their own. An FO
official wrote rather arrogantly, if with concern that: 'If America now aspires to replace
Britain in her former position supremacy, she must satisfy Siam that she has real
qualifications for the role.' 91 Behind this confidence, the British were extremely
conscious of competition from the Americans in Siam. The British Embassy in Bangkok
and the relevant Departments within the British government kept close communication
and any piece of information relevant to that matter was noted and analysed by the
British authorities in Siam and Britain.
The British analysed what drew the USA to Siam in the first place. They came to
the conclusion that it was, first, 'sympathy' towards the country which had kept
89 PRO FO 371 46545 F4298/G report by the Far Eastern Committee, 14 July 1945, p. 23.
99 ibid, pp. 23-5.
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independence against Western and Japanese intervention with skilled diplomacy, and the
feeling of 'sorrow' towards a 'helpless' independent state; and secondly, commercial
interest. 92 What part the USA would play in all this was not clear; nevertheless America's
'mothering' instincts seemed to be attracting her towards Siam, whose potential markets
and comparatively little developed resources also had an appeal. In short there was every
indication that the USA intended to play a part in post-war Siam.93
From the point of view of the USA, there were other factors more influential than
sympathy and economic interest. The official US government policy published in
September 1949 made clear their interest in cultivating Siam as a centre of positive
American influence in SEA. 94 The USA needed Siam as a supporter of US policies in the
various organisations of the UNO. Furthermore, the USA wanted to assist Siamese
prosperity to be an example to the emerging Southeast Asian countries of the advantage
of good relations with the USA, and the advantages of democracy over Communism.95
As the USA wanted to promote the Philippines as a model colony to other Western
colonial powers, Siam was to exhibit another form of model for the USA. In any case, it
was conceived that Siam would be less resistant to US penetration than any other
Southeast Asian countries, whether still dependent or already independent, because she
was not tied up by political relations with the European colonial powers, which would
not allow any ground for late-comers.%
91 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum by the Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit of
the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, Part V. Annex II.
92 See PRO FO 46544, 46545, 54052, and 63549 etc.
93 PRO FO 371 46544 F10161296/G40 minutes by Sterndale Bennett, FO, to Horace Seymour,
Chungking, 16 Feb. 1945.
94 PRO FO 371 76025 F17668/10345/61G US Policy towards Southeast Asia: copy of a US Planning
Staff Paper, 29 Mar. 1949, pp. 26-27.
FRUS (1950) vol. vi , East Asia and the Pacific, Policy Statement (US relations with Thailand)
Prepared in the Department of State, 15 Oct. 1950, pp. 1529-30. Notably Britain declared a similar
ambition in Malaya, and the intensive rehabilitation work in Malaya was in line with this ambition.
96 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/21291G61 draft memorandum prepared by the Far Eastern Civil Planning
Unit of the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, Part II.
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As far as the USA was concerned, Britain wanted to, and was able to influence
Siam. To some extent Americans recognised Britain's weakened economy and political
influence that would obviously affect her traditional position in the country. Her inability
to fill orders for consumer and capital goods was in contrast to the ability of the USA to
fill Siam's rehabilitation needs and it would be a hindrance to maintaining her influence.
Yet Britain was still influential on the country's economic and political life thanks to,
firstly, the strength of private business interests, and secondly, to Siam's favourable trade
balances with Sterling areas, and thirdly the influential British Financial Adviser to the
Siamese Government.97
Indeed, the British hoped to maintain and develop their trading and business
interests in the country, but knew that their pre-war position would not be easily
recovered. Firstly, the British could not resume their businesses before the termination of
the war state between the two countries and the official resumption of the trade.
Therefore there had been no trading activity, whether in the form of public procurement
or private trading activity." In fact, a forecast of what arrangements should be made to
assist the re-establishment of British commercial interests in Siam itself was not possible
before actually entering the country to inspect any damage to their business assets and
general economic conditions. In addition, the SEAC was obviously pre-occupied by their
own responsibilities to give the necessary facilities for the businessmen to re-enter
Siam. 99 Secondly, the prolonged negotiation upon war claims was hampering Britain's
relationship with Siam. The negative effects of the negotiations to British business
97 FRUS (1950) vol. vi , East Asia and the Pacific, Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State,
15 Oct. 1950, P. 1535. See also PRO FO 371 46544 F3491/296/G40 revised draft report on terms for
Siam, 31 May 1945, p. 22.
98 'Procurement (of the substantial tonnages of tin ore and metal) by us is complicated by the trading
with the Enemy position. . .Technically we are at war with Siam.': FO 371 46543 F10668/250140 copy
of letter from Carr, Ministry of Supply, to D. Blunt, Treasury Chambers, 30 Nov. 1945.
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interests were realised among some British quarter. Dening of the SEAC Headquarters
wrote to Sterndale Bennett of the FO:
[I] cannot take Siam's declaration of war on us very
seriously. ... I conceive it to be in our interests from the
point of view of post-war trade that Siam shall be friendly
and prosperous. ... Beyond that I would strongly advocate
that we should forget and forgive. To this extent I think the
American attitude is more realistic than ours, and if we are
not careful, we shall find that it is they who in post-war days
will have achieved popularity while a grudge is borne against
Complaints were consistently heard mainly from the diplomats in the field. The British
Ambassador, G.H. Thompson sent a letter to Bevin to warn him of the danger of
American competition while the British were unduly wasting time over war damage
compensation:
... as regards coming American competition, time is not on
our side and that this being the case, they (the British
business community here) should get going while the going
is yet good. Unfortunately, some of our major interests still
appear unduly concerned with interminable negotiations
relating to compensation for war damages and so forth,
doing little or nothing in the meantime to re-start working
99 PRO FO 371 46580 F6139/6139/40 FO minute by A.C.S Adams, FO, 29 Aug. 1945, after a visit by
Heyworth of Lever Bros. to the FO.
'°° PRO FO 371 46544 F540/296/G40 SEAC Headquarters, to Sterndale Bennett, 14 Dec. 1945.
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when the Americans arrived on the scene with their
caterpillars and skidders and dollar exchange.'°'
J. Allison in the British Embassy in Washington saw this matter from a different
perspective — the loan agreement. He warned that when the loan agreement was under
fire in the USA, there should not be any apparent difference between the two countries
on the Siamese matter, for the Americans were particularly sensitive on Siamese
affairs. m The main theme of these letters was not to force Siam too hard to gain too
much compensation, which would be a short-sighted policy; the more quickly Siam
recovered, the better for Britain.103
Meanwhile, American competition seemed to be already under way. Around the
end of 1945 there were numerous rumours reported to the FO that the Americans were
already trading with the Siamese, which was obviously a violation of their agreement.
This was found out to be untrue, but clearly showed how anxious and watchful the
British were on any move by the Americans. British inability to provide the necessary
goods and concessions in the forms of loans and aid exacerbated their feelings of anxiety.
The Overseas Reconstruction Committee published a memorandum on 19 December
1945, in which the merits of providing consumer goods to the Siamese were emphasised
as a stimulant to produce more rice to supply for the neighbouring countries in SEA.'"
However despite her significance as the only rice supplier available at that moment,
Siamese needs had to be ignored, as the British own as well as Dependencies' needs for
rehabilitation could hardly be satisfied.
—
101 PRO FO 371 54422 F17846/1495/40 G.H. Thompson to Bevin, 14 Dec. 1946.
102 PRO FO 371 54052 F2129/2129 conversation between B.I.T. Gage, FO, and John Allison, US
Embassy, 4 Feb. 1946.
103 PRO FO 371 63897 F10872/123/40 British Embassy, Bangkok, to M.E. Dening, 2 Aug. 1947.
104 PRO FO 46573 F12249/1748/40 memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford
cripps, 19 Dec. 1945.
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With regard to loans and aid to Siam, the following example demonstrates
Britain's situation. In 1947 there was another request from Siam for a loan to help
reconstruction, particularly of the railways. The Treasury Chambers sent a very clear
answer to the FO that it was ' ... the brutal fact that in present circumstances we simply
cannot afford to make any loans of any shape or size for any purpose to anyone'. The FO
transferred the message to the British Embassy in Bangkok, putting on its own gloss:
'HMG simply cannot afford to make any loans of any shape to anyone. "Tis pity, tis
true.".' The FO also added that they were anxious to help Siam if it were possible to
assure the future market, but for the time being it would not be possible to do so.105
When there was every indication that the Americans were anxious to provide Siam with
dollars to obtain the future market for the American exports, 1°6 it was apparent that
Britain could not do so and that inability brought a deep despair particularly among the
British in Siam.
Under the circumstances the British were well aware of the possibility of losing
markets to the Americans. However, to some degree they were still confident of their
position. Although the equipment and parts to reconstruct the railways would not be
supplied by Britain in the near future, the FO did not think that there was an immediate
danger of the Americans successfully competing with them, since all existing Siamese
railway equipment was of British origin,'" and since changing standardisation of
equipment took time such a transfer of supplier seemed remote in the foreseeable future.
Thus the British could still afford to be optimistic about the prospect of maintaining
British influence as the main supplier in the Siamese market.
1 °5 PRO FO 371 63898 F14877/123/40 M. Loughnane, Treasury Chambers, to A.M. Palliser, FO, 5 Nov.
1 947.
106 PRO FO 46573 F11506/1748/40 Granger-Tayler, British Embassy, Bangkok, to J.R. Willis, Board of
Trade, 6 Dec. 1945.
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In the meantime strong backing from the Americans for Siam to get concessions
from the British over war claims forced Britain to come to terms with the reality by
withdrawing some of the claims. 108 Feeling bitter, the British warned that when the USA
removed the protectionist policies of imperial powers, which was a somewhat stable
system, racial strife and native chauvinism would replace them, w9 and in retrospect this
was true in most ex-colonies.
In 1947 Michael Wright, Killearn's deputy, who had just returned from
Singapore and Malaya informed the FO that there was much greater harmony between
the British and the Americans on the ground, thanks to the British, who were anxious to
persuade the Americans to work with them rather than in competition. n° While the
Siamese were unlikely to prove cooperative unless they knew that the Americans were
with the British, whatever the British did should be done in closest cooperation with the
Americans at any cost." On the other hand, as Montgomery of the Treasury stated, the
107 PRO FO 371 46572 F10867/1748/40 I.A.D. Wilson-Young, FO, to R.G. Mercer, Department of
Overseas Trade, 7 Dec. 1945.
108 The Siamese cleverly used the USA in ways, which the British deeply resented, to avoid outstanding
UK and Commonwealth war claims which were about £6.5 million, and also to obtain concessions
regarding control over Japanese assets in Siam and a sterling loan: PRO PREM 8 1073 W. Strang, FO,
to Attlee, 1 Sept. 1949. In May 1950 an agreement was reached for settlement in a lump sum of certain
British Commonwealth claims against Thailand for war damages to property owned by Commonwealth
nationals. The claims were paid through the re-lease of frozen sterling assets in London: FRUS (1950)
vol. vi, East Asia and the Pacific, Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State, 15 Oct. 1950, p.
1535. Also see I. Pocmontri, 'Negotiations between Britain and Siam on the Agreement for the
Termination of Their State of War, 1945: An Instance of Intervention by the US in British Foreign
Policy', MA Dissertation, Department of International Studies, University of Warwick, 1981.
109 PRO FO 371 54052 F6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum prepared by the Far Eastern Civil Planning
Unit of the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945. As far as Siam was concerned, the British warning of the
racial animosity did not come true. In fact, Siamese politics were rather stable and co-operative to the
Western powers, that there was no anti-Western feeling as strong as their anti-Chinese sentiment.
110 PRO FO 371 63549 F2616/2616/6 British policy in South East Asia, South East Asia Department, 24
jap. 1947, p. 4.
111 PRO FO 371 84397 FS1193/16 British Embassy, Bangkok, to the FO, 5 Nov. 1950.
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British had always tried to carry the Americans with them to release their burdens in
Siam, but this resulted in opening a way for the Americans to intervene further.112
From 1948 onwards Britain still had the same dilemma in Siam concerning the
way in which the need simultaneously to compete and cooperate with the USA should be
reconciled: over the use of Advisers and in the face of Communist advance in Asia. The
presence of the British Financial Adviser to the Siamese government caused enormous
jealousy from the Americans, despite the fact that there were numerous American
technical advisers working for the Foreign Operations Administration of the Siamese
government. Apart from the Financial Adviser to the Siamese government, Britain did
not have these same advantages of working closely with the Siamese government."'
American businesses lamented the shortage of dollar exchange in Siam as the cause of
the lack of progress of their business, and there was a tendency among them to believe
that the British were somewhat to blame.'" When Siam joined the Sterling group on
September 17 1947, this caused much pain within American commercial circles and
created hostility towards the British Financial Adviser, William Doll, for the Americans
believed that Britain had control of Siamese fiscal policies through his influence. In order
to avoid further embarrassment, the US Ambassador finally came forward to be assured
that neither the British Embassy nor Doll was exerting undue influence on the Siamese
with respect to the exchange rate or cognate problems. He was given this assurance, but
was also criticised himself for using Kenneth Patton, the American Political Adviser to
the Siamese government, for his own exercise of improper influence on the government.
In addition to the jealousy between the Embassies and Advisers, there was also acute
112 PRO T 236 1292 M.D. Montgomery to Rowe-Dutton, 6 May 1947. Montgomery said this to oppose
the suggestion made by Whitteridge of South East Asia Department, FO, on talking as openly and much
as to the US government regarding the British talks with the Dutch on exports from the NEI.
113 PRO FO 371 112286 DS1151/4 draft article on Thailand provided by the Commercial Secretariat of
the British Embassy, Bangkok, for publication in the Board of Trade Journal, 17 Mar. 1954,
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competition between British business circles and local American representatives in
Bangkok. Thompson in Bangkok wrote, 'We are dangerous commercial competitors
whose disappearance from the Far East would be of enormous benefit to America
trade.' 115 However much both wanted to prevent it, there was certainly Anglo-American
bickering in the community. 116 British efforts to work with the Americans may have
helped the Americans to be more forthcoming in their views; nevertheless there was a
deeply rooted mutual suspicion, and the conflicts between them remained unresolved.
Throughout 1948, Siam's strategic position in SEA was again becoming an issue
in front of Communist advance in China. It was the British local authorities that foresaw
a complete Communist victory in China and warned the London government to be aware
of the disastrous consequence that would considerably alter the situation and prospects
in SEA. Thompson in particular emphasised the urgency of the situation by saying that
almost anything could happen at almost any moment. 117 Once again the security of India,
Australia and New Zealand was in jeopardy depending upon halting the advance of
Communism in SEA. In these circumstances, the tritish should do all they could to
encourage the Siamese government to commit themselves clearly to the British side and
to 'avoid any attempt to compromise with a future Communist Government in China'.118
Though it was believed that there was somewhat greater natural resistance to
Communism among the Siamese than elsewhere in SEA because of their comparatively
prosperous standards of living and the absence of nationalist struggle in recent Siamese
114	 FO 371 70029 F2310/2310/40 annual report for 1947 by G.H. Thompson to Bevin, Feb. 1948.
115 PRO FO 371 84514 FZ1022/4 G.H. Thompson, British Embassy, Bangkok, to M.E. Dening, FO, 1
Feb. 1950.
116 PRO FO 371 63896 F9077/123/40 G.H. Thompson, British Embassy, Bangkok, to FO, 5 July 1947;
FO 371 70029 F2310/2310/40 annual report for 1947 by G.H. Thompson to Bevin, 12 Feb. 1948.
117 PRO FO 371 69684 F15157/148/61 G.H. Thompson, Bangkok, to FO, 30 Oct. 1948; FO 371 69684
F17499/148/61/G MacDonald, Singapore, to FO, 10 Dec. 1948. Thompson said, ... this being so, the
first duty of people like myself is to stay at their posts ready so far as anyone can be, for the emergency
that may suddenly arise'.
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history."9 On the other hand, Siam had local Communist elements, which would receive
encouragement and possibly material aid from Communist China.'" If Siam fell to
Communism, the consequences for Malaya would be grave because of the common
frontier that they shared. The British also badly needed Siamese cooperation along the
southern border, which would help their anti-Communist campaign in Malaya. In return,
the success against the insurgency in Malaya would materially contribute to internal
security in Siam. The British Embassy, therefore, pointed out to Bevin that they were
often surprised by the amount of attention devoted to Burma in word and deed because
in comparison with Siam, the troubles in Burma would not have so great an impact on
either Malaya or SEA due to her geographical isolation. 121 MacDonald, the
Commissioner-General also strongly advised the government to be as forthcoming as
possible over the Siamese request for arms and equipment so that the Siamese
government could establish stable conditions. Under the circumstances the British FO
assured Bangkok that Britain was doing so to the best of her ability in the provision of
arms and equipment for the Siamese forces, for having a powerful force was as much in
the Siamese interests as the British.122
On numerous occasions the British said that they should do all they could to help
Siam politically, strategically and economically in order to keep her on the British side.123
118 PRO PREM 8 1073 W. Strang, FO, to Attlee, 1 Sept. 1949. For more, see PRO FO 371 69684,
76004, 76280, T 236 4446, BT 11 3968, etc.
119 The Times, 7 Dec. 1948, and The Times, 19 Feb. 1949, cited in PRO BT 11 3968. Nationalistic
struggle in most of Asian countries made the masses politically conscious and young intellectuals turn
towards Communism.
120 PRO FO 371 76004 F5735/1017/61 telegram from FO to Bangkok, 11 May 1949.
121 PRO FO 371 76280 F12535/1017/40G British Embassy, Bangkok, to Bevin, 16 Aug. 1949. The
Malayan insurgents often fled across the southern border of Siam to find refuge, and also the northern
Siamese border was most disquieting due to the general trend of bandit movement that was both
backwards and forwards conditioned by their need for food: PRO FO 76280 F8678/1017/40 report of
interview between Marshal Pibul, Premier of Thailand, and Buckley of the Daily Telegraph, 1 June
1949.
122 PRO FO 371 76004 F5735/1017/61 telegram from FO to Bangkok, 11 May 1949.
123 PRO PREM 8 1073 E.E. Tonldns, FO, to E.G. Cass, 10 Downing Street, 27 Aug. 1949.
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However, in early 1948 when the possibility of floating a £5 million loan in the London
market was brought up, it was said at first that the application would be given a
sympathetic consideration because of the Siamese role in combating Communist
influence in the region, and any move made by the British would receive wide publicity
and emphasise the value of relations with the British and the West in general.
Nevertheless, in effect it was rejected at once. 124
Alone, Britain could not provide sufficient military and financial assistance to the
Siamese due to her lack of resources and consequently needed US assistance.
Additionally, Britain did not have any alternative other than working with the USA
because of the pressure exerted by the Siamese. To the Siamese the UK was a declining
power, while the USA was the rising one. Around mid-1949 certain wealthy Sino-
Siamese bankers and merchants, who firmly believed that America had given up the Far
East as a bad job, and that Britain was virtually powerless to influence the course of
events, became financially very cautious and began to seek to convert their investments
into liquid resources. 125 Therefore, unless the Siamese knew that the Americans were
behind the British, they could hardly be convinced to work on the British side. According
to Thompson's own words,
Whatever we do should, of course, be done in closest co-
operation with the Americans, if for no other reason than that
Siamese are unlikely to prove co-operative unless they know
Americans are with us. 126
Though widely observed among the British, working with the Americans was more of
an urgent matter to the local British authorities in Siam. Thompson in particular was
124 PRO T 236 4446 FO to Bangkok, 12 Mar. 1948.
125 PRO FO 371 76280 F7411/1017/40 telegram from G.H. Thompson to FO, 23 May 1949.
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very precise and alert. He told the FO not to think of any serious approach to Siam nor
of making plans for British military experts to go to Siam without some prior agreement
with the USA, because unless the Siamese knew that the British and Americans fully
understood the Siamese mind and were prepared to act together, the Siamese would not
come down irrevocably on their side. Moreover, there would be no useful results from
partial aid: 'We must be ready to go a long way. Just to go a little distance will be waste
of energy and time.' 127 In sum, while the 'UK should remain in front of the shop
window in Southeast Asia', 128 the British needed to bring in the USA, to achieve
economic and political collaboration in the region.129
The American attitude towards SEA from 1948 until mid-1949 (and even
beyond) was however, often lamented by their British counterparts. The US State
Department was suspicious of British aid to Southeast Asian countries against
Communism, which was mostly piecemeal with the furnishing of moral and material
support, particularly in Afghanistan,'" Burma, and Siam. In particular reference to Siam,
not only were the signs of American assistance to the country meagre, but also where
they were forthcoming, they were in competition with, or encroaching upon British
interests. As a result, the British Embassy in Bangkok wrote to the government at home;
'If the US will not work with us, it should at least be guaranteed that they will not work
against our interests (underlined in original).'m
126	 FO 371 84397 FS1193/16 G.H. Thompson, Bangkok, to FO, 4 Nov. 1950.
127 PRO FO 371 69684 F17833/148/61 G.H. Thompson, Bangkok, to FO, 14 Dec. 1948.
128 PRO FO 371 69684 F17833/148/61/G note by P.F. Grey, FO, 22 Dec. 1948.
129 PRO FO 371 69684 F1536311148/61/G P.F. Grey to R.J. Bowker (Rangoon), G.H. Thompson
(Bangkok), P.S. Scrivener (Singapore), Sir Frances Shepherd (Batavia), F.S. Gibbs (Saigon), 25 Oct.
1948.
130 Afghanistan is not included in the category of 'Southeast Asia', but in the term Tar East', though
not always. For instance, R.H. Scott of the FO took the term 'Far East' to mean Afghanistan, the Indian
sub-continent, and the rest of Asia, east of India in PRO FO 371 92065 F1022/34/951 memorandum by
R.N. Scott of the FO on British Policy in the FE, 30 Oct. 1951.
131 PRO FO 371 69684 F17833/148/61 G.H. Thompson, Bangkok, to FO, 14 Dec. 1948.
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Despite the attitude in Washington the local US authorities in Siam were more
understanding and perceptive. The local US representatives in Siam were not only more
than willing to discuss Siamese matters freely with their British counterparts, but also to
make representations to the government at home. 132 The US Ambassador in Bangkok,
Stanton, for example, raised issues related to Siam and the Communist threat to SEA on
his own initiative when he met Thompson and entirely agreed with the latter's opinion of
the need for close Anglo-American consultation and agreement on how to deter
Communist threats to SEA and Siam. Stanton himself feared that little was to be
expected from Washington because the general impression there seemed to be that since
the Americans had so much on their hands in Europe there was not much they could do
in SEA. 133 Nevertheless, this was a valuable encouragement to the British authorities,
while Washington was not quite prepared to talk about Siam in their belief that Siam was
primarily a British responsibility. When Dening went to Washington with the idea of
conducting a full-scale review with the USA of the possibilities of action in SEA he was
told by Walton Butterworth, the US State Department's Director of Far Eastern Affairs,
that it was doubtful whether the Western countries could usefully do much to influence
the Southeast Asian countries and thus Britain ought not to fritter away her resources on
behalf of governments that were neither willing nor able to stand up for themselves.134
The British FO gathered that the US government, after having had their fingers burnt in
China, where the USA 'suffered a severe setback and a grave emotional disappointment
132 PRO FO 371 69684 F17833/148/61/G note by P.F. Grey, FO, 22 Dec. 1948.
133 PRO FO 371 69684 F17971/148/61/G G.H. Thompson, Bangkok, to FO, 17 Dec. 1948.
134 PRO FO 371 69684 F17833/148/61/G note by P.F. Grey, FO, 22 Dec. 1948; FO 371 76024
F14149/1024/61 M.E. Dening, Washington, to W. Strang, FO, 15 Sept. 1949; FO 371 76024
F15735/1024/61 FO minutes by M.E. Dening, 12 Sept. 1949; FO 371 76025 F17668/10345/61G R.H.
Scott, FO, to H.A. Graves, Washington, 24 Nov. 1949.
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in the extension of Communist influence',135 were unwilling to risk burning them further
in SEA. Therefore Scott warned the British government that unless the British could
induce a radical change of heart in the US State Department, it very much looked as
though the British should have to 'try and hold the Siamese baby alone' •136
Throughout the post-war period the Siamese were eager to earn dollars to the degree
that the procurement of rice by Britain and the Sterling area and their payments became a
source of a long-running conflict between the countries involved. The Siamese exports to
the Sterling area were normally paid for with sterling, and since Britain and the Sterling
area were her major trading partners, Siam in the past had not been unwilling to hold
sterling in reasonable amounts. However, as the possibility of obtaining capital
equipment of all kinds, particularly locomotives and railway equipment, from the Sterling
area was becoming uncertain, the Siamese were trying to export more toward the dollar
area. The British were afraid that in the near future the Siamese might want to get dollars
by the method of withholding a proportion of their exportable rice from the Sterling area.
As Malaya and Singapore depended greatly on rice imports from Siam, this could affect
her counter-insurgency effort. It was also possible that Siam would demand dollars for
her rice supply to the Sterling area, which was equally unacceptable, for the whole
British Empire and Commonwealth were suffering from the shortage of dollars. Thus,
the British Cabinet invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stafford Cripps, in
consultation with the President of the Board of Trade, Harold Wilson, to discuss how far
it was possible to meet Siam's requirements for capital as well as consumer goods.
Additionally the Board of Trade examined the matter of granting of priority to Siam in
135 PRO FO 371 76386 W5573/3/500G P.U.S.C. (51) Final: Anglo-American Relations: Present and
Future, produced by the Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee, Oct. 1949, p.4.
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supplying the required goods, from the point of view of developing British connections
in a market, which was likely to have considerable long-term possibilities for capital
goods. The British manufacturers who prior to the war used to be the suppliers of
vehicles, machinery, chemicals and drugs, miscellaneous manufactured goods, iron and
steel and textiles for Siam, were, of course, interested in the Siamese market as a long
term prospect for investments. Provided that there was official encouragement, they
wished to develop the Siamese market, not only by supplies of goods but also through
the supply of services of a technical kind. In spite of the willingness by the manufacturers
to proceed, and the government's full awareness of the vital nature of Siamese exports
and the necessity for maintaining British economic connections with her, the British
government could not offer Siam priority for orders of capital goods for which there was
a demand in hard currency markets.'" It was at this time that alleged instructions were
made to British manufacturers from the British government to retain their output or most
of it for the home market, and thus to decline to accept orders from the colonies.'" A
Working Party, established to examine Siamese dollar position and their request for
goods, concluded that Siam's dollar position was by no means tight, and her eagerness to
obtain more dollars was mainly due to her conviction that the sterling would not buy her
the goods that she needed, while dollars would. Though the analysis was accurate, the
British chose the wrong way to renew Siamese confidence in the purchasing power of
sterling, for the conclusion drawn by the Working Party was no more than an empty
-
PRO FO 371 76004 F5735/1017/61 minutes by R.H. Scott, 5 May 1949.
187 PRO BT 11 3968 minute on Siam's Requirements for Sterling Goods, 2 Aug. 1948; BT 11 3968
Export Promotion Department, Board of Trade, to L. Fetch, Cabinet Office, 27 Aug. 1948
188 CD (49) 1, 25 Jan 1949, cited in Morgan, Developing British Colonial Resources 1945-1951, p. 22.
The CO, despite the final responsibility for dependent territories, did not have any voice in allocations of
commodities (virtually all commodities) in which they were interested.
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rhetoric promise: ' ... give them some hope that their requirements can be met from the
United Kingdom in the not-too-distant future."'
In spite of a favourable trade balance with the dollar area in 1947 and 1948, the
Siamese were about to impose considerable restrictions on dollar imports, which would
leave them only two alternatives for the procurement of their requirements in railway
equipment, either the UK and the Sterling area or the Soviets. The British were well
aware of the fact that unless her requirements for machinery and capital equipment were
satisfied, there was a danger of her developing close trade relations with the Soviets and
Czechoslovakia, of whom the former was interested in Siamese tin, and both had already
made generous-sounding offers of machinery. 140 However, even after 1949 when the
British economy recovered the pre-war level in terms of production, a Siamese request
for locomotives was still turned down for the same reason as in previous years and again
in 1951, although this time because of the rearmament programme in Britain,'
The problem with sterling payments in Siam continued throughout the rest of the
Attlee government. There were some cases in which the buyers were required to pay
with dollars by the sellers, and also rumours that the Siamese Ministry of Commerce
actually demanded US dollars in payment. 142 The Siamese government, in effect, pursued
a definite policy of building up dollar reserves even to the point of converting some
sterling holdings into short term dollar assets. Since the British and Australian companies
139 PRO BT 11 3968 CABINET O.N. (48) 310: report (Exports to Siam) of the Working Party of the
overseas Negotiations Committee, 31 Aug. 1948.
149 PRO FO 371 76043 F11997/1103/61 Economic Survey of Thailand (Summary and Conclusions): FO
minute, 12 Aug. 1949.
141 PRO FO 371 101170 FS1022/1 report of conversation between Siamese Prime Minister and Sir J.
Bent, Deputy Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, 31 Mar. 1952.
142 PRO FO 371 84378 FS1114/1 and FS1114/3, 84433, 84384, BT 11 3968, T 236 446 etc.
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controlled 75 per cent of tin in Siam, 143
 and the majority of the tin ore was exported to
the Malayan smelters, the Siamese government asked the companies to pay partially with
dollars. As a response to this request Thompson in Bangkok suggested to the FO that
the British government should offer the Siamese government hard currency for some
portions of their tin ore exports to Malaya. In spite of the strong inducement for the
Siamese to ship tin ore to the USA owing to exchange advantages due to the premium
on dollars in the open market, the advantage on exchange was not sufficient to outweigh
the disadvantages to exporters of the American payments system by which final payment
was made one month after the arrival of the shipment in the USA and at the price then
ruling. In any case, after the 1949 sterling devaluation, which was thirty per cent against
the US dollar, the exchange advantage was not so great, and sales of tin ore to the USA
actually fell off Nevertheless, this gesture of paying the Siamese exports partially with
dollars was designed to show goodwill. Here the British authorities were again in a
dilemma. If the British paid for Siamese tin partially with dollars, the Siamese would no
longer be anxious to export tin ore to the USA because of the disadvantage explained
before. The USA needed high quality Siamese ore for its domestic smelting industry.
Thus, unless some of the Siamese ore were sent to the USA, the Americans themselves
would seek concessions in Siam and might try to directly control Siamese tin mines,
which would be very much against British interests. Moreover, it was also possible, as
the Ministry of Supply pointed out, that the Texas smelter would backward invest to
secure Siamese tin ore and locate permanently in Siam, an idea that the FO 'hated'.1"
In Siam there was plenty of sterling available, and the British were confident that
their products and methods of business had a good reputation locally. In 1950, the First
143 Australia had a considerable interests in the Siamese tin mines. In fact it was they who invented the
bucket dredging against the traditional method of open casket, which greatly helped the western firms
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Secretary (Commercial) in Bangkok sent an article for publication in the Board of Trade
Journal. He wrote that direct exports from the UK to Siam had increased encouragingly
and steadily ever since the war, and especially after devaluation, the advantage of trading
with the UK for Siam was in addition to the fact that British prices did not rise so sharply
as those of other producing countries.' However, the reality was much grimmer than
anticipated in the article and reflected the typically confident attitude among the British.
It was true that UK exports to Siam steadily increased throughout the post-war years.
However, the percentage (calculated on the basis of the value of the export) of British
exports to Siam was still only half the 1938 level in 1948, and only reached the pre-war
level in 1954. This whole picture looks rather disastrous in comparison with US
achievement in the country; US exports occupied 6.59 per cent of the total Siamese
imports in 1938, but eleven years after, the percentage went up to 15.67 per cent. On the
other hand, imports by Britain did not change much, staying steadily around 3 per cent,
except around 5 per cent in 1949. Thus Britain enjoyed a favourable balance of payment
with Siam, whereas the US import ratio doubled from 1938, 11.09 per cent, to 1948,
22.24 per cent, though it subsided gradually in 1949, the USA running an unfavourable
trade with Siam. After the end of the Korean War boom, US imports from Siam then
rapidly reduced while exports substantially increased. Overall, US exports to Siam
dramatically increased from 6.59 per cent in 1938 to 20.51 per cent in 1954, while UK
exports from 13.73 per cent to 13.08 per cent respectively. 146
(with capital) overtake Chinese position in tin mining.
144 PRO FO 371 84433 FS 1543/1-2, 4, 6, 17 and 20. See file FS1543/10 for the figure of tin ore exports.
145 PRO FO 371 84376 FS 1122/1 article written by the First Secretary (Commercial) in Bangkok for
publication in the Board of Trade Journal, 1950.
146 United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1954, prepared by the Statistical Office of
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the United Nations (New York, 1955), pp. 495-6. The table
below is based in Table 6. Trade by Principal Countries of Production and Sale, in p. 496, and the
percentage was reproduced by the author; 'imports' means 'General Imports c.i.f and 'exports' means
'General Exports fo.b';
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The majority of British enterprise in Siam were merchant firms which worked as
merchants, agencies, and also producers like the Borneo company, and there were banks,
tin and petroleum companies.' UK export trade with Siam was dealt with by various
selling organisations on the spot. Firstly, there were branch houses and the
representatives of British manufacturers of capital and consumer goods, and secondly
there were merchant firms who worked with British firms in a smaller scale, who could
not afford the former type of operation. The merchants firms worked by establishing
contracts with firms in the UK who needed agents for sales, and, if necessary, acted as
financiers for them.'" Since a very large percentage of total UK export trade was done
by smaller firms who worked with and were assisted by the locally-based reputable
British merchant firms and managing agencies, less trade between Britain inclusive of the
whole Sterling area and Siam meant less profit for these agencies. The degree of despair
felt by the American business community in Siam about the shortage of dollar exchange
in the country is, therefore, hardly surprising, for less dollars in Siam meant less trade
between the two countries, and less profit for them.149
Principal Countries	 1938 1948 1949 1954
Japan	 Imports 15.61 2.42 8.30 22.95
Exports 1.17 0.30 6.05 28.28
Malaya	 Imports 13.08 33.53 18.29 0.65
Exports 56.44 23.92 29.56 26.35
United Kingdom Imports 13.73 7.03 8.69 13.08
Exports 1.42 2.69 4.96 2.91
United States	 Imports 6.59 9.18 15.67 20.51
Exports 11.09 22.24 16.53 5.61
141 This is the list of the biggest British businesses in Siam: Borneo Co., Ltd., Anglo-Thai Corporation,
Ltd., Bombay-Burmah Trading Corp., Ltd., Louis T. Leonowens, Ltd., London Tin Corp., Ltd., Siamese
Tin Syndicate, Ltd., Kamra Tin Dredging Ltd. & Pattani Tin, Ltd., Asiatic Petroleum Co. (Siam) Ltd.,
Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, Mercantile
Bank of India: PRO BT 11 2515 letter to D. Carter, Trading with the Enemy Department, 21 Aug. 1945.
148 PRO T236 1960 minutes of the sixth meeting of the Overseas Trade Development Council,
Department of Overseas Trade, 2 May 1945.
149 PRO FO 371 70029 F2310/2310/40 Siam: annual report for 1947 by G.H. Thompson, British
Embassy, Bangkok, to Bevin, 12 Feb. 1948.
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The competition between the business communities was fierce, and British
businesses in Siam were acutely aware of the American advance, while competition from
other countries for sometime to come was discarded. The British manifested their fear of
competition from representatives of American interests taking advantage of the situation
that the USA was not in a state of war with Siam, while the Americans were 'obviously
trying rapidly to establish friendly relations with Siam in the interest of future trade'.1"
Their fears were often worsened by the openly declared optimism of people in the USA.
A speech made by Vincent, the Director of Far Eastern Affairs in the US State
Department on 12 November 1946, was an example of their ambition and of the
aggressive tactics intended to increase trade with the Far East. In this, he confidently
stated that private business and government should work together for that purpose;
When I use the term "American business" I have in mind all
American business irrespective of whether it has a private,
semi-official, or official character. I do not believe that we
can have one standard for private business and another
standard for official business.m
The readiness of the USA to compete with British traditional interests in various parts
of the Far East, especially in Siam, often aggravated the relationship between the
established overseas communities of the two countries.
Local American interests were aggressive and forthcoming, and they worked
hard to keep the British out of the market, lavishing all kinds of attractive promises on
the Siamese. As a result, the Siamese, who were already somewhat affected by Britain's
I' PRO BT 11 2515 note of a meeting held at the Trading with Enemy Department, 11 Oct. 1945. The
business side was presented by Borneo Co. Ltd., Bombay-Burma T.C. Ltd., Thai Tin Syndicate, Shell
Co., Anglo-Thai Corp., and John Swire & Sons Ltd; the Treasury, the FO, the Board of Trade and the
Department of Overseas Trade presented the Government.
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internal difficulties and problems, were slow in issuing tenders or in placing firm orders
with the British firms because they were waiting to see to what extent these promises
were likely to be implemented. 152 Nonetheless, by the end of 1948 great relief was felt
throughout the British business community in Siam with respect to US competition. On
14 December 1948, a despatch was sent from Bangkok to the British FO stating that
'they [the Americans] have not succeeded in ousting British influence either political or
economic'.'" Another despatch was soon followed;
... the British community, since resuming operations in 1946,
have done extremely well and earned large profits. In
contrast, the Americans, who fondly imagined at the end of
the war they should sweep the board here commercially, have
not done nearly as well as they anticipated ... . 154
Despite the fact that there was a very large increase in the strength of the American
business community since the war, they had somewhat excessive expectations of newly
arising opportunities in post-war Siam. Their new business ventures were still on a small
and rather individual scale except for the Standard Vacuum Oil Company and
International Engineering. Insomuch as the Americans, most of whom had expected a
commercial walk-over in post-war Siam, looked forward with keen anticipation to the
convertibility of sterling from July 1947 onwards as a means of remedying the dollar
shortage, their disappointment was profound when convertibility was suspended in
-
151 PRO FO 371 53971 F17004/13/61 speech by the Director of Far Eastern Affairs Committee in the US
State Department, 12 Nov. 1946.
152 PRO BT 3968 Bangkok to FO, 14 Sept. 1948.
153 PRO FO 371 69684 F17833/148/61/G despatch from Bangkok to FO, 14 Dec. 1948.
154 PRO FO 371 76024 F16284/1024/61 G.H. Thompson, British Embassy, Bangkok, to M.E. Dening,
FO, 18 Oct. 1949.
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August.' 55 The acute shortage of dollar exchange throughout 1947 in Siam 'caused much
heart-burning in American commercial circles'. Even worse, when Siam in due course
joined the sterling convertibility group to enable her sterling earnings to be used for
current transactions with a variety of non-dollar countries, 'the American sense of
frustration reached its height'. Although this hostility subsided towards the end of the
year when dollar prospects improved with increased American buying of tin and the
possibility of substantial American purchases of rice for Chinese relief, this was the time
of a sharp return of exchanges between the British and American Embassies in Bangkok
upon the use of the British Financial Adviser to the Siamese government. 156
The Americans attributed the relative success of the British in post-war Siam to
the existing British private business interests.' 57 However as far as the companies that
produced goods for local consumption were concerned, competition was fierce, and the
success was limited due to the size of the market. For instance, Shell, which supplied oil
for the Siamese market, saw a reduction of their proportion of Siamese trade since the
war as a result of the advent of Caltex to the Siamese market,' Unilever, which
competed against Procter and Gamble in Siam as in other Southeast Asian countries, also
had the same disadvantage as a producer of goods for local consumption. This local
competition was beyond the reach of the central government, but the success or failure
entirely depended, for instance, on the price and reputation of goods.
The British political authorities were not in a position to dismiss lightly the undue
pessimism in some British commercial circles regarding their future business in Siam
while the political situation in Malaya and China was rapidly deteriorating. However, in
155 ibid; FO 371 70029 F2310/2310/40 Siam: annual report for 1947 by G.H. Thompson to Bevin, 12
Feb. 1948.
156 ibid
151 FRUS (1950) vol. vi , East Asia and the Pacific, Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of
State, 15 Oct. 1950, p. 1535.
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the absence of the extreme political and economic conditions that many British firms
experienced in post-war Malaya, Indonesia and Burma, most of the requests made by
British enterprise in Siam were not as urgent as in those countries. The correspondence
was made up of expressions of confusion about the timing of opening trade and the
passage of British business personnel wishing to return to Siam. There were suggestions
within business circles of the possibility of providing credits and loans for the Siamese to
buy more from Britain. Nevertheless, the British FO and the Embassy in Bangkok kept
up close communication with British business about their interests in Siam. Thus, when
four or five American tobacco experts were being sought by the Siamese in June 1949
and Dean Rusk, US Under-Secretary of State, promised assistance in selecting them
along with railroad experts to advise on the rehabilitation of Siamese State Railways and
electrical engineers to work in the Bangkok power station, the withdrawal of the British-
American Tobacco Company from Siam earlier on March 31 was recorded as
unfortunate and somewhat an unduly precipitate decision.'"
There was another incident that induced a series of correspondence between
British firms, the Embassy in Bangkok, and the London government. Throughout
January 1950 the British Embassy in Bangkok and the FO carefully watched the
establishment of an American company to manufacture plywood in Siam, which was the
first instance of the investment of American capital in an industrial enterprise in Siam.
The Commercial Secretary at the British Embassy, immediately made contact with the
Manager of the Bombay-Burmah Trading Corp., which was one of the largest timber
concerns in Siam. The Manager told the Commercial Secretary that the Corporation
were not interested in establishing a factory in Siam, but one on Borneo and another in
158 PRO FO 371 84384 FS1121/10 FO to Bangkok, 5 July 1950.
159 PRO FO 371 76280 F9094/1017/40 telegram from Bangkok to FO, 22 June 1949.
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the Andamans, and also added that he did not think that any British firm would invest in
such an undertaking in Siam because of political uncertainty, and of the alleged demand
that the Siamese government should have a controlling interest.'" However, in less than
ten days another despatch was sent to the British FO to report that the establishment of
an American plywood factory might be more serious than it had at first appeared. It now
appeared to be a big threat to British commercial interests in Siam because the new
plywood factory would be an activity of the Forest Industrial Organisation (set up by the
Siamese government) to work the government leases in the teak forests and to market
the timber therefrom. Therefore, when the proposal that the Forest Industrial
Organisation should be re-capitalised on a joint Siamese/American basis under American
management was made, this would not only give US capital an immediate considerable
interest in forestry in Siam, which was hitherto a virtual British and Danish monopoly so
far as foreigners were concerned, but also it would almost certainly mean the elimination
of the British and, of course, the Danish teak firms on the event of expiration of their
leases in 1955 or thereabouts. 161 The prompt reaction of the British Embassy to the news
of Americans establishing a factory, their immediate contact with business and the FO at
home, and their insight in the establishment that would affect the existing British interests
clearly proved the closeness between the British business community in Siam and the
British local authorities. Likewise, when the managing agencies selected managers, their
ability to mingle with the civil servants was taken account of in their selection, as close
communication between them was a mutually valuable asset.
In 1953 and 1954 the situation did not change substantially. The British were keen
to improve their position relative to that of their competitors, mainly the USA and
160 PRO FO 371 84405 FS1281/1 G.H. Thompson, British Embassy, Bangkok, to Hector McNeil, FO, 4
Jan. 1950.
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notably Japan and Germany. 162 The rumour of a loan negotiation between the Siamese
government and the US government was immediately passed to the Board of Trade and
Export Credits Guarantee Department, in case the US loan resulted in a substantial
reduction in UK exports to Siam. At the same time the British firms were also anxious to
know the possibility of a sterling loan with an expectation to increase exports to Siam; 'if
Siam had the sterling she would as readily spend it here as anywhere'. 163 However, as in
the 1940s this kind of request was firmly turned down by the government with same sort
of explanation: 'there were a large number of countries ... who would like money from
us and we had not enough to go round and it was a question of priorities' 164 The
business interests and local British authorities in Bangkok, on the one hand, were
optimistic about their future position as they were convinced that UK capital goods had a
high reputation in the country. However, on the other hand, they felt themselves to be in
a disadvantageous position in comparison to the Americans, due to the presence of
numerous American technical advisers working for the Siamese government, who would
obviously recommend the Siamese government to use American products. 165 Moreover
the British Embassy was anxious about the British importing firms in the country buying
161 ibid.
162 PRO FO 371 106905 FS1152/1 letter from British Embassy, Bangkok, to Salisbury, 13 Aug. 1953.
At the end of 1945 the British government, especially the Treasury and the Board of Trade, observed
that Japan would 'not be a serious competitor for at least a short period, and Germany for a much
longer period' (PRO FO 371 54052 F 6208/2129/G61 draft memorandum prepared by the Far Eastern
Civil Planning Unit of the Cabinet Office, 31 Dec. 1945, p. 5). However differently from what was
expected, 1950 onwards German competition was already well-positioned in the region. This is
reflected in the various Treasury and Board of Trade files in 1950 and 1951.
162 PRO T 236 61 Currency: Sterling Area - Dollar Pool 1944-46. The Americans, on the contrary,
constantly complained that because of the abundant sterling the Asian purchaser would automatically
look to the Sterling area.
163 PRO FO 371 112286 DS1151/9 letter from H. Edgar of Edgar Brothers Ltd. to the Board of Trade,
16 Aug. 1954 and note of interview written by S.H. Levine, Board of Trade, 30 Aug. 1954. Also see FO
371 112285 DS11345/3 letter from H. Edgar of Edgar Brothers Ltd., to S.H. Levine, Board of Trade, 6
Dec. 1954.
I 'l PRO FO 371 112286 DS1151/9 letter from H. Edgar of Edgar Brothers Ltd. to the Board of Trade,
16 Aug. 1954 and note of Interview written by S.H. Levine, Board of Trade, 30 Aug. 1954.
165 PRO FO 371 112286 DS1151/4 draft article on Thailand by the Commercial Secretariat of the British
Embassy, Bangkok, for publication in the Board of Trade Journal, 17 Mar. 1954.
304
indiscriminately from all countries rather than from Britain, and also about British
manufacturers who instead of investing capital in improving their sales organisation in
Siam kept their assets 'as small as possible in views of the nationalistic tendencies of
Siamese economic policy and other the Communist threat to Southeast Asia'. 166 As they
did throughout 1940s, the main actors worked together in the 1950s so as not to lose
their traditional interests in Siam in the 1950s. Thus the British business community and
the Embassy, which would immediately inform the government at home even a slightest
change to US business interests in the country, kept watchful eyes towards the USA.
Conclusion
The experiences of British businesses in Siam and Indonesia during the period concerned
differed to a large extent in accordance with the political and economic situation in the
host countries. There was, however, a common fear of losing business. In the case of
Indonesia, British businesses faced a completely new situation after the end of the war —
things had moved from a position of relative stability to one of complete chaos. The
resumption of business was almost impossible because of the hostilities between the
Dutch and Indonesians, and there was also the possibility of losing their businesses as a
result of an abrupt nationalisation programme in the newly independent Indonesia, where
economic policy was subordinated to the political stance that was based on strong
nationalist and anti-foreign sentiment. British businesses in Siam were feared being
gradually eliminated by the Siamese government's systematic discrimination against
foreign interests and by foreign competition. The competition from American businesses
was especially fierce. American companies were given an advantage by the fact that they
were based in the USA with all the political power and economic weight that this fact
166 PRO FO 371 106905 FS1152/1 letter from British Embassy, Bangkok, to Salisbury, 13 Aug. 1953.
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alone bestowed upon them. In addition to this the US firms showed a remarkable desire
to actively anticipate in new opportunities that had arisen in Siam in the post-war period.
In these circumstances the British government and local British authorities, and British
companies in these countries kept in close touch. Information was exchanged, and
communication was exceptionally close. Their interests — profitability and protection of
British subjects and expansion of British business interests — coincided rather than
conflicted. Both sides understood the need for coherence and for cooperation between
them if they were to be more effective, and this was especially the case as British
interests depended on the generosity of the host countries.
What is worth mentioning here, though it was never intended to undertake a
research on the subject, is the peculiar continuity of the elements that had determined
Britain's pre-war relations with Siam in the post-war period. Admittedly British
dominance in post-war Siam was not so firm as in the pre-war times, not least because of
Siam's need of material assistance from the USA and of US support to shed off Britain's
war claims. Yet the British continued to enjoy strong influence over Siam due to the
presence of the British Financial Adviser, and the tight economic and commercial bond
between Siam and Britain and the Sterling area. In hindsight the factors that had
determined pre-war relations between the UK, USA and Siam also existed in the post-
war period, especially because of Siam's need of US support and protection. Britain's
position was again challenged by the external factors rather than by any internal source,
especially in the light of the escalating tension between the Communist and non-
Communist forces in Asia, which resulted in increasing the significance of Siam's
strategic position and the growing significance of the US role in the strategic thinking of
Britain and Siam. There are also similar features of the pre-war times. These stretched
from jealousy over the use of the British Financial Adviser, and the power of the dollar,
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to things as trivial as the concern of the British authorities about the possibility of the
Americans interfering into the Siamese tin industry. As Aldrich correctly points out, there
was a change in the general attitude of the Americans toward Siam throughout the war
and in its aftermath. US policy shifted from being one of firmness to one that was
concessionary. 167 Nevertheless, the intransigence of the local American authority in Siam
and Washington was evident. The lack of interests in Siamese matters in the latter part of
the 1940s — differently from their enthusiasm during the immediate years of the post-
war period — prevented the USA from taking advantage of themselves being in a better
position in Siam. Another difference between the pre-war and post-war periods was the
confidence among the American commercial interests in Siam and the consequent fierce
competition between the British and American business communities. However, while
the bilateral trade between Britain and Siam looked, comparatively speaking, to be in
decline, there was no 'commercial walk-over' by the American businesses in Siam either.
Helped by the strong traditional link of Siam and the Sterling area, British businesses still
retained their position. In summary my findings suggest that the main issues that
characterised Britain's relations with Siam during the 1930s and the 1940s still persisted
in the 1950s, while the decline of Britain's influence over Siam was more evident.
167 Aldrich, op.cit., pp. 368-73.
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Chapter. 7 Diversification and Flexibility: The Survival of British
Firms in Southeast Asia
We have seen that the British governments and firms with business interests in SEA
worked closely together to overcome post-war problems in the region. However, despite
the fact that there was a symbiosis of interest in the interactions between them, there
were limitations as to how far that this could go and the firms were often left alone to
deal with problems. In such circumstances, if the firms were determined to survive, they
had to adapt to new situations. In doing so, flexibility to adjust, to diversify, and to
withdraw if necessary was essential. This was possible and sometimes necessary as a
large percentage of them had various interests in various countries, and thus were subject
to all kinds of external pressures.
Apart from war destruction, and economic and political instability immediately
following the war, firms were confronted by the challenges posed by the presence of
nationalist movements across the region, over which the British government hardly had
any control. When a newly appointed Manager of the Haiphong branch of the Hongkong
and Shanghai Bank in Indochina, Chambers, was heading north to reach the office, he
was struck by the look of animosity on the faces of the local Vietnamese. To start a
banking business there, he had had to go and see Ho Chi Minh to obtain permission. He
emphasised the fact to Ho Chi Minh that the bank had nothing to do with the French,
being entirely British, and that there was no trouble between the British, the Viet Cong
and the Viet Minh. 1
 Permission was eventually given, but not all such stories had happy
endings. The main element of the Indochinese anti-Western propaganda was their
antagonism towards foreigners and foreign business interests for exploiting the natural
1 King, The History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, vol. iv, p. 95.
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abundance created from their land. The Manager of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in
Singapore complained of discrimination against British banks in Indochina and mooted
the possibility of closing down his branches in the country, though in the end he was
advised by the central quarter to bide his time: festina lente.2
Discrimination against foreign business interests was present everywhere in post-
war SEA. Even in Siam, where foreign business interests enjoyed the conditions of
relative political stability, growing nationalism had an adverse effect on British
commercial and shipping interests. Government monopolies were set up in various fields,
and leases were renewed on less favourable terms for the foreigners as the scales were
weighted against the foreign traders.'
However, the problems in independent Indonesia were unprecedented. On 27
December 1949 the Netherlands formally transferred sovereignty to the Indonesians. At
a Round Table Conference held at the Hague from 23 August to 2 November 1949, the
Indonesian delegates, Sukarno, the would-be President of the Republic of the United
States of Indonesia (RUST), and Hatta, its prospective Prime Minister and Vice-
President, provided various guarantees for Dutch investments in Indonesia along with
agreements on consultations on some financial matters. 4 The British valued highly the
continued commercial and economic connection between the Dutch and Indonesians
after independence. They did so from the point of view of their own commercial benefit
as they knew that this was reliant on the presence of stable conditions in Indonesia (as
has been pointed out in previous chapters). When such conditions gave way to instability
the consequences were devastating for British business.
2 PRO FO 371 63554 F3521/3521161 Special Commissioner, Singapore, to Batavia, 12 Mar. 1947. He
also complained of the lack of business in Java, so considered the possibility of closing down the
branches in the NET. Again he was advised that closing down might be premature and that considerable
opportunities for British banks were likely to arise in time especially in the NET.
3 PRO FO 371 46545 F4298/G Policy towards Siam by Far Eastern Committee, 14 July 1945.
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There was constant labour unrest which the British firms believed to have been
instigated by Communists who were seeking, for their own nefarious ends, to paralyse
production by dominating a new and unregulated trade union movement.' Moreover, by
March 1951, theft, murder and general insecurity in the plantation areas were becoming
serious. 6 As a result, the Annual General Meeting of AsAhan Rubber Estates, Ltd., for
instance, announced on 29 March 1951 a loss of property and profit to the equivalent of
about £5 million, excluding the tobacco crop, on which the loss could not yet be
assessed.' When the British Ambassador at Djakarta (formerly Batavia) and the FO were
criticised for having been on the side of the Indonesians and unwilling to stand up for
British nationals and their interests, the reply was that the only hope seemed:
to lie in continued efforts by the Western powers to treat the
Indonesian Government sympathetically and assist
unobtrusively and gradually to establish peace and prosperity.
... We are satisfied that the policy of patient persuasion is the
only one likely to be effective . . •8
However, as far as the British firms were concerned, there were businesses to run, and
yet nobody really seemed to be able to alter anything.'
Finally President Sukarno made a public statement at the beginning of September
1951 calling for firmer action against lawlessness, but he did not succeed in establishing
4 Ricklefs, op.cit., p. 220.
5 PRO FO 371 92494 FH1151/22 The 38 th Annual General Meeting of AsAhan Rubber Estates, Ltd., 29
Mar. 1951. For more reports on strikes, see The Times, 8 Feb. 1951.
6 PRO FO 371 92494 FH1151/20 British Embassy, Djakarta, to the FO, Mar. 1951; there are details of
robbery and damage on rubber estates in Indonesian, in The Times, 1 Feb. 1951.
7 PRO FO 371 92494 FH1151/22 The 38th Annual General Meeting of AsAhan Rubber Estates, Ltd., 29
Mar. 1951.
8 PRO FO 371 92495 FH1151/47 Parliamentary Under-Secretary, to Geoffrey Wilson, House of
Commons, 24 Nov. 1951.
9 PRO FO 92494 FH1151/30 Royal Norwegian Consulate General, Djakarta, to Leif Hoegh & Co., Oslo,
Norway, 21 Apr. 1951.
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immediate order.'° The basic problem with independent Indonesia was that the
accelerating growth in the population served to worsen the conditions of food shortage.
The social instability that this caused was further complicated, from the point of view of
foreign firms, by an economic policy which kept the exchange rate artificially high in
order to provide support for the net-importing economy of Java. This, in turn, imposed
difficulties on export industries." In such circumstances, where revenues from export
activities were hit badly, gold and foreign exchange reserves were drained to finance
non-productive areas like the army, rapidly growing government jobs, and other projects
such as constructing prestige buildings. 12 In addition, the situation was further
complicated when the Korean War boom was over and the price of rubber fell by 71 per
cent. In an effort to correct the unfavourable balance of trade the Indonesian government
imposed heavy surcharges on luxury imports and they cut government expenditure.° At
the same time, the government consistently controlled the selling prices of goods, which
impeded the manufacturers' struggle to make a profit in circumstances of the ever rising
price of raw materials.14
In order to tackle all such problems, unique to the post-war period, the British
firms needed to be flexible and ready to modify their methods, in accordance with the
external business environment. In 1956 the Borneo Company published its history of the
first one hundred years of trading in the Far East. It emphasised the key points that
enabled survival as being flexibility and the creative use of human resources;
... an enterprise which, with its fifteen subsidiary companies,
will sell you anything from a teak log to a box of matches, a
113 PRO FO 92495 FH1151/38 E. Davies, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, to P.G.T. Buchan-Hepburn,
House of Commons, 4 Sept. 1951.
11 Ricklefs, op.cit., p. 226.
12 Fieldhouse, op.cit., p, 286.
13 Ricklefs, op.cit., p. 233.
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barge to a bottle of beer; which will insure you, book you an
air passage, victual your ships, or act as your agent whatever
country you may live in and whatever you want to sell. The
secret of all these great 'venture' companies lies in flexibility,
the way in which if one line of activity fails — as, for
instance, tea failed a couple of years ago in Sumatra, never
having recovered from the war — they can immediately
probe out elsewhere. And the secret of flexibility lies, of
course, in human beings.15
In retrospect flexibility was not something strategically chosen as a way of survival, but
something the firms had learnt from the past experiences of going through fit and lean
years.
The merchants had always sought fresh opportunities to expand their interests,
and investment in rubber was a result of a deliberate attempt by the merchants (with the
help of Ceylon coffee planters) to select another tropical crop that could be adapted to
plantation in the East. The agency houses and the rubber companies had to learn how to
adapt to the times because of their experiences with fluctuations in the demand for
rubber, for instance, during the rubber boom in the 1900s resulting from the American
car production boom, and the downturn in world trade in the inter-war period.
Moreover, their involvement in the extractive industries widened the scope of, and
complicated, their business interests: they were traders, agencies and secretaries for the
rubber companies, had interests in shipping, insurance, and banking, and also owned
14 Fieldhouse, op.ciL, p. 292.
15 Longhurst, op.ciL, pp. 112-13.
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rubber companies which they floated in public. The more estates they controlled, the
bigger the business done in the estates' supplies and engineering departments.16
In Harrisons & Crosfleld's case, the collapse of business interests in Russia after
the 1917 revolution affected the company so much so that they had to restructure the
extravagant administration style and costly organisations to a manageable size. Before
1919 the Russian market had been their most important single outlet outside the home
trade. The British agency houses with interests in the rubber and tin industries were all
directly affected by: the Stevenson Scheme in 1922, which worked unfairly against the
Malayan rubber industry; the world depression in the late 1920s and the subsequent
rubber price decline and the Slump in 1932; and the Second World War. And Harrisons
& Crosfleld was not an exception. As the fortunes of the industry depended almost
entirely on the external forces, over which the agency houses were not in control, those
in charge of the estates in the Harrisons & Crosfield Agency Group also had to learn
how to adapt. In times of difficulties, some estates were being rested; the labour forces
of both European managers and Asian labourers alike were reduced; the output of rubber
was minitnised; at the extreme, cultivation work was reduced to a maintenance basis and
capital expenditure curtailed!' Particularly after the end of the Second World War, while
it was not yet possible to work on rehabilitation and restoration of the estates and mines,
Harrisons & Crosfleld concentrated on developing trading activities instead. 18 In
Indonesia Harrisons & Crosfield struggled on until 1952, trying to make a go of their
interests in tea, but costs and funding made it almost impossible. The directors in the end
decided to abandon the business, and so handed over the properties to the Indonesian
16 pug, ,n op.cit., p. 76.
17 ibid., p. 106. For more details on the dramatically fluctuating and changing fortunes of the industry in
the 1920s, read the description written by Eric Miller, the Chairman of Harrisons & Crosfield, in Pugh,
op.cit., p. 99.
18 ibid., p. 137.
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government who undertook responsibility for the labour force, while European staff
were transferred to rubber estates.°
The efforts made by the British firms to localise management are also evidence of
their willingness and readiness satisfy Asian aspirations. Mira Wilkins points out that the
British enterprises imposed familiarity by: dispatching their men abroad, UK
incorporation, sending their methods and products abroad, and requesting treaties that
helped assure their property rights. 20 However, the British were becoming more prepared
to adapt to the new situation and the only way left for them was to adopt localisation.
Indeed, localisation was widely chosen by the British enterprises as a means to
survive as, on the one hand the native governments put them under pressure, while, on
the other, such a strategy was made possible due to the greater availability of educated
Asian staff. Attlee himself supported the localisation of management. He did so on the
basis that Western capital and technique could play its part in raising the standard of life
in the less developed parts of the world:
I think, wherever European or Western enterprises are
operating, an endeavour should be made to bring the local
people into co-operation so that the enterprise, instead of
being that of an alien power, is accepted as belonging in part
to the country concerned. Recently in Burma I talked with
British businessmen who had grasped the necessity for this
and had brought in Burmese directors and were training
young Burmese to take their part in management and in
19 ibid., p. 144.
20 M. 'The History of European Multinationals: A New Look', The Journal of European
Economic History, 15, 1986, pp. 497-8. According to her the British seemed to have been the least
successful in adapting because domestic experience with adaptation over distance did not exist, while it
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technical operation with very happy results. No doubt this is
troublesome, but it is well worth while.
Even before the war efforts were made to replace Europeans by Asians in
supervisory tasks, 22 and this process started in India before anywhere else in South and
South East Asia because indigenous capital in India was longer established, which had
resulted in the greater availability of educated indigenous personnel.
Localisation could merely mean that some Asians were recruited to replace
Europeans in a limited number of managerial posts, while top management positions,
whose occupants were be in charge of formulating company policy, remained in the
hands of expatriates. It could also mean opening up the highest posts to the locals, which
would effectively change the nature of the foreign enterprise, from being that of an
expatriate company to being a genuinely Asian company with an Asian chairman and
managing director. However, reference to the localisation of management, more often
that not, has meant the former rather than the latter.
In the case of Unilever's Indian subsidiary, which had already started local
manufacturing by 1938, the Second World War forced a change of attitudes towards the
Indianisation of management because many British managers and technical staff were
absent on military service and it was impossible to replace them from home. By July
1942 the Special Committee of the company accepted localisation of management as a
general principle in the recruitment for junior and senior managerial positions. As a
result, in 1944 15 of the 57 senior managers were Indians. 23 After independence in 1947
this tendency was perforce strengthened as the Indian government's attitude towards the
seemed likely that it would be relatively easier for the American enterprise to deal with the heterogeneity
abroad.
21 Attlee, op. cit., p. 176.
22 Allen and Donnithorne, op.cit., p. 129.
23 Fieldhouse, op.cit., pp. 191-2.
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expatriate firms and the managing agencies became strict: the companies managed by
British-controlled managing agencies were officially considered to be foreign-controlled,
regardless of the ownership of the company. 24
 However as far as Unilever's Indian
subsidiary was concerned, it took them around twenty more years to appoint an Indian
(Tandon) as the Chairman of the subsidiary, then with a board of six directors of whom
only two were expatriates and with 205 managers in India of whom only 14 were
Europeans. 25 Differently from the subsidiary in India, Unilever in Siam had problems with
recruitment of Siamese management because the burdens of life for a senior manager
were not avidly sought by the Siamese. Therefore Unilever were competing in a very
tight market.26
Localisation of management in Indonesia needs more detailed studies, as it was
strongly supported by the government as a part of the work of Indonesianisation. In
September 1950, the Indonesian Prime Minister delivered a Government Statement
before Parliament regarding the promotion of smallholders' rubber growing; the Rubber
Fund would be re-organised to benefit smallholders in production and selling, as well as
in the purchasing of the necessary equipment. At the same time the existing foreign
enterprises were urged to open broad and real opportunities for Indonesians 'to obtain
training up to the top ranks and also to open the opportunity for Indonesian capital to
participate'. 27 Immediately after the Statement the government announced an economic
plan, the so-called RUP (The Economic Regency Plan), in order to quicken
Indonesianisation. The Plan was essentially a pragmatic programme intended to promote
small industry and indigenous entrepreneurship, while nationalisation was still
24 M. Kidron, Foreign Investments in India (London, 1965), p. 5.
26 Fieldhouse, op.cit., Ch. 4.
26 Wilson, op.cit., p. 243.
27 Modern Record Centre (MRC), University of Warwick, TUC MSS.292/959.2/1 T 696 1945-53
Summary of Government Statement, 21 Sept. 1950.
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restricted. 28 Unfortunately political instability, including the inconsistency of numerous
governmental economic policies, prevented more inward investment to Indonesia as well
as any expansion of the existing foreign business interests. Nevertheless localisation of
management proceeded, for instance, 1,350 expatriates working for the Shell Group in
Indonesia in 1949 were reduced to 493 in 1959, while the Indonesian staff increased
from 117 to 1475 respectively. Moreover, Indonesians were promoted to do jobs which
previously had been undertaken by expatriate staff; and taken to Europe for training
during their service with the Group.29
A Unilever subsidiary in Indonesia started local manufacturing of soaps in
October 1934 and edible fats in 1936, and the success was immediate. By 1941 Unilever
was well settled in the NET and had plans to prepare for expansion, which came to a
complete halt due to the war. The subsidiary's post-war history is all about 'the reactions
of the company to political instability, hyper-inflation and hostility to foreign enterprises'.
The two main factories at Jakarta and Surabaya were formally handed back in March
1946 (and by the beginning of 1947 the subsidiary was back in business), and 'by 1949
sales of soap and edible fats were some three times the volume of 1940. 30 Nevertheless
Unilever's plan to increase total investment into the subsidiary in May 1949 seemed too
ambitious because some of the most significant criteria for private investment, such as
security, political stability and confidence, were lacking in Indonesia. Of course, behind
the decision, profitability was a key factor, nevertheless Unilever felt 'a certain moral
obligation to show confidence in ... the future [of Indonesia]' .31
The general attitude of Unilever's Indonesian subsidiary in the post-war period
was to accept 'without question the right of successive governments, Dutch, democratic
28 H  Hill, Foreign Investment and industrialisation in Indonesia (Oxford and New York, 1988), P. 4.
29 MRC, MSS. 200 B/3/3/264A FBI Committee on Policy towards Under-Developed Countries.
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and dictatorial, to set the conditions within which it had to operate'. Since Unilever was
producing consumer goods that would easily be replaced by other sources (for instance,
local producers and American competitors like Procter & Gamble) and contributed little
to the country's exports, the company did not have much bargaining power against the
Indonesian government, therefore it was entirely depended on its goodwill. 32 Therefore,
it is not surprising that Unilever responded quickly to the government's pressure for
localisation of management. In fact, as soon as the factories were handed over in 1946
the new senior managers accepted the need for recruitment of able young Indonesians.
However, the process was much slower than in India and Ceylon mainly because of
obstacles unique to Indonesia: firstly, an official policy of training and promoting the
locals for the higher level of civil service did not exist in pre-war Indonesia. Secondly,
the culture was not business-orientated. Moreover universities were less developed, so
that there were less educated men available than otherwise there might have been.
Despite this, the first intake of local management trainees in 1950, were immediately sent
to the Netherlands for training for a long period. The Headquarters of Unilever in
London were also encouraged to replace expatriate managers who were expensive for
the company. However, progress was slow; by the later 1950s there were only two
Indonesians on the boards of the local companies, though there were five Indonesian
senior managers and 53 junior managers. Nevertheless their relatively early endeavour to
train and promote local Indonesians was paid back later during the periods of anti-Dutch
policy in 1957 and of the Confrontation with Malaya which began in 1963, while both
Dutch and British were forced to leave their jobs and the country. Therefore, it was no
exaggeration when a visiting director attributed the survival of the business in Indonesia
3° Fieldhouse, op. cit., pp. 282, 288.
31 ibid., p. 284.
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under extreme duress to the great number of competent Indonesians (thus to the
company's early endeavour to recruit the Indonesians).33
In the case of Malaya the first economic plan initiated by the Federation of Malaya,
a Draft Development Plan published in June 1950, mainly dealt with the development of
social services, national resources and utilities, and trade and industry. 34 There was
hardly any systematic promotion of localisation by the Federation government, as there
was in Indonesia. Instead things were left entirely up to the firms. Nevertheless the
agency houses' involvement in the extractive industries helped them step further towards
localisation of management and diversification of business interests. Since the houses had
responsibility to appoint competent men to the management of individual estates, the
losses of European managers and assistants during the war were the gravest among the
war damages. In fact, even before the war there was a tendency to replace Europeans by
Asians in supervisory tasks, and by around 1950 all the larger estate groups employed a
considerable number of locally recruited staff." By 1955 there were still plenty of
European applicants for Malayan posts. Nevertheless opportunities for them on estates
were contracting with the growth in the number of educated Asians, and companies also
began to train Asian planters under the supervision of senior members of their staff.36
Moreover, furtherance of the localisation of management was to a great extent in
response to heavy criticism for incompetence. The Chinese businessmen blamed the
British manufacturers for lagging behind in market research, with a tendency to ignore
32 ibid., p.313.
33 ibid., pp. 296-99.
34 P.P. Courtenay, A Geography of Trade and Development in Malaya (London, 1972), p. 142. See the
table on the expenditure of the Draft Development Plan in M. Rudner, 'The Draft Development Plan of
the Federation of Malaya 1950-1955', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 3, 1972, p. 67.
35 Allen and Donnithorne, op.cit., p. 129.
36 ibid., p. 129. As far as the civil service area was concerned, with independence not far ahead, British
officials were replaced as quickly as possible by Malayans. As a result, between 1947 and 1954 the
number of Asians in higher administrative positions more than doubled: Woodcock, op.cit., p. 241.
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local conditions. They also felt that the old British agency houses, on whom the British
manufacturers relied for sales, lacked energy and enterprise, and moreover 'were losing
favour locally because they were reluctant to move with the times and "nationalise" their
staff.'"
However, the real pressures came from the British manufacturers who feared that
the Malayan government would vigorously pursue a policy of economic nationalism to
accelerate Malayanisation, thus divert industrial and commercial influence from
foreigners to nationals. Kuala Lumpur was already fast gaining in importance and many
firms who previously operated through a branch controlled from Singapore were
reversing the process and transferring their headquarters to the capital of the Federation.
Accordingly, most continental and Japanese businessmen were concentrating on Kuala
Lumpur. The Federation of British Industries reported that it was often heard that British
business visitors were still comparatively few in numbers and that insufficient attention
was paid by them to this growing centre of trade. Therefore, the members of the
Federation pointed out that although local firms were still very much inexperienced, it
might prove more politic in the future to operate through an indigenous firm rather than
through any of the British agency houses, who were already over-burdened with
agencies."
However, as pointed out earlier, increasing the degree of local participation was
quite different from appointing the locals at the executive and director levels. Even in
India, where localisation of management started before it had in any of the Southeast
Asian countries, progress in providing the locals with employment opportunities at the
executive level was slow. Among the British agency houses in Malaya and Singapore,
37 MRC, MSS. 2001F/3/D3/6/75 Federation of British Industries (Kipping File) D/5527 1955-6.
88 ibid.
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Sime Darby and Company, which had begun as merchants, diversifying by 1952 into
rubber and tin, engineering and electricity generation, had for many years had Chinese
directors on its board. 39 In fact it was normal for the British agency houses to work with
the locals, mainly the local Chinese, for they were often middlemen, financiers, and
businessmen in their own right. Such a development is not very surprising because the tin
industry had first been established by the Chinese before the Europeans got in on the act.
This led the Guthries, for instance, to develop a variety of joint speculative enterprises in
the tin industry with Chinese and other local connections."
One of the major problems with the economic structure of the Southeast Asian
countries was their heavy reliance on the extractive industries. These industries were
directly affected by fluctuations in world market prices, and this sort of external force
strongly and directly influenced the living standard of the Southeast Asians. Thus the
necessity of diversifying the economy was well recognised by government and business
alike. However, the immediate need for capital was an impediment to implementation of
government plans to expand the manufacturing industries. British firms with extensive
interests in the extractive industries also wanted to diversify the range of their business
activities, mainly because of lack of confidence in the future of natural rubber in the face
of competition from synthetic rubber and the grim future political prospects of the
region. As a result of this awareness, a number of British companies in Malaya spread
their risks, for instance, by turning over some part of rubber estates to plant oil palms,
tea, and occasionally and more experimentally to cocoa. 41 At the same time they widened
their sphere of investments, rather than seeking other opportunities within Malaya, in
39 Allen and Donnithorne, op.cit., p. 57. For the relationship between Western and Asian enterprise,
especially the role of the Chinese in Malaya and Indonesian, see ibid., pp. 59-60, 65, and J.H. Drabble,
and P.J. Drake, 'The British Agency Houses in Malaysia: Survival in a Changing World', Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies, 12, 1981, pp. 304-06.
49 ibid., p. 305.
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order to avoid the political and economic chaos ahead before and after independence. In
1950 the Guthries promoted a subsidiary company in Rhodesia, which was their first
venture outside the East. 42 William Jacks and Company (Malaya) bought shares from a
Siamese-Chinese firm to establish a joint trading venture in Siam, and later in the 1960s
set up a liaison office in Vietnam. Harrisons & Crosfield started this process earlier and
more intensively than other agency houses, and by 1975 the geographical distribution of
interests of the Company was wider than any other competitors, such as Guthries,
Boustead and Harper Gilfillan.43
As Drake and Drabble explain, Harrisons & Crosfield case was 'something of an
exception' in terms of its structure and range of business." The house started as a tea
merchant in 1844, but by 1895 and 1897 made the first venture into plantations as a
partner without full ownership or even majority shareholdings in return for
administration, financial management and commercial expertise. Harrisons & Crosfield
then started working mainly as the agents and secretaries for rubber companies (as
agents and secretaries they took fees and commissions for the sale of estate crops), but
also bought estates, then floated the rubber companies in public. Indeed, the style of the
limited liability company suited the agency houses, for added capital and more permanent
capital were vital to the rubber industry. At the same time Harrisons & Crosfield set up
an Engineering Department to supply and repair machinery associated with the tea and
rubber industries, in order to provide a better quality service to the estates as an agent,
which helped them later represent a wide range of British and other engineering
manufacturers. Even before the First World War Harrisons & Crosfield was involved in
41 Allen and Donnithorne, op.cit., p. 130.
42 • n • ,.ima, p. 130.
43 See the Table 4 (Geographical Distribution of Interests of Selected Agency Houses), in Drabble and
Drake, op.cit., p. 313.
44 Drabble and Drake, op.cit., p. 319.
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manufacturing; buying sawmills to make tea chests and also tile works to export to
Ceylon. Then they came to believe that chemicals were beginning to form a considerable
proportion of the other supplies in the estates, and also the Second World War taught
them that the business could no longer be so heavily dependent on one geographical
area. Thus a chemicals business in Canada was acquired: in April 1947, Durham
Chemicals (Canada) Ltd. was formed to manufacture and market chemicals in Canada.
And soon after the Second World War Harrisons & Crosfield started marketing a
specialised type of processed rubber, Linatex. At the same time other crops of important
potential were sought out to diversify away from rubber. Oil palm development in 1948
began as the second crop, followed by cocoa after 1950.45
Apart from Harrisons & Crosfield, Harper Gilfillan was distinguished by their
involvement in manufacturing. Their business included 'local production and assembly of
commercial vehicle bodies, mineral treatment equipment, and electrical engineering' 46
Overall, by the 1960s the British agency houses not only merchandised local
manufactures in place of some imports, but also made direct investment into
manufacturing, which conformed to the official policy of the newly independent Asian
countries to promote domestic industrialisation.°
Despite the Malayan government's efforts to diversify the economic infrastructure
by encouraging secondary industry, 48 the country's economy in the 1950s was still heavily
45 P. Pugh, Great Enterprise: A History of Harrisons & Crosfield (London, 1990).
46 Drabble and Drake, op.cit., p. 319.
47 ibid., pp. 318-9.
48 Between 1952 and 1953 the manufacturing or secondary industry made 'a surprisingly large
contribution to national income-about 14 %': PRO DO 35 9863 Commonwealth Relations Office C.R.O.
Ref: MAL80/1 Federation of Malaya: The Economy, UK High Commissioner for the Federation of
Malaya to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 23 June 1959.
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dependent on rubber and tin. Tin accounted for 25 per cent of exports by value in 1955-
56 49 . Over the five years, 1950 to 1954, rubber exports were worth about 65 per cent of
all Federation exports, and export duties on rubber comprised nearly 60 per cent of all
revenue from export duties. 5° From the point of view of land utilisation, rubber had over
3.5 million acres of land out of a total of approximately 5.5 million acres under
agricultural crops. 51
 Rubber still accounted for 60 per cent or more of Malaya's export
earnings even in the 1960s. 52 In Siam, 'the previously relatively balanced agrarian
economy' was transforming into one in which its economy was heavily dependent on
rubber production driven by the need for foreign currency. In 1946 rubber accounted for
only some 10 per cent of total exports, but in 1951 rubber represented 33 per cent of the
total exports of Siam, being second only to rice in export value.53
European participation was also formidable in the extractive industries. For
instance, in 1953, 60 per cent of Malaya's tin was produced by European-owned mining
companies, while Europeans owned 83 per cent of total acreage under rubber
cultivation. 54 Oil palm and coconut industries also had a similar degree of European
control. Moreover, in the same year, European owned firms held between 65 and 75 per
cent of the import trade. 55 Britain continued to hold her long-standing position as the
49 MRC, MSS. 2001F/3/D3/6/75 Federation of British Industries (Kipping File) D/5528 1955-56.
59 PRO PREM 11 873 P. Diz, 2 Aug. 1955; PREM 11 873 document by Sir D.C. MacGillivray, High
Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17
May 1955.
51 ibid. Of which 2 million was estate rubber and 1.5 million smallholder rubber.
52 D.W. Fryer, Emerging Southeast Asia; A Study in Growth and Stagnation (London, 1970), p. 283.
53 MRC, MSS.292/959.1/7 T479 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions: Asian Plantation
Workers' Conference, Kuala Lumpur, from 28 Sept. to 1 Oct. 1955.
54 Only 20 per cent of the whole Malaya was cultivated in 1956, and of this area 65 per cent was
devoted to rubber: MRC, MSS. 2001F/3/D3/6/75 Federation of British Industries (Kipping File)
D/5528 1955-56. Although as far as production was concerned, 30 per cent of the rubber was produced
by European owned estates, 20 per cent by Asian owned estates and 50 per cent by peasant growing
during the similar period between 1952 to 1954: MRC, MSS.292/959.1/5 T814 Malayan Trade
Unionism 1952-54.
55 Lee Kam Hing, 'Malaya: New State and Old Elites', in R. Jeffrey (ed.), Asia-the Winning of
Independence (New York, 1981), p. 234.
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principal supplier to Malaya. In 1955 the UK contributed 30 per cent of the Federation's
total import trade, and within that figure covered 67 per cent of the Federation's total
imports of capital equipment, such as machinery and transport equipment. 56 In 1962
Malaya was still 'the sixth most important recipient of British direct investment' and
Britain's position as the largest single investor in the country remained throughout the
1970s.57
However, the British long-term dominance over the Malayan economy, thanks to
their interests in extensive plantation, manufacturing, trading, banking, insurance and
other economic activities, hardly suggests that the British firms in Malaya enjoyed an
exclusive advantage over the locals. Here it is worth taking note of the Federation and
central government policy of promoting the smallholdings of the rubber industry,
particularly after the Second World War, at the expense of the estate, the majority of
which were owned by the British rubber companies and the managing agencies. At one
point a Committee had to be set up to investigate the breaking up of estates deliberately
into smallholdings, which had occurred since December 31 1954, in order that they
might benefit from replanting grants paid to smallholders, which were substantially
greater than those paid to estates." Before independence another incentive to support
the smallholders came from both the central and Federation governments. Replanting
rubber trees with high-yielding stock was a matter of life or death to the Malayan rubber
industry, but due to the war and the Emergency the whole process was falling far behind.
56 The capital equipment was mainly 'power machinery, agricultural machinery, tractors other than
steam, metal working machinery, other machinery (construction and mining machinery), electric
machine, railway vehicles, road motor vehicles, road vehicles other than motor (cycles)': MRC, MSS.
2001F/31D3/6/75 Federation of British Industries (Kipping File) D/5528 Imports into the Federation of
Malaya, 23 Nov. 1956.
57 Davenport-Hines and Jones, 'British Business in Asia Since 1860', p. 7.
58 PRO DO 35 9972 L. Bevan, UK Trade Commissioner in the Federation of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, to
R.C. Wright, Commercial Relations & Exports Department, Board of Trade, 31 Dec 1957, and report by
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Nevertheless, by 1955, 70 per cent of the total planted acreage of the larger European
estates was replanted with high-yielding materials, while less than 8 per cent of the 1.5
million acres owned by smallholders was under high-yielding rubber, and even worse,
some 50 per cent of the trees in the smallholdings were more than 30 years old (the
economic life of a rubber tree is in general 30 to 35 years). In order to create a find to
support the smallholders to replant the rubber trees, the Federation government imposed
a cess in 1952 on all exports of rubber produced in the Federation at the rate of 4.5 cents
a pound. 59 In the case of the tin industry Chinese owned tin-mines were also given the
consideration of making advances for rehabilitation purposes, though more for political
reasons, as it was considered by the Treasury, the Ministry of Supply, and the CO to be
discriminatory-looking to leave the rehabilitation of the Chinese tin mines to the Chinese
government, while at the same time assisting European mines with advances. However, it
is not certain whether the advances were actually made to them because the Departments
were trying to avoid duplicating the assistance (from both the Chinese and British
governments). 60 Moreover, as far as the Treasury was concerned, the advances should be
used not only to rehabilitate, but also to improve the structure and efficiency of the
Chinese section of the tin industry. Thus they first needed to secure some form of
assurance on reform and the possibilities for some improvements in these areas.
Nevertheless the Treasury were 'willing to authorise expenditure ... to help with the
financing of local labour and their charges' .61
the Members of a Committee (to investigate the sub-division of estates occurred since 31 December
1954), to the Secretary to the Minister for Natural Resources, Kuala Lumpur, 1957.
59 PRO PREM 11 873 document written by Sir D.C. MacGillivray, High Commissioner for the
Federation of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 May 1955.
6° PRO T 220 134 note of a Meeting (presented by the Treasury, Ministry of Supply, and Colonial
Office) held at the Treasury, 5 Mar. 1946, to discuss the rehabilitation of the Malayan tin industry.
61 PRO T 220 134 R.L.M. James, Treasury, to W.B.L. Monson, CO, 22 Feb. 1946.
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Sensitivity was shown by British firms to the aspirations of the soon-to-be-
independent Malayans, instead of enjoying vested interests without making any effort to
adapt to the new situation. Just before independence in Malaya (which became fully
independent in 31 August 1957), the Commonwealth Relations Office raised the issue of
setting up an organisation for the purposes of protecting British interests. The heads of
British commercial firms objected to this suggestion. Hussey, the President of the
Federated Malay States Chamber of Commerce, and Director and Local Manager of
Harper Gilfillan & Co. Ltd. argued that:
To set up an organisation now would tend to destroy mutual
trust and good will which characterised relations between the
British commercial community and Malayan authorities.62
Tory, the Permanent Under Secretary of the Office of the High Commissioner for the
UK, Kuala Lumpur, also considered that 'any form of British "ganging up" in Malaya
itself or any appearance of dictation from London' would do more harm than good,
especially immediately after independence. He felt that the maintenance of the British
commercial position in Malaya:
depends entirely on the continuance of the present excellent
relationship between the main commercial interests and the
Malayan authorities, and that for the British interests to draw
together now in a defensive manner would be likely to
damage the atmosphere of mutual trust.63
When the UK's share of Malaya's import trade fell (from 48 per cent in 1958 to 42
per cent in 1959), the UK Trade Commissioner in charge of Malaya and Singapore,
62 PRO DO 35 9900 letter from G.W. Tory, Office of the High Commissioner for the UK, Kuala
Lumpur, to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Commonwealth Relations Office, 6 Nov. 1957.
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H.W. Woodruff, warned the British manufacturers that the time when British business
interests could rely upon built-in sympathy in Malaya to ensure a market for their goods
had gone, thus advised to review the attitudes and methods of the past, and to re-
examine the market and consumers very carefully if they were to recover."
Nevertheless the confidence within the British business community in Malaya
stayed on because of their contribution to the Malayan economy. The position of British
interests was after all,
unique in that they are regarded by the Malayan authorities as
an integral part of the Malayan economy and they enjoy, for
this reason, direct access to the Ministers concerned and
equality of treatment.°
Estates, after all, paid all housing, medical and general health expenses of the labourers,
and births and deaths were also covered by estate grants. As J.M. Baber (Chairman and
Managing Director of Alor Pongsu Amalgamated Estates) pointed out, if estates would
have to shut down, that would lead to a general discontent among labourers, which
might destabilise the country even further. Therefore he urged that labour should be
prepared to take the ups and downs of the economy through a reduction in wages if
necessary. Baber confidently concluded that the mass of labour was already conscious of
this fact, thus would 'infinitely prefer to swim' with the rubber industry to revive the
industry rather than to sink with it.66
63 ibid.
64 PRO DO 35 9863 draft of an open letter from H.W. Woodruff, UK Trade Commissioner in Charge in
Malaya and in Singapore, 'To All Exporters to Malaya' was sent by T. Sharp, Board of Trade, to V.E.
Davies, Commonwealth Relations Office, 15 June 1960.
65 PRO DO 35 9900 letter from G.W. Tory, to D.W.S. Hunt, Commonwealth Relations Office, 27 Aug.
1959.
66 The Financial Times, 16 Aug. 1949.
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British business interests in post-war SEA on the one hand actively sought
cooperation and assistance from the relevant governments, but, on the other, pursued
their own strategy for survival, often in the absence of assistance from the central
governments. They needed flexibility to continue their business, thus they pursued the
localisation of management. They also diversified the range of business operations and
widened the sphere of investment. Underlying these efforts was a belief that their
contribution to the region's economy would also help get them through the post-war
difficulties. In spite of the efforts made by the Southeast Asian governments to diversify
their economies away from concentration on the extractive industries, the significance of
these industries in the Southeast Asian economies remained throughout 1950s and 1960s
and even beyond, and so did the foreign influence in these economies. British firms had
the relative advantage of being the traditional commercial power in the region, but
nevertheless much depended on the goodwill of the newly independent countries.
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Conclusion
It is concluded that there existed both unity and conflict between the British government
and British businesses in SEA. Whilst both sectors needed to ensure the reconstruction
of British businesses, the government also shouldered the burden of many other
responsibilities, both at home and abroad. Therefore it faced a situation of having to
position the interests of British businesses within a wider framework, including that of
ensuring the existence of an acceptable level of social welfare and of the presence of the
institutions of civil society in the colonies. The problem with this strategy became
apparent when the emphasis on social rehabilitation in Malaya, intended as a
complementary aspect to the reconstruction work of Malaya, in effect brought with it
adverse effects on the governing process. While the British authorities continued to
pursue a strategy for socio-economic regeneration, the first few months of the British
Military Administration in Malaya saw policies that sought to ensure the norms of
liberal and democratic freedoms, such as the right of association, freedom of speech and
the press, and the right of workers to combine in effective trade union activities. These
policies were then largely abandoned in the face of the emergence of hostility to British
colonial rule, which was increasingly voiced through these mediums. Such challenges to
the state's authority were perceived to jeopardise the possibilities of a strong and long-
term reconstruction of British economic operations in the country.
The conflict of interests between British enterprises in Malaya and the British
political authorities manifested itself in the ideological arena in businesses' emphasis on
the need for a more laissez-faire approach to managerial prerogatives. Meanwhile they
pressurised government for economic assistance for the rehabilitation of their business
interests in Malaya and for a more robust coercive state response to labour protest and
the activities of the MCP and its affiliates.
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Under the Conservatives, after 1951, Oliver Lyttelton was to meet the
requirements of safeguarding British investments by applying a vigorous approach to
the counter-insurgency campaign. Such actions assured business of the government's
determination to continue their fight for Malaya. Yet again the conflict of interests
between government and business under the Conservatives began to dominate their
relationship, as high taxation, inadequate security and the government's pragmatic
approach to the colony's political future became the centre of attention.
My findings suggest that the relationship between government and business in
Malaya was hindered by the British governments' determination to succeed in Malaya,
which tended towards ignoring businesses' needs. In fact business was afraid that the
Malayan Union constitution would destroy the traditional cohesive relationship with the
Malays. Yet, when it was replaced in 1948 by the federal constitution, the latter served
to perpetuate Malay supremacy and thus created political instability, because of the
Chinese' feeling of a sense of betrayal. To some extent the creation of the Federation of
Malaya also retarded economic development, which could have been achieved through
the incorporation of the productive capacity of all sectors, which would have been aided
by a democratically inclusive agenda in the fields of social and economic policy.
Additionally, the overall strategy of retaining the pre-war economic structure of Malaya
was not achieved to the extent which business had expected due to the lack of material
assistance from the metropolitan and colonial governments.
The post-war crisis in Malaya opened up the division between the political
authorities in the metropolis and the periphery. The metropolitan government tended to
emphasise the need for a greater level of state intervention in the direction of economic
affairs. They provided an Economic Adviser, whose work deterred further intervention
from private business interests in the shaping of economic policy. However, the division
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between them manifested itself overtly in the social and political arenas. Such
differences were exemplified in the assessments made about the type of responses
required to deal with the Emergency and the issues related to democratic and political
developments. Whilst there had been an ideological hesitance within the metropolitan
government to resort to firm action to resist militant organised labour and to proscribe
the Communist Party, once the counter-insurgency campaign was under way, the old-
fashioned liberalism which prevailed among the officials of the colonial administration
became an obstacle to taking firmer measures necessary to defeat the insurrection.
Putting aside any doubts about the Attlee government's overall desire for Britain
to remain a major world power, they certainly wished her to be one in SEA. The strong
presence of British business interests in the region was significant to the British political
authorities on three different counts: in relation to the remittance of profits, dollar
earnings, and the maintenance of British influence in the region. However, the strategic
goal of maintaining pre-war hegemony in SEA appeared to interfere with the need to
ensure the future of British investments. The government's strategic approach was first
to obtain cooperation from the governments of the independent ex-colonies — or the
soon-to-be-independent colonies — and the USA. However, this contributed to
lessening the possibility for flexibility in Britain's decision making on the questions
relating to her own economic interests. Overall it is fair to say that Britain endeavoured
to deter the Communist advance through a strategy of economic development in the
region, which, in turn, would have contributed to ensuring a stable basis for the
continuation of the successful operation of British businesses.
The British government's ability to deal with the post-war problems that British
enterprises faced in other Southeast Asian countries was more limited. The political
status of Siam as a sovereign nation, which had been a hindrance to a further expansion
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of British business interests during the pre-war period, continued to be a concern for
business. Indonesia's political relations with The Netherlands, and its eventual
independence, limited the British government's scope to directly intervene in the
country's political development. Such intervention might, in turn, have served to assist
in the protection of British companies in that country. Moreover, the drive to export to
the hard currency areas to a great extent entailed ignoring the needs of other countries,
among them the Southeast Asian countries which needed manufactured goods from
Britain for their rehabilitation, but could not pay in dollars. It is no exaggeration to say
that Britain's eventual failure to recover her traditional position in some areas in SEA
can, to a large extent, be attributed to her inability to provide manufactured goods for
them, and to the desperation of Britain's own financial position.
What then has been gained by not only looking simply at the interactions
between the British political authorities and British business interests in Malaya, but
also by examining their interactions in Siam and Indonesia? By examining
government/business interactions in the countries outside the colonial context, we can
discern both similarity and dissimilarity in the nature of their relationships and in the
difficulties that faced British firms in each of these countries. In Malaya the main
impediments to their business operations were the political instability of the country,
and the lack of material assistance from the governments. In Indonesia, British firms
were to endure unprecedented problems of political instability and general insecurity,
whilst in Siam there was increasing foreign competition and local pressure. Hostile
attitudes and discrimination against foreign business interests were present throughout
the region and, worse still from the business point of view, this sentiment was often
used by the Communists in order to cement their relations with other nationalist forces.
Siam and Indonesia were determined to govern their own affairs, independently of any
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foreign interference, hence they resented any foreign intervention to their domestic
affairs.
The examination of the relationship between government and business against
the background of these variations in the situations, experienced by British businesses in
Siam and Indonesia, points towards the conclusion that these adversities in fact did not
affect the process and degree of cooperation between the British government, its
representatives and British enterprises. To a large extent these sectors experienced an
atmosphere of close cooperation and unity while reconstructing and pursuing British
interests. Another important factor in their interactions in these countries was British
companies' flexibility and their ability to survive in adverse circumstances. They
negotiated with every possible quarter if and when it was necessary (including
Vietnamese Communists), even in conditions in which there was an absence of any
systematic protection for foreign nationals and businesses.
Contrary to what might have been expected, the relationship between
government and business in Malaya was not as straightforward as it was in Siam and
Indonesia. British companies' confidence about their contribution to the metropolitan
government's dollar needs and in their role as a provider of employment and revenue
for the Malayan government made them more assertive and forthcoming with requests
and demands, while the British political authorities in Malaya were preoccupied by their
governing responsibilities. In these circumstances, their interests were often
incompatible and clashed. As distinct from this, the British government and its
representatives and British firms in Siam and Indonesia understood their limits as
foreign nationals, and thus they worked closely together to maintain British interests.
The level of active communication and cooperation between them, in these countries,
should be taken as a good example of the cooperative nature of their relationship.
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British firms constituted a vital British interest, therefore the London
government felt obliged to protect and maintain them. However, as far as the firms were
concerned, they had the option to pack up and leave if the business environment was no
longer suitable for their purposes, but if they did cut and run, this would damage
Britain's general political and economic influence in the region. US policymakers, well
aware of this factor, were happy to see British firms withdraw and were correspondingly
irritated by the continued strong presence of British firms in Siam. As in Europe, Britain
worked to obtain US cooperation in SEA in order to lessen her heavy responsibilities.
However, conflicting views between the two governments on the resumption of
European colonial rule in the region, and on Siamese matters, often produced results
that the British government found unsatisfactory. The laissez-faire attitude of the US
administration towards SEA was another impediment. In retrospect, Britain was
pursuing incompatible strategies in relation to the US role in post-war SEA. The British
government hoped, on the one hand, that the USA would assist Britain in implementing
her post-war plans for the region by providing the Southeast Asian countries with loans
and aid that Britain could not afford, and on the other hand, they hoped to keep
legitimate US commercial competition at bay.
Although some British firms chose to leave the region, most stayed. What made
them stay on? Why did more British firms not sell up or go elsewhere? They stayed not
because they were convinced by the degree of assistance and protection given by the
home country, but because they were confident that the Southeast Asian countries
would continue to need foreign capital and businesses. Moreover, they believed in their
own ability to get through the post-war difficulties, in the same way that they had
weathered other storms throughout their histories.
335
It could be suggested that firms had to draw on their own resources but that the
British government did all it could to assist British firms in SEA for the latter to
continue to be able to stay, in practice though, this support was insufficient. Chapters 3
to 6 examined this hypothesis in relation to government support and the possibility that
they wished to assist business to their utmost. It is clear from the evidence that, despite
this being the government's intention, the reality was that the resource constraints did
not fully allow them to support business to the extent that it desired. Chapters 3, 4 and 5
examined the Malayan case, and the conclusion drawn here is that not only was
business not assisted sufficiently, especially regarding the provision of equipment and
finance, but also both metropolitan and colonial governments were reluctant to resort to
firm actions against the forces in society which were disruptive to businesses'
productive capacity. The firms had to spend large amounts on the counter-insurgency
campaign without ever gaining any real sense of security.
Similarly, as it has already been acknowledged, the problems facing British
business interests in Indonesia — the continued instability and the physical danger
directed to the British business personnel, and uncertainty about the future of the
country — were not matters that could be easily resolved by diplomatic representation.
Meanwhile, in post-war Siam the British faced the challenge of increasing American
interest, and this made the restoration of Britain's pre-war dominance in the country
difficult. This difficulty was, in turn, exacerbated by Siamese enthusiasm to work with
the Americans. While the British business interests in Siam enjoyed close
communication with the diplomats and the British FO, the intensification of local
competition from American commercial interests was a problem that the British firms
had to deal with alone. They could only do this by maintaining the reputation of British
products. Britain's inability to supply the required goods for Siam's rehabilitation work
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was, however, an obvious hindrance to restoration of the prestige of British firms.
Meanwhile, some of the British firms which had first tried to restore their businesses
immediately after the end of the war in Indonesia, eventually gave up their operations.
Yet most of the firms in that country stayed, however they had much less confidence in
their future prospects.
It is clear that assistance from the British government was not sufficient to
protect business interests, and, business was often left alone to deal with the problems.
On the other hand, for businesses used to struggling for survival, by seeking out
opportunities to expand profits, it was not an entirely new situation. The British firms
pursued local management, encouraged by the British officials including Attlee, and
diversification of the lines and location of their business. They invested beyond SEA,
for example, in Canada, the USA, and Rhodesia, and often in completely new fields. At
the same time the firms endeavoured to maintain their traditional relations with the
Southeast Asian countries, which were believed to be based on mutual trust, by showing
respect towards the newly independent countries and their efforts to govern themselves.
British business was also confident about its continued role as the mainstay of
the Southeast Asian economies in the post-war period and that this would present future
opportunities. Therefore, while firms were cautious about new investments, advances
were made in rehabilitating their businesses. Indeed, some of them invested out of a
certain sense of moral obligation to show confidence in the future of the countries.
Meanwhile, as long as the Southeast Asian countries relied on the income from
exporting raw materials, in which British firms were deeply involved, then these firms
had bargaining power. Rubber growing in particular needed a substantial amount of
fixed capital which most of the indigenous firms could not yet supply. In addition, the
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newly independent governments needed cash to implement their ambitious projects and
policies.
Business had very limited ability to influence the policy making of the
governments. Nevertheless, firms had the advantage of being able to bargain directly
with the local people, which it was not possible to do through the medium of the British
government. For instance, whilst there was no direct communication between the
British government and the Indochinese Communists, the manager of the Hongkong
and Shanghai Bank directly negotiated with Ho Chi Minh to re-establish the business.'
The series of incidents in Asia, such as the Malayan Emergency, the Communist
take-over of China, and the Korean War, largely influenced British Southeast Asian
policy. In the context of the emerging Cold War, ideology became the primary issue,
with SEA becoming more significant in the conflict with Communism. British
Southeast Asian policy objectives were accordingly moving from protecting their own
specific interests and subjects, and fostering good relationships with countries in the
region, to fighting Communism. The threat to business interests from Communism was
more serious than ever in the mid-1950s as the war in Vietnam escalated. Also, by this
time, any hope that the nationalist Asian countries would stabilise their domestic
politics and economy was fading away. In front of the grand strategy of fighting
Communism, the specific interests of business were not highlighted as strongly as
before. Nevertheless, firms stayed, and some expanded their interests to become truly
modern multinationals. These achievements were attained by firms building on the
survival tactics of earlier periods. In a situation in which the business environment grew
ever harsher, companies developed their own long-term strategies, working closely with
civil servants and politicians based in Britain and Asia. As a result of such
1 PRO FO 371 63554 F3521/3521/61 Special Commissioner, Singapore, to Batavia, 12 Mar. 1947,
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entrepreneurial pragmatism, the British presence in the region, albeit on a reduced scale,
continued against all the odds.
339
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Aldrich, R.J., The Key to the South: Britain, the United States, and Thailand during the
Approach of the Pacific War, 1929-1942 (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford, Singapore, New
York, 1993).
Allen, G.C., and Donnithorne, A.G., Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya; A
Study in Economic Development (London, 1954).
Anstey, V., The Economic Development of India (London, New York, Toronto, 1929).
Attlee, C.R., As It Happened (Melbourne, London, Toronto, 1954).
Avon, Earl of (Sir A. Eden), Full Circle (London, 1965).
Barker, E., The British between the Superpowers 1945-50 (London, Basingstoke, 1983).
Bemis, S.F., A Diplomatic History of the United States (London, Toronto, 1936).
Blum, R.M., Drawing the Line The Origin of the American Containment Policy in East
Asia (New York, London, 1982).
Boyd, G., Pacific Trade, Investment and Politics (London, New York, 1989).
Brown, I., Economic Change in South-East Asia (Kuala Lumpur, 1997).
Brooke, S. (ed.), Reform and Reconstruction: Britain after the War 1945-51
(Manchester, New York, 1995).
Bullock, A., Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1985).
Cage, R.A. (ed.), The Scots Abroad (London, 1985).
Cain, P.J., and Hopkins, A.G. (eds.), British Imperialism; Crisis and Deconstruction
1914-1990 (London, New York, 1993).
Carlton, D., Anthony Eden — A Biography (London, 1981).
Casson, M., Multinationals and World Trade (London, 1986).
Casson, M., The Growth of International Business (London, 1983).
Chapman, S., Merchant Enterprise in Britain; From the Industrial Revolution to World
War I (Cambridge, 1992).
340
Cho, G., The Malaysian Economy (London, New York, 1990).
Christie, C.J., A Modern History of Southeast Asia: decolonization, nationalism and
separatism (London, New York, 1996).
Corley, T.A.B., A History of the Burmah Oil Company 1886-1924 (London, 1983), Vol.
1.
Courtenay, P.P., A Geography of Trade and Development in Malaya (London, 1972).
Cowan, C.D. (ed.), The Economic Development of South-East Asia: Studies in
Economic History and Political Economy (London, 1964).
Darby, P., Three Faces of Imperialism British and American Approaches to Asia and
Africa 1870-1970 (New Haven, London, 1987).
Davenport-Hines, R.P.T., and Jones, G. (eds.), British Business in Asia Since 1860
(Cambridge, 1989).
Davis, L.E., and Huttenback, R.A., Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire ; The
Economics of British Imperialism (Cambridge, 1988).
Dennis, P., Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command,
1945-46 (Manchester, 1987).
Dobson, A.P., The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship
1940-1987 (New York, 1988).
Donnison, F.S.V., British Military Administration in the Far East 1943-46 (London,
1956)
Fforde, IS., An International Trade in Managerial Skills (Oxford, 1957).
Fieldhouse, D.K., Unilever Overseas; The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895-1965
(London, Stanford, 1978).
Fifield, R.H., Southeast Asia in United States Policy (New York, Washington, London,
1967).
Fisk, E.K., and Osman-Rani, H. (eds.), The Political Economy of Malaysia (Kuala
Lumpur, 1982).
Floud, R., and McCloskey, D. (eds.), The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, Vol.
3: 1939-1992 (Cambridge, 1995).
Freeman, R.A., Socialism and Private Enterprise in Equatorial Asia; The Case of
Malaysia and Indonesia (Stanford, 1968).
341
Fryer, D.W., Emerging Southeast Asia; A Study in Growth and Stagnation (London,
1970).
Gilpin, R., United States Power and the Multinational Corporation; the Political
Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (London, Basingstoke, 1975).
Gordon, M., Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy (Stanford, 1969).
Gorst, A., Johnman, L., and Lucas, W.S. (eds.), Contemporary British History 1931-
1961. Politics and the Limits of Policy (London, 1991).
Hall, D.G.E., A History of South-East Asia (London, 1964).
Harper, T.N., The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (Cambridge, 1999).
Harris, K., Attlee (London, 1982).
Hill, H., Foreign Investment and Industrialisation in Indonesia (Singapore, Oxford,
New York, 1988).
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic
Development of Malaya (Baltimore, 1955).
Jeffrey, R. (ed.), Asia — the Winning of Independence, the Philippines, India,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaya (New York, 1981).
Jomo, K. S., Growth and Structural Change in the Malaysian Economy (London, 1990).
Jones, C.A., International Business in the Nineteenth Century: the Rise and Fall of a
Cosmopolitan Bourgeoisie (Brighton, 1987).
Jones, C.A., E.H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie (Cambridge, 1998).
Jones, G. (eds.), British Multinationals: Origins, Management and Performance
(Aldershot: Gower, 1986).
Kennedy, J., A History of Malaya A.D. 1400-1959 (London, New York, 1962).
Kidron, M., Foreign Investments in India (London, 1965).
Kindleberger, C.P., American Business Abroad (New Haven, London, 1969).
King, F.H.H., Volume IV of the History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation: The Hongkong Bank in the Period of Development and Nationalism,
1941-1984 From Regional Bank to Multinational Group (Cambridge, New York, Port
Chester, Melbourne, Sydney, 1991).
Kirby, M.W., and Mary, B.R., Business Enterprise in Modern Britain: From the
Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century (London, New York, 1994).
342
Kratoska, P., The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History (St
Leonards, 1998).
Latourette, K. S., The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951 (New York, 1952).
Lim, C., Economic Development of Modern Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, London, New
York, Melbourne, 1967).
Lim, D. (ed.), Readings on Malaysian Economic Development (Kuala Lumpur, 1975).
Longhurst, H., The Borneo Story: the History of the First 100 Years of Trading in the
Far East (London, 1956).
Louis, Wm.R., Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the
British Empire 1941-1945 (New York, 1978).
Magdoff, H., The Age of Imperialism; The Economics of US Foreign Policy (New
York, London, 1969).
McCoy, A. (ed.), Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation (New Heaven, 1980).
McMahon, RI., Colonialism and Cold War; the United States and the Struggle for
Indonesian Independence, 1945-49 (Ithaca, London, 1981).
McMillan, J., The Dunlop Story: the Life, Death and Re-birth of a Multi-national
(London, 1989).
McT. Kahin, G., Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, 1952).
Morgan, D.J., The Origins of British Aid Policy 1924-1945, Official History of Colonial
Development, Vol. 1 (London, 1980).
Morgan, D.J., Developing British Colonial Resources 1945-1951, The Official History
of Colonial Development, Vol. 2 (London, 1980).
Morgan, D.J., Changes in British Aid Policy 1951-1970, The Official History of
Colonial Development, Vol. 4 (London, 1980).
Morgan, D.J., Guidance Towards Self-Government in British Colonies 1941-1971,
The Official History of Colonial Development, Vol. 5 (London, 1980).
Munro, D.G., Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921
(Princeton, 1964).
Nakagawa, K. (ed.), Government and Business, Proceedings of the fifth Fuji
Conference, The International Conference on Business History 5 (Tokyo, 1980).
Naval Intelligence Division, Geographical Handbook Series: Indo-China (1943).
343
Ovendale, R. (ed.), The Foreign Policies of the British Labour Governments, 1945-51
(Leicester, 1984).
Pluvier, J., South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence (Kuala Lumpur, London,
New York, Melbourne, 1974).
Pugh, P.et al., Great Enterprise: A History of Harrisons & Crosfield (London, 1990).
Puthucheary, J.J., Ownership and Control in the Malayan Economy; a study of the
structure of ownership and control and its effects on the development of secondary
industries and economic growth in Malaya and Singapore (Singapore, 1960).
Rernme, T., Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1945-49 (London,
New York, 1995).
Ricklefs, M.C., A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present (London, 1981).
Rimmer, P.J., and Allen, L.M. (eds.), The Underside of Malayan History (Singapore,
1990).
Robertson, J.0., America's Business (New York, 1985).
Rotter, A.J., The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to SEA (Ithaca
and London, 1987).
Rungta, R.S., The Rise of Business Corporations in India 1851-1900 (Cambridge,
1970).
Ryan, N.J., The Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore; A History from Earliest
Times to 1966 (Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, 1969).
Short, A., The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 (London, 1975).
Shuckburgh, E., Descent to Suez Diaries 1951-56 (London, 1986).
Silcock, T.H., The Commonwealth Economy in Southeast Asia (Durham, London,
1959).
Singh, All, The Limits of British Influence; South Asia and the Anglo-American
Relationship 1947-56(London, New York, 1993).
Stenson, M.R., Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948
(London, New York, Kuala Lumpur, 1970).
Stockwell, A.J. and Smith, R.B. (eds.), British Policy and the Transfer of Power in
Asia: Documentary Perspectives (London, 1985).
344
Stockwell, A.J. (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, Malaya, Part I: The
Malayan Union Experiment 1942-1948 (London, 1995).
Stockwell, A.J. (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, Malaya, Part II: The
Communist Insurrection 1948-1953 (London, 1995).
Stockwell, A.J. (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire, Malaya, Part III: The
Alliance Route to Independence, 1953-1957 (London, 1995).
Stowe, J.A., Siam Becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue (London, 1991).
Stubbs, R., Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-
1960 (Singapore, Oxford, New York, 1989).
Tarling, N., Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950
(Cambridge, 1998).
Tarling, N. (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast, vol. 3: From c. 1800 to the
1930s (Cambridge, 1999).
Tarling, N. (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 4: from World War II
to the Present (Cambridge, 1999).
Tiratsoo, N. (ed.), The Attlee Years (London, New York, 1991).
White, N.J., Business, Government and the End of Empire: Malaya, 1942-1957
(Oxford, 1996).
Wilkins, M., The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad
from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974).
Wilkins, M., The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad
from the Colonial Era to 1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970).
Williams, F., A Prime Minister Remembers: The War and Post-war Memoirs of the Rt.
Hon. Earl Attlee (London, Melbourne, Toronto, 1961).
Williams, P.M. (ed.), The Diary of Hugh Gaits/cell 1945-1956 (London, 1983).
Wilson, C., Unilever 1945-1965 Challenge and Response in the Post-War Industrial
Revolution (London, 1968).
Wong, J., Asean Economics in Perspective; A Comparative Study of Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (London, Basingstoke, 1979).
Woodcock, G., The British in the Far East (London, 1969).
345
Yonekawa, S., and Yoshihara, H. (eds.), Business History of General Trading
Companies ; The International Conference Business History 13 Proceedings of the Fuji
Conference (Tokyo, 1987).
JOURNAL ARTICLES AND CHAPTERS IN EDITED BOOKS
Akashi, Y., 'The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: Interruption or Transformation?', in
McCoy, A. (ed.), Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation (New Heaven, 1980), pp.
65-90.
Armstrong, J., 'An Introduction to Archival Research in Business History', Business
History, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1991.
Batson, B.A., 'Siam and Japan: the Perils of Independence', in McCoy, A. (ed.),
Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation (New Heaven, 1980), pp. 267-302.
Caldwell, M., 'From "Emergency" to "Independence", 1948-57', in M. Amin and
Caldwell, M. (eds.), Malaya: The Making of A Neo-Colony (Nottingham, 1977), pp.
217-249.
Caldwell, J.A.M., 'Indonesian Export and Production from the Decline of the Culture
System to the First World War', in Cowan, C.D. (ed.), The Economic Development of
South-East Asia: Studies in Economic History and Political Economy (London, 1964).
Catterall, P. (ed.), 'The East of Suez Decision', Contemporary Record (The Journal of
Contemporary British History), Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1993.
Chandler, A.D., 'The Growth of the Transitional Industrial Firm in the United States and
the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis', Economic History Review, Second
Series, Vol. 33, 1980.
Cheah, B., 'The Social Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya (1942-1945)',
McCoy, A. (ed.), Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation (New Heaven, 1980), pp.
91-124.
Cheong, Y.M., 'The Political Structures of the Independent States', in Tarling, N. (ed.),
The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 4: from World War II to the Present
(Cambridge, 1999), pp. 59-137.
Christopher, T., 'After the European: American Designs for the Remaking of Southeast
Asia', Diplomatic History, Vol. 12, No. 2, Spring 1988.
Coleman, D.C., 'Failings and Achievements ; Some British Business 1910-1980',
Business History Vol. 29, No. 4, 1987, pp. 1-17.
346
Corley, T.A.B., 'Strategic Factors in the Growth of a Multinational Enterprise ; The
Burmah Oil Company, 1886-1928', in Casson, M. (ed.), The Growth of International
Business (London, 1983), pp. 214-235.
Corley, T.A.B., 'Britain's Overseas Investments in 1914 Revisited', Business History,
Vol. 36, No. 1, Jan. 1994, pp. 71-88.
Darwin, J., 'British Decolonization since 195: A Pattern or a Puzzle?', The Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. Xii, No. 2, Jan. 1984, pp. 187-209.297-328.
Davenport-Hines, R.P.T., and Jones, G., 'British Business in Asia Since 1860', in
Davenport-Hines, R.P.T., and Jones, G. (eds.), British Business in Asia Since 1860
(Cambridge, 1989), pp. 1-30.
Dobson, A.P., 'Labour or Conservative: Does it Matter in Anglo-American Relations?',
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 25, No.4, 1990, pp. 387-407.
Drabble, J.H., and Drake, P.J., 'The British Agency Houses in Malaysia: Survival in a
Changing World', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12, 1981, pp. 297-328.
Drabble, J., 'Politics of Survival: European Reactions in Malaya to Rubber Smallholders
in the Inter-war Years', in Rimmer, P.J., and Allen, L.M. (eds.), The Underside of
Malayan History (Singapore, 1990), pp. 50-71.
Drake, P.J., 'The Economic Development of British Malaya to 1914', Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies, 10 (1979).
Dunning, J., 'Changes in the Level and Structure of International Production: the Last
One Hundred Years', in Casson, M. (ed.), The Growth of International Business
(London, 1983), pp. 84-139.
Elson, R.E., "International Commerce, the State and Society: Economic and Social
Change', in Tarling, N. (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast, vol. 3: From c. 1800
to the 1930s (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 127-191
Fallcus, M., 'Early British Business in Thailand', in Davenport-Hines, R.P.T., and Jones,
G. (eds.), British Business in Asia Since 1860 (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 117-156.
Fieldhouse, D.K., 'The Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1945-51',
in Ovendale, R. (ed.), The Foreign Policies of the British Labour Governments, 1945-51
(Leicester, 1984), pp. 83-120.
Foltos, L.J., 'The New Pacific Barrier: America's Search for Security in the Pacific,
1945-47', Diplomatic History, Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 1989, pp. 317-342.
Gardner, R.N., 'Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective', International Affairs
1985-86 62 (1): 21-33.
347
Gerlof, D.H., 'The United States and the Netherlands East Indies: the Evolution of
American Anticolonialism', Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 53, 1984.
Gerlof, D.H., 'The Netherlands, the United States and the Indonesian Question 1948',
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1990, pp. 123-141.
Gidley, A.G., 'The Managing Agency System in India', The Secretary, Vol. LI, No 7
(July 1954), pp. 292-298.
Gillespie, J.L.Jr., 'Rhetoric and Reality: Corporate America's Perceptions of Southeast
Asia, 1950-1961', Business History Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 325-363.
Gorst, A., 'Facing Facts? The Labour Government and Defence Policy 1945-50', in
Tiratsoo, N. (ed.), The Attlee Years (London and New York, 1991), pp. 190-209.
Gourvish, T.R., 'British Business and the Transition to a Corporate Economy:
Entrepreneurship and Management Structures', Business History, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1987,
PP . 18-45.
Greenwood, S., `Bevin, The Ruhr and the Division of Germany: August 1945-December
1946', The Historical Journal, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1986, pp. 203-212.
Greenwood, S., 'Ernest Bevin, France and 'Western Union': August 1945-February
1946', European History Quarterly, 14, 1984, pp. 319-337.
Hannah, L., 'Government and Business in Britain: The Evolution of the Modern
Relationship', in Nakagawa, K. (ed.), Government and Business, Proceedings of the fifth
Fuji Conference, The International Conference on Business History 5 (Tokyo, 1980),
pp. 107-124.
Harvey, C., 'Business History: Concepts and Measurement', Business History, Vol. 31,
No. 3, 1989, pp. 1-5.
Herring, G.C., 'The Truman Administration and the Restoration of French Sovereignty
in Indochina', Diplomatic History, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 1977.
Hess, G.R., 'The First American Commitment in Indonesia: The Acceptance of the Bao
Dai Solution', Diplomatic History, Vol. 2, No. 4, Fall 1978.
Hinds, A.E., 'Imperial Policy and Colonial Sterling Balances 1943-56', Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 19, No. 1 Jan. 1991.
Hinds, A.E., 'Sterling and Imperial Policy 1945-51', The Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, Vol. 15, No. 2, Jan. 1987, pp. 148-169.
Holland, R.F., 'The Imperial Factor in British Strategies from Attlee to Macmillan, 1945-
63', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 7, No. 2, Jan. 1984, pp. 165-
185.
348
Homan, G.D., 'The US and the Netherlands East Indies: The Evolution of American
Anticolonialism', Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 53, 1984.
Ileto, R., 'Religion and Anti-colonial Movements', in Tarling, N. (ed.), The Cambridge
History of Southeast, vol. 3: From c. 1800 to the 1930s (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 193-
244.
Immerman, R.H., 'The US and the Geneva Conference of 1954: A New Look',
Diplomatic History, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1990.
Iriye, A., 'Contemporary History as History: American Expansion into the Pacific Since
1941', Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 53, 1984.
Jones, C.A., 'Institutional Forms of British Foreign Direct Investment in South America',
Business History, Vol. 39, No. 2, Jan 1997, pp. 21-41.
Jones, G., `Locational Choice, Performance and the Growth of British Multinational
Firms: A Comment', Business History, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1991.
Jones, G., 'The Growth and Performance of British Multinational Firms before 1939:
The Case of Dunlop', Economic History Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 35-53.
Jones, G., and Wale, J., 'Merchants as Business Groups: British Trading Companies in
Asia Before 1945', Business History Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, Autumn 1998, pp. 367-
408.
Jones, G., and van Helten, J., 'British Business in Malaysia and Singapore Since the
1870s', in Davenport-Hines, R.P.T., and Jones, G. (eds.), British Business in Asia Since
1860 (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 157-188.
Jones, S., 'The overseas Trading Company in Britain ; The Case of the Inchcape Group',
in Yonekawa, S., and Yoshihara, H. (eds.), Business History of General Trading
Companies ; The International Conference Business History 13 Proceedings of the Fuji
Conference (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 131-170.
Kling, B.B., 'The Origin of the Managing Agency System in India', Journal of Asian
Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (November 1966-August 1967), pp. 37-47.
Knight, W., 'Labourite Britain: America's "Sure Friend"? The Anglo-Soviet Treaty
Issue, 1947', Diplomatic History, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1983, pp. 267-82.
Kratoska, P., and Batson, B., 'Nationalism and Modernist Reform', in Tarling, N. (ed.),
The Cambridge History of Southeast, vol. 3: From c. 1800 to the 1930s (Cambridge,
1999), pp. 245-320.
Louis, W.R., 'American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire',
International Affairs, No. 3, 1985, pp. 395-420.
349
McMahon, R.J., 'Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Reoccupation of the Netherlands
East Indies', Diplomatic History, Vol. 2, No. 1, Winter 1978.
McMahon, R.J., 'Historiography-The Cold War in Asia; Towards a new Synthesis?',
Diplomatic History, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 1988.
McMahon, R.J., 'Interpreting America's Failures in the Third World', Diplomatic
History, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 1991.
Monzingo, D.P., 'Containment in Asia Reconsidered', World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3,
April 1967, pp. 361-77.
Newsinger, J., 'A Forgotten War: British Intervention in Indonesia 1945-46', Race &
Class, Vol. 30, 1989, pp. 51-66.
Newton, S., 'Britain, the Sterling Area and European Integration, 1945-50', The Journal
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. xiii, No. 3, May 1950, pp. 161-182.
Nicholas, S.J., 'Agency Contracts, Institutional Modes and the Transition to Foreign
Direct Investment by British Manufacturing Multinationals Before 1939', Journal of
Economic History, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1983), pp. 675-686
Nicholas, S.J., 'British Multinational Investment Before 1939', The Journal of European
Economic History, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1982), pp. 605-630.
Nicholas, S.J., Tocational Choice Performance and the Growth of British
Multinational Firms', Business History, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1989), pp. 122-141.
Nicholas, S.J., 'The Overseas Marketing Performance of British Industry, 1870-1914',
The Economic History Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1984), pp. 489-505,
Ovendale, R., 'Britain, the United States, and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1949-
1950', International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3, Summer 1982.
Owen, N.G., 'Economic and Social Change', in Tarling, N. (ed.), The Cambridge
History of Southeast Asia, vol. 4: from World War II to the Present (Cambridge, 1999),
pp. 139-199.
Parker, J.G., 'Scottish Enterprise in India, 1750-1914', in Cage, R.A. (ed.), The Scots
Abroad (London, 1985).
Pemberton, G.J., 'Australia, the United States, and the Indochina Crisis of 1954',
Diplomatic History, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 1989.
Perkins, B., 'Putting London in Its Place', Diplomatic History, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1991, pp.
433-37.
Reader, W.J., 'Merchants or Manufacturers? British Methods in Foreign Trade, 1870-
1939', in Yonekawa, S., and Yoshihara, H. (eds.), Business History of General Trading
350
Companies ; The International Conference Business History 13 Proceedings of the Fuji
Conference (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 209-237.
Reid, A., 'Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword', in McCoy, A. (ed.), Southeast
Asia under Japanese Occupation (New Heaven, 1980), pp. 16-32.
Reid, A., 'Indonesia: Revolution without Socialism', in Jeffrey, R. (ed.), Asia-The
Winning of Independence (New York, 1981).
Richardson, J.H., 'Convertibility of Sterling', The Secretary, Vol. LI, No. 9, Sep. 1954,
pp. 390-395.
Rudner, M., 'Rubber Strategy for Post-War Malaya, 1945-48', Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies, Vol. 1, ISS. 1, 1970, pp. 23-36.
Rudner, M., 'The Draft Development Plan of the Federation of Malaya 1950-1955',
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 3, 1972, pp. 63-96.
Rudner, M., 'A Reply to P.T. Bauer's Comment on Post-War Malayan Rubber Policy',
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, ISS. Iv, 1973, pp. 300-304.
Rudner, M., 'Financial Policies in Post-war Malaya: The Fiscal and Monetary Measures
of Liberation and Reconstruction', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,
Vol. III, No. 3, May 1975, pp. 323-348.
Rudner, M., 'Malayan Rubber Policy: Development and Anti-Development during the
1950s', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 7, 1976, pp. 235-259.
Rudner, M., 'Development Policies and Patterns of Agrarian Dominance in the
Malaysian Rubber Export Economy', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1981, pp.
83-105.
Schaller, M., 'Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of
Containment in Southeast Asia„ Journal of American History, Vol. 69, June 1982-
March 1983.
Schonberger, H., 'Peacemaking in Asia: The US, Great Britain, and the Japanese
Decision to Recognise Nationalist China, 1951-52', Diplomatic History, Vol. 10, No. 1,
Winter 1986.
Shalom, S.R., 'Ties That Bind: A Century of US-Philippine Relations', Diplomatic
History, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 1994.
Schenk, C.R., 'The Origins of a Central Bank in Malaya and the Transition to
Independence, 1954-59', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 21,
No. 2, 1993, pp. 409-431.
351
Smith, R.B., 'Some Contrasts between Burma and Malaya in British Policy in Southeast
Asia', in Smith, R.B. and Stockwell, AI, British Policy and the Transfer of Power in
Asia: Documentary Perspectives (London, 1985).
Stockwell, A.J., 'A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in
Malaya? The Origins of the Malayan Emergency', The Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1993, pp. 66-88.
Stockwell, A.J., 'Insurgency and Decolonisation during the Malayan Emergency',
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1987, pp. 71-81.
Stockwell, A.J., 'British Imperial Policy and Decolonization in Malaya, 1942-52', The
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 13, No. 1, Oct. 1984, pp. 68-87.
Stockwell, A.J., 'Colonial Planning during World War II: The Case of Malaya', Journal
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 3, 1974, pp. 333-351.
Stockwell, A.J., The Approach to a Possible 'Transfer of Power' Series on Malaysia and
Singapore, in Smith, R.B. and Stockwell, A.J., British Policy and the Transfer of Power
in Asia: Documentary Perspectives (London, 1985).
Stockwell, A.J., 'Southeast Asia in War and Peace: The End of European Colonial
Empires', in Tarling, N. (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 4: from
World War II to the Present (Cambridge, 1999).
Stockwell, S., `Decolonisation Beyond the Public Record office: Non-Official Sources
for Studying the End of Empire', Contemporary Record (The Journal of British History),
Vol. 6, No. 3, Winter 1992, pp. 557-566.
Stopford, J.M., The Origins of British-Based Multinational Manufacturing Enterprises,
Business History Review, 48, 1974, pp. 303-35.
Sugiyama, 'A British Trading Firm in the Far East ; John Swire & Sons, 1867-1914',
in Yonekawa, S. and Yoshihara, H. (eds.), Business History of General Trading
Companies ; The International Conference Business History 13 Proceedings of the Fuji
Conference (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 171-207.
Supple, B., 'British Economic Decline Since 1945', in Floud, R., and McCloskey, D.
(eds.), The Economic History of Britain Since 1700 (Cambridge, 1995), Vol. 3: 1939-
1992, pp. 318-346.
Symposium, 1967 'Devaluation', Contemporary Record, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1988, pp. 44-53.
Tarling N., 'The Establishment of the Colonial Regimes', in Tarling, N. (ed.), The
Cambridge History of Southeast, vol. 3: From c. 1800 to the 1930s (Cambridge, 1999),
pp. 1-74.
Tomlinson, B.R., 'British Business in India 1860-1970', Davenport-Hines, R.P.T., and
Jones, G. (eds.), British Business in Asia Since 1860 (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 92-116.
352
Trocki, C.A., 'Political Structures in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries', in
Tarling, N. (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast, vol. 3: From c. 1800 to the
1930s (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 75-126.
Tumbul, C.M., 'Regionalism and Nationalism', in Tarling, N. (ed.), The Cambridge
History of Southeast Asia, vol. 4: from World War II to the Present (Cambridge, 1999),
pp. 257-317.
Van Langenberg, M., 'North Sumatra 1942-1945: The Onset of A National Revolution',
in McCoy, A. (ed.), Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation (New Heaven, 1980),
pp. 33-64.
Warner, G., 'The Anglo-American Special Relationship', Diplomatic History, Vol. 13,
No. 4, Fall 1989.
White, N.J., 'Government and Business Divided: Malaya, 1945-57', The Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1994, pp. 251-274.
White, N.J., 'Capitalism and Counter-Insurgency? Business and Government in the
Malayan Emergency, 1948-1957', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32, Part. 1, 1998, pp.
149-177.
Wilkins, M., 'European and North American Multinationals, 1870-1914: Comparisons
and Contrasts', Business History, 30, pp. 8-45.
Wilkins, M., 'Modem European Economic History and the Multinationals', The Journal
of European Economic History, 6, 1977, pp. 575-95.
Wilkins, M., 'The History of European Multinationals: A New Look', The Journal of
European Economic History, 15, 1986, pp. 483-510.
Williams, J.E., 'Siam: A Bone of Contention Between Britain and the United States,
1942-46', Review of International Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1982.
Wolf, D.C., 'To Secure a Convenience Britain Recognises China-1950', Journal of
Contemporary History, Vol. 18, 1983, pp. 299-326.
Xiang, L., 'The Recognition Controversy: Anglo-American Relations in China 1949',
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1992, pp. 319-343.
Yasuhara, Y., 'Japan, Communist China, and Export Controls in Asia 1948-52',
Diplomatic History, Vol. 10, No. 1, Winter 1986.
353
MA & PhD DISSERTATIONS
Pocmontri, I., Negotiations between Britain and Siam on the Agreement for the
Termination of Their State of War, 1945: An Instance of Intervention by the US in
British Foreign Policy, M4 Dissertation, Department of International Studies, University
of Warwick, 1981.
White, NJ., Government and Business in the Era of Decolonization: Malaya 1942-57,
PhD thesis, Department of History, University of London, 1993.
PRIMARY SOURCES
I. The Public Record Office, London
Prime Minister's Office
PREM 8
PREM 11
PREM 13
Treasury
T 220 Imperial and Foreign Division
T 230
T 236 Overseas Finance Division Files
T 238
Board of Trade
BT 11 Commercial Relations and Exports Department
Colonial Office
CO 537 Records of the Colonial Office, Commonwealth and Foreign and
Commonwealth Offices
CO 825 Eastern Department
CO 1030 Far Eastern Department
CO 1022 South East Asian Department
Dominion Office & Commonwealth Relations Office
354
DO 35 Malaya Department
Cabinet
CAB 128
CAB 129
Foreign Office
FO 371 Political Departments
II. Guildhall Library
Ms. 14,487 / 5-6, Association of British Chambers of Commerce, Overseas Division:
Committee Minutes and Papers, Dec. 1944 - May 1964.
Ms. 14,487
Ms. 16,611 / 2
Ms. 16,612, London Export Merchants Minute Books 1940-57.
Ms. 16,613 / 2-4, London Chamber of Commerce, National General Export Merchants
Group Minute Book 1945-58.
Ms. 16,736 / 2-3, London Chamber of Commerce, Overseas Committee (Special
Committee Minute Book) 1943-48.
Ms. 16,742
Ms. 16,533
Ms. 16,745
Ms. 17,364
Ms. 18,287 / 13-15, The Federation of Commonwealth and British Empire Chambers of
Commerce, Report of the proceedings to the Eighteenth Congress May 1956-the
Twentieth Congress May 1958.
Ms. 18,282 / 3, the Federation of Commonwealth Chambers of Commerce, Annual
Reports, 1935-59.
Ms. 18,283 / 3, The Federation of Chambers of Commerce of the British Empire, minute
Books 1937-51.
355
Ms. 18,283 / 10, The Federation of Chambers of Commerce of the British Empire,
Report of the London Conference Oct. 1945.
Ms. 18,287 / 10-13 The Federation of Chambers of Commerce of the British Empire,
Report of the Fifteenth Congress South Africa, Sep. 1948-Report of the Eighteenth
Congress London, June 1954.
Ms. 18,288 / 2A and 2B The Federation of Commonwealth and British Chambers of
Commerce.
Ms. 27,032
Ms. 27,029 / 3 & 10.
Ms. 27,179
Ms. 27,188 / 1-4
Ms. 27,181-2
Ms. 27,196
Ms. 27,298
Ms. 27,259 / 1
Ms. 27,213
Ms. 27,260
Ms. 27,274
Ms. 27,295
Ms. 27,297
Ms. 27,376
Ms. 27,305
Ms. 27,328
Ms. 27,363
Ms. 27,326
Ms. 27,373
Ms. 27,367
356
Ms, 27,386
Ms. 27,437
Ms. 27,439
Ms. 27,516
Ms. 27,522 /2
III. Modern Record Centre, The University of Warwick, Coventry
MSS 200/F/3/02/3/25 Trade with Indonesia 1953-61.
MSS 200/F/3/02/4/1 Federation of British Industries, Agency Agreements Overseas
Correspondents, 1951-60.
MSS 200 B/3/3/264A FBI Committee on Policy towards Under-Developed Countries.
MSS 2001F/3/D3/6/75 D/5527-8 FBI Kippng Files.
MSS 226/ST/3/0/FE/1 189 Far East Company: Internal Memorandum.
MSS 226/ST/3/0/FE/1 189-190 Far East Company: Advantages of a UK Subsidiary for
the Far East 1959.
MSS 226/ST/3/0/FE/1 209
MSS 226/ST/3/0/FE/2 190
MSS 292/930/2 TUC, Colonial Questions, 1945-59.
MSS 292/930/3 TUC, Malaya, 1953-58.
MSS 292/930.6/1 1955-60 T1170 Colonial Office.
MSS 292/959/1 T1030, East Indies 1946-60.
MSS 292/959.1/11939, 1946-49 Malaya, Society of Planters of Malaya with Advisor in
Malaya Communist Disruptions.
MSS 292/959.1/2 1947-48.
MSS 292/959.1/3 1949-51.
MSS 292/959.1/4 T 479 1951-52.
357
MSS 292/959.1/5, T 814 Malayan Trade Unionism 1952-54.
MSS 292/959.1/6, T 814 1955-56.
MSS 292/959.1/7, 8a, 8b T 479
MSS 292/959.1/9 Dunlop Plantation, 1954.
MSS 292/959.2/1 T696 1945-53 Indonesia
MS S.296/REG/341.04
IV. FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States)
FRUS, 1949, Vol. vii, Part. 2, Department of State, Washington, pp. 1115-1220.
FRUS, 1950, vol. vi , Department of State, Washington, pp. 1-188, 1529-39.
FRUS, 1951, Vol. vi, Part 1, Department of State, Washington, pp. 1-265.
FRUS, 1951, Vol. vi, Part. 2, Department of State, Washington, pp. 1594-1649.
FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. xii, Department of State, Washington, pp. 647-748.
FRUS, 1955-57, Vol. )ocii, Department of State, Washington.
FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. iv, Department of State, Washington, pp. 152-288.
FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. xvi, Department of State, Washington, pp. 1-228.
FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. xxiii, Department of State, Washington.
V. Hansard
Vols. 457, 458, 467, 475, 480, and 485
VI. Newspapers and Journals
The Times
The Financial Times
The Manchester Guardian
358
The New Statesman and Nation
359
